Managing Large-Scale Security Events:

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies



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This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. Vivian Chu (chuv@cna.org), Tammy Felix (felixt@cna.org), Denise Rodriquez-King

Table of Contents

Message from the Director	1
Acknowledgements	3
Executive Summary	5
Major Findings	6
Conclusion	9
Section 1: Introduction	11
1.1 Background	11
1.2 Methodology	12
1.3 Report Organization	13
Section 2: Pre-event Planning	17
2.1 Initiate Internal Department Planning	17
2.2 Develop the Operational Plan	20
Section 3: Core Operational Areas	25
3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support	25
3.2 Command and Control	33
3.3 Credentialing	37
3.4 Crowd Management	40
3.5 Dignitary/VIP Protection	45
3.6 Financial Management	47
3.7 Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/ Public Health	50
3.8 Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter Surveillance	52
3.9 Interagency Communications and Technology	55
3.10 Legal Affairs	57
3.11 Non-Event Patrol	59
3.12 Arrest Processing	61
3.13 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities	63
3.14 Public Information and Media Relations	66
3.15 Screening and Physical Security	69
3.16 Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials	77

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies	
3.17 Training	79
3.18 Transportation and Traffic Management	82
Section 4: Post-event Considerations	88
4.1 Demobilization	88
4.2 After-Action Analysis	88
Section 5: Conclusion	90
Appendix A. Planning Toolkit	A-1
A.1 Pre-Event Planning Matrix	A-5
A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment	A-7
A.3 Operational Plan Template	A-11
A.4 Logistics Information Form	A-13
A.5 Food Vendor Information Sheet	A-15
A.6 Inspection Checklist for Vendors	A-19
A.7 Hotel Survey Questionnaire	A-23
A.8 Incident Organization Chart Template	A-31
A.9 Organization Assignment List Template	A-33
A.10 Credentialing Checklist'	A-35
A.11 Considerations for Managing Crowds	A-39
A.12 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance	A-47
A. 13 Financial Provisions and Policies	A-51
A.14 Post-award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse	A-55
A.15 Emergency Medical Services Venue Assessment Checklist	A-59
A.16 Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist	A-61
A.17 Incident Radio Communications Plan Form	A-63
A.18 Legal Affairs Checklist	A-65
A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances	A-67
A.20 Considerations for Processing Prisoners	A-71
A.21 Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers	A-73
A.22 Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist	A-81
A.23 Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist	A-83
A.24 Bomb Threat Checklist	A-85

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies	
A 25 Training and Everaine Course Catalogue Checklist	۸ 97
A.25 Training and Exercise Course Catalogue Checklist	
A.26 Training Request Form	
A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides	A-93
A.28 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template	A-111
Appendix B. Summary of Key Planning Checklists	В-1
Appendix C. Acronyms	C-1
Appendix D. Document References	D-1

Managing Large-Scale Security Events		
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies		
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Message from the Director



For too long, local law enforcement had few resources or blueprints to help plan and provide security for a large-scale event. To address this need, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), working in partnership with CNA, developed *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. This comprehensive Planning Primer brings together model practices and lessons learned in all aspects of security planning and operations that will help guide future decision makers and senior leaders as they prepare for large-scale security events.

It is my hope that this Planning Primer will benefit law enforcement agencies across the country, whatever size they may be and for

whatever event they are providing security. It was important to BJA to make the Planning Primer an easy-to-use tool for agencies when planning and conducting operations for a large-scale security event. For this reason, it offers clear guidance and provides much needed templates, forms, and checklists—developed from a post-event analysis of the 2012 presidential nominating conventions—to facilitate the planning process.

In developing this report, CNA provided technical assistance and on-site analytic support to assist local law enforcement security operations in Tampa, Florida during the 2012 Republican National Convention and in Charlotte, North Carolina during the 2012 Democratic National Convention. By originating on-site, the Planning Primer can offer especially helpful guidance in the security planning of a large event, whether in pre-event planning, core event operations, or post-event activities.

While large-scale events may draw revenue and other economic benefits to a host city, they may also bring the potential for violence, risk to officer safety, and clashes between police and demonstrators. Yet with solid plans in place, law enforcement will be better prepared to handle incidents and achieve event goals, such as minimal civil unrest, reduced response times, and a heightened sense of public safety throughout the event.

Denise E. O'Donnell

Director

Bureau of Justice Assistance Office of Justice Programs U.S. Department of justice

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Managing Large-Scale Security Events
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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Acknowledgements

The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance and CNA would like to express our gratitude to the local law enforcement hosts of the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions: the Tampa Police Department (TPD) and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). Specifically, we would like to thank TPD Police Chief Jane Castor and CMPD Police Chief Rodney Monroe for allowing our analysts unfettered access to the planning and operations processes, as well as CMPD Deputy Chief Harold Medlock, CMPD Captain Michael Adams, TPD Assistant Chief John Bennett, and TPD Corporal Paul Smalley for generously providing information throughout the development of this Planning Primer. We are particularly grateful for the willingness and candor of the many local law enforcement officers and planning partners that spoke with us regarding lessons learned and best practices for the events. Without these insights, this report and the accompanying toolkit could not have been completed.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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Executive Summary

Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing revenue, revitalizing a city, and providing an increased sense of community. With these benefits comes greater responsibility for local law enforcement to ensure the public's safety.

When law enforcement executives are tasked with managing a large event, they can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies and adopting proven practices. Too often, however, past lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance worked in partnership with CNA to develop this Planning Primer.¹

This Planning Primer synthesizes salient best practices pertaining to security planning for a large-scale event, specifically pre-event planning, core event operations, and post-event activities. The Planning Primer includes detailed information on 18 core operational areas that law enforcement executives can give to lead law enforcement planners as supplemental guidance. This guidance can be used as a foundation for coordinating area-specific operational plans and can be modified to accommodate event security requirements and existing protocols. Furthermore, supplementing each operational area presented in the Planning Primer are actionable templates, checklists, and key considerations designed to facilitate the planning process (see Appendix A: Planning Toolkit).

18 Core Operational Areas

- Administrative and Logistics Support
- Command and Control
- Credentialing
- Crowd Management
- Dignitary/VIP Protection
- Financial/Grant Management
- Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/ Public Health
- Intelligence/Counterterrorism/Counter surveillance
- Interagency Communications and Technology

- Legal Affairs
- Non-event Patrol
- Prisoner Processing
- Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities
- Public Information and Media Relations
- Screening and Physical Security
- Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials
- Training
- Transportation and Traffic Management

¹ CNA analysts conducted a review of past after-action reports for large-scale special events and used first-hand observations and analysis of the Tampa, Florida Police Department and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina Police Department as they planned and executed operations for the 2012 Presidential Nominating Conventions.

Major Findings

This executive summary highlights major findings learned from previous police departments related to planning, finances, logistics, operations, and command² of a large-scale security event.

Planning

During large-scale events, the potential exists for violent demonstrations, clashes between police and demonstrators, and high risk to officer safety. Therefore, it is important for local law enforcement to actively engage in strategic and collaborative planning, which involves the following four steps:

```
Develop a strategic vision centered on establishing a friendly and safe environment.
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Law enforcement executives should develop an overall philosophy and define the specific tactics and strategies they will use for these types of events, to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers providing security. This strategic vision should articulate local law enforcement's strategy to effectively maintain security and public safety, while preserving Constitutional rights and civil liberties; to minimize disruptions caused by demonstrators; and to avoid unnecessary arrests.

```
Create a core planning team to oversee major decision-making and planning.
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Local law enforcement should begin by providing clear oversight. The lead local agency should establish a core planning team staffed with personnel from each of the key participating agencies (e.g., police, fire, and emergency management agencies), as well as with personnel who have expertise in grant policies and legal contracts. The personnel selected to serve on the core planning team should have the appropriate command-level authority to identify, assign, and ensure the completion of tasking identified for event preparedness and conduct.

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Conduct formal and informal meetings with stakeholders to walk through cross-cutting activities and to develop relationships.
```

The nature of the event will require collaboration among a multitude of local, regional, and federal entities, each with their own roles and responsibilities. Formal and informal meetings with these stakeholders are invaluable for establishing solid relationships that will likely be called upon during the event and for coordinating crossing-cut activities in operational plans.

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Develop scalable plans that can be altered should intelligence indicate that differing
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² These areas are the five major management functions of the Incident Command System.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

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resources are required.
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Large-scale security events will likely initially require worst-case scenario planning; however, as the event date nears, intelligence may indicate that fewer resources are required to safely secure the event. In response, local law enforcement should establish plans that are flexible and can accommodate changes in resource demands.

Finances

Financial management is a critical component of effective command, security, and accountability. Therefore, it is important for local law enforcement to be mindful of the following:

```
Be aware of federal budgeting procedures, and understand that funding is often made available later than desired.
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One of the biggest challenges planning jurisdictions can face is financing pre-event procurements prior to receipt of grant funds. If funding is not appropriated or received by the jurisdiction's desired timeline, then that jurisdiction may incur—and consequently absorb—unforeseen costs. As well, costs incurred prior to the date of the appropriation may not be reimbursable under the grant.

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Begin planning with careful attention to reimbursable costs.
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Executives must be cognizant of funding procedures and guidelines for reimbursable costs. In addition, accurately building a precise budget breakdown early in planning may help to avoid the absorption of unallowable costs later on.

Logistics

Administrative and logistics support requires 24-hour care to all law enforcement and supplemental personnel throughout an event. It is important for local law enforcement to be mindful of the following when planning and coordinating this effort:

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Do not underestimate the large scope of caring for visiting officers.
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One of the largest and most complicated tasks that law enforcement will need to engage in is ensuring that all security personnel are cared for. If officers feel they are well taken care of, they will be better positioned and inclined to perform in their expected roles. Agencies who have hosted large-scale security events repeatedly note that officer care is a large undertaking that can often be overlooked.

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Understand that officer logistics have many overlapping planning components.
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Care of officers encompasses a broad range of overlapping planning components and often becomes a catch-all function. Components include coordinating officer assignments, coordinating with vendors, obtaining officer lodging and nourishment, and arranging for officer transportation. It is critical to ensure ample staff is assigned to support this function.

Operations 3

A number of operational elements will be executed during the event, many of which will require the heightening of normal security operations. In addition to these activities, law enforcement can execute effective strategies to maximize their resources and ensure a safe environment, including the following:

Provide **officer training** that focuses on nonconfrontational team policing and the protection of Constitutional rights.

Officer training should focus on educating all officers on the overall security strategy for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. Training should stress the importance of maintaining a balance between Constitutional rights and agencies' need to protect persons and property from injury and damage. Scenario training and exercises can teach officers to remain unresponsive to demonstrators that try to bait and elicit negative responses. Furthermore, law enforcement executives play a vital role in instilling this message of non-confrontational policing, not only with officers, but with the public and demonstrators as well.

Use and enhance only proven and pre-established technologies.

For a large-scale security event, security planners should avoid using new technology systems and equipment, as unforeseen technical challenges may arise. Instead, law enforcement should focus on enhancing existing tools and processes that have proven successful within the department.

Use dual-sport vehicles and bicycles to effectively manage crowds and maneuver across large distances.

Field forces should be deployed on bicycles and in dual-sport vehicles (as opposed to on foot or horseback) to manage crowds and demonstrators in an efficient and timely manner.

Command

Law enforcement responds to a wide range of security incidents and operations that are typically handled by a single unit or department. However, large-scale security operations will require a different approach and a different command structure. Therefore, local law enforcement executives should consider the following actions:

Deploy police executives in the field to facilitate real-time decision-making and establish a solid presence to the public.

An effective response strategy for local law enforcement is to position Police Chiefs, Commissioners, and/or supervisors in the field during demonstrations. By being present in the field, executives can assess a situation first-hand and determine the best tactics to deploy. Response decisions can then be communicated to field forces faster, thus diffusing the escalation of potentially unruly behavior from demonstrators. Furthermore, this presence can pacify crowds before they become unruly.

Increase situational awareness by deploying intelligence officers in the field with wearable cameras.

Law enforcement agencies can also deploy intelligence officers in the field using state-ofthe-art technologies for gathering information, such as backpack cameras, cellular phone cameras, or body-worn cameras. This practice can provide incident commanders who are not in the field with real-time information, allowing them to make timely and well-informed response decisions.

Conclusion

Carefully planned security operations and multi-agency coordination before, during, and after a large-scale security event are paramount to local law enforcement's ability to maintain a safe environment and to conduct a successful event. With this Planning Primer, law enforcement departments and agencies nationwide can benefit from the lessons learned and proven practices of other agencies. The detailed activities in the Planning Primer and the interactive Planning Toolkit serve as useful instruments for lead planners as they develop operational plans around the 18 core operational areas. By having solid plans in place, law enforcement will be prepared for incidents and can help to ensure public safety throughout event operations.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events		
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies		
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Section 1: Introduction

Large-scale events provide local governments with a number of valuable opportunities, including increasing revenue, revitalizing a city, and providing a sense of community. With these benefits comes greater responsibility for local law enforcement to ensure the public's safety and security.

While many large-scale security events do not deviate greatly from typical law enforcement operations (e.g., dealing with public intoxication, traffic control, or acts of violence), some events do garner special security attention due to their high-profile nature. Large-scale events pertaining to political, economic, social, or religious themes have the potential to adversely impact public safety and security. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has designated some of these events as National Special Security Events (NSSEs), which includes events such as presidential nominating conventions, large sporting events (e.g., the Olympics), international summits, elections, and presidential inaugurations.



To ensure that large-scale events and NSSEs are carried out safely, securely, and efficiently, a number of agencies and organizations must collaborate to perform a variety of functions. Local law enforcement's primary role in these large-scale events is to develop a comprehensive security plan that focuses on: maintaining everyday policing activities, providing event site security, traffic and crowd management, and security of non-official event venues. This role is more distinguishable in NSSEs where local law enforcement must work collaboratively with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to ensure event security coincides with local security efforts. In these events, it is important for local law enforcement and federal partners to work closely to ensure the compatibility of plans; however, realizing that the local jurisdiction is solely responsible for the development of a comprehensive local operations plan.

1.1 Background

Detailed documentation to guide local law enforcement through the planning and operations of a large-scale security event is sparse. In order to address this gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) worked in partnership with CNA to support local law enforcement security operations during the 2012 Republican National Convention (RNC) in Tampa, Florida, and the 2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Charlotte, North Carolina, by providing on-site analytic support and technical assistance. The primary goal of the technical assistance was to guide the development of a

comprehensive Planning Primer that documents key findings of security and planning operations.

1.2 Methodology

To effectively analyze event planning and operations, CNA created a comprehensive evaluation plan that detailed the pre- and post-event data collection requirements for the post-event analysis.³

Prior to the event, CNA analysts conducted two visits to each of the national convention sites. During these site visits, CNA analysts observed a number of NSSE subcommittee meetings and internal departmental planning meetings, where they documented planning processes and challenges. In addition, CNA analysts met with the Chiefs of Police and lead planners to discuss internal planning challenges and lessons learned. In preparation for each of the site visits and for the national convention itself, CNA analysts reviewed planning documents, meeting minutes, training materials, and presentations that the lead planners provided from the Tampa Police Department (TPD) and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD).

Analysts were deployed to each convention city to observe and document the operations of the TPD and CMPD.⁵ In particular, they noted key decisions at local law enforcement agencies' major nodes of engagement, including police command centers, the USSS Multi-Agency Command Center, Emergency Operations Centers, and mobile field force operations.

After the event, the analysts focused on three primary activities to develop this Planning Primer:

1. Interviewing TPD and CMPD law enforcement personnel. Analysts sought input and feedback from the event operators by holding structured hotwash meetings and conducting one-on-one interviews with core law enforcement planners. ⁶ These meetings helped analysts to gain the operators' perspectives on issues, lessons learned, and possible recommendations for future host agencies.

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³ CNA, 2012 National Convention Support – Evaluation Plan, IWP-2012-U-003410, August 2012. CNA analysts used this evaluation as a guide for documenting and analyzing on-site activities during the conventions.

⁴ CNA conducted the initial site visit to Charlotte, NC from May 14–15, and the second site visit from June 5–7. CNA conducted the initial visit to Tampa, FL from May 15–16, and the second site visit from July 10–11.

⁵ The 2012 RNC was held Monday, August 27 through Thursday, August 30, 2012. The 2012 DNC was held Sunday, September 2 through Thursday, September 6, 2012.

⁶CNA analysts attended post-event hotwash meetings in Tampa, FL on September 10, 2012 and in Charlotte, NC on September 24–25, 2012.

- 2. Developing Internal Quick-Look Reports on the convention that documented key findings for each hosting agency. These documents served as a basis for the analysis and findings incorporated into this Planning Primer.
- 3. Reviewing previous law enforcement agencies' planning and operations of securing large-scale security events. This review included a literature review of existing planning guidance; department policies; and After-Action Reports (AARs) from the St. Paul, Minnesota Police Department (2008 RNC); the Denver, Colorado Police Department (2008 DNC); and the Boston, Massachusetts Police Department (2004 DNC).

Through these activities, CNA in partnership with BJA developed this comprehensive Planning Primer which synthesizes best practices and common security planning and operational themes for future planners, senior leaders, and decision-makers to implement for large-scale security events.⁸ All law enforcement agencies, regardless of size or designated event, can benefit from the guidance identified in this Planning Primer.

1.3 Report Organization

The format of this document allows the reader to easily refer to the operational area most related to his/her planning responsibilities. The templates, listed in Appendix A, provide supplemental material for these planning efforts and are also organized by operational area. Broadly, this report covers the three major phases of managing a large-scale security event:

- Pre-event planning
- Operational management
- Post-event operations

Section 2 contains critical information for getting started on event planning, including key considerations for initiating internal department planning and developing an operational plan.

Section 3 contains information on planning and executing event operations. This section is organized by 18 core operational areas that are most important for event planning and operations:⁹

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⁷ Key findings for the RNC were documented in a Quick-Look Report titled, "Command, Control, and Coordination: A Quick-Look Analysis of the Tampa Police Department's Operations during the 2012 Republican National Convention." Key findings for the DNC were documented in a Quick-Look Report titled, "Command, Control, and Coordination: A Quick-Look Analysis of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department's Operations during the 2012 Democratic National Convention."

⁸ Although this document was primarily developed using the lessons learned and observations made during the 2012 RNC and DNC, the best practices and themes noted throughout this primer are applicable to large-scale event security planning and operations.

⁹ CNA identified these areas using DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007, as well as the subcommittees established for the 2012 RNC and DNC.

- 1. Administrative and Logistics Support
- 2. Command and Control
- 3. Credentialing
- 4. Crowd Management
- 5. Dignitary/VIP Protection
- 6. Financial/Grant Management
- 7. Fire/Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/Hospitals/Public Health
- 8. Intelligence/Counterterrorism/Counter Surveillance
- 9. Interagency Communications and Technology
- 10. Legal Affairs
- 11. Non-event Patrol
- 12. Prisoner Processing
- 13. Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities
- 14. Public Information and Media Relations
- 15. Screening and Physical Security
- 16. Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials
- 17. Training
- 18. Transportation and Traffic

Command level officers and the police department's internal planning team may use appropriate sections for planning activities within their assigned operational area and/or subcommittee.

Depending on the operational area, the information provided may be relevant to all large-scale security events or more specifically to only NSSEs. These activities are distinguished using the following coding:



Section 4 explains the demobilization process and the importance of writing an AAR.

Following the body of the report are five appendices:

Appendix A presents the Planning Toolkit, which contains templates and checklists for local law enforcement planners to use when planning and conducting operations for a large-scale security event. Planners should remember that these documents are guides and should be scaled to the event and tailored to the specific needs of the department/agency.

Appendix B presents a summary of the key planning considerations for each of the 18 core operational areas described in Section 3.

Appendix C presents a summary of overarching planning considerations.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Appendix D presents a list of acronyms.

Appendix E presents a list of tables and figures in the document.

Appendix F presents a list of references used to develop this primer.

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Section 2: Pre-event Planning

A significant portion of the security effort consists of pre-event planning. Planning should begin at least 12-18 months prior to the event, or immediately upon notification that a large-scale event will be held in a given jurisdiction. This section focuses on general lessons learned for planning and developing the event operational plan. Specific operational planning components are discussed in greater detail in Section 3.

2.1 Initiate Internal Department Planning

Given the nature of hosting a large-scale event, local departments should anticipate an intense and exhaustive planning process. Lead planners must emphasize the importance of expediently initiating internal department planning.

Initiating Internal Department - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed
•	Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events	
^	Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance	
•	Develop a Strategic Vision	
•	Identify a Lead Planner for the Department	
•	Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies	
•	Establish a Local Core Planning Team	
•	Understand that Operational Plans will Remain in Flux	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

• Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events

Although information regarding lessons learned from previous large-scale events can be difficult to find in the public domain, law enforcement departments should reach out to other jurisdictions that have prior experience planning for similarly scaled events. For example, in preparing for the 2012 national conventions, both TPD and CMPD noted that reaching out to law enforcement agencies in prior host cities—including Denver, Colorado, St. Paul, Minnesota, and Boston, Massachusetts—was beneficial to the planning process. These

agencies helped to provide a better understanding of planning assumptions and other event-related expectations. TPD and CMPD traveled to Chicago, Illinois in spring 2012 to observe the city's operations during the NATO Summit. As a result of the trip, both departments gained valuable insights into command center operations and communications, and crowd control strategies.

▲ Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance

There is no pre-set operational plan template for NSSEs. Various jurisdictions have noted that they were somewhat hesitant to begin developing plans as they awaited official guidance from their federal partners; however, in practice, the local planners are responsible for developing their own operational plan regardless of the designated lead agency. Planners can use knowledge gained from visiting other cities to start planning six months **prior** to the arrival of the USSS designated security planning co-chair. The checklists and references provided in Appendix A ("Planning Toolkit") will help planners to identify the key components of building and completing a comprehensive local operational plan.

Develop a Strategic Vision

BEST PRACTICE

Develop a strategic vision that focuses on protecting the Constitutional rights of attendees and promoting a peaceful environment.

Developing a strategic vision is critical to governing both planning and operations. Given the political nature of the event, the potential exists for political activism and protests. As such, planners must work closely with conflict resolution groups and known activist groups to understand how to adapt

their policing styles/techniques to ensure the protection of the civil rights and civil liberties of all of the attendees (i.e., activists, patrons, delegates, and VIPs). Planners must establish a mission to protect the Constitutional rights of all attendees while providing a peaceful and safe environment. It is critical that this vision is shared with the entire planning team, reinforced through training and monitored during the event. Police chiefs and their command staff should promote this vision to their officers, and emulate this position in the field.

Identify a Lead Planner for the Department

A lead local planner for the host department helps to ensure that commitments and plans across various subcommittees are appropriately vetted and coordinated. The lead planner:

- Has decision making authority and is a command-level officer
- Serves as the incident commander for the planning phase, ensuring coordination among each of the various planning functions.
- Reports directly to the Chief of Police and to other city leaders to ensure buy-in and concurrence on all aspects of the local security plan.

• Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies

Authority for event security planning and operations is often the responsibility of the local law enforcement agency that has operational control over the jurisdictional area; however, other agencies inside and outside of law enforcement will likely serve key functions critical to successful security operations. Neighboring law enforcement agencies (including those with events in their jurisdiction) and other mutual aid partners should be brought to the table

early to engage in the planning process. If grant funds are used to support personnel costs, these funds are typically administered by the lead agency; there must be an open and transparent process for those funds to be distributed among mutual aid partners to cover personnel and security event expenses and to related events in neighboring jurisdictions. The

BEST PRACTICE

Identify key stakeholders (which may include agencies outside of law enforcement) that will have authority over security-related operations.

local police department should serve as the lead liaison between local response partners and all other partners for the purpose of developing the components of, and implementing the event security plan. In this role, the local police department will identify key stakeholders (which may include agencies outside of law enforcement) that will have authority over security-related operations. Activities that are typically outside of the local police department's purview tend to include: communications, fire/emergency medical services/public health response, transportation management, tactical/explosive support, consequence management, emergency management, and recovery. It will be the police department's responsibility to coordinate the inputs of these stakeholders into the event security operations plan.

• Establish a Local Core Planning Team

Establish a core planning team to mimic the Incident Command System (ICS) structure that is used during event operations. Staff this core planning team with personnel from each of the key participating agencies, as well with personnel that have expertise on grant policies and legal contracts. The personnel selected to serve on the core planning team should have the appropriate command-level authority to identify, assign and ensure the completion of tasking required for event preparedness and conduct.

BEST PRACTICE

Create a Core Planning Team that can maintain oversight of all local planning and operations.

Members of the core planning team should be assigned to monitor the activities of all event-related planning entities. While it is possible to assign staff to the core planning team on a part-time basis early on, consider alleviating them of all other non-event related duties and responsibilities at least 8 months prior to the

event to focus on security planning on a full-time basis.

• Understand that Operational Plans will Remain in Flux

Throughout the planning and operational phases, certain aspects of the operational plan will remain in flux. It is important to accept this burden early in the planning process and to remain flexible and prepared for both anticipated and unforeseen changes (e.g., changes to event venues, itineraries, and ad hoc security requirements). For example, planners may need to react to the cancellation of several events due to severe weather or the reallocation of staff as venue locations care changed. Flexibility will ensure that last-minute changes do not result in any adverse security implications.

2.2 Develop the Operational Plan

The operational plan will be the most important output of the planning process. The completeness and efficacy of this plan will be a result of the coordinated effort of local, state, regional, federal, and private-sector partners.

Developing the Operational Plan- Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
A	Staff and Engage in Subcommittees	
•	Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups	
•	Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations	
•	Develop Scalable Plans	
•	Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

▲ Staff and Engage in Subcommittees

For a NSSE event, the USSS will recommend the formation of subcommittees ¹⁰ to focus on and develop specific plans for its operational area. Local law enforcement should be actively involved in the initial coordination of subcommittees and should determine whether additional subcommittees are required. For example, while planning the 2012 DNC, CMPD identified three additional subcommittees (Technology, Logistics/Asset Identification, and Staffing and Housing) that were needed throughout the planning process. It is important that local planners recognize that additional subcommittees may not be in the scope of interest for the USSS and thus will not be part of their planning packages and preparation.

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¹⁰ The term "subcommittee" refers to the planning groups that the USSS forms for planning major NSSE operations. This term differs from "operational area," which is one that we use in this document to categorize and highlight the core functions we feel are important to event planning and operations. In many cases, operational areas will be assigned and covered in one or multiple subcommittees.

Create an Executive Steering Committee (ESC), comprised of agency representatives across multiple jurisdictions responsible for maintaining situational awareness across planning subcommittees.

Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups

Determine planning work groups or subcommittees early to ensure ample time for developing planning considerations and assumptions. For example, planners responsible for technology will need time to research and implement systems; logistics/asset identification planners will need time to research the best methods of supporting personnel and identify appropriate rest and rehabilitation locations; and the staffing and housing planners will need time to recruit the proper number of personnel and secure housing to keep costs reasonable.

Focus on the following activities for security operations:

- Define the scope and goals;
- Assess staffing and resource capabilities;
- Identify and procure appropriate resources;
- Create collaborative partnerships with various government, community, and business entities; and
- Develop policies, procedures, and training; organize them into a realistic and comprehensive operational plan.

Assign local law enforcement personnel as co-chairs on planning groups or subcommittees with a public safety mission and as participants on the remaining subcommittees. Meet regularly to ensure that subcommittee planners and command-level personnel maintain situational awareness of planning activities and can make key strategic decisions in a timely manner.

Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations

Develop relationships with supporting agencies and organizations with operational responsibilities related to security of the event, including federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., the USSS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Marshals) and local, state, and regional agencies and outside organizations. Meet with interagency partners regularly (on a weekly or monthly basis) to coordinate planning operations, and to build effective working relationships that will form a foundation of collaboration and teamwork during the event.

BEST PRACTICE

Potential supporting organizations may include:

• Event Promoters/Sponsors;

Hold regular formal and informal meetings with interagency partners to develop effective working relationships.

- Emergency services agencies (e.g., law enforcement, fire/rescue, emergency medical services, public health and safety) and neighboring Emergency Managers and agency representatives (to coordinate mutual aid needs);
- Local planning agencies and individuals (e.g., community development agencies, city planners, and hazard-mitigation planner);
- Local emergency planning committees for hazardous materials information;
- Public works agencies and utility companies;
- State supporting entities, including the State Emergency Management Agency or National Guard;
- Social service agencies and volunteer organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross and Salvation Army), including animal care and control organizations;
- Medical community representatives (e.g., area hospitals, EMS agencies, medical examiner, coroner, mortician);
- Communications representatives (e.g., Public Information Officer, local media, radio);
- Aviation and coastal authorities (e.g., state aviation authority, other air support representatives, port authorities, U.S. Coast Guard station);
- Chief Financial Officer, auditor, and heads of any centralized procurement and resource support agencies;
- Business and retail communities that are directly impacted by the event;
- The jurisdiction's legal counsel and leaders from labor and professional organizations;
 and
- Leaders of area facilities, including industrial and military installations, schools, and universities.

• Develop Scalable Plans

Constantly assess operational plans for efficacy based on intelligence reports and other available event data (e.g., how many people will be attending). Begin planning for the worst-case scenario to cover all potential security threats. However, develop plans that are scalable and can reduce the planned workforce and resources should intelligence information indicate otherwise (for example less criminal activity or fewer event patrons.). De-escalation plans should be a primary planning assumption that is included in all relevant security plans and account for outside factors such as geographic location, travel for outside agencies, and available mutual aid.

Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event

Conduct an exercise to identify potential gaps in the planned response once required entities have drafted their section of the operational plan (and all of these components are unified to

form the local jurisdiction's operational plan). A variety of exercise types may be employed, and senior leadership should determine what type of exercise may best benefit their operations. Decide who should be exercised: the decision-makers, the operators, or both. The following types of exercises should be considered:

- Tabletop Exercise: A discussion-based exercise typically involving senior leaders that is aimed at identifying knowledge gaps for authorities and participants pertaining to information contained in the operational plan. This type of exercise is best administered earlier in the planning phase, as outputs will be used to modify and amend planning guidance.
- Functional Exercise: An operations-based exercise that allows participants to test their operational knowledge of plans, policies, and procedures. This type of exercise should be conducted closer to the event date (after participants receive training on the operational plan) to test the implementation of plans and to assess whether additional training is needed.
- Rehearsal of Concept Drill: This type of exercise typically involves the use of scenarios or vignettes of incidents that may occur during a large-scale security event. These scenarios provide participants with the opportunity to discuss their agency's actions based on these plausible situations. A key focus might be resource allocation, allowing participants and planners to make assertions or determine whether their planned response assets will adequately meet the potential needs of the event.

In addition to pre-scripted exercises, host agencies should test their plans during regularly scheduled large-scale events such as Fourth of July Celebrations and other events. Evaluating public safety coordination and response during these events will allow local agencies to assess their operational plans and to make changes based on lessons learned during these activations. Pre-event exercises also help planners to ensure that draft plans will adequately establish appropriate response guidelines and procedures.

Toolkit References

The following planning matrix, assessment form, and template (found in Appendix A) can be used to begin pre-event planning:

- A.1 Pre-event Planning Matrix, Page A-5
- A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment, Page A-7
- A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

Managing Large-Scale Security Events
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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Section 3: Core Operational Areas

This section provides lessons learned and major considerations for 18 core operational areas. Each section covers: a brief description of the operational area; an overview of key strategies in a planning checklist; an in-depth description of each strategy supported by lessons learned; and references (included in the appendices) that can be used to develop the event security plan. The core operational areas are listed in alphabetical order and are not ranked in order of importance.

3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support

Administrative and logistics support requires 24-hour care to all law enforcement and supplemental personnel throughout an event. This care encompasses a broad range of activities and often becomes a catch-all function. Activities include planning for and managing event logistics, coordinating officer assignments, coordinating with vendors, obtaining officer lodging and nourishment, and arranging for officer transportation.

Administrative and Logistics Support - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Engage in Collaborative Planning	
A	Work with Federal Grant Partners	
•	Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel	
•	Obtain Necessary Equipment	
•	Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics	
•	Practice Plans and Protocols	
•	Determine Staffing Requirements, and Track and Demobilize Officers	
	Collaborate with Vendors and Hold them Accountable	
•	Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers	

Administrative and Logistics Support - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Coordinate Lodging for Officers	
•	Arrange for Officer Transportation	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Engage in Collaborative Planning

Partnerships and collaboration are critical to acquiring and coordinating logistics resources. Planners should quickly identify other entities that can contribute to planning efforts (e.g., federal and state agencies, or outside law enforcement agencies, fire departments, health departments, city business support services, project managers, vendors, or property owners). Local businesses and community partners may be able to provide resources and logistical support in the form of venues or donations (e.g., cash, water, food, or first aid supplies) during the event.

In addition, communication between logistics personnel through weekly meetings is critical. Since logistics activities are dependent upon other event security efforts, lead logistics planners should collaborate with other planners on activities that are likely to have implications on logistics (e.g., delegate/VIP protection and credentialing).

lacktriangle Work with Federal Grant Partners

BEST PRACTICE

Work closely with funding agencies to ensure that expenditures are appropriately catalogued, tracked, and accounted for. Ensure accurate time keeping and procurement records during planning, which will save time during post-event financial auditing.

For NSSEs, agency liaisons should work regularly with federal funding authorities to properly communicate specific resources and funding needs. Collaboration with federal grant partners will allow jurisdictions to become familiar with financial processes and protocols to ensure that they are compliant with grant guidelines and requirements when procuring equipment or making logistics purchases. Knowledge of these guidelines is

critical to avoiding financial impacts and obstacles during and after the event, when all financial expenses are closely audited. Section 3.6 details the federal financial process and key considerations when receiving federal funding. It is important to understand that an appropriation for this activity must be passed before any discussions with the federal granting agency can begin in earnest. However, jurisdictions can continue planning and Appendix A-12 can help guide the discussion.

Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel

It is easy to undervalue the demands that will be placed on administrative and logistics support during the planning phase. During previous large-scale security events, staffing for planning and operations was often underestimated by local law enforcement planners, causing assigned

BEST PRACTICE

Plan reserve resources and logisticians to ensure flexibility of forces to quickly respond to unforeseen complications.

planning staff to be overburdened. Lead planners should ensure that ample personnel are assigned to logistics and administrative support during both the planning phase and the operational phase. Specifically, more than one person (ideally command staff with decision making authority) should be responsible for the following logistical planning activities: operational logistics (field resource requests), vendors, officer transportation, and officer lodging. During planning, these leaders should not be expected to maintain regular job duties while planning for the event, so they have adequate time to focus on planning.

Obtain Necessary Equipment

In addition to staff, a variety of specialized equipment—such as helmets, bullet-proof vests, vehicles, or uniforms—may be required to enhance security operations. Below are some important strategies for assessing, procuring, and tracking equipment:

- **Assessment:** Conduct a needs assessment to identify existing equipment and needed equipment. Work with interagency partners to see if resources can be borrowed and/or leased to minimize costs of having to procure new equipment.
- **Procurement:** Develop broad "target lists" of equipment to purchase, which can later be scaled down to critical items if budgets do not permit the acquisitions. This is a helpful strategy to ensure that all possible needs are identified. A way to avoid incurring higher costs is to purchase equipment as early as possible to avoid expedited shipping rates. Acquire equipment early to allow time for testing and training, especially for newly acquired technologies.
- Tracking: Assign one or two persons to ordering and receiving equipment, in order to reduce uncoordinated and duplicative efforts. The logistics unit should also develop a tracking system for all equipment as it is procured, assigned to officers, used in the field, and collected during demobilization. Such a system will allow the department to maintain accountability of where equipment is, who is using it, and how it should be reallocated, if needed. Work closely with their local government procurement office, to assist the logistics section with procurement, purchasing, and tracking of equipment prior to the event.

Other important strategies include assigning equipment to officers before the event begins so that personnel have time to become familiar with it and establishing and educating officers on demobilization protocols to ensure all equipment is collected and tracked at the completion of the event.

Agencies should not be afraid to over-plan. In the event that equipment manufacturers, vendors, or facility managers back out weeks or even days prior to the event, these contingencies will allow for flexibility.

• Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies

Focus on acquiring equipment that your agency is familiar with, especially technologies. Agencies may become overwhelmed with offers, suggestions, and solutions to handle the event. Though new tools may be appealing, departments should adhere to those that have been proven successful within the department.

BEST PRACTICE

Avoid acquiring new technologies and systems. Focus on known tools that can enhance existing resources.

Implementing new tools may or may not have the intended effect of improving operations; however, it will likely require a great deal of effort on the front end and administrative/logistics support. Instead, focus on making deliberate and researched technological enhancements to existing systems to ensure effective operational capabilities. These enhancements can include adding additional surveillance cameras to an existing network or bolstering motorcycles capabilities for field forces.

Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics

A well-organized logistics plan describing check-in processes, equipment distribution, and feeding/sleeping accommodations is critical for setting the tone for the event. Develop a logistics operational plan in coordination with interagency partners that includes the following elements:

- Logistics command assignments and contact information: Include the names, assignment, and contact information of logistics command staff.
- Organizational chart: Detail reporting mechanisms between the logistics commander, field operations supervisors, operations support, mobile distribution, vendors, volunteers, etc.
- **Mission and goals:** Include statements declaring the roles and responsibility of the logistics unit (e.g., providing 24-hours support to all personnel in the form of nourishment, hydration, sanitation, and/or rest and rehabilitation.)
- Events and operational dates: Provide an overview of the event and when the logistics unit will be operational.
- Communication protocols: Include details regarding communication mechanisms (e.g., radios or phones) for various logistics activities.
- **Timeline of expected key events:** Describe event activities, such as when staff will be activated, when sites will be set up or taken down, when vendors begin deliveries of equipment or food, and when meals will be scheduled.
- Execution plan: Include details for meal schedules; key staff assignments and contact information; details on major and auxiliary facilities/locations (including addresses, staffing, related activities, and photos); and other supplemental information on site security, vehicle maintenance, vendors, parking, and/or fueling.

• Practice Plans and Protocols

If time allows, exercise plans that are specific to the event (i.e., not standard operating procedures) prior to the event. For example, prior to the 2012 DNC, the CMPD Logistics Unit practiced their operational plan during a number of smaller events. This practice allowed them to identify key personnel needs, field-test their plans, note various shortfalls in planned operations, and make appropriate adjustments to compensate for concerns ahead of the DNC.

Manage and Coordinate Officer Support

One of the most important tasks for the security of an event is to ensure that all venues, VIPs, crowds, and traffic posts are sufficiently staffed. Some strategies to accomplish appropriate staffing include:

- Conduct a needs assessment: Conduct a needs assessment of personnel to acquire sufficient staff for various posts. Designate staff to coordinate officer assignments early on, in anticipation of staffing resources from other agencies that might be changing up through the start of the event and that might require rearrangements of officer assignments. Plans should include a staffing contingency for last minute assignments.
- Create a database to track officers: Develop a database (or use an existing one) to accurately track officer job assignments, shifts, and timecards. Tracking assignments allows command-level staff to maintain situational awareness of officers deployed and to make staffing adjustments if a security

BEST PRACTICE

Develop a system that has both tracking and reporting capabilities, to keep commanders up-to-date on officer assignments.

incident occurs. Tracking assignments is also valuable for keeping officers accountable of their timecards and accurately conducting payroll after the event. When developing tracking protocols and systems, logistics personnel should consider the following:

- Establish a time-tracking process for outside agencies.
- Ensure existing database has the ability to create job assignment reports for commanders during the event (or develop one).
- Ensure that the system allows for multiple assignments if it is necessary to alter officers' assignments/posts.
- Use resource-tracking software, such as Radio Frequency Identification, to track personnel and their equipment. Conduct a test of the system prior to the event to identify potential downfalls or technical glitches.
- Develop back up time tracking methods (e.g., written time logs) in the event that electronic tracking systems do not work in certain locations.
- Collect and maintain officer timecards: Obtain officer's completed timecards and accurately track days of departure during demobilization. This will ensure that overtime and travel compensation are accurately captured. Personnel should also be

mindful that personnel tracking and accountability may require time and effort post event.

Collaborate with Vendors and Hold them Accountable

Coordinating meals for a large number of officers requires close collaboration with outside vendors. Conduct a comprehensive, city-wide assessment of current contracts to understand the scope of existing contracts and prevent duplication of efforts. Planners can reach out to existing and new vendors to acquire event resources. Become actively involved and familiar with the bidding process to ensure that resources are properly acquired and details of contacts are properly understood by both parties.

BEST PRACTICE

Be actively involved in the bidding process for contracts to ensure that resources are properly acquired and that both parties understand the contracts. Vendors should be held accountable for their responsibilities to ensure that resources are provided in the appropriate manner. Planners can encourage accountability by conducting taste tests, performing site visits, and having vendors join in on planning meetings. Anticipate that vendors will have different

questions, complaints, and concerns regarding event logistics than law enforcement usually encounter.

Leverage the additional capacities that vendors provide whenever possible. For example, vendors can be used to provide off-site delivery to prevent the overstretching of logistics staff capabilities. Hire an outside contractor to manage the larger logistics challenges, like a large feeding operation. Even though hiring a contractor can be costly, it could save law enforcement a lot of time and personnel that could be used elsewhere for the event.

Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers

All personnel assisting in the security operation will need to be fed and hydrated at least once per shift (with a likelihood of two meals). Fixed rest and rehabilitation (R&R) sites are typically used to attend to officers' needs; however, mobile feeding operations can also be used to send resources out to officers farther from R&R sites or on moving duties

BEST PRACTICE

Prepare for mobile delivery operations of food for officers who cannot get to fixed R&R sites.

(e.g., attending to demonstrators or parade routes). Below are some useful strategies for providing event nourishment as it relates to R&R sites, mobile deliveries, per diems, and weather:

• R&R sites: Plan for multiple R&R sites, taking into consideration officer assignments and posts to avoid having officers travel far distances for nourishment. R&R sites should be quality locations (adequate space and restrooms) that are open whenever officers are on duty. Planners can set up sites that are specifically assigned to officers' posts and should ensure that each site has an appropriate amount of resources.

- **Mobile deliveries:** Prepare for mobile delivery operations using Utility Terrain Vehicles (UTVs) to provide nourishment to officers that cannot leave post or for those with immediate resource requests (e.g., water). This consideration should be planned for in the event of a large-scale demonstration where officers cannot leave their posts and must be fed and hydrated in the street.
- **Per diem:** Work with federal grant managers to determine if per diem can be given to officers in remote locations and for sources or plainclothes officers to minimize the scale of the feeding operations.
- Weather: If there are concerns with extreme heat or cold, set up cooling or heating stations at R&R sites, as well as at heavily trafficked checkpoints, where officers will be on duty for long hours of the day.
- **Food Vendors:** Hire multiple outside vendors to feed personnel. Multiple vendors can be chosen to ensure that spoiled food from one vendor does not make the entire workforce sick, and to spread the return of funds to the local economy.

• Coordinate Lodging for Officers

BEST PRACTICE

Inspect lodging facilities immediately before the event to ensure that they meet health safety standards to avoid housing officers in sub-standard facilities.

All out-of-area officers who are not currently working or living within driving distance of the event will require lodging. The scope of this task will depend on the number of local hotels, universities, or other lodging accommodations available. In order to efficiently coordinate housing assignments, contact participating agencies for information regarding personnel housing needs. House officers assigned to the same functions/activities within close proximity

of one another to aid in coordinating transportation. Intelligence sources should be provided with secure housing facilities separate from other officers to ensure that their covers are protected. Planners should also work closely with Officer Transportation personnel when coordinating these assignments.

If applicable, confer with the host/event committee, or the group responsible for reserving rooms for event delegates and VIPs early on. This will allow law enforcement to gauge the availability of hotels that can be used for officers. Ensure that funding or federal approval is acquired early in order to reserve blocks of hotel rooms and secure low rates. If funding or approval is not available, hotels may not set aside rooms for officers and could open them up to the public. It is important that law enforcement communicate and work with federal funders early to begin necessary approval processes. In the event that insufficient lodging is available, look to use alternate mass housing options, such as local universities.

Before reserving any lodging facility, conduct site visits to facilities to inspect accommodations and avoid any health concerns (e.g., bed bugs). Visit the secured lodging facilities just prior to the beginning of the event to ensure cleanliness and appropriate facilities for public safety personnel. In addition, health department experts should be placed on standby during the event to respond quickly to any health concerns.

Ensure that visiting officers are properly checked-in and checked-out. Identify local officers and supervisors—who are familiar with the area and can welcome officers on behalf of the host agency—to perform this function. These local officers should be provided with brief training regarding their exact roles and responsibilities.

Hire an event planner or travel agency to coordinate large housing needs in an effort to free time and resources of law enforcement officers for other security-related tasks. If applicable, be mindful of any federal grant requirements and guidelines for hiring an outside firm; the possibility of greater costs; and potential for complications with locked contracts (e.g., not being able to cancel or change reservations). With increased scrutiny around event planning in federal grants, the costs of hiring an event planner may not be reimbursable and this activity should be discussed with the federal granting agency.

Arrange for Officer Transportation

Officer transportation consists of the movement of all officers in and around the secure and non-secure zones of an event, as well as to and from lodging and assignments. Proper coordination of officer transportation is critical for ensuring that officers are on time for their assignments and can return to their lodging locations to properly rest after long shifts. The following are some useful strategies for creating officer transportation plans and coordinating movement for officers.

- Officer transportation plans: An outside vendor may be used to transport officers assisting in the event; local law enforcement should work closely with vendors in developing transportation plans and protocols. Allot time to ensure that drivers fully understand the transportation plan and can identify the equipment and training necessary to implement the detailed provisions (e.g., transportation providers may wish to purchase equipment such as GPS to ensure drivers are able to maintain transport schedules and routes). The plan should:
 - Allow agencies to bring their own patrol cars if there is adequate parking, to alleviate the scope of officer transport;
 - Locate officers that cannot selftransport centrally, near mass transit options, and locating officers that self-transport (have vehicles) in surrounding hotels; and
 - Identify back-up transportation
 - options (e.g., extra vans) for maximum flexibility.

BEST PRACTICE

Allow agencies to bring their own patrol cars to minimize the number of officers who require transportation assistance. When possible, identify options in advance for parking these vehicles as staging areas will likely be limited during a large-scale event.

Officer movement: Assign local officers to help with officer transportation, since they are familiar with navigating the area. Assign a commander in the field to quickly respond to transportation needs. Provide visiting officers clear instructions of transportation plans and procedures (e.g., pick-up/drop-off locations) prior to the event.

- Officer pick-up: Coordinate officer pick-up at a final duty station (rather than where a shift began) to eliminate the need for officers to return to the initial drop-off point.
- Using Buses: When/if acquiring buses to transport officers ensure that sufficient vehicles are obtained to meet duty schedules and transportation distances to officer lodging. Buses should have the capacity to adequately accommodate officer's equipment and gear.

Toolkit References

The following resources (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations of administrative and logistics support:

- A.4 Logistics Information Survey, Page A-13
- A.5 Food Vendor Information Sheet, Page A-15
- A.6 Inspection Checklist for Vendors, Page A-19
- A.7 Hotel Survey Questionnaire, Page A-23

3.2 Command and Control

Law enforcement responds to a wide range of security incidents and operations that are typically handled by a single unit or department. A large-scale security event will require a different approach and a different command structure.

DHS provides consistent national guidance to local, state, and federal government agencies for approaching incident management of domestic events. ¹¹ This standard approach—including the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS)—provides a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enable efficient, flexible, and collaborative incident management at all levels. Since large-scale security events involve the collaboration of multiple jurisdictions, NIMS and ICS provide an effective standard for coordination.

Command and Control - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership	
•	Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders	
•	Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center	
A	Coordinate Response with the MACC	

¹¹ This guidance was mandated as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5.

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	Command and Control - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
	Maintain Situational Awareness		
•	Keep Open Lines of Communication		
•	Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations		
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

• Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership

Appoint an Incident Commander or Director to oversee operations early in the planning stages. Overarching leadership is important for ensuring that the major security functions are well coordinated and managed. Commanders should have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities during both the planning and operations phases.

Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders

During the planning phase, build professional relationships with leaders from outside local, state, and federal agencies involved in security operations. If you are the lead agency, determine which agencies are important to help accomplish your mission.

Arrange monthly informal lunches with relevant local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., USSS, Air Force, U.S. Marshals) to assist in developing valuable working relationships. Conducting and documenting these meetings is invaluable in maintaining productive relationships (especially as the event nears and planning intensifies).

Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center

If the event involves VIPs, demonstrators, and/or other stakeholders, local law enforcement should activate its command center; in many cases, this may be a few days before the actual event occurs.

▲ Coordinate Response with the Multi-agency Command Center (MACC)

For NSSEs, event security is monitored by USSS through a MACC. The MACC is generally activated in a safe location, sometimes outside of the host city. Several agencies, including local, state, and federal agencies, are represented at the MACC to promote integrated communication and coordination, as well as enhanced situational awareness.

If local law enforcement has a close relationship with USSS and there is adequate space, local law enforcement operations can be coordinated together at the MACC. Otherwise local operations can be coordinated at a separate location, such as the department's Command Center. Local law enforcement can be deployed to the MACC to facilitate coordination of police responses with the USSS.

Maintain Situational Awareness

During multi-day events, operations command centers should conduct shift briefings and develop situational reports to ensure that all key stakeholders maintain situational awareness. Executives should also maintain awareness through regular briefings with decision-makers from the mayor's office, police department, fire department, transportation services, solid waste services, public affairs, and the event committee. These meetings should review operations from the previous day and expected activities and challenges for the upcoming day.

BEST PRACTICE

Conduct daily executive-level briefings with inter-agency leadership to bolster situational awareness, and to keep abreast of potential event-related changes that could impact the operational security plan.

In addition, interagency partners can use eventmanagement software to maintain instant situational awareness and share information. Such a system can provide officers and security personnel with a comprehensive format for viewing planned activities, tracking incidents, coordinating responses, and managing personnel and resources. Data recorders can be placed in

established command and operations centers to record information related to the event in the software. Prior to the event, planners should consider how network firewalls may limit access for interagency users and field personnel.

• Keep Open Lines of Communication

Communication and information sharing are major challenges for command and control. Commanders in operations centers must communicate changes in response plans effectively and in a timely manner to commanders in the field. Communication can be achieved using various technologies, such as cell phone, radios, or email. Radio talk groups (channels) are often used to facilitate communication for various security operations (e.g., transportation talk group, mobile field force talk group, etc.). Commanders also can set up an "executive" talk-group to promote open communication without congested radio traffic and unwanted interference.

BEST PRACTICE

Educate security personnel on proper communication protocols and reporting structures to avoid communication chokepoints and oversaturation.

Due to the nature of large-scale events, consider establishing encrypted channels to ensure secure communications. Available technologies can be used to prevent individuals from scanning radio channels.


Brief all officers on communication protocols prior to the event to ensure that officers

understand who they should be reporting to, how, and when. Unclear and/or mixed

communication flows can overburden the Incident Commander, can result in miscommunication and confusion, or can compromise event security. For example, visiting officers may resort to reporting to their own agency's commander, who may then directly contact the Incident Commander, as opposed to reporting in accordance with their proper chain-of-command.

Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations

Host departments can encourage seamless command and control with outside agencies by mirroring operations after typical law enforcement patrol structures, in which various levels of command facilitate coordinated communications. For example, the first level of operations can consist of a squad of nine patrol officers and one supervisor. The next layer can be a grouping of five to six squads into platoons. The final layer of command and control can include functional group commanders, to which platoon leaders reported (Figure 2 below). Establishing a command and control structure that is familiar to officers from outside agencies enables clear communication of activities and the direct supervision and reporting of issues throughout the event.



Toolkit References

The following template and checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations of command and control:

- A.8 Incident Organization Chart Template, Page A-31
- A.9 Organization Assignment List, Page A-33

In addition, the following are references that other agencies and organizations have developed that contain useful information for planning command and control:

- DHS, National Incident Management System, December 2008.
- DHS/FEMA guidance on NIMS/ICS: <u>www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system</u>.

3.3 Credentialing

Credentialing is critical because it allows event planners and law enforcement to control the number of people attending the event; regulate access levels; and ensure that those who are being screened at checkpoints are who they claim to be.

Credentialing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
A	Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols	
•	Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required	
•	Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed	
•	Detail Credential Specifications	
•	Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials	
•	Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion	
•	Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials	
•	Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols	
KEY: Clarge-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

▲ Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols

For an NSSE, the USSS will create federal credentials for access to high-security areas that will require background checks or investigations. Early in the planning process, work with USSS to submit names of local agencies, and/or city officials in order to control access to specific city locations or delineate security zone access.

Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required

The type and level of credentials required will vary depending on the event. For an NSSE, the local agency may chose not to issue additional credentials. Alternatively, and for non-NSSEs, the local agency might decide to provide one type of credential identifying all officers as local law enforcement and tier the access level according to an officer's role and

responsibilities during the event. For example, a command officer might require access to various secure locations during the event, whereas an officer directing traffic might not. Local law enforcement may also choose to issue different types of credentials to improve their ability to manage outside persons (e.g., city personnel or vendors) that may require access to secure zones, but are not performing in a safety role.

When establishing the type and level of credentials, planners should determine if background checks will be required, and if so, who will conduct them. If the departments or agencies do not have the capacity to coordinate credentials and background checks, they can consider hiring a private-sector company to assist.

BEST PRACTICE

Limit physical access to the event by issuing credentials to essential personnel only.

In order to develop credentials in a timely manner and prevent production of unnecessary credentials, local law enforcement executives should determine who will require what type of credential. Also, outside law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to only request

credentials for those who will be participating directly in the event (not complete staffing rosters). Having an abundance of extra credentials is a security risk and should be avoided.

• Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed

Credentials can also be required for vehicles accessing secure zones or for parking in event areas, to show that a vehicle has been searched and/or where parking is limited. Vehicle credentials (placards) should be issued using vehicle information in order to prevent individuals from sharing credentials. Credentials can also be created for specific venues or events to create security measures in addition to perimeter checkpoints.

• Detail Credential Specifications

Include the following specifications to ensure proper verification and to prevent counterfeiting:

- Photo identification
- Personal information
- Color-coding or details regarding the individual's level of access or role (e.g., law
 enforcement personnel, event staff, or VIP). This strategy allows event security the
 ability to determine agency or venue access by first sight as opposed to a more indepth inspection.

Choose the approach most suited to the operational environment early.

• Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials

Clearly communicate cut-off dates and timelines for submitting credentialing information to all participating organizations. At a minimum, require that commanders and supervisors playing a leadership role during the event submit their credential information well in advance of the event date. Be prepared for any last minute personnel changes.

Instructions on requesting credentials should alert agencies of specific information requirements; describe what personnel photographs should look like (e.g., the dimensions of the photograph; appropriate attire, such as hats not being allowed in photographs); and describe approval processes. The host agency should also provide examples of photographs to alleviate having to request new pictures.

BEST PRACTICE

Provide specific instructions on the information required to receive credentials to avoid unnecessary delays in processing access requests.

Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion

The local jurisdiction may receive thousands of requests for credentials. To expedite the credentialing process, develop a system or database (or use a pre-existing one) to securely process personnel information and photographs and to track all required information. In addition, anticipate the need for last-minute production of new and corrected credentials by establishing an adequately staffed and equipped on-site credentialing location near event venues.

Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials

Have a plan for receiving and distributing local, state, or federal credentials that ensures these materials are always in the custody of authorized personnel (e.g., delivered directly to support agencies, or picked up in-person). If credentials are picked up in person, designate a single location that is open before and during the event to prevent uncertainty of where credentials should be obtained.

BEST PRACTICE

Determine protocols and authorities for tracking and distributing credentials to ensure that they are not distributed to unauthorized personnel.

• Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols

Security personnel staffing security checkpoints must know the credentialing protocols to prevent secure zones from being comprised of non-verified personnel and to avoid uncertainty when granting access to secure zones. Brief all security staff on the appearance of credentials and their associated access requirements. Establish and publicize a single point of contact (including phone number or email address) to event attendees and security personnel for answering questions regarding credentials.

Toolkit References

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for credentialing:

• A.10 Credentialing Checklist, Page A-35

3.4 Crowd Management

Large-scale security events often attract large groups of demonstrators underscoring law enforcement's public safety role.

Crowd management planning must take into account all elements of an event, especially the type and duration, venue characteristics, methods of entrance, the size and demeanor of the crowd, communication mechanisms, crowd control mechanisms, and queuing practices.

Crowd Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions	
•	Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Control Deployment	
•	Develop a Policing Strategy that is Focused on Non- Confrontational Tactics Centered on Team Policing	
•	Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for the Mission	
•	Determine Officer Dress	
•	Control Demonstrator Activities	
•	Collaborate with Other Organizations	
•	Train Officers on the Policing Strategy	
•	Inform the Public of Response Tactics	
	Create Mobile Response Teams	
•	Position Commanders in the Field	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs NSSEs		

Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions

Prior to the event, understand the nature of the audience attracted by a particular event. Work with event planners and interagency partners to gather intelligence on expected demonstration groups, including their size, typical behaviors, and any adversary groups. Information on demonstrators is primarily obtained through criminal intelligence gathering, which is detailed in Section 2.8. Intelligence/Counterterroriem/Counterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterroriem/Counterterroriem/Counterro

BEST PRACTICE

Use intelligence data/information to preposition officers in areas where large numbers of demonstrators are expected to gather to ensure adequate crowd management.

in Section 3.8 – Intelligence/Counterterrorism/Counter Surveillance.

Common demonstrator tactics that police should be aware of include the following: 12

- Blocking roads, streets, and intersections;
- Heaving barricades, rocks, and sticks;
- Wearing masks or other protective equipment to block effects from chemical irritants;
- Spitting or yelling in police officers' faces; or
- Breaking windows or vandalizing property.

• Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Control Deployment

Strategic analysis can be done prior to the event to determine where crowd control officers and assets should be deployed. For example, for the 2012 RNC, TPD conducted a geospatial analysis of the arrests that occurred in St. Paul, MN for the 2008 RNC and overlaid that data in the event space for Tampa. Because of this analysis, the department was able to make informed, data-driven decisions of where potential hotspots for arrests may occur and staged their resources appropriately.

Develop a Policing Strategy Focused on Non-Confrontational Tactics and Team Policing

Most demonstrators tend to be peaceful and simply want media attention drawn to their causes. As a result, crowd control tactics should focus on non-aggressive policing tactics that not only protect civil rights (specifically, a persons' First Amendment right to free speech and peaceful assembly), but also encourages open communication between the police and the public.

Focus policing strategies on the importance of working as a team when responding to large crowds/demonstrators; this will provide a unified front for local law enforcement's public

¹² A more extensive list of protestor tactics can be found in the DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

safety plans and protocols. Daily policing activity typically required officers to respond to threats individually, which should not be encouraged for large-scale special events. For such events it is important that officers understand the value of providing a unified front and that individualized responses to threats are discouraged. Threats and risk have to be re-packaged from officers' traditional and daily experiences and trained with a new paradigm shift to team policing that won't tolerate anyone being harmed or any property being damaged.

BEST PRACTICE

Stress team policing tactics and impress upon officers that their mission is to protect the Constitutional rights of all of the event attendees. Though non-aggressive strategies are recommended for crowd control tactics, law enforcement also prepares for responses to criminal behaviors. Protocols on what types of behaviors will not be tolerated and appropriate uses of force should be detailed in operational plans. Instilling the department's philosophy on use of force can be a challenge since these events

may require bringing in officers from outside agencies with different use of force policies. Ensure that all outside officers are thoroughly trained on the selected use of force policies for the event.

Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for Crowd Management

A variety of vehicles can be used as part of non-confrontational crowd control tactics, including bicycles, dual sport motorcycles, or UTVs. Such vehicles are valuable because they can be used as physical barriers for controlling crowd movement and can allow police to rapidly respond to crowd control incidents. Dual sport motorcycles are useful for patrolling the larger outer perimeter of an event, as they do not fatigue officers like bicycles do.

While planners may consider the use of mounted officers for crowd control, they should understand the advantages and disadvantages of these resources. The use of horses can be inefficient and costly and not as useful as bicycles based on cost, maintenance, and speed.

BEST PRACTICE

Use bicycles and dual-sport vehicles to create force flexibility and as a non-confrontational crowd control tactic.

• Determine Officer Dress

Officer dress can impact public perceptions and actions. For example, officers in full riot gear may encourage demonstrators to be more aggressive. Determine how crowd control officers should dress and any equipment needs (e.g., helmets, shields, chemical irritants).

Determine if a common uniform or an officer's personal uniforms should be used. A common uniform can be valuable in providing a unified front for crowd control operations. Conversely, the local agency can allow visiting officers to wear their department's uniform, which can be a cost-effective approach to showing a wide-range of force.

42

¹³ Dual sport motorcycles are 400 cc on/off road motorcycles.

Control Demonstrator Activities

Consider the following strategies for controlling demonstrator activities during a large-scale security event:

- Pre-designate parade and march routes to better manage traffic interruptions of planned demonstrations.
- Prior to the event scan the area to remove objects that could be thrown at officers or used to damage property.
- Pre-position officers out of sight in hatch/riot gear.
- Designate space for demonstrators to sleep and set up their base of operations to consolidate demonstrators to one location and allow police to maintain better awareness of demonstrator activities.
- Evaluate the need for and layout of a free speech platform.

• Collaborate with Other Organizations

A number of local, state, and federal organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties

Union (ACLU) and the DOJ Community Relations Service (CRS), specialize in interactions with demonstrators and may be able to provide advice and intelligence. CRS is a third-party conciliation agency that specializes in resolving racial and ethnic conflict. CRS personnel often attend largescale security events and can help resolve disputes

BEST PRACTICE

Allow demonstrators to set up camp in designated areas in order to better monitor their activities.

arising from alleged use of excessive force by police. Begin collaboration with these types of agencies during the planning phase.

• Train Officers on the Policing Strategy

Critical to the success of crowd control operations is effectively training all officers (not just field officers assigned to crowd management) in predetermined policing strategies. Include information on unacceptable behaviors and expected response tactics in training. Specifically,

BEST PRACTICE

Reinforce appropriate police responses by educating officers of actions they should not participate in.

teach officers behaviors and tactics that allow demonstrators to exercise their Constitutional rights, as well as encourage officers to engage in friendly interactions with attendees. Moreover, reinforce department policies on use of force and how an adverse reaction or lapse in judgment may lead to an overall negative public perception of the department.

BEST PRACTICE

TPD executed a highly effective training strategy for the 2012 RNC entitled "Don't be that guy." This training reinforced enforcement actions through

videos and pictures of officers using poor decisionmaking skills, conducting themselves in an inappropriate manner, and using excessive force. Offer training at multiple times and through multiple mechanisms to ensure that all officers receive and understand the department's protocols and

expectations for crowd management. Examples for delivering training include presentations, webinars, online course curriculum, or in-person training at an academy. Lesson and instructional training can also include specific scenarios and exercises that resemble actual or probable events. To highlight the importance of this training, consider having the Chief or Sheriff provide a direct message that reinforces the department's crowd management primary mission and tactics.

• Inform the Public of Response Tactics

Conduct a public awareness campaign that includes the overall goals, crowd control strategies, and use of force protocols that local law enforcement will be using for the event, so that the public is properly informed of expected actions. This campaign should educate demonstrators and the public on law enforcement's primary crowd management objective: maintaining professional interactions and a balance between protecting demonstrators' rights and public safety.

The campaign should consist of meetings with protestor groups and civil rights organizations weeks ahead of the event to discuss primary objectives and resolve public concerns. Town hall meetings should also be facilitated by leaders of the city to inform the public and community members on what to expect prior to and during the event (see Section 3.14 – Public Information and Media Relations for details on how to communicate effectively with the public).

• Create Mobile Response Teams

The use of Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams can be effective for crowd control responses, as they are dedicated forces assigned to responding to incidents immediately. These teams should be trained specifically to quickly remove agitators and law breakers before they can incite the crowd.

Position Commanders in the Field

Position executives and leaders in the field during demonstrations to allow them to assess a situation first-hand and determine the best tactics to deploy. Response decisions can be communicated to field forces faster, diffusing the potential

BEST PRACTICE

Position police leadership in the field who can engage with protest groups to quickly diffuse potentially unruly behavior.

escalation of disruptive behavior from demonstrators. In addition, field commanders should be issued designated golf carts or dual-sport vehicles to quickly navigate secure zones.

Toolkit References

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for crowd management planning and operations:

A.11 Considerations for Managing Crowds, Page A-39

3.5 Dignitary/VIP Protection

Dignitaries and VIPs require security protection as they can be targets for harmful or criminal attacks. Dignitaries are categorized as "any person that has a law enforcement protective detail as directed by state or federal statute," such as current or former U.S. Presidents, state governors, foreign heads of state, or Senate/House leadership posts. A VIP is "any person who has limited protection or is being granted special access privileges," such as U.S. senators, U.S. congressman, city mayors, diplomatic corps, or famous personnel (e.g., actors or athletes). ¹⁴

For NSSEs, the USSS is responsible for the protection of White House personnel. Local law enforcement will primarily be responsible for assisting in all non-USSS protection details participating in the event, ¹⁵ which includes coordinating the use of multi-agency assets to assist dignitary/VIP transportation, access to event venues, credentialing, communications, special event coverage and hotel security.

Dignitary/VIP Protection - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Determine Who Needs Protection	
•	Determine Your Protection Strategy	
•	Acquire and Train Officers	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection	
•	Minimize Officer Fatigue	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSES		

• Determine Who Needs Protection

Identify which dignitaries and VIPs will require protection and what level of protection they will need. Reach out to protectee staff prior to the event to directly obtain sensitive information regarding a protectee's anticipated movements and activities. Direct contact between local law enforcement and protectee staff removes additional layers of information-transfer through agencies and can speed up the VIP protection-planning process.

45

¹⁴ 2012 RNC Dignitary/VIP Subcommittee, Executive Steering Committee Brief, January 11, 2012.

¹⁵ Some dignitaries and VIP details may provide their own bodyguards and protection.

Determine Your Protection Strategy

Choose a strategy for organizing and conducting protective details – the "jump teams" approach or the "wheels-up to wheels-down" approach.

• "Jump teams" approach: This approach assigns officers to quick-response teams that provide security as needed to VIPs

during the event (e.g., while attending a meeting or party; while transporting in a motorcade). This approach permits response flexibility and is more accommodating if few personnel/resources are available.

BEST PRACTICE

Assign officers to each protectee to

provide effective communication and

situational awareness of all VIP activities.

• "Wheels-up to wheels-down" approach: This approach assigns an officer to each VIP requiring protection, allowing commanders to communicate and maintain situational awareness of all VIP activities/issues.

• Acquire and Train Officers

Ensure that adequate police personnel is available to provide security, which will require cooperation with other police, fire, and sheriffs' departments, as well as coordination with other event-planning subcommittees (e.g., Venue, Delegate Buses, Transportation, Officer Lodging/Transportation, and Credentialing subcommittees).

BEST PRACTICE

Acquire and train all security personnel prior to the event, including private security and/or personal security guards.

It is critical that all personnel resources, including reserve or light-duty officers, are identified and accounted for prior to the event. Train and brief each officer on expectations, standards, and the professionalism and fluidity required of them. Briefs should include logistics and details of the operational plan for providing protection to

important personnel (e.g., shifts, communication protocols, transportation routes, and credentialing procedures). Equally important are briefs on relevant security information to private security and personal bodyguards.

Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection

Cover the following key elements in the operational plan for VIP protection:

Access: Include information on arrival and departure locations and site-security plans.

BEST PRACTICE

Include pre-defined routes and parking information for protective details in transportation plans.

- Transportation: Cover logistics of protective motorcades, tail and lead vehicles, or drivers. Plans should include pre-defined routes and parking that protective details will use and should consider coordinating protective details' transportation movements with that of pedestrian sidewalk traffic.
- Contingency routes: Include back-up routes in anticipation of traffic problems.
- Communication: Detail dispatch centers, email groups, or radio coverage mechanisms.

- **Credentialing:** Explain coordination with the credential subcommittee, as well as credential requirements and formats for dignitaries and VIPs; the process to obtain request for credentials, and the distribution process of credentials.
- **Site coverage:** Describe the usage of law enforcement officers at key event venues that dignitaries and VIPs will be attending.
- **Training:** Detail pre-event training on operational plans, transportation routes, and emergency evacuation/medical procedures.

Minimize Officer Fatigue

Protective detail officers will probably be tired from long shifts hours, due to getting up early for vehicle sweeps and staying out late at special events. Minimize officer fatigue by strategically pairing officers' behaviors with those of VIPs (i.e., matching officers' early-morning or late-night behaviors with those behaviors of VIPs). In addition, reduce long hours by locating officer's lodging accommodations near their protective details' hotels.

In addition, keep in mind that law enforcement officers on protective details must follow the movement of their protectees and may not be able to go to designated R&R sites for food. Thus, local law enforcement should consider providing adequate food options (e.g., per diem or multiple R&R sites) so officers are properly nourished.¹⁶

Toolkit References

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for dignitary/VIP protection:

• A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

3.6 Financial Management

Financial management is critical for the effective execution and accountability of a large-scale security event. Specifically for NSSEs, jurisdictions should understand any requirements and expectations that accompany the receipt of federal funds.¹⁷

Financial Management - Planning Checklist		
Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget		
Understand How NSSEs may be Financed		

¹⁶ Also discussed in Section 3.1 – Administrative and Logistics Support.

¹⁷ Not all large-scale security events receive federal funding; in these instances, local jurisdictions operate with finances similar to those set aside for daily operations. The information provided in this section is applicable to those events where federal funding is received.

Financial Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Communicate Regularly	
A	Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-event Audits	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget

Create a comprehensive budget that outlines and breaks down every potential cost (e.g., equipment and technology) to successfully and safely host the event. Accuracy and detail are paramount to this process in order to avoid any unexpected costs or last-minute purchases, and to prepare for potential city or federal audits immediately following the event.

▲ Understand How NSSEs may be Financed

Local jurisdictions will incur certain costs for NSSE designated events. Congress may appropriate funds for an NSSE event through the DOJ Office of Justice Programs/BJA, U.S. Department of Defense, and DHS to reimburse security costs incurred by a host jurisdiction. Wherever possible, jurisdictions should look to leveraging existing grant funds for these events.

It is important to understand the potential amount of planning and preparatory costs prior to applying to host an NSSE, as some early pre-event planning costs will arise in advance of the grant-funding approval and will remain solely in the responsibility of the jurisdiction. A jurisdiction must keep in mind that the grant process for these kinds of large-scale awards is often a lengthy one. In addition, expenses incurred prior to the appropriation of federal funds for this purpose will likely not be reimbursable. Please see the Appendix A.12—BJA Special Event Funding Guidance—for information on the use of federal funding, including financial guidance on pre-event planning, the application period, the award period, closing the award, and a sample timeline of key activities.

• Maintain Open Lines of Communication with Financial Stakeholders

BEST PRACTICE

Keep open lines of communication with financial stakeholders to ensure accurate financial reporting in accordance with contractual requirements.

Convene appropriate key personnel early at all levels, including local, state, and federal, to discuss and determine the financial scope of the event and all expected costs. Dedicate personnel to act as a point of contact with the city or federal agency. Ensure that this point of contact conducts regular conference calls or in-person

meetings throughout the process to communicate any issues or changes in the projected budget.

▲ Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-event Audits

With federal funding, expect the federal agency to conduct site visits and audits prior to and after the event. These visits will include a thorough review of all expenses incurred with grant funds and serve to ensure that grant funds were managed properly.

BEST PRACTICE

Keep detailed records of purchases and expenses in preparation for a post-event financial audit.

To effectively prepare for post-event audits,

- Ensure that all administrative, financial, managerial and related operational personnel participate in Office of the Inspector General (OIG) fraud-prevention training.
- Share fraud-prevention information to all host site personnel that have the potential to be involved in acquiring safety and security materials and services. It is important that all those involved understand what grant and/or procurement fraud is and the consequences for intentionally or unintentionally committing fraud.
- The host jurisdiction or state must keep a record of every transaction throughout the grant program.

Toolkit References

The following guides (found in Appendix A) can be used for financial and grant management planning and operations:

- A.12 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance, Page A-47
- A.13 Financial Provisions and Policies, Page A-51
- A.14 Post-award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, Page A-55

Additional resources on financial planning and grant management include:

- The OJP Procurement Procedures for Recipients of DOJ Grants
 Post-award Instructions for Office of the Chief Financial Officer grant recipients and subrecipients
 (http://www.ojp.gov/financialguide/PDFs/New%20Procurement%20Guide_508comp_liant.pdf).
- Federal government regulation information: http://www.regulations.gov
- Grants Management System (GMS) Training and Technical Assistance: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/training/gmstraining.htm
- The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) Sub-award Reporting System (FSRS): https://www.fsrs.gov

3.7 Fire/Emergency Medical Services/Hospitals/Public Health

Public health and medical support focus primarily on preventing, minimizing, and quickly responding to injury or health issues. Fire departments, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and medical care are primarily responsible for supporting this public health operation during large-scale security events. Local law enforcement should assist as needed.

Fire/ Emergency Medical Services/ Hospitals/ Public Health - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans	
•	Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response	
•	Coordinate Joint Reponses to Encourage Situational Awareness	
	Train Medical Response Personnel	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSES		

Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans

Document the following information for public health and medical operations into the operational plans: 18

Fire/EMS

II CA INTO

- Command, control, and coordination structures
- Pre-hospital/field emergency locations (e.g., mobile field hospitals) and protocols;
- Resources, equipment, and personnel for fire, medical, and mobile response teams;
- Logistics deployment and requirements;
- Transportation protocols and traffic routes for emergency vehicles on the ground and in the air (patient evacuation);
- Staging information for fire trucks, ambulances, and other emergency vehicles;
- Protocols for National Disaster Medical Assistance Teams or other strike team assistance (e.g., Urban Search and Rescue or Aeromedical Response Teams); and
- Transitions to consequence management, if required (staging and dispensing of antibiotics or considerations for mass casualties).

¹⁸ More detailed discussions of fire and EMS planning and response activities can be found in DHS/FEMA's *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

Hospital

- Methodologies for tracking patients and conducting surveillance of health incidents;
- Communication protocols, tools, and systems;
- Integration with local primary and secondary response hospitals; and
- Medical measures for prisoner and detention-related activities.

Public Health

- Food security and safety;
- Disease-prevention strategies;
- Plans for protecting the local public health and medical infrastructure; and
- Decontamination measures.
- Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response

BEST PRACTICE

Promote interagency collaboration to help ensure a city-wide common operating picture is maintained.

The local fire department and EMS agency will have lead authority in the planning and operations of fire and medical coverage. Preestablished partnerships with local public health organizations, hospitals, and community groups will help to ensure a common operating picture

and seamless communication during planning and steady-state operations. Among relevant agencies, identify required and available resources based on joint threat and vulnerability assessments.

Coordinate Joint Reponses to Encourage Situational Awareness

Create a Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) to serve as a central coordination unit that will oversee triage stations, state hospitals, field hospitals, and mobile medical units. The JMOC should be staffed with all health and medical assets, including public health, mass casualty, animal health, and agriculture.

Develop situation reports and conduct daily briefings to ensure that everyone is aware of fire/EMS/hospitals/public health incidents and response actions.

Train Medical Response Personnel

Train all local medical response personnel, as well as federal strike assistance teams, in the fire/EMS/hospital/public health plans, protocols, and communication mechanisms; this training reinforces communication channels among response personnel and maintains a safe public health and medical environment.

Toolkit References

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for Fire/EMS/Hospitals/Public Health Services planning and operations:

• A.15 EMS Venue Assessment Checklist, Page A-59

3.8 Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter Surveillance

Intelligence operations for local police departments are often conducted by internal criminal intelligence units. To better support intelligence operations (obtain, assess, and disseminate information about potential threats) departments that lack internal capabilities can look to regional or state fusion centers, or to federal agencies for assistance.

For larger events, especially NSSEs that have national priorities and high-level security implications, the FBI is the lead federal agency for intelligence, specifically terrorism-related issues. Local law enforcement is responsible for intelligence gathering as it relates to anarchist, demonstrator groups, and other criminal activity not related to terrorism. During NSSEs, federal partners have event security plans that can activate many intelligence operational centers, such as the Protective Intelligence Coordinating Center, the FBI Intelligence Operations Center, and the MACC; intelligence teams, such as USSS Protective Intelligence Teams (a.k.a. "ID Teams") and FBI Intelligence Teams (a.k.a. "I" Teams).

	Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter Surveillance - Planning Checklist	
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Intelligence	
•	Collaborate with Field Operations	
•	Leverage Video Surveillance Technologies	
•	Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis	
•	Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies	
•	Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

¹⁹ 2012 Republican National Convention Subcommittee, *Final Plan of Operation Intelligence Subcommittee* (*DRAFT*), May 2012.

• Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments

Collaborate with the FBI to identify potential threats from outside the jurisdiction. Local law enforcement should work closely with intelligence counterparts to ensure accurate threat information is obtained. Prior to the event, local, state, and federal intelligence agencies should be actively monitoring and tracking anticipated demonstrators and security threats. Threat and risk assessment is valuable to determine vulnerabilities and the resources required for intelligence operations. Focus threat assessments on the following four key elements:²⁰

- Threat inventory: Determine groups or individuals that may pose a threat to the event.
- **Threat assessment:** Determine the level of threat for each threat identified in threat inventory.
- **Target assessment:** Determine probable targets and locations in the jurisdiction that criminals may attempt to disrupt.
- Target vulnerability: Determine how vulnerable each target is for an attack.

• Develop an Intelligence Operational Plan

An intelligence operational plan should include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of the intelligence unit and what type of threats it will be trying to deter.
- Event details and participating agencies: Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- Command and operations centers: Include information on staffing, hours of operation, and reporting protocols.
- Other operational elements: Include specifics on field teams, intelligence sources, communication mechanisms and protocols, critical incident response protocols, air space or waterway restrictions, and pre-event intelligence.

Collaborate with Field Operations

Local law enforcement coordination of intelligence can be enhanced by conducting joint operations between intelligence and field officers. Collaboration can improve field commanders' awareness and knowledge of key players causing disruption, allowing for strategic arrests and deterrence of criminal behavior.

• Leverage Video Surveillance Technologies

Use video surveillance—in the form of wireless and wired cameras, high-definition backpack cameras, and cameras on cellular phones—to provide law enforcement with real-time information sharing and situational

BEST PRACTICE

Use video surveillance to help with real-time information sharing and decision-making.

²⁰ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, November 2004.*

awareness. Such mechanisms improve commanders' ability to make well-informed decisions in real time (e.g., by zooming in on suspicious objects or persons) and to deploy field forces appropriately.

After appropriate video technology is selected, make sure that all event personnel are trained on how to use it. In addition, tests and exercises should be conducted to validate that technologies are operational. Finally, establish back-up plans, such as replacement technologies or technicians on standby to fix broken equipment, in the case that technologies fail during the event.

Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis

BEST PRACTICE

Supplement traditional crime analysis tools with other technologies, such as monitoring cellphone networks or social media.

Traditional crime analysis activities can bolster the effectiveness of video surveillance technologies, police departments can conduct commonly used analysis strategies to identify threats, such as monitoring calls for service, license plate readers, and intelligence databases/watch

lists (e.g., National Crime Information Center, local police department command center, and NSSE watch lists). Use more novel crime-intelligence strategies—such as social media monitoring (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and Open Stream) or cellular network technologies—to compile and disseminate useful security information.

• Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies

Deploy intelligence sources and intelligence officers to gather real-time intelligence on the suspicious persons or activity, intent, tactics, and challenges related to demonstrator groups. Intelligence sources can use text messages and cellular phones to communicate intelligence to command staff for operational responses. Consider using mobile technologies that also allow intelligence sources to send photos and allow commanders to track their locations. Intelligence sources can also receive covert responses from its command post through text messages.

Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources

Integrate intelligence sources with demonstrator groups in a multi-tiered system in case officers are discovered. In addition, a number of measures should be conducted to limit a source's interactions with law enforcement, including briefing them off-site, giving them per diems for meals, and locating them at a separate R&R site. ²¹ An easy to identify system must be developed for interactions between intelligence sources and regular law enforcement (e.g., they can identify themselves without compromising their cover). If practical, this system should not be obvious and used as needed as not to give away other covert sources.

²¹ Also discussed in Section 3.1 Administrative and Logistics Support.

Toolkit References

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for intelligence/counterterrorism/counter surveillance activities:

 A.16 Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist, Page A-61

3.9 Interagency Communications and Technology

Security personnel and its partner agencies (e.g., health, fire, or federal partners) must be able to communicate with their own staff and among one other to obtain a proper understanding of the nature and scope of response operations. Establish partnerships and hold regular meetings or conference calls early on in the planning process to ensure that communications and communication technologies are well-coordinated and seamless.

	Interagency Communications and Technology - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications		
	Identify Communication Technologies		
•	Test Communication Mechanisms		
•	Establish a Central Communications Center		
	Create Communication Strike Teams		
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs			

• Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications

A comprehensive communications plan should provide streamlined communication for both field operations and interagency coordination. Separate event-related communications from regular city communications (9-1-1 calls), so that event personnel can differentiate between the two.

Detail the following information in the communications plan:

 Mechanisms: For field operations, the use of radio talk groups (channels) can reduce radio congestion and ensure that radio communications cannot be scanned by non-law enforcement officials.

- **Equipment:** Radios are the most common form of communication equipment for law enforcement agencies. When using radios, interoperability between various agencies and their dispatch centers needs to be evaluated. Include distribution and demobilization plans, as well as a tracking system, for planned equipment.
- **Communication protocols:** Brief personnel on proper protocols for communications and clearly explain to all officers and personnel prior to the event to avoid uncertainty of how radio channels operate, whom to report to, and assign call signs and terminologies.
- **Dispatchers:** Assign sufficient personnel to manage calls through radios and ensure that they are equipped with proper information. For example, during the 2012 RNC, Tampa Police Communications Center had its own internal Wiki that was used extensively by dispatchers. Rosters, phone numbers, radio numbers, schedules, event information and much more were programmed into the Wiki site, which enabled the dispatchers to quickly access information within seconds.
- Contingencies: Plans should include redundancies (e.g., back-up radio networks, dispatchers, or radio talk groups) in case primary mechanisms fail or become overloaded. Other useful contingency strategies include having full contact information of officer radio assignments should officers need to be contacted for technical difficulties.

Identify Communication Technologies

Focus communications plans primarily on technologies available for maintaining situational awareness throughout the event. Technologies can include radios, telephones, cellular phones, email, mass email services, or texting services, or web-based event/incident management software systems. It is important that agencies determine if technologies are interoperable to freely allow field units and participating agencies to communicate in real time, regardless of different equipment or frequencies.

• Test Communication Mechanisms

Brief all personnel on the use of various technologies and then conduct tests and exercises, prior to the event, to ensure that systems are functional and that personnel know how to effectively operate them.

• Establish a Coordination Communications Center

Communication operations and responses should be well-coordinated among partners during the event. A coordination communications center—at a Command Center or a dedicated location—with representatives from each major agency can ensure that information flows are streamlined and open. Staff this communication center with security personnel from the police department, fire department, and emergency services. By having all stakeholders in the same room, personnel will be able to maintain situational awareness of the entire communications operation.

• Create Communication Strike Teams

Systems or technologies can fail during a large-scale security event. For example, it is

Create communication strike teams to quickly respond to technical issues that could potentially stall safety operations.

common for officers in the field to have issues with broken radios or need back-up batteries due to their long shift hours. To properly prepare and quickly respond to communication failures, create communication strike teams who can be quickly called upon to resolve technical problems.

Toolkit References

The following form (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for interagency communications and technology:

• A.17 Incident Radio Communications Plan Form, Page A-63

3.10 Legal Affairs

The complexity of security for large events means that there may be legal issues to address before, during, and (particularly) after the event. Law enforcement should pay close attention to legal issues related to public disclosure and to minimizing risk for civil liberties litigation.

A major challenge for law enforcement is minimizing the risks of lawsuits when responding to demonstrations, engaging in use of force, and making arrests. For example, during arrests, it is important that officers who are making arrests understand how to articulate reasons for arrest to the Assistant District Attorney, so that the charge isn't declined before going to court. ²²

	Legal Affairs - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed	
•	Include Law Experts in Early Planning		
•	Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound		
•	Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts		
•	Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigations		
	Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction		
KEY: Clarge-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs			

²² Police Executive Research Forum, *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field*, June 2011.

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Include Law Experts in Early Planning

Early coordinated planning and collaboration can prevent litigation challenges after an event. The legal subcommittee should consist of law experts from all major planning agencies who can discuss potential legal issues with city officials, unions (e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union), and special interest groups (e.g., the National Media Guild). Subcommittee members should clearly define its mission and objectives and meet on a regular basis. Assign law enforcement liaisons to all subcommittees that will require their expertise.

Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound

BEST PRACTICE

Conduct a legal review of security plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure that tactics are Constitutionally sound.

Engage in legal planning specific to the security of the event and work with the internal legal department and City Attorney's Office to review all security plans, procedures, and protocols on tactics to ensure that they are Constitutionally and legally sound. This will give the host agency confidence in all aspects of

their plan, allowing them to be open and transparent with the media and unions.

Work with the City Attorney's Office to draft and pass new rules, policies, or event ordinances specific to improving safety of the event (see Appendix A.19 for example ordinances from the 2012 national conventions). Policies can detail regulations for prohibited items, police use of force and arrests, and demonstrator activity. Comprehensive policy analysis from other cities that commonly handle large-scale security events (i.e., New York City, Boston, Philadelphia, and Oakland) can be conducted to determine whether new and/or amended regulations need to be established. New ordinances should be discussed in advance with the media and union groups in order to establish the precedence and general message that the agency has safety measures under control.

• Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts

Work with city officials to prepare and review the contracts that will be established to obtain necessary goods and services (e.g., hotel accommodations, food, office space, etc.). Outside assistance on contract reviews can be provided to law enforcement officers who may not be familiar with contractual procedures and ensuring that contracts meet not only grant, but city legal requirements.

Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigations

Other strategies for mitigating civil litigations include the following:

- Review existing ordinances and laws, and amend or create new laws to ensure the safety of the event.
- Provide officers with specialized training.
- Manage crowds and their activity based on illegal behaviors and the number of resources available.

BEST PRACTICE

• Assign State's Attorney representatives to the law enforcement command center to provide guidance on arrest laws.

Have legal representation at the command center to answer questions regarding arresting rights.

- Deploy attorneys from the department's legal department or City Attorney's Office to the field for demonstrations and arrests.
- Plan ahead for post-event litigations by documenting activities and keeping
 meticulous records during planning, training, and operations. Record these activities
 in an after-action report. In addition, consider using surveillance camera recordings
 for fending off lawsuits or carefully overseeing the collection of public records prior
 to, during, and after the event
- Videotape all encounters with protestors for future review.

• Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction

Legal planners are also responsible for ensuring that all officers from outside agencies have legal jurisdiction in the local area. These visiting officers should be covered by a mutual aid agreement that details critical topics such as compensation, insurance, and compliance with grant conditions.

Toolkit References

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for legal planning and operations:

- A.18 Legal Affairs Checklist, Page A-65
- A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances, Page A-67

3.11 Non-Event Patrol

During a special event, local law enforcement must maintain daily public safety response requirements for citizens in their jurisdiction. These agencies must also collaborate with other city agencies to ensure the maintenance of non-security-related essential services and to prepare for emergency relief.

	Non-Event Patrol - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
•	Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels		
•	Manage Non-Security Event Responses		
	Prepare for Large Emergencies		
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

• Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels

Maintaining regular patrol operations requires that duty assignments remain adequately staffed, sufficient resources are available for normal operations, and regular communication mechanisms are not interrupted.

BEST PRACTICE

Ensure that staffing and resources for regular patrol operations are maintained.

Educate and brief all non-event patrol on event security plans, protocols, and incidents in case they are required to supplement event response. In addition to responding to normal day-to-day operations, regular patrol officers will likely also support crowd control units when demonstrations ventured into areas outside of the designated march routes. To maintain situational awareness with event incidents, patrol supervisors should provide patrol officers with daily roll calls and briefings between relief shifts. Due to the high potential for non-event patrol officers to come into contact with demonstrators, in each shift briefing, shift commanders should reiterate the department's clear and concise expectation of demonstrator rights and the need for officers to show tolerance and patience.

Manage Non-Security Event Responses

In addition to daily law enforcement operations, local emergency management agencies should manage the jurisdiction's emergency operations to coordinate non-security related matters (e.g., water, power, waste management, or bank services), including the potential for natural and man-made emergencies separate from the event.

Prepare for Large Emergencies

Cities often have existing emergency operating plans that can be used as a basic response plan for consequence management (e.g., natural disasters) during the event. Such plans should be coordinated by the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC). For example, during the 2012 RNC, emergency management agencies and partners supporting the event operated the Consequence Management EOC, which allowed federal, state, and local emergency management agencies and partners to collaborate and communicate effectively and to transition seamlessly into a crisis/consequence management mode in the event of an emergency or disaster incident, like Hurricane Isaac. Although Hurricane Isaac did not directly hit Tampa as was initially tracked, officials activated the EOC and prepared to activate emergency operating plans.

Emergency planners should include and activate its local EOC early in planning to allow ample time to prepare for the event and coordinate with other agencies. In addition, planners should co-locate the EOC with other local command nodes in the same building (e.g., the JMOC, Critical Infrastructure Resource Center (CIRC), or Interagency Coordination Communication Center (CCC)) to allow for a common operating picture.

Toolkit References

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for non-event patrol planning and operations:

A.3 Operational Plan Template, Page A-11

3.12 Arrest Processing

Large events can likely draw demonstrators seeking media attention for their cause by breaking the law and getting arrested (e.g., disrupting traffic, venues, or the event). Properly educate law enforcement personnel to deter arrests, but also prepare them to handle mass arrests in an efficient manner that does not disrupt event activities or escalate unruly behavior.

Arrest Processing - Planning Checklist			
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
•	Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests		
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Arrest Processing		
•	Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training		
•	Conduct Arrests Quickly		
•	Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence		
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs			

Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests

While preparations should be made to handle the increased potential for mass arrests, a specialized focus on deterring arrests is also important. Identify and implement effective crowd management strategies, such as MFF training on behaviors to prevent criminal activities and build cooperative relationships with demonstrators. This focus will allow law enforcement planners to avoid negative media attention and costly litigation (see Section 3.5 – Crowd management for details on MFF training).

Review strategies and tactics used by previous departments for managing mass arrests. Be mindful that typically a small percentage of arrests made are a result of criminal behavior (arrest numbers are typically driven up by non-criminal demonstrators simply wanting to exercise their freedom of speech). Deterrence strategies should consist of careful analysis of arrest data from previous events, specifically with an assessment of arrests made for unlawful assembly versus criminal behavior. This is valuable for understanding and properly educating arresting officers on the types and scale of arrests that will be directly related to use of force.

Develop an Operational Plan for Arrest Processing

An effective operational plan should address the potential need to make mass arrests (i.e., personnel for arresting and prosecuting, equipment for arrests, and jail space). This plan should be developed in coordination with interagency partners and include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of arrest-processing activities and their importance to event security.
- Event details and resource/staffing logistics: Include information about staffing numbers, shifts, prison locations (that are safe, clean, and large enough for mass arrests), expected peak/off peak operation times, and mutual aid agreements or vendor contracts. For staffing, consider using internal/local officers for arrest processing to avoid having to bring outside officers back for litigations. Consider beginning with a minimal number of personnel and expand as needed.
- Organizational and command structure: Provide detailed charts and contact information on responsible authorities.
- **Arresting officer procedures:** Detail officer check-in processes and procedures for receiving equipment, communicating, and obtaining credentials.
- Operational procedures: Include specifics on transporting personnel, making onscene arrests, processing arrestees remotely, transportation and tracking of arrestees, searching of arrestees/property, receiving and housing, and booking (e.g., corridor security, fingerprinting, or medial screening). Include maps of facilities and directions, when appropriate.
- Contingency plans: Although alternatives to mass arrests are encouraged, contingency plans should be detailed should such actions become necessary to facilitate the restoration of order.
- Housing and population assessments and plans: Include information from assessments, which can include inmate capacities per facility and separation of genders or different age groups.
- Court procedures: Describe how follow-up civil processing will occur.

Once this processing plan is developed, brief and educate all personnel on processing and tracking procedures.

Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training

Train arresting officers on their roles and responsibilities to ensure that they are well-educated on how they should behave (e.g., patience, adaptability) and the types of criminal behavior that will not be tolerated (e.g., damaging property, crossing a police line). Combine training with MFF operations so that arrest-processing officers are familiar with field protocols. This combined training will allow arrest-processing officers and MFF operations to have a better understanding for how these processes work together. More specifically, arrest-processing officers will understand the philosophy of MFF command staff members and temper their role to compliment this function.

Conduct Arrests Quickly

Event-related arrest plans and procedures may have to be modified and amended in real-time. For example, during the 2012 DNC, CMPD learned that if it modified its arrest process to moving the arrest scene to another location, it could open roads and deescalate the original site. Future host departments should consider

BEST PRACTICE

Process arrests away from the arresting scene to deescalate demonstrators and unruly behavior.

immediately transporting arrested individuals to an off-site location for processing to effectively diffuse potentially violent situations during arrests.

Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence

During arrests, an individual will often have personal property that needs to be collected as evidence. Develop protocols for processing, handling, and storing evidence, prior to the event, so that during civil proceedings, such property can be easily tracked and obtained. Also keep in mind that the volume of personal effects that may need to be taken into custody may be large and require additional resources to adequately transport and stow these materials.

Toolkit References


The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for prisoner processing:

• A.20 Considerations for Processing Prisoners, Page A-71

3.13 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities

Coordinate security of critical infrastructure and utilities, in collaboration with interagency partners. Types of critical infrastructure include: energy systems, pipelines, utilities, waterways, hotels, communication networks, and mass transit systems.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities - Planning Checklist			
	Key Steps	Completed	
•	Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments		
•	Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure		
•	Request Assistance from the National Guard		
•	Use Risk Management Software		



Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments

Work with city and county stakeholders to conduct a risk assessment of physical infrastructure prior to the event. Assessments will help planners determine priority assets that must be secured, as well as the resources required to maintain them during the event. For example, in preparation of the 2012 RNC, TPD, in conjunction with DHS, assessed the risk of over 60 critical sites, such as utilities, waterways, and hotels. To accomplish this, TPD used risk management software and a survey tool developed for a previous presidential nominating convention.

Conduct cyber risk analysis and modeling to determine vulnerabilities, regional communication characteristics, and resiliency. Planners can develop and give host site entities a resiliency survey tool to assess their infrastructure and determine their strengths and weaknesses.

Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure

Develop a critical infrastructure operational plan in coordination with interagency partners and include the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of critical infrastructure protection and its importance to event security.
- Event details and participating agencies: Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- Primary/secondary venues, lifeline utilities, and support facilities: Include details on their location, significance, and normal use.
- Command and coordination: Include information on activated command centers, command structures, and communication protocols.
- **Interagency partners:** Agencies like the state National Guard can provide assistance with physical infrastructure. Other agencies, like U.S. Department of Defense and FBI, can provide assistance with cyber infrastructure.
- **Pre-event, event, and post-event support activities:** Outline major event-related activities, such as performing risk-based surveys or identifying key infrastructure contact pre-event, staffing infrastructure-protection desks at integrated command centers during the event, or transitioning back to steady-state operations post-event.
- Resources and staffing assignments: Detail staffing plans, schedules, and required equipment for critical infrastructure sites.

• Request Assistance from the National Guard

Local law enforcement agencies can request assistance from their state's National Guard if they require additional personnel, equipment, or capacities to maintain the security of critical infrastructure sites during the event. National Guard assets can be used to fill resource gaps for providing security at key critical infrastructure sites. National Guard assets can also be used to provide maintenance for fixed infrastructure (e.g., venues, electrical lines, natural gas lines) and organic assets (e.g., vehicles, weapons). Having additional trained personnel can provide an added layer of situational awareness and intelligence gathering to help properly allocate response assets. Many National Guard units also have supplemental Reaction Response Teams that can be pre-trained and stationed within an hour's distance to aid in potential incidents if additional security was required. However, if using the National Guard, the jurisdiction must budget funds to reimburse the National Guard for their costs, as with any other partner agency. Neither the Department of Defense nor the National Guard Bureau includes NSSEs or other response activities in their standard budgeting process. Interagency agreements or interstate funding transfers can be accomplished for reimbursement purposes.

Coordinate Response Efforts

Maintaining both infrastructure and utilities throughout an event requires proper coordination. This can be effectively achieved by setting up a non-security coordination center, like a CIRC. An established CIRC will allow for more situational awareness and a more robust common operating picture. City, county, and private-sector representatives (e.g., banks, water, power, and energy companies) from each of the 18 DHS identified critical infrastructure sectors ²³ should be represented at the CIRC. The CIRC will serve as a single point of contact for information and questions regarding critical infrastructure. A CIRC allows for representatives from different companies among the same sector to work together to solve problems.

• Use Risk Management Software

Use risk management software to categorize and track incidents according to levels of risk. These software tools can be used by specialized law enforcement units (such as intelligence teams) to track their positions in relation to critical infrastructures. This capability would allow special teams or forces to prioritize suspicious activity if it was near critical infrastructures.

If planners decide that a risk management tool would be useful for tracking critical infrastructure, they should make sure that all local and out-of-area personnel are trained on how to use it.

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²³ There are a total of 18 critical infrastructure sectors, identified by the criteria set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). These include: food and agriculture, defense industrial base, emergency, healthcare and public health, national monuments and icons, banking and finance, water, chemical, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, nuclear reactors/materials/waste, information technology, communications, postal and shipping, transportation systems, and government facilities.

Toolkit References

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for protecting critical infrastructures and utilities:

• A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment, Page A-7

3.14 Public Information and Media Relations

It is imperative for law enforcement, event leaders, and public information officers to effectively communicate unified and accurate information to both the public and the media in a timely manner. There are two major types of public information related to special events:²⁴

- General event information about the event: Examples include when the entrance doors or gates are open, when certain performers or activities begin and end, which VIPs are attending, parking locations, etc.
- **Security information**: What items are allowed (and not allowed) into the event, how to evacuate in case of emergency, where first aid services are located, etc.

Place special attention on identifying lead authorities and developing an operational plan that details strategies for engaging and coordinating public affairs for the public, demonstrators, and the media.

Public Information and Media Relations - Planning Checklist			
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
•	Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase		
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs		
•	Build Positive Relationships with Demonstration Groups		
•	Communicate Openly with the Media		
•	Keep the Community Informed		
•	Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center		
•	Provide On-site Information		
KEY: Clarge-Scale Security Events and NSSEs NSSEs			

²⁴ DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

• Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase

Early in planning, the lead agency and public information/affairs subcommittee should designate a Public Information Officer (PIO) who will oversee all public affairs matters. The designation of a single authority figure for releasing information can help promote efficiency and provide rumor control and corrective messaging. Designating the appropriate person early ensures opportunities for additional training, enhanced coordination between PIOs, and the ability for the PIO to meet with members of the media and potential demonstrator groups long before an event.

Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs

Develop a public information operational plan in coordination with local partners including information on the following elements:

- **Mission and goals:** Describe the purpose of public information and media relations and their importance to event security.
- Event details and participating agencies: Include information on the execution of the event and the roles and authorities of various agencies.
- **Information needs of the public:** Detail anticipated information needs, such as traffic plans and road closures, security screening protocols, or prohibited items.
- **Mechanisms for communication:** Describe plans for disseminating information to the public through press briefings, press releases, or social media.
- Strategies for media, law enforcement, community, and demonstrators outreach: Detail activities and various mechanisms that PIOs should engage in to educate these four critical audiences. A variety of concepts are listed in Appendix A: 21: "Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers," which can be tailored to different jurisdictions depending on the unique circumstances, geography, and demographics of each venue.

Build Positive Relationships with Demonstration Groups

Law enforcement and local PIOs can build positive relationships with demonstrators prior to the event by meeting with members of the ACLU to provide avenues for law enforcement executives to describe the operational philosophy for the event, and to set demonstrators' expectations on crowd control operations. Continue to build positive relationships, especially with demonstrators, by openly communicating security protocols and services available to the public. For example, to encourage friendly relationships with demonstrators during the 2012 RNC, TPD provided demonstrators with a pamphlet that listed where services (e.g., water and restrooms) could be located. TPD also announced daily weather reports to the demonstrators via its Long Range Acoustic Device system.

Communicate Openly with the Media

Media will be reporting on the event and requesting current information from local PIOs on event security measures, incidents, road closures, and/or traffic detours. Conduct regional meetings with key stakeholders from local services (e.g., schools, hospitals) that will be

BEST PRACTICE

Use public information campaigns to provide accurate and timely event-related information to the public and the media.

impacted by the event. Law enforcement representatives can set the media's expectations regarding the planned police operations and the department's planned response to violent demonstrators during these meetings. These meetings can also serve as a good platform to explain ground rules with the media (e.g., where they can set up, what access they will be given).

Provide designated secure areas for media to park satellite trucks and run operations. This designation will allow law enforcement to maintain some oversight of media operations, ensure that they do not interfere with traffic/event security, and demonstrate the police's attention media needs. Hold regular press briefings and disseminate press releases to keep the media abreast of security-related incidents and responses.

Keep the Community Informed

Provide the local community with information on law enforcement operations prior to and during the event. Hold town hall meetings facilitated by city leaders (e.g., the Mayor, the Police Chief, the Head of Transportation) to inform the public on what to expect prior to and during the event. To engage the public early:

- Develop a website with information regarding business services, transportation, security, and the event;
- Create email- or mobile phone-notification services for community members to sign up and receive alerts, updates, and changes in event plans; and
- Develop business alerts for local business that will be affected by the event.

Provide information updates through the above services, as well as through a public information hotline during the event. These strategies will ensure that the public has ample access to obtain security information about the event, which will likely reduce the amount of questions and discourage unwanted rumors. Having someone directly leading the planning efforts who is also accessible to the community will help to build community trust and lessen potential adverse reaction to event operations.

• Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center

Establish a unified Joint Information Center (JIC) to manage public information and media inquiries. This JIC will primarily be responsible for ensuring that local, state, and federal interagency unified messages are disseminated to the media.

A jurisdiction may also choose to set up its own local JIC to cover city-specific information needs. A local JIC can be useful in releasing city-wide unified messages that other event

entities will not have purview of, such as city or local business services. PIOs from within the city and neighboring localities can be brought in to manage this operation. Local law enforcement and other city partners must be ready to perform the following functions:

- Maps: Tracking incidents, traffic, and other information important to the media on a city map
- Fact-finding: Verifying event information/rumors from the media
- Status board: Tracking media-related activities within the JIC
- 3-1-1: Answering questions from the community on a public information hotline
- Information products: Developing press releases and information products
- Social media: Monitoring activity on social networks to verify rumors or gather intelligence

When setting up a local JIC, assign single PIOs to particular tasks for the entire event to ensure streamlined operations. Prior to the event, educate PIOs on their responsibilities and communications protocols, and then give them opportunity to participate in field training to improve their understanding of how public information ties into security operations. The local JIC should also work with other public information nodes and interagency partners to coordinate event-related messages.

• Provide On-site Information

Various tactics can be taken in the field to answer inquiries from the media and reduce uncertainty among spectators that can often lead to negative group mentalities. An easily identifiable on-site information center should be set up near event venues. Knowledgeable staff assigned to the center

BEST PRACTICE

Deploy Public Information Officers in the field to answer questions from the public.

can then answer security, medical, or other event-related questions. Establish and dispatch mobile PIOs wearing easily identifiable clothing (e.g., CMPD had mobile PIOs with vests stating, "Public Information Officer") to provide the public with quick and frequent access to public information.

Toolkit References

The following resource (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations related to public information and media relations:

• A.21 Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers, Page A-73

3.15 Screening and Physical Security

A critical mechanism for law enforcement to maintain control and public safety during a planned event is establishing security perimeters and checkpoints, and providing security for the airspace, the maritime space, and event venues.

Screening and Physical Security - Planning Checklist

	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
	Security Perimeters and Checkpoints	
•	Determine Secure Zones	
•	Establish Screening Protocols	
•	Define Staffing Responsibilities	
	Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters	
	Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones	
	Airspace Security	
•	Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols	
•	Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders	
	Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center	
	Airport Security	
	Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security	
•	Establish Traffic Control Strategies	
•	Communicate with Stakeholders	
	Maritime Security	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security	
	Venue Security	
•	Determine Lead Authority	
•	Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning	

	Screening and Physical Security - Planning Checklist							
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹						
•	Coordinate Venue Security Officers							
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs							

Security Perimeters and Checkpoints

The primary purpose of setting up security perimeters is to ensure the protection of both people and venues. Secure zones also allow law enforcement personnel to control access and to ensure that only appropriately credentialed personnel and patrons are permitted to access controlled areas. Since these events are often attended by dignitaries and VIPs, there are added security challenges. Appropriately established, staffed, and controlled access points aid in ensuring the safety of these high-profile individuals. Effectively establishing security perimeters and checkpoints requires steadfast attention to several key tasks.

• Determine Secure Zones

Collaborate early with law enforcement and security stakeholders to determine and negotiate secure zones; these zones directly impact a variety of other security-related activities (e.g., staffing assignments; parade routes; and locations for demonstrators, the media, or free speech zones). Secure zones are often set up as

BEST PRACTICE

Work with security stakeholders to establish security requirements that meet the needs of all entities.

multiple rings surrounding the main event venue(s). Available guidance suggests planning access control around main venues in terms of three perimeters (outer, middle, and inner), with greater security checkpoints as one moves closer to the event venue (e.g., visual identification checks to credential checks to body/vehicle scans and use of bomb sniffing dogs). Depending on the number of key event venues, there may be several areas of a city that require separate perimeters. Be prepared to continuously adjust secure zones due to the high likelihood of last minute changes and issues, including threats to dignitaries, venue relocations, or event time changes.

Using risk assessments and event information (e.g., the number of expected attendees and dignitaries), local law enforcement and federal interagency partners can adequately determine the number and corresponding security levels that are necessary for the event and event-related activities. This risk assessment must be conducted as a joint local and federal endeavor to leverage resources and knowledge inherent at both of these jurisdictional levels.

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²⁵ DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

This risk assessment should be conducted as early as possible in the planning process, as this information will be used to form key planning assumptions necessary to build the operational security plan. These key planning assumptions include identifying the secure zones, determining equipment needs for access control, and developing personnel estimates for access control.

Establish Screening Protocols

To secure each perimeter checkpoint, law enforcement officers will need to screen incoming persons and vehicles. Planners should clearly define the level of screening required at various secure zones and the different screening mechanisms that could be required for event patrons, staff, and media personnel. Decide if protocols for exiting and re-entering checkpoints should be established. Conduct exercises to test and time security check-point inspections to determine what cascading impacts (if any) screening time will have on ancillary operations (e.g., traffic and transportation plans and routes) once protocols have been established. A key aspect to screening is identifying the items that will be prohibited (e.g., weapons, alcohol, bottles, and backpacks). This list of prohibited items and screening protocols should be widely publicized prior to the event (via city promotions, websites, social media, and print/broadcast media) and clearly communicated through signage during the event.

• Define Staffing Responsibilities

Staffing responsibility will vary for events depending on the priority level identified by the lead credentialing entity. All officers assigned to perimeter checkpoints should be fully trained on screening protocols, such as verification of credentials and screening exemptions for clean vehicles, vendors, and/or deliveries. If private security companies are used for screening, provide similar training and additional reserve or sworn law enforcement personnel on site to provide assistance, as needed. Station local law enforcement familiar with the area at each checkpoint because much of the federal staffing will consist of personnel from outside the jurisdiction. Establishing a local law enforcement presence at these critical interaction points allows for more effective resolutions to issues in accordance to local custom and personality.

Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters

Work closely with federal partners to determine equipment needs and staffing assignments at checkpoints after perimeters have been determined. Equipment needs include scanning technologies (e.g., magnetometers or x-ray machines), as well as physical barriers in the form of cones, cement barricades, or fences. Careful consideration should be made to ensure that physical barriers cannot be moved or trespassed by event patrons (e.g., use anti-climb fences with links that are too small for people to insert their fingers through to gain traction).

During the event, have technicians on standby in case equipment needs to be repaired. Moreover, ensure that these technicians have all necessary security credentials should the need for on-site maintenance be required during the event.

▲ Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones

For NSSEs, the USSS will establish its own security perimeters and main event zones (hard zones). Though USSS personnel will be responsible for securing these areas, local law enforcement must coordinate with the USSS local security operations outside of the hard zones.

In addition, prior to NSSEs the USSS will conduct sweeps of the venues for explosive and hazardous materials. Once an area is deemed "clean," the USSS will lock it down, and event security measures are implemented. Local law enforcement should regularly communicate with the USSS to security sweeps plans and protocols in order to promote situational awareness and coordinate all operations personnel. Law enforcement should also work with the USSS during planning to determine when secure zones will be demobilized and become public space.

Airspace Security

Airspace security focuses on detecting, identifying, assessing, and mitigating airborne threats to the event and its participants. The USSS and Federal Aviation Administration will be the primary lead for airspace security, requiring assistance from local law enforcement as needed.

Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols

Become familiar with event airspace security plans that will outline airspace control measures, restrictions (including temporary flight restrictions), detection/monitoring, operations communications and coordination, and an integrated air defense plan that includes the use of military aviation support. During the event, identify who will handle dispatch of air missions and resource requests at the event's designated interagency operations center, in the event of overlapping security operations.

• Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders

Coordination of airspace plans and operations should include airport police, local law enforcement, and other relevant federal stakeholders (e.g., the U.S. Department of Defense, Federal Air Administration, and Transportation Security Administration).

lacktriangle Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center

For NSSEs, federal agencies typically coordinate command and control through an Airspace Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is responsible for tracking the status of all aviation missions and coordinating authorized flights in the airspace.

Airport Security

Airport security includes maintaining on-site physical security at local airports, directing traffic through terminals, and coordinating dignitary and VIP travel plans. Such security focuses on ensuring order, safety, and security of individuals' lives, civil liberties, and property at local airports.

Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security

Prior to the event, create a traffic plan for airports per consultation with local airport officials and law enforcement and include the following:

- Event resources and staff
- Anticipated dangers
- Crowd control protocols
- Traffic-movement plans
- Command/control
- Communication/information flows

In the plan, detail whether additional control measures for airspace security are required (as it relates to passengers, cargo, and general aviation traffic). For example, address whether Federal Air Marshal Service coverage or Customs and Border Protection passenger screeners need to be increased for the duration of the event. Identifying this need early on—and ensuring that adequate personnel are on hand—will help planners to avoid adverse impacts to other plans, such as traffic, transportation, and dignitary protection plans.

Avoid deviating from proven and successful traffic control strategies. For example, during the 2012 DNC, the Charlotte Airport Administration had civilians and cones in the road to direct traffic. Due to small terminal frontage space, this caused traffic backups. After recommendation from CMPD, the Airport Administration removed the civilians and cones, reducing the traffic delays for incoming vehicles and allowing traffic to flow without any interruption.

• Establish Traffic Control Strategies

The influx of people attending a large event will result in airport security having to handle significant increases in travelers. In a large event, such as an NSSE, there is an added component of high-profile persons requiring personal security protection. To effectively control airport traffic, develop strategic traffic plans for roadways and for indoor areas. One strategy to minimize vehicular traffic is to have motorcades staged in nearby lots for transporting dignitaries and VIPs to and from the airports, which will help to alleviate traffic impositions on the general public and event attendees, and will lessen the burdens on those charged with providing dignitary and VIP protection.

Another concern for airport security is heavy crowding inside airports on arrival/departure dates. Be flexible and use creative solutions to make potentially crowded areas more manageable for security. Using flight itineraries of event attendees, planners can estimate the

number of travelers by day and develop creative solutions for managing crowds. Work with airlines to allow selected personnel to pre-check bags or work with hotels to allow late checkouts, which will help to prevent personnel from waiting in lobby areas for extended periods of

BEST PRACTICE

Acquire sufficient personnel to coordinate VIP travel, and expect last-minute itinerary changes.

time.

Plan to provide additional resources at airport facilities on heavy arrival and departure days to ensure smooth operation of vehicle and pedestrian through-fares. Consider adding a Special Response Platoon two days prior to, and one day following the event to deal with the high volume of travelers.

Communicate with Stakeholders

State and local law enforcement are primarily responsible for airport security, in collaboration with airport police. Proper coordination and a shared communication channel are critical to airport security operations. This system will allow state and local law enforcement to coordinate with and provide situational updates to the airport police on the arrival of VIPs and possible protection details as they move throughout the airport.

Conduct daily briefings to coordinate and exchange dignitary/VIP arrival and departure itineraries, manage traffic, and allocate resources in support of these activities. Key personnel should include airport police, the Transportation Security Administration, and state and local law enforcement.

Maritime Security

Event venues located near major bodies of water will require maritime security, including the establishment and enforcement of water security zones, protection of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) (e.g., commercial vessels and MTS facilities), and maintenance of Maritime Domain Awareness to expeditiously identify potential threats to the event and to MTS.

Key elements for the operation command of maritime security—which should be detailed in an operational plan for maritime security—include safety of all personnel providing security; effective interagency communications; use and safety of search and rescue assets; tactical control coordinated through a maritime operations center; and personnel behaviors and use of force protocols.

BEST PRACTICE

Establish common and clear lines of communication for maritime security units, to ensure situational awareness of maritime security threats.

• Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security

Maritime security operational plans should include the following:

- **Command/control structures:** Include operations/planning/logistics/finance section chiefs, liaisons, protection units, and/or venue branch managers.
- Weather forecasts/tides/currents: Provide forecasts at the beginning of each operational period.
- Response objectives: Include information, such as providing waterside security of main venues, protecting the MTS, ensuring safety and security, or maintaining Maritime Domain Awareness to identify potential threats.

- Status of major maritime infrastructure: Include information such as whether traffic or transit is allowed for piers, rivers, bridges, or channels.
- Assignment lists: Include information on the locations of primary (peak), off-peak, and back-up personnel.
- Communications plans: Define radio, phone, and/or pager contact information for interagency personnel.
- Medical plans: Detail contact information for medical aid stations and hospitals.
- **Contingency plans:** Include plans for severe or heavy weather (e.g., storms or hurricanes), and ensure that weather plans account for an adequate number of vessels to continuously secure area bridges.
- Other related plans: Include information on decontamination, force protection, or demobilization plans.

Venue Security

The mission of venue security is to provide a safe and secure environment for main event venues and for attendees staying in hotels.

Determine Lead Authority

Identify the lead authority for various event venues to prevent duplicative planning efforts, and to assess any resource needs. During an NSSE, the USSS is in charge of security at the venues, while local law enforcement is in charge of event venues that fall outside the secure zone, such as hotels, restaurants, or meeting spaces. In every case, local law enforcement will be called upon to handle disturbances and make arrests in the secure zone, event venues, and throughout the affected area of the event.

Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning

Local law enforcement must participate in early planning, in the form of regular or weekly meetings, with federal partners and outside agencies. Early collaborations will allow the planning subcommittees to establish relationships with key stakeholders. Collaboration should include all appropriate stakeholders—such as the local fire department, department of public works, TSA, U.S. Postal Inspector Service, U.S. Department of Defense, state National Guard, and U.S. Department of State—that have assets and infrastructures related to the security of event venues. Planned activities for venue security should include site vulnerability assessments, emergency preparedness, environmental impacts, and the identification of technical and tactical assets. Determine if security perimeters will be established and how they will be maintained (e.g., required physical barriers, detection technologies, and/or vehicle sweeps).

Include both emergency evacuation and contingency plans in the event of an emergency or overflow of attendees. All of these planning elements should be detailed in the operational plan, which should include timelines for venue security (such as when site visits should be conducted) and for secure zones that will be swept and cleaned; and the location of temporary vehicle and magnetometer checkpoints.

Conduct site visits and walk-throughs of all event venues in order to plan for daily operations and special circumstances prior to the event.

Coordinate Venue Security Officers

Adequately staff critical posts to ensure that law enforcement has oversight of the entire venue and can respond quickly to incidents. Effective strategies for officer assignments may include:

- Place officers on permanent duty assignments to prevent officers from having to continuously orient themselves to new venues.
- Assign local officers to venue security, as they are familiar with the area and can provide directions to outsiders.
- Ensure a sufficient number of personnel to allow for the flexible allocation of resources, especially during VIP visits or during times when potential security problems are anticipated.

Toolkit References

The following checklists (found in Appendix A) can be used to assess planning and operations of access control:

- A.22 Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist, Page A-81
- A.23 Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist, Page A-83

3.16 Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials

Due to the high-profile nature and mass media attention of large-scale security events, law enforcement must be ready to respond to terrorist threats or attacks. Public safety agencies must be able to respond to, assess, and render safe any hazardous materials, suspicious items, or improvised explosive devices during an event.

Tactical support and explosive device response planning should focus on safeguarding life and property, minimizing panic and disruptions to venues, and restoring situations to normal as soon as possible after an incident. Hazardous threats include explosives, chemicals, biological toxins, radiological sources, "military" chemical weapons, and nuclear devices. ²⁶ Prior to the event, law enforcement should use counterterrorism intelligence and threat assessments to identify potential and propriety threats for the event.



²⁶ DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, 2007.

Tac	Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/ Hazardous Materials - Planning Checklist							
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹						
•	Combine HAZMAT and Explosive Device Response (EDR) Planning							
•	Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT							
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs							

Combine HAZMAT and EDR Planning

Collaborate with local partners and with state/regional/federal agencies to maintain situational awareness of HAZMAT and explosive response actions and protective measures.

Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT

HAZMAT and ERD response plans should contain the following elements:

- Event overview and mission: Describe the purpose of the event and how HAZMAT operations are important to event security.
- **Primary and secondary venues:** Detail locations of high-risk areas, including event venues, hotels, and parking garages.
- **Staffing assignments:** Detail how response teams will be staffed and when they will be operational (shifts).
- Communication protocols: Describe interagency how teams will communicate and if they will need encrypted channels. Also common HAZMAT terminology as it relates to the event, including differentiating between terms the

BEST PRACTICE

Consider using Hazard Assessment Teams to quickly respond to and clear suspicious packages.

- "suspicious," "unattended," "bomb," and "incendiary device." Establish one center number for the All Hazards Desk to receive calls.
- Execution protocols: Include information on how local, state, and federal partners will respond to incidents. Determine if different procedures are required to respond to unattended packages/vehicles and/or suspicious packages/vehicles. Educate and train response personnel (bomb technicians and canine handlers) on these protocols so they can more accurately assess calls and respond appropriately.
- Command and control: Detail activated operations centers, bomb management centers, or canine operations areas.

- Response team protocols: Describe response teams, their mission/activities, and who will be staffing them. Use the Render Safe Procedure Teams (RSP) or Hazard Assessment Teams (HAT) to respond to HAZMAT calls and Heavy Decontamination Teams to respond to decontamination/fire calls.
- **Security sweeps:** Detail how security sweeps will be conducted and who will conduct them.
- Other operational response: Include information on resources needs (e.g., equipment or canines), technology implementation and training, threat responses, render-safe procedures, post-blast responses, intelligence, and tactical medics.

Toolkit References

The following checklist (found in Appendix A) can be used for tactical support and explosive device response planning and operations:

• A.24 Bomb Threat Checklist, Page A-85

3.17 Training

Training is a key component for protecting public safety during event operations. Training is an important way to build skills and to educate staff on the expected roles, responsibilities, and performance when participating in the event. Work closely with all stakeholders and conduct a training needs assessment to determine the type and level of training required for security personnel early in the planning phase.

	Training - Planning Checklist	
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Recommend Federal Incident Management Training	
•	Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum	
•	Deliver Training in Various Forms	
•	Track Training Sessions	
•	Test Personnel Post Training	
	Conduct Drills and Exercises	

	Training - Planning Checklist								
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹							
•	Give Training Resources to Officers								
•	Provide the Community with Training								
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs								

• Recommend Federal Incident Management Training

DHS/FEMA offers online Incident Command System training ²⁷ as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) curriculum. This valuable online training tool covers standard, on-scene, all-hazards responses and provides an opportunity for all personnel involved to have a basic understanding of command structures.

Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum

Focus training on educating all officers of the overall security plan for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. In addition, provide specialized training to officers in their assigned duties. Specialized units, such as bomb squads or Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, may not need additional training, as they are typically required to participate routine training to maintain certification.

Suggested training topics include, but are not limited to, the following:²⁸

- Tactics for managing and controlling crowds (see section 3.4 for more details)
- Command and control structures
- Communication protocols
- Legal issues

• Use of specialized equipment or technologies (e.g., credentialing software or camera systems)

- Timekeeping and payroll
- Demobilization

Place careful consideration on the training sequence. Focus training on planned non-confrontational tactics, protocols, and strategies. These strategies will differ from federal training which tends to use worst case scenarios to educate on crowd management tactics.

²⁷ DHS/FEMA Incident Command System training resources can be found online at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm.

²⁸ See Appendix A for a more detailed list of training courses that can be offered.

The local agency should determine how they want to effectively instill their chosen philosophy for policing for the event.

Provide specific training to supervisors as well. Such training will give supervisors a clear sense of their roles and responsibilities and increase their accountability to ensure that these tactics are adequately implemented by their subordinate staff. This training will also provide a platform for ensuring that supervisors understand the philosophy of enforcement, and the specific expectations of the host department.

Deliver Training in Various Forms

Training is critical to ensure that all officers receive and understand the message. Training can be delivered in many facets: web-based classes, Microsoft[®] PowerPoint presentations, and webinars, with a direct message from the chief or sheriff, or inperson at training academies. Offer training multiple times to provide officers with the flexibility they need to fit training into their pre-event workloads.

BEST PRACTICE

Develop a mechanism for tracking training sessions to ensure all officers receive the necessary training to perform their job function.

Track Training Sessions

Catalogue and track all training activities so that the department can accurately manage who has completed what type of training, the associated personnel hours for payroll, and the times when outside personnel will be in town and require lodging for training sessions. Have subcommittees report to local law enforcement on their scheduled training sessions and the anticipated number of personnel participating in the sessions. Tracking training may also be important after the event to support financial reimbursement or to defend officers against legal claims.

Test Personnel Post Training

The department must ensure that officers fully understand and absorb training on event philosophies, protocols, and plans. Implement post-tests following training sessions to assess officer's comprehension of the material and principles they are taught.

• Conduct Drills and Exercises

As stated previously in this primer, conduct training, drills, and exercises (tabletop, functional, of full-scale) prior to the event in order to provide personnel and operations centers with opportunities to define, test, and learn their roles and proper communication mechanisms. Exercises allow personnel from various agencies to test the efficacy of the operational plan, to build collaborative relationships, and to ensure that personnel are aware of their roles and responsibilities.

• Give Training Resources to Officers

During the event, provide officers with a field or "pocket" guide that they can quickly refer to for answers regarding basic security functions, including the department's use of force policy and arrest procedures; information on medical illnesses; hazardous materials; maps depicting the event zone, comfort stations, and the public viewing area; a list of items

prohibited citywide; and radio communication protocols. This is valuable in minimizing the amount of questions field supervisors receive from their officers, allowing them to focus on security operations.

Additional references can be provided for information the department feels is critical. For example, for the 2012 DNC and RNC, CMPD and TPD provided every officer with reference brochures and cards that listed the profile of radio channels. ²⁹ This reference material served as a quick guide and as on-the-job training for using the

BEST PRACTICE

Develop a pocket guide for field officers to provide a quick-reference of important event-related information.

radio and related equipment (e.g., earpieces and microphones). and identifying call signs.

Provide the Community with Training

BEST PRACTICE

Conduct a Citizen's Academy to provide the public with the information they need to build a positive perception of the department's security plans and efforts.

Training can also be provided to the public and community stakeholders through an event specific Citizen's Academy. Tailor this training to a public audience and provide community leaders with the information they need to build a positive perception of the department's efforts and to ensure public

safety during the event. Training can include information lectures and scenario training on the department's mission and goals, as well as tactics and protocols for the security operation. Two weeks prior to the 2012 RNC, TPD hosted a Citizen's Academy to educate community leaders on the department's security operations. The session included scenarios of incidents that have occurred in past protests, and the law enforcement response to these different types of incidents, including the escalating levels of violence.

Toolkit References

The following references (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations for training:

- A.25 Training and Exercise Course Catalogue Checklist, Page A-87
- A.26 Training Request Form, Page A-91
- A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides. Page A-93

3.18 Transportation and Traffic Management

Transportation is critical to security for a large-scale event and is often one of the major elements that will quickly impact attendee's impressions of the event's organization, security, command, and control.

Transportation and Traffic Management - Planning Checklist

²⁹ These pocket guides can be found in Appendix A: Section 2.17 – Training.

	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Collaborate with Other Stakeholders	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation	
•	Be Flexible	
•	Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities	
•	Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic	
•	Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses	
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs	

• Collaborate with Other Stakeholders

The impact on a jurisdiction's transportation system can be effectively minimized through comprehensive and early planning. Transportation planners, likely led by the local Department of Transportation and police department, must work together to coordinate motorcade and waterway route security for the safe transportation of VIPs and event participants, as well as to develop a plan for the control, diversion/rerouting of pedestrian and commercial traffic. Planners should hold meetings and have direct access to stakeholders with operational areas affected by transportation to ensure proper coordination of transportation needs. This may include collaboration with sworn officers and civilian entities from the following:

- Crowd management, civil disturbance, or arrest processing for demonstrators blocking roads;
- Intelligence/counter surveillance for intelligence on changing routes;
- **Dignitary/VIP protection** for managing and coordinating their routes;

BEST PRACTICE

Work with other subcommittees to understand their transportation needs, and the impact that these needs will have in developing the transportation plan.

- Explosive device response/HAZMAT for responding to suspicious packages found on routes;
- **Fire/health/medical personnel** for event patrons or officers with heat exhaustion and/or dehydration;
- **Interagency communications** for maintaining coordinated communication and situational awareness:

- Venue security for effective and efficient access to event venues; and
- **Airspace security** for effective and efficient access to airports.

In addition, planners can use the expertise of city traffic personnel, particularly local traffic engineers, for designing road closures. While local law enforcement works with city traffic planners, it should be mindful that city traffic planners are not police officers; therefore, they do not recognize the challenges police face in terms of staffing for a change in roadway patterns.

BEST PRACTICE

Work with city traffic engineers to design road closures and be mindful that they do not recognize the challenges of staffing changes in roadway patterns.

Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation

Transportation and traffic plans will depend on the area perimeters designated by the lead law enforcement agency as secured zones. The following traffic considerations should be detailed in plans:

- Road closures: Include plans for secure hot zones and equipment/signage needed for road closures. Produce user-friendly maps and websites, FAQs, and hold town hall meetings to educate outsiders of planned road closures.
- **Transit assets:** Determine operational status of mass transit systems and parking facilities. Designate parking lots for housing buses used for VIP transportation.
- **Staffing plans:** Detail plans for traffic posts and directing traffic. Evaluate how many officers are required and what key intersections need to be staffed. Remember that controlling traffic is a basic police function that officers from outside of the area can manage. Also consider staffing plans for outside route security to protect delegates/VIPs staying farther from main event areas.
- Command and control: Designate a site where traffic commanders will control and monitor traffic.
- **Technologies:** Detail the use of camera systems for traffic surveillance.
- Communications plans: Detail protocols and mechanisms for personnel to communicate during the event.
- **Contingency plans:** Design a number of contingency or alternate traffic routes in the event of demonstrations or other roadblocks.
- Transportation of large groups of VIPs or delegates: Create secure motorcade routes early on, using educated estimates of anticipated traffic activities. Develop protocols to sweep VIP or delegate buses to ensure that they are clean. Make sure vehicles are accessible to individuals with special access and functional needs.

Be Flexible

During the event, flexibility and frequent communication are critical for efficient real-time operations, and facilitate command-level decision making. The use of mobile relief squads on motorcycles or patrol cars can speed up responses to traffic-specific needs.

Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities

Traffic operations encompass a multitude of widely differing activities. Break up the following traffic functions into separate subcommittees, each with a single commander: traffic management, motorcades, and buses for VIPs. This will allow commanders to focus their attention to activities related to a single function and will prevent particular incidents from being overlooked.

• Use Officers, Signage, and Other Resources to Guide Traffic

Strategically disperse traffic officers at street intersections to help guide traffic. Provide each officer with detailed maps and directions informing them of major street closures, one-way streets, and checkpoints. This will help guide officers who are unfamiliar with the local area or new traffic protocols, thus promoting smooth flows of traffic. It is important to ensure that enough staff is assigned to producing advanced materials prior to the event.

Station adequate signage to direct traffic to checkpoints and exits and use physical barriers, such as jersey barriers, to cordon off street traffic. Strategically placed barriers and signs can effectively inform and direct vehicles trying to navigate the area and prevent traffic back-ups that could compromise the safety of the event environment.

Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses

VIPs or delegates (in the case of national political conventions) will require secure transportation. When coordinating such transportation, local law enforcement should work closely with event planners and private companies hired to transport VIPs, to ensure that all parties fully understand transportation plans, protocols, equipment (e.g., GPS), and routes.

Develop protocols to sweep VIP or delegate buses to ensure that they are clean and safe prior to the event. Work with event planners to ensure that vehicles are accessible to individuals with access and functional needs, to avoid complications with having to identify additional secure resources to transport these individuals during the event.

In some cases, law enforcement may need to help coordinate transportation. It is important that field commanders are on-hand with proper communication mechanisms to mitigate travel problems.

Toolkit References

The following template (found in Appendix A) can be used for planning and operations to manage transportation and traffic:

• A.26 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template, Page A-107

An additional reference that contains useful information for planning for transportation and traffic management:

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

• U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, *National Special Security Events: Transportation Planning for Planned Special Events*, Washington, D.C., May 2011.

Managing	Large-Scale S	ecurity Events

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Section 4: Post-event Considerations

4.1 Demobilization

At the end of a large-scale security event, agencies might close down their operations prematurely. However, properly closing operations and bringing business back to normal is critical for ensuring community safety.

Begin demobilization efforts during the planning stages and continue throughout the event life-cycle. Law enforcement agencies must decide on a logical order to release and out-process officers and to collect resources coming back in from the field (e.g., equipment, supplies, and vehicles). Designate a point of contact to release personnel and resources. In addition, as officers are out-processed, they should be required to submit completed timecards and travel information so that local law enforcement can accurately complete payroll for visiting personnel.

LESSON LEARNED

CMPD learned that demobilization efforts should be set up before the event closes. CMPD was not prepared for visiting agencies to leave immediately after (and sometimes before) their duty assignments ended. CMPD's plans to out-process officers in set locations on the last day of the event had to quickly change to deploying CMPD personnel to multiple locations to out-process people and gather equipment.

In addition, barricades, fences, and other resources used to secure perimeters and mobile command or medical sites must be disassembled in a timely manner and temporary adjustments to critical infrastructure must be made so that normal city operations can resume.

4.2 After-Action Analysis

BEST PRACTICE

After-action analysis should begin in the planning phase.

The after-action process is a critical step to evaluate and better understand a host jurisdiction's performance—including strengths and areas for improvement—following any major event or large operational activation. Begin the evaluation process in

conjunction with other pre-event planning activities. Evaluators must participate in the pre-event design discussions to ensure that the post-event analysis accurately captures all phases of the planning and operational processes. For the most accurate evaluation, evaluators should come from both internal and external sources, to ensure a diverse perspective. Evaluators should be chosen based on their expertise in operational activities or the standard operating procedures for the venue/site that they will observe. Evaluators will observe the event at specific venues/sites that have roles and responsibilities related to the host jurisdiction's objectives or areas of focus. At each site, evaluators will need to record performance capabilities and capture any unresolved issues. They will also ensure that data is collected whenever possible to support their after-action analyses.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Following the event, evaluators should take part in a hotwash and/or de-briefing, which consists of a facilitated discussion held immediately after an event. This hotwash will allow the evaluators the opportunity to capture feedback about any issues, concerns, or proposed improvements. It is also an opportunity for all individuals involved in the event to express their opinions, which will later be incorporated into the overall after-action report. The team of evaluators will compile and analyze all of the data collected to assess outcomes related to pre-identified operational areas. The data will include the evaluator's notes and any other materials or documents produced at their location that may add to the analysis process. Data-consolidation is an important first step in the analysis, and it documents what happened during the exercise. It also supports the evaluators in determining *why* events happened, by providing the necessary data to determine root causes. ³⁰ The analysis will highlight all observations deemed most relevant for the jurisdiction to have the best overall report of their activities throughout the event process.

The main products of the evaluation process and analysis are a timeline (or reconstruction) of key events and an after-action report. The timeline record consists of key events, decisions, and resource deployments, which may prove important post-event. The AAR captures observations of the event and will include recommendations, best practices, and lessons learned for post-event improvements.

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³⁰ A "root cause" is the causal factor of an identified issue, as uncovered during detailed analysis, toward which the evaluators can direct recommendations.

Section 5: Conclusion

Operations of previous large-scale events such as NSSEs have provided valuable lessons learned and best practices that can inform, prepare, and better equip planners, senior leaders, and decision-makers hosting events in their own jurisdiction. These events pose the potential for violent demonstrations, clashes between police and demonstrators, and high risk to officer safety. Recognize that different tactics, strategies, and a common philosophy should be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers assisting in the response. The strategic vision should focus on local law enforcement's ability to effectively maintain security and public safety, with special attention paid to minimizing disruptions caused by demonstrators, avoiding unnecessary arrests, and preserving Constitutional rights and civil liberties.

Build a Foundation for Success

To establish a foundation of success for this vision, it is critical that law enforcement begin with early planning, clear leadership, and a comprehensive operational plan that incorporates the needs and response efforts of all participating stakeholders. Planning should include the identification of core operational areas applicable to the event, 18 of which were outlined in this report. These core areas will guide the agency as it determines staffing requirements and recruits police officers both from within and outside of their jurisdiction. These officers are vital to providing safety to event venues, critical infrastructure sites, delegates/VIPs, and event attendees. As planning proceeds, maintain coordinated and open lines of communication and a flexible mentality toward expected changes during planning and operations.

Highlighted Strategies

Some of the notable strategies discussed in this report highlight the importance of using both traditional and non-traditional approaches to policing, include:

- Develop a strategic vision and effectively communicate it to officers and the public
- Supplement traditional criminal intelligence with live video surveillance technologies, deployable cameras on undercover officers, or social media–monitoring to maintain situational awareness and make real-time response and resource-allocation decisions.
- Use bicycles as mobile barriers
- Promote a shift in officer training for crowd control tactics and non-confrontational techniques to maintain officer composure.

Public Information and Media Relations

Since large-scale events can draw media attention and demonstrators from across the nation, carefully planned security operations are critical to maintaining a safe environment for event goers and for deescalating potentially violent situations. Clear public information is crucial for ensuring that demonstrators exercise their right to free speech, while also functioning within clearly defined parameters. In addition, training is crucial for ensuring that all law

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

enforcement offices and other stakeholders understand their strategic vision to minimize arrests; deescalate situations whenever possible; and provide a safe, secure environment for all who choose to operate within those parameters.

Therefore, proper security planning and multi-agency coordination throughout the entirety of the event (before, during, and after) are paramount to local law enforcement's ability to maintain a safe environment and to conduct a successful event.

Additional Resources, Templates, and Checklists

Law enforcement agencies nationwide can benefit from the lessons learned and best practices that are documented in this Planning Primer. An interactive toolkit is provided in **Appendix A**, which serves as a useful instrument for developing operational plans. By having solid plans in place, law enforcement will be better prepared for incidents and to achieve event goals, such as reduced response times, reduced civil unrest, and a heightened sense of public safety throughout a large-scale event.

Appendix A. Planning Toolkit

This Planning Toolkit provides considerations, templates, and checklists for local law enforcement to use when planning and conducting operations for a large-scale security event. Local law enforcement planners should remember that these templates and checklists serve as guides and, in some cases, should be scaled to the event and tailored to the specific needs of the agency.

The information provided in this toolkit was gathered through a number of resources, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency's 2005 document, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual³¹; the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs' Office of the Chief Financial Officer 2011 Financial Guide; 32 and planning material developed by local law enforcement and the U.S. Secret Service that was used in the 2012 Republican National Convention and the 2012 Democratic National Convention. CNA also developed additional checklists and forms using the lessons learned and best practices gathered and documented in the post-event analysis of the 2012 national conventions.

Table A. Planning Tool Kit References

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Core Operational Area	Applicable Planning Checklists and Forms	Appendix Page #						
Planning	A.1: Pre-event Planning Matrix	A-5						
	A.2: Hazard Vulnerability Assessment ³³	A-7						
	A.3: Operational Plan Template ³⁴	A-11						
2.1 Administrative and	A.4: Logistic Information Survey	A-13						
Logistics Support	A.5: Food Vendor Information Sheet	A-15						
	A.6: Inspection Checklist for Vendors	A-19						
	A.7: Hotel Survey Questionnaire	A-23						
2.2 Command and Control	A.8: Incident Organization Chart Template	A-31						

³¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual, 2005.

³² U.S. Department of Justice/Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Planning and Managing* Security for Major Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement, 2007.

³³ The checklist in Section A.2 applies to two core operational areas: Pre-Event Planning and Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities.

³⁴ The checklist in Section A.3 applies to multiple core operational areas; Pre-Event Planning, Dignitary/VIP Protection, and Non-Event Patrol.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Core Operational Area	Applicable Planning Checklists and Forms	Appendix Page #
	A.9: Organization Assignment List Template	A-33
2.3 Credentialing	A.10: Credentialing Checklist	A-35
2.4 Crowd management	A.11: Considerations for Managing Crowds	A-39
2.5 Dignitary/VIP Protection	A.3: Operational Plan Template 35	A-11
2.6 Financial/grant management	A.12: Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance	A-47
	A. 13: Financial Provisions and Policies	A-51
	A.14: Post award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse	A-55
2.7 Fire/ Emergency Medical Services (EMS)/ Hospitals/ Public Health	A.15: EMS Venue Assessment Checklist	A-59
2.8 Intelligence/ counterterrorism/ counter surveillance	A.16: Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist	A-61
2.9 Interagency communications and technology	A.17: Incident Radio Communications Plan	A-63
2.10 Legal	A.18: Legal Affairs Checklist	A-65
	A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances	A-67
2.11 Non-event patrol	A.3: Operational Plan Template ³⁶	A-11
2.12 Arrest processing	A.20: Considerations for Processing Arrestees	A-71
2.13 Protecting critical	A.2: Hazard Vulnerability Assessment ³⁷	A-7

35 Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The checklist in Section A.2 applies to two core operational areas: Pre-Event Planning and Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Core Operational Area	Applicable Planning Checklists and Forms	Appendix Page #				
infrastructure and utilities						
2.14 Public information and media relations	A.21: Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers	A-73				
2.15 Access control: screening and physical	A.22: Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist	A-81				
security	A.23: Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist					
2.16 Tactical support and explosive device response/ Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)	A.24: Bomb Threat Checklist	A-85				
2.17 Training	A.25: Training and Exercise Course Checklist	A-87				
	A.26: Training Request Form	A-91				
	A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides	A-93				
2.18 Transportation and traffic	A.28 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template	A-111				

Managing Large-Scale Security Events
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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A.1 Pre-Event Planning Matrix

Because responsibilities vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, certain risks or hazards are not always handled by only one agency. This matrix is designed to determine the risks and hazards to which your agency is held. Refer to the corresponding page in the Job Aids Manual.³⁸

If more than one agency is tasked to respond to the risk or hazard, some overlap of responsibility may occur. One way to handle this is to place a "P" in the primary agency position and an "S" in the support agency position. The responsibilities of each agency must be discussed and decided in the planning stages, not when an incident occurs.

Table A.1-1: Pre-event Planning Matrix

					Ciit i iui								
	County Agency	Emergency Medical	Emergency Management	Federal Aviation Administration	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agency	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/ Sponsor
Abandoned Vehicles													
Airspace Encroachment													
Suspicious Package													
Bomb Threat													
Civil Disturbance													
Communications													
Credentials													
Crowd Control													
Demonstrations													
Dignitary Protection													
Emergency Medical													
Services													
First Aid Stations													
Food Handling													
Hazardous Materials													

³⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, 2005.

	County Agency	Emergency Medical	Emergency Management	Federal Aviation Administration	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agency	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/ Sponsor
Media Relations													
Motorcades													
Parking													
Permitting													
Portable Water													
Terrorist Threat													
Ticketing													
Traffic Control													
Weather Hazards			•									·	·

A.2 Hazard Vulnerability Assessment³⁹

Consider conducting a hazard vulnerability assessment. Local/state emergency management agencies can assist with conducting a vulnerability analysis. These assessments are important to the development of operational and contingency plans.

Frequency Distribution

Assign a frequency distribution for each type of hazard identified in the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3 below). A frequency distribution categorizes the jurisdiction's exposure to each hazard (that is, the likelihood of occurrence for each type of hazard). Exposure can be assessed in terms of cycles, hours, or years. The definitions of frequency distribution are shown in Table A.2-1 below.

Table A.2-1: Frequency Distribution

	146.6742 1111.6946.169 2.641.1644.1611
Exposure	Frequency
Highly likely = 3	The potential for impact is very probable (near 100 percent) in the next
	year.
Likely = 2	The potential for impact is greater than 10 and less than 100 percent within
	the next year.
	Or
	There is at least one chance of occurrence within the next 10 years.
Possible = 1	The potential for impact is between 1 and 10 percent within the next year.
	Or
	There is at least one chance of occurrence within the next 100 years.
Unlikely = 0	The potential for impact is less than 1 percent in the next 100 years.

Severity Ratings

Use historical and analytical data to assign a severity rating to each type of hazard that the team identifies in the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3 below). The severity ratings selected should quantify, to the degree possible, the damage to be expected in the jurisdiction as a result of a specific hazard. The definitions of the severity ratings are shown in Table A.2-2 below.

Table A.2-2: Severity Ratings

Population/Poverty Level of Severity	Definition
Catastrophic = 3	Multiple deaths.
	Complete shutdown of critical facilities for 30 days or more.

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³⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, 2005.

Population/Poverty Level of Severity	Definition
	More than 50 percent of property is severely damaged.
Critical = 2	Injuries and/or illness result in permanent disability. Complete shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks. More than 25 percent of property is severely damaged.
Limited = 1	Injuries and/or illness do not result in permanent disability. Complete shutdown of critical facilities for more than 1 week. More than 10 percent of property is severely damaged.
Negligible = 0	Injuries/or illness are treatable with first aid. Minor quality of life lost. Shutdown of critical facilities and services for 24 hours or less. No more than 1 percent of property is severely damaged.

Ranking the Hazards

Using the severity and frequency distribution definitions, identify potential hazards for the event and rank them in the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3 below).

Table A.2-3: Hazard Rating Worksheet

	Tubi	e A.Z-3. Hazaru	Rating Works	CCL	
Hazard	Frequency	Potential Impact on	Potential Impact on	Level of Coverage in Emergency	Point Total
		Population	Property	Operations Plan	
	0 = Unlikely	0 = Negligible	0 = Negligible	0 = None	
	1 = Possible	1 = Limited	1 = Limited	1 = Limited	
	2 = Likely	2 = Critical	2 = Critical	2 = Sufficient	
	3 = Highly	3 = Catastrophic	3 = Catastrophic	3 = Comprehensive	
	Likely			(annex)	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	
	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3	

Recording the Information

Using the information from the Hazard Rating Worksheet (Table A.2-3), complete the Profile Worksheet (Table A.2-4) below to assess each hazard.

Table A.2-4: Profile Worksheet

Hazard Profile Worksheet

Hazard:

Potential Magnitude:

- Catastrophic: Can affect more than 50 percent of the jurisdiction.
- Critical: Can affect between 25 and 50 percent of the jurisdiction.
- Limited: Can affect between 10 and 25 percent of the jurisdiction.
- Negligible: Can affect less than 10 percent of the jurisdiction.

Areas Likely to be Most Affected (by sector):

Probable Duration:

Potential Speed of Onset:

- More than 24 hours warning will probably be available.
- Between 12 and 24 hours warning will probably be available.
- Between 6 and 12 hours warning will be available.
- Minimal (or no) warning will be available.

Existing Warning Systems:

Vulnerability Analysis:

[Using the information gathered in the above tables, and with the assistance from your local/state management agency, complete a Vulnerability Analysis]

Managing Large-Scale Security Events
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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A.3 Operational Plan Template®

An operations plan serves as the blueprint for the joint strategy, within a particular functional discipline, for resolution of an incident or ongoing problem, as well as overall event-support management.

[Name of Subcommittee/Working Group]

Situation:

- Nature and significance of event
- Venue(s) information
 - Location
 - o Special significance
 - o Normal use
- Security infrastructure, if applicable to subcommittee/working group
- Significant dates pertaining to event, including set-up and tear-down of command centers, if applicable

Mission:

- Clear and concise statement of intended purpose of the operation in support of the event
- During normal event operations
- During an incident pertaining to the particular functional discipline

Execution:

This is the bulk of the document. It includes the full details of the subcommittee/working group's operational plan:

- Resources allocated to the event and surrounding area
- Manpower allocated to the event and surrounding area
- List of specific tasks by operational and support assets relative to:
 - o The event during normal operations
 - o Any incidents at the event
- Specifics of how each task will be accomplished
- Specific information regarding hazards or dangers that may impede response to an incident
- Transition, if any needed, from normal event operations to incident-response mode

⁴⁰ This operational plan template was provided to TPD by the USSS to assist the subcommittee groups in developing their operational plan.

Administration:

- Subcommittee/working group member agencies
- Recipients of plan and any identified caveats (e.g., "Official Use Only" or "Law Enforcement Sensitive")
- Locations of command centers and staging areas relevant to the particular functional discipline
- Staffing and scheduling of manpower and assets

Command/Coordination:

- Command structure within the particular functional discipline
- Coordinating instructions to personnel
- All communications logistics
 - o Radio frequencies and assignments
 - o Phone and fax numbers for command centers and staging locations
- Detailed information-flow plan for normal event operations
 - To provide ongoing situational awareness to the Multi-agency Command Center (MACC) throughout the event period
 - o Among operational elements
 - o To/from the MACC, Joint Operations Center (JOC), or other operational center
- Detailed information flow plan in the event of a request for assistance
 - o To another functional discipline
 - o To the MACC, JOC, or other operational center
 - Ex: "If I am responsible for securing a dignitary hotel and need an ambulance or fire truck, how do I call for that?"

Appendices:

• Any certifying body's standards or interagency agreements for how the subcommittee/working group's mission is accomplished.

A.4 Logistics Information Form41

Use this form to identify what resources will be needed from each subcommittee/working group.

Date:			
To: Lo	ogistics [Working Group/Subcommittee]		
From: [Working Group/Subcommittee]			
_	, Chair/Co-Chair		
Brief Description of Training Need:			
1. Transp	portation		
•			
a.	What types of vehicles/modes of transportation do you need to be rented and/or		
	acquired (gap between anticipated resources and operational plan)?		
	Passenger Vans?		
• Cars?			
	• Buses?		
	Storage Trucks?		
	-		
	• Other?		
b.	What are your anticipated fuel requirements?		
2. Person	inel		
a.	Number of personnel currently outlined in your Draft Operational Plan?		
	Will you need relief items delivered to fixed post personnel?		

⁴¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual, 2005.

3.	Equipment				
	a. What special equipment/supplies will the [Working Group/Subcommittee] need in order to close any gaps between anticipated resources and resources required under Draft Operational Plan? (e.g., generators, large items, fencing, flex cuffs)				
		——————————————————————————————————————			
	b.	Will this equipment be managed by the Logistics [Working Group/Subcommittee]?			
4.	Su	pport			
	a.	Is there any additional support that the [Working Group/Subcommittee] will need to operate beyond anticipated available resources? (e.g., shuttles w/driver, portable toilets, trash disposal)			
	b.	Will you require a first aid station or medical support beyond what the [Working Group/Subcommittee] can currently provide?			
5.	Но	ousing for Mutual Aid			
		a. Will incoming personnel require hotel rooms?			
		b. How many days will the rooms be needed?			
6.	Fo a.	od Please list the dates and times the [Working Group/Subcommittee] will require meals.			
	b.	Please list the anticipated number of personnel per meal.			
	c.	Would you prefer a centralized feeding location?			
	d.	l. Are there any additional needs?			

A.5 Food Vendor Information Sheet⁴²

Use this checklist when identifying food vendors. This checklist will assist in quickly distinguishing if a food vendor is able to meet the needs of the event.

Date:				
Name of Vendor:				
Business Address:				
Business Phone:	Business Fax:			
1. Indicate which of the follow	ying foods you sell directly or will be using as ingredients:			
Milk/milk products	YesNo			
• Poultry	YesNo			
Salads/rice dishes	YesNo			
Egg products	YesNo			
Fish/fish products	YesNo			
Raw meat	YesNo			
Ice cream	YesNo			
• Shellfish	YesNo			
 Cooked meatYesNo 				
Other (specify):				

⁴² U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, 2005.

2	Indicate the type of operation	n:			
•	Stall	YesNo			
•	Mobile Unit	YesNo			
•	Stand	YesNo			
•	Tent	YesNo			
(Other (specify):				
3.	Indicate the type of equipment	to be provided/used on-site:			
	• Refrigerator _	YesNo			
	• Freezer	YesNo			
	• Oven	YesNo			
	• Deep fryer	YesNo			
	Microwave oven	YesNo			
	• Sink	YesNo			
	Wash hand basin	YesNo			
	• Grill				
(Other (specify):				
4.	Are fire extinguishers provided	d at each site? YES/ NO			
	If YES, what kind/type?				
5.	Indicate power sources:				
•	LPG (propane)	YesNo			
•	• Electrical generatorYesNo				
Other (specify):					
	ther (speeny).				
6.					
6.	Is the food to be prepared or st	ored on premises other than in the temporary food	No		
6.	Is the food to be prepared or st premises or vehicle?	ored on premises other than in the temporary foodYes	No		
6.7.	Is the food to be prepared or st premises or vehicle? If YES, please state the address	ored on premises other than in the temporary foodYes _	No		
	Is the food to be prepared or st premises or vehicle? If YES, please state the address Will food be delivered to the state of the stat	ored on premises other than in the temporary foodYes _	No		

Managing Large-Scale Security Events			
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies			
8. Have you or any of your staff completed a food handler hygiene course?YesNo If YES, when and where:			
Vendor Point of Contact signature:			
Date:			
Location of vendor in event footprint:			

Managing Large-Scale Security Events				
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies				
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A.6 Inspection Checklist for Vendors⁴³

The establishment of a temporary catering facility can mean working in less than ideal conditions. The following checklist will provide guidance on minimum requirements for this type of event catering.

Date:				
Name of Vendor:				
Business Address:				
Busin	ness Phone: Business Fax:			
Settin	g Up			
1.	Food service operation is licensed or registered in accordance with	h state/local		
	requirements.	YesNo		
2.	The appropriate permit has been obtained from the state/local auth	nority where the event		
	is to be held.	YesNo		
3.	The area is clear for which the permit is valid (i.e., the location when the location when the permit is valid (i.e., the location when the locatio	here the vendor can		
	set up).	YesNo		
Train	ing Staff			
1.	Staff is trained in food handling and food safety.	YesNo		
2.	Staff has been instructed on machinery operation, food preparation	n routines, and		
	occupational health and safety matters.	YesNo		
3.	Clear guidelines are in place for staff about what to do if problems	s occur (whom to		
	contact, appropriate contact numbers).	YesNo		
Handling Food				
1.	All food handlers wash their hands thoroughly and regularly, parti	icularly:		
	Before commencing work and after every break	YesNo		

⁴³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual, 2005.

	• After visiting the toilet	Yes _	No
	After handling raw food	_Yes _	No
	• After using a handkerchief or tissue or touching nose, hair or mouth _	_Yes _	No
	After handling trash	Yes _	No
	• After smoking	Yes _	No
2	. Correct food temperatures can be—and are—maintained.	Yes _	No
3	. Food is cooled rapidly under refrigeration in trays not more than 4 inches	deep.	
		Yes _	No
4	. Tongs are provided and used where possible for food handling.	Yes _	No
5	. Gloves, if used, are changed regularly.	Yes _	No
6	. Food is thoroughly cooked.	Yes _	No
7	. Food is protected from dust, insect pests, and other contaminating matter.		
	_	Yes _	No
8	. Staff wear suitable and clean clothing, and have long hair tied back	_Yes _	No
9	. Food on display on counters is protected from contamination from the pul	olic	
	by use of covers or guards.	Yes _	No
1	0. The condiment area is checked and cleaned regularly.	Yes _	No
Stori	ng Food		
1	. Sufficient refrigeration space is provided to cope with peak demand	Yes _	No
2	. Refrigerator storage temperatures can be maintained during peak loads	Yes _	No
3	. Raw foods are stored below cooked or ready-to-eat foods	Yes _	No
4	. Food containers are covered.	Yes _	No
5	. Food is stored off the floor on pallets or shelving.	_Yes _	No
6	. Frozen food is thawed on the bottom shelf in the refrigerator or under colo	d	
	running water.	_Yes _	No
7	. Dry food storage space is adequate for peak loads.	Yes _	No
8	. Dry foods are protected from dust, insects, pests, and rodents at all times.		
	-	Yes _	No
9	. Hot food storage is in accordance with applicable standards.	Yes _	No
1	0. Cold food storage is in accordance with applicable standards.	Yes _	No

Trans	porting Food		
1.	Transport times are kept to a minimum.	_Yes	_No
2.	Food temperatures are met at all times during transport.	_Yes _	_No
3.	. All foods are protected from dust, pests, chemicals, and other contaminating matter.		
		_Yes _	_No
Cleani	ing and Sanitizing		
1.	Cleaning cloths are replaced frequently.	_Yes _	_No
2.	Equipment and surfaces used for the preparation of raw foods are cleaned	and sani	tized
	before further use.	_Yes	_No
3.	Sanitizers are appropriate for use in the food industry and are used in according	rdance w	ith
	the manufacturers' directions.	_Yes _	_No
Packa	ging and Labeling		
1.	All prepackaged foods are labeled in accordance with U.S. Food and Drug		
	Administration's nutritional requirements.	_Yes	_No
Manag	ging Waste		
1.	Waste is removed regularly from food preparation areas.	_Yes	_No
2.	Putrescible (decomposable) waste removed from food preparation areas is	placed i	n
	bins with tight-fitting lids.	_Yes _	_No
3.	Capacity to store sewage is adequate or connection to the sewer is maintain	ned with	out
	leakageYes	_No	
Avoid	ing Infectious Diseases		
1.	All staff are required to report any gastrointestinal-type illness to the super	visor.	
		_Yes _	_No
2.	A register of staff illness is kept by the supervisor.	_Yes	_No
3.	Staff are not permitted to work while they have symptoms of gastrointesting	ıal illnes	s or
	are in the acute stage of a cold or flu-like illness.	_Yes _	_No
Ensur	ing Safety		
1.	The workplace is safe (i.e., there are no trip hazards, no unprotected hot zo	nes, and	no
	unguarded equipment).	_Yes _	_No

2.	Fire precautions are followed, and fire safety devices are to the satisfaction of the fire		
	authorities.	Yes	_No
3.	Food handlers have contact details for all necessary personnel in case pro	blems occ	cur.
	-	Yes	_No
4.	A list of appropriate contact details is maintained by supervisors and is ac	ccessible.	
	_	Yes	_No
	Ex:		
	• Event organizer		
	• Environmental health officer		
	• Plumber		
	• Electrician		
	Refrigeration mechanic		
	Alternative refrigeration suppliers		

A.7 Hotel Survey Questionnaire4

Date: _____

This checklist will assist planners in quickly distinguishing if a hotel/rooming establishment is adequate and able to meet the needs of the event.

Hotel Name:					
Address:					
Website:					
	Co	ompan	ies and	Contacts	
Who is your:					
General Manager?	Name:			Contact info:	
Rooming Manager?	Name:			Contact info:	
Maintenance and Enginee	ering Manager?				
	Name:			Contact info:	
Security Manager?	Name:			Contact info:	
Do you have a(n):					
Information Technology	department?	Yes	No	Company:	
				Contact info:	
				Email Address:	
Remote access?		Yes	No		
Fire alarm company?			No	Company:	
Corporate Risk Management Department?YesN			No	Contact info:	
Fire alarm company?		Yes	No	Company:	
After-hours emergency number:				Contact info:	
Sprinkler company?		Yes	No	Company:	

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual, 2005.

After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Hood system company?YesYes	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Elevator company?YesYes	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Clean-up company for spills?Yes	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Fire restoration company?Yes1	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Glass and door company?Yes1	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Plumbing contractor?Yes1	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Electrical contractor?Yes1	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
HVAC contractor?Yes	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
Security camera company?Yes	No Company:		
After-hours emergency number:	Contact info:		
General Buildin	ng Information		
Building Address:			
Building Name:			
Number of Stories:/ Subfloors			
Main Building Size?(Square Feet)			
How are the building floors numbered?			
Are there floor plans available for each floor:Yes No _ If yes, is a digital version available?Yes No			
Is the ground floor "1" or "Lobby"? 1 Lobby			
Is there a 13 th floor?Yes No			
Sprinkler System			

Is the building covered by sprinklers? _Yes _No _PartiallyWet _Dry _ Combination		
Describe partial/combination (floors covered):		
Where are the Sprinkler Zone valves (to cut off specific areas or floors) located?		
Does the building have a fire pump?Yes No How many? Where?Gasoline DieselElectric		
Standpipe System		
Does the building have standpipes?Yes NoPartially Date of last test? Describe partial/combination (floors covered):		
Class of Standpipe:I II III Class I: 2 ½" hose connections for FF only Class II: 1 ½" hose cabinets with hose Class III: 1 ½" hose cabinets with hose AND 2 ½" hose connections for FF only		
Type of Standpipe:Wet Dry Dry (Fire Department-supplied only)		
Does the building have: Pressure-restricting Device (PRD)? Pressure-reducing Valve (PRV)? No		
Type/Brand of PRD: Type/Brand of PRV:		
If PRV's do they contain check valves?Yes No		
What is the pressure? Is the PRV fireground adjustable?Yes No		
On what floors do the PRVs/PRDs stop?		
Fire Department Connections		
Are there multiple FDCs for the building?Yes No		
Where are FDCs located?		
Are the sprinkler and standpipe connections combined or separate?		
Are they located together/on the same side of the building?Yes No If not, how are they split?		
Are the FDCs set up in zones for floors?Yes No How are they set up?		
Utility Systems		
Do you have a power company vault on the property?Yes No Company:		
Do you have a backup generator?Yes No		
What is the fuel source?Diesel GasolineNatural Gas		
Is the fuel stored on premise?YesNo Location:		

How long can you operate on backup power?			
Is/Are the generator(s) equipped with an electric shunt disconnect?YesNo			
What is powered from the backup? HVAC Security system			
Elevators Which ones are? Which ones are not?			
Lights Which ones are? Which ones are not?			
Doors Which ones are? Which ones are not?			
Fire Alarm System			
What other systems are or are not powered by the backup generator?			
Do you have a ground-level HVAC air intake?YesNo Location:			
Is your smoke control system tied to the HVAC?YesNo			
Do you have a radio repeater system?YesNo			
Who provides you with the following? Gas: Shut-off location:			
Water: Shut-off location:			
Electric:			
Sewer:			
Telephone:			
Internet:			
Security Information			
Do you have proprietary/private security?YesNo			
Are they employed by you or another company? Company: Contact info:			
Are they uniformed or plainclothes?Uniform Number of uniform:			
Plainclothes Number of plainclothes:			
Total number of private security personnel:			
Is security on site 24 hours a day/7 days a week?YesNo			
Are they armed?Yes No			
Firearm Taser OC/ Pepper Spray			

Where is their office located on the premises?	
Typical responsibilities:	
Do you have plans for additional security during the event week?Yes No	
Do you have security cameras?YesNo	
Where can the cameras be accessed?	
Are they recorded?YesNo How long is the retention period?	
Can the cameras be accessed remotely outside the facility?Yes No	
Does the city, county, or state have cameras mounted outside your facility?Yes No	
Location:	
Do you have a "zone map" for your fire alarm and burglar alarm system?Yes No	
Do you have a "zone map" for your security cameras?YesNo	
Additional Information	
Where is the nearest fire station?	
What is their response time?	
Where is the nearest Emergency Medical Services?	
Where is the nearest acute care hospital?	
Do you have a pool?YesNo	
What pool chemicals are stored on site?	
Are they in a secured location?	
Do you have a chute that would typically be used for laundry or garbage?YesNo	
Locations:	
Is there any location that 24-hour staff could not access with keys on hand?YesNo	
Location: Contact with access:	
Location: Contact with access:	
Estimated event-week occupancy (staff and guests):	
Weekday Weekend	

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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	Day				
	Night				
'		•	1		
(<i>M</i>	lake addition	Elevator al copies of the	'S nis page, as nec	eded)	
Elevator: Car num		•			
This elevator is typically used for:		Passenger	Service	F	Freight
and services floor	to floor				
What Phase does this elevator have	:	No fire servic	eII	I and	recalls to floor
Phase I: The key switch v Phase II: The key switch				or in the c	control room.
Is this a blind shaft elevator?	Yes	No Blind sl	naft from floor	to)
Elevator manufacturer:	Otis	ThyssenKrup	pSchindler	:	
Connected to Network?	Yes	No			
Where is/are the elevator key(s) loc					
Elevator: Car num					
This elevator is typically used for:	_	Passenger	Service	F	Freight
and services floor	to floor _				
What Phase does this elevator have	: _I _	II No f	ire service	and rec	calls to floor
Phase I: The key switch v Phase II: The key switch				or in the c	control room.
Is this a blind shaft elevator?:	_Yes _	No Blind sl	naft from floor	to)
Elevator manufacturer:	Otis	ThyssenKrup	pSchindler	•	
Connected to Network?	Yes	No			
Where is/are the elevator key(s) loo	cated?				
		Stairwal	la -		

Stairwells
(Make additional copies of this page, as needed)

Stair:		
Label: Location:		
Floors Served: Does this stairwell lead to	the outside of the building? Yes No	
Standpipes? Yes No	Is this stairwell pressurized? Yes No	
Does this stairwell access the roof?	Yes No	
Can you <i>enter</i> the stairwell from the ground floor?	Yes No	
Type of Stair: Standard Scissors F	ire Tower	
Stair:		
Label: Location:		
Floors Served: Does this stairwell lead to	the outside of the building? Yes No	
Standpipes? Yes No	Is this stairwell pressurized? Yes No	
Does this stairwell access the roof?	Yes No	
Can you <i>enter</i> the stairwell from the ground floor? Yes No		
Type of Stair:StandardScissorsF	ire Tower	
Stair:		
Label: Location:		
Floors Served: Does this stairwell lead to	the outside of the building? Yes No	
Standpipes? Yes No	Is this stairwell pressurized? Yes No	
Does this stairwell access the roof?	YesNo	
Can you <i>enter</i> the stairwell from the ground floor?	YesNo	
Type of Stair: Standard Scissors F	ire Tower	

Managing Large-Scale Security Events			
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies			
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A.8 Incident Organization Chart Template*


Purpose: The Incident Organization Chart is used to indicate what Incident Command System (ICS) organizational elements are currently activated, as well as the names of personnel staffing each element. The template below is an example of the kind of organizational chart used with the ICS. Personnel responsible for managing organizational positions would be listed in each box, as appropriate.

Preparation: The organizational chart is prepared by the logistics/resources unit and posted with other displays at the Incident Command Post. A chart is completed for each Operational Period and updated when organizational changes occur.

Distribution: When completed, the chart is posted on the display board located at the Incident Command Post.

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⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, 2005.



A.9 Organization Assignment List Template*

Purpose: The Organization Assignment List provides event personnel with information on the units that are currently activated, as well as the names of personnel staffing each position or unit. It is used to complete the Incident Organization Chart (see Appendix A.8), which should be posted on the Incident Command Post display after completion.

Preparation: The list is prepared and maintained by the logistics/resources unit under the direction of the Planning Section Chief.

Distribution: The Organization Assignment List is duplicated and given to all recipients of the Operational Plan.

Instructions: An Organization Assignment List may be completed any time the number of personnel assigned to the incident increases or decreases, or when a change in assignment occurs. See the table below for further instructions related to each section of the Organization Assignment List.

Table A.9-1: Instructions for Organization Assignment List

Item Number	Item Title	Instructions
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the incident.
2.	Data Prepared	Enter the date prepared (Month Day, Year).
3.	Time Prepared	Enter the time prepared (24-hour clock).
4.	Operational Period	Enter the time interval for which the assignment list applies. Record the start time and end time, and include date(s).
5. through 10.		Enter the names of personnel staffing each of the listed positions. Use at least first initial and last name. For units, indicate the Unit Leader; for divisions/groups, indicate the Division/Group Supervisor. Use an additional page if more than three Branches are activated.
	Prepared By	Enter the name of the logistics/resources unit member preparing the form. Attach the form to the Operational Plan.

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual, 2005.

Organization Assignment List

1. Incident Name		Chief	
2. Date	3. Time	Deputy	
4. Operational Peri	lod	a. Branch	I – Division/Groups
Position:	Name:	Branch Director	
5. Incident Co	ommander and Staff	Deputy	
Incident Command	ler	Division/Group	
Deputy		Division/Group	
Safety Officer		Division/Group	
Information		Division/Group	
Liaison Officer		Division/Group	
6. Agency	Representative	b. Branch	II- Division/Groups
Agency	Name	Branch Director	
		Deputy	
		Division/Group	
7. Plar	nning Section	Division/Group	
		c. Branch I	II – Division/Groups

A.10 Credentialing Checklist 47' 48

The mission of special events credentialing is to design and produce badge identification to ensure the greatest possible level of security for personnel and property, and to enhance the ability of law enforcement personnel to control access to secure areas, facilities, and events.

A credential identifies specific individuals who require access to a venue(s) to perform an operational role or function, whereas a ticket is issued to spectators or other members of the general public who do not perform an operational role or function. In essence, a credential is equivalent to an "Incident Badge." A "ticket" is NOT a "credential."

Credentialing provides sufficient information to verify the identity of the bearer and his or her level of access, and should include security features to prevent counterfeiting and assist in credential verification.

Consider the following questions:

- Who will be credentialed?
- Will credentialed personnel require police record checks?
- Who will conduct the record checks?
- What criteria will be used for various levels of access?
- Who will have the final decision on who will or will not be credentialed?
- Who will be responsible for credential production?
- Who will authorize credential production?
- What is the format for the receipt of the information necessary to produce the credential (e.g., electronic, paper)?
- Will a photograph be needed?
- Where will the credentialing center be located? (The credentialing center should be located outside of the secure zone and should be accessible to those requiring credentials.)
- Who will secure this location and provide security for personnel and equipment?
- How will the security of the credentialing database be maintained?
- How, and to whom, will credentials be distributed?

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual, 2005.


⁴⁸ Information from the U.S. Secret Service/Information Resources Management Division's "Credential Distribution System Brief" was also used in the production of this checklist.

Other Considerations

- Personnel who should receive credentials can include:
 - Security agents (U.S. Secret Service [USSS]/other U.S. Government details/foreign security);
 - o Plainclothes law enforcement officers (LEOs) whose duties *require* them to be within the perimeters of the NSSE venues;
 - Uniformed LEOs/ Public Safety personnel who will receive a non-photo credential distributed by supervisory personnel; and/or
 - o Delegates, vendors, and media.
- Personnel who should not receive credentials can include:
 - Security agents/ LEOs/ Public Safety personnel who are not assigned to a National Special Security Event (NSSE) venue, such as:
 - Hotel staff;
 - Motorcade route security;
 - Maritime assets; or
 - Consequence-management personnel.
- Types of credentials include:
 - o Law Enforcement and Public Safety
 - Officers and agents with routine duties within the perimeter of an event venue
 - o Emergency Response
 - Public Safety personnel dedicated to respond in the event of an emergency
 - Pre-staged outside the perimeter
 - Examples: Fire Department HAZMAT, Bomb Squad, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams
 - o Media
 - o Vendors
- Types of vehicle placards include:
 - o Official Vehicle
 - Allows vehicle through a perimeter checkpoint
 - Motorcade Vehicle
 - All vehicles in an official motorcade, regardless of agency (USSS/others)
 - o Emergency Response
 - Bomb Squad, Initial Fire Department/ Emergency Medical Services response, SWAT

Figure A.10: USSS Credential-Distribution System

Web Application Process Diagram



Managing Large-Scale Security Events	
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies	
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A.11 Considerations for Managing Crowds*

In the planning process for a forthcoming event, organizers must have an understanding of both individual and crowd dynamics, as well as how these elements interrelate. While this is a preliminary guide to crowd control problems that organizers most frequently encounter, planners need to expand upon the particular issues for each crowd and venue. All of this information will assist in predicting potential problems that agencies can then address in the planning process.

General Issues for Consideration

- 1. Major crowd issues that the planning process should address include:
 - *Size* Maximum numbers permitted are often established by regulation for safety reasons.
 - Demographics Consider the composition of the audience, including the age and
 gender mix. If you identify in advance that young children will constitute a high
 proportion of the audience, consider additional facilities, such as childcare, family
 bathrooms, and rental strollers. Audiences made up of young children or elderly
 people tend to require additional medical facilities, and children and the elderly are
 more susceptible to crush injury than teens or adults.
- 2. Different kinds of events may attract certain types of spectators that require special attention. Consider the following:
 - Rock concerts, in contrast to other types of concerts, may experience a higher number of incidences with drug and alcohol abuse, underage drinking, and possession of weapons.
 - Religious and "faith healing" events may attract a significant number of ill and infirm people, which may increase the need for on-site medical care.
 - Events for senior citizens may also require higher levels of health services.
 - Certain sports events may attract over-reactive and violent supporters.
 - Cultural events may require special arrangements, including the provision of interpreter services; special food services; and multilingual signposting, brochures, and announcements.
 - For outdoor concerts or events, consider:
 - Control and distribution of spectators in the field;
 - Suggested minimum space allocation of 4 to 5 square feet per person on grounds with no seats; and

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, 2005.

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Some form of sectoring and barrier management by security.

Crowd Issues

1. Crowds are complex social structures.

Crowd roles:

- Active Core: carry out action of crowd
- Cheerleaders: provide oral support for leaders
- Observers: follow actions but rarely take part

Significance of crowds:

- Increase the probability of a dangerous occurrence
- Increase the potential number of victims
- Make communication slower and more difficult
- Make changes in action slower and more difficult
- Diffuse responsibility (someone else will do it)

2. Panics and Crazes

Panic in a group is the flight from a real or perceived threat from which escape appears to be the only effective response. What appears to be panic is usually the result of poor inputs (especially communications, or the lack of) and previous knowledge and experience.

Craze in a group is the temporary, short-lived competitive rush by a group toward some attractive object. A craze tends to occur on entering an event, and may be exacerbated by the lack of information.

3. De-individualization

De-individualization is a loss of self-awareness and evaluation apprehension in group situations that foster anonymity. Behavior may include:

- Mild lessening of restraint (e.g., screaming during a concert);
- Impulsive self-gratification (e.g., theft, vandalism, molestation); or
- Destructive social explosions (e.g., group violence, rioting and torturing).

4. Defusing

The tedium that may be created by waiting and/or by the perception that other gates are being opened first, or later arrivals are being admitted first, can create problems. The following can help defuse the situation: appropriate music, the use of humor, food and beverage services moving through the group, cheerful security staff moving through the group, and good communication that includes a public address system.

Crowd Types

One crowd may exhibit all or part of these types; therefore, you must consider each category (as described in Table A.11-1 below), or at the least the most likely categories, in your plan.

Table A.11-1: Crowd Type

Crowd Type ⁵⁰	Description
Ambulatory	Walking, usually calm
Disability/Limited Movement	Crowd has limited or restricted movement; requires
	additional planning
Cohesive/Spectator	Watching specific activity
Expressive	Emotional release (e.g., cheering movement in unison)
Participatory	Involved in actual event (e.g., community fun runs)
Aggressive/Hostile	Initially verbal, open to lawlessness
Demonstrator	Organized to some degree (e.g., pickets, marches)
Escape/Trampling	Danger may be real or imaginary
Dense/Suffocating	Reduction of physical movement
Rush/Looting	Attempt to acquire/obtain/steal something
Violent	Attacking/terrorizing

Crowd Composition

When you understand what you are dealing with, then brief ALL personnel on what to look for and how they should respond while they are performing their duties (as described in Table A.11-2 below).

Table A.11-2: Crowd Composition

Assessment ⁵¹	Description
Organizational structure	For example, walking to venue versus running or marching
Leadership	For example, if a crowd has no leadership and/or they are
	spontaneous
Cohesiveness	For example, the degree of bonding between demonstrators
Unity of purpose	For example, some demonstrators may be focused and/or
	others may have their own agenda (e.g., moshing or slam
	dancing)
Common motive for action	Note: The distinction between performing the same action
	(e.g., cheering) and the motive for the same action (e.g.,
	leaving the venue)
Psychological unity	For example, crowds at benefits are typically psychologically
	united for good; however, demonstrators could pose problems
	if antagonized
Emotional intensity	Note: Much of this depends on the event and or special effects
	taking place
Volatility	For example, the degree to which the crowd reaches an
	explosive point

⁵⁰ Table modified from Berlonghi, Alexander E., "Understanding and Planning for Different Spectator Crowds," Engineering for Crowd Safety. Ed. R.A. Smith and J.F. Dickie. Elsevier Science Publications B.V, 993.

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⁵¹ Ibid.

Assessment ⁵¹	Description
Individual behavior	For example, the level at which individual control and
	responsibility are being exercised. Note: The more this is
	evident, the more restrained the crowd.
Group behavior	For example, the degree to which individuals are dominated by
	the group. Note: The more this is evident, the closer to "mob
	mentality."
Degree of lawlessness	Note: The level of criminal behavior taking place.
Level of violence	Note: This can be assessed historically and/or by current
	observations.
Level of property damage	For example, The likelihood of property damage occurring,
	and where (e.g., parking area, toilets, walkways).
Likelihood of injury or	For example, certain places at certain times (e.g., major
death	sporting event) and at certain events (e.g., motor
	races) affect the likelihood of injury or death.
Need for crowd control	Note: The plan must be discussed with experts and
	experienced persons; the more detailed and complex the plan,
	the more expensive and resource-intense the commitment.

Other Considerations for Managing Crowds

Entrances and Exits

- 1. Considerations for Spectator Entry and Exit
 - Entrances The primary function of entrances is to provide:
 - For supervision, marshaling, and directing crowds;
 - Access for emergency services;
 - Egress and evacuation routes; and
 - Initial surveillance and inspection of attendees (i.e., magnetometers).
 - Entrances should also:
 - Be clearly signposted;
 - Be in working order;
 - Be compliant with the Americans With Disabilities Act; and
 - Provide for separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

2. Entrance Management

Event organizers should:

- Permit flexible opening and closing times (however, advertised times are recommended);
- Stagger entry times by providing supporting activities;

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

- Keep entrances clear of all other activities;
- Keep lines away from entrances;
- Ensure there are sufficient numbers of suitable barriers, fences, gates, and turnstiles;
- Locate ticket sales and pick-up points in line with (but separate from) entrances;
- Arrange to have a public address system or alternative communications system to provide information and entertainment to the crowd waiting at the entrance;
- Consider the potential need for medical and security personnel presence;
- Provide sufficient numbers of personnel who are appropriately trained;
- Ensure that control points for searches to detect prohibited items, such as alcohol, social drugs, glass, metal containers, and weapons are in place and do not affect movement;
- Provide a secure area for the storage of confiscated goods;
- Provide toilets, if lines are expected to be long; and
- Apply metering techniques, as appropriate.

3. Exit Management

Event organizers should:

- Ensure that exit doors are not locked (if personnel are concerned about illegal entry, then doors could be fitted with alarms);
- Ensure that exit doors open in the direction of escape and are confirmed as operational;
- Check the placement, function, and signposting of exits;
- Ensure that doors that do not lead to an exit are so marked, preventing "dead end" entrapment and the potential for panic;
- Ensure that all exit corridors are free of all impediments to crowd movement;
- Ensure that turnstiles are freewheeling or can operate in reverse; and
- Ensure that cords, which can create trip hazards, do not cross exit corridors (if this precaution is unavoidable, the cord should be marked, insulated, and secured to the floor to prevent damage and potential electrical risks).

4. Escalator Management

Event organizers should provide for:

- Staff control at the top and bottom, including an emergency stop button; and
- Meter the flow at both ends.

5. Stairway/Corridor Management

Event organizers should provide for:

- Control of both ends if the crowd is large; and
- Metering that may be required for safety.

Ticketing

Ticketing is the first means of achieving crowd control. Essential matters to address include the following:

- If advance ticketing is possible, it is preferred, as it allows organizers to anticipate audience numbers and plan accordingly. It also enables them to pass on information about needed services (e.g., parking, traffic patterns, first aid, water sources, toilets, and personal needs) to ticket-holders before the event.
- When multiple entrances to the venue are provided, directing spectators to arrive via specific entrances can reduce congestion.
- If it is feasible, stagger crowd arrival by specifying entry times, which reduces congestion at entrances.

Barriers

Effective use of barriers can prevent many problems, including congestion in thoroughfares and walkways. Questions that you should consider in the planning phase include the following:

- What types of barriers are required? Is a solid physical barrier required, or would a psychological barrier, such as barrier tape, suffice? The use of psychological barriers is suitable only for orderly crowds. Any physical barrier must be able to withstand crowd surges.
- How will personnel respond if the barrier is breached?
- Can barriers be used to section the crowd and create passages for emergency personnel to evacuate ill or injured spectators?
- Will barriers be used to create a "pit" between the crowd and the stage, which can be used to facilitate the evacuation of injured spectators?
- Can barriers be easily dismantled by the crowd and used for other purposes?

There are physical structures designed for use in areas of egress that, in the event of an emergency where evacuation is required, collapse to allow for the maximum pass-through.

Defusing Crowd Tension

The tedium that is created by an extended wait in line for tickets or admission can be a precursor for crowd control problems. Such boredom can create or magnify tempers, particularly if, with little distraction, those in line perceive other doors being opened first or other patrons getting in at the head of the line.

The following means of defusing anger have been used with success in different venues:

- Up-tempo music (of a type consistent with the age group of the crowd) played over the public address system
- A humorous, animal-costumed individual, such as a mascot, walking up and down the line giving handshakes, pats, and waves
- A large inflated beach ball, which is lobbed back and forth over (and by) the spectators
- Food and beverage sellers moving through the group
- Cheerful security staff passing up and down the line, talking to people, and communicating event information (e.g., wait times or directions)

Introducing some of these same distractions inside an event can calm a potentially agitated crowd. For example, a mascot conducting a spectator sing-along to up-tempo music or a ticket or program number draw on the field for the last ball used at a sporting event can alleviate tension in a crowd.

Whenever possible, spectators should be informed before an event of any special conditions or arrangements for the event, such as parking, clothing, food and drink, sunscreen, shelter, and alcohol restrictions. Notice of special conditions or arrangements may be distributed via advertisements or in leaflets accompanying tickets.

Outdoor events, sometimes spread over large areas, can require further considerations, such as:

- Toilet facilities located outside gates and between disembarkation points and the venue;
- Shelter; and
- Telephone facilities.

The venue should allow sufficient regulation of crowd movement, such as adequate exiting from ticketed seating areas and sectoring and flow barriers, including barriers to separate vehicles from pedestrians.

Spectator overflow areas should be available to prevent crushing. Contingency plans are required in case spectator turnout significantly exceeds expectations. This phenomenon is common at rock concerts. This may be more of an issue for outside venues, as life safety codes for inside venues may help address maximum crowd attendance.

Restricted-viewing Locations

Clear lines of vision for spectators are important to reduce the likelihood that crowds will move to get a better view of the stage. Also, a wide angle of view helps to reduce crowd densities in front of the stage. If restricted viewing is unavoidable, tickets for spectators in those sections should note this fact.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events	
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies	
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A.12 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Special Event Funding Guidance

This document is intended to provide general guidance for use of federal funds that have been appropriated to support extraordinary law enforcement and related security costs for an event, including those designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). This information is intended to help guide planning efforts and may not be all-inclusive for all scenarios.

Pre-event Planning:

- **Pre-Appropriation questions and concerns.** Federal agency program and budget staff can assist with general programmatic or financial questions, but cannot provide any official guidance or approval prior to the appropriation of funds. Funds may only be expended from the time of appropriation; any expenditure prior to this timeframe may not be reimbursable.
- **Develop a detailed budget early**. The budget review process can be lengthy and may involve multiple communications among BJA, the budget office, and the applicant in order to clarify costs. Be prepared to provide cost breakdowns and a narrative justification for all requested items.
- **Establish partnerships**. Grantees should develop working groups with relevant mutual aid partners and other planning entities as soon as notification of the event occurs. Partners may include entities from the state (such as emergency management agencies) or the military (such as state National Guard forces).

The coordinating agency must have an open and transparent process in place to ensure that all mutual assistance agencies receive reimbursement for security costs related to the event security plan.

• **Leverage funding**. Explore other funding sources that can also be used to support event expenses.

Application Period:

- Submit an application as soon as possible. An agency will have up to 30 days to submit an application through the online Grants Management System (GMS.) The sooner an application is submitted, the sooner BJA can begin the review process.
- **Prepare written requests for waivers.** Some costs require waivers; all requests for waivers must be submitted with the application in GMS. These waivers must address all issues at hand (i.e., lodging costs, specialized vehicles, etc.) and approval is at the

discretion of the BJA Director. Examples of items requiring waivers may include SUVs, mobile command posts, armored response vehicles, boats, aircraft, and any other types of vehicles outside of police cruisers, police boats, and police helicopters. Jurisdictions will also need to provide justification as to why any specialized equipment cannot be borrowed from another jurisdiction and must be purchased separately.

- Establish a list of partners to be reimbursed through the grant. This process should include neighboring jurisdictions, mutual aid partners, state entities, private sector, or non-profit partners as applicable. Use a fair and transparent process when determining those entities to be considered for payment under the grant.
- Minimization of Conference Costs. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) has
 established guidance on the use of funds for conference-related costs
 (www.ojp.gov/funding/confcost.htm). As many of these costs must be pre-approved,
 plan ahead for all conference and training activities that may be needed for the event.

Award Period:

- Office of the Inspector General (OIG) training. Consider inviting OIG staff to conduct fraud, waste, and abuse training prior to the event.
- OJP Financial Guide. Refer to the OJP Financial Guide early and often for guidance on draw-downs, contracts, travel and associated financial issues. (The OJP Financial Guide can be found on the OJP website at: www.ojp.gov/funding/funding.htm.)
- Operational Security Plan (unclassified version) and law enforcement agency list. Provide an Operational Security Plan and list all state, local, tribal, or private security agencies that may provide officers for the event.
- Supplanting/Mutual Aid Funding Plans. Fully explore other non-federal funding streams to ensure that federal funds are being used to supplement, and not supplant, available state, local or other sources and obtain required Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Develop and implement written mutual aid agreements with all law enforcement and public safety partners specific to the event and ensure grant funds to all authorized mutual aid partners are disbursed in a timely manner.
- **Additional Reporting.** In addition to other required reporting forms, plan to submit a monthly expenditure report to BJA.
- Reimbursement procedures. Special circumstances sometimes exist in which grant funds may not be accessible immediately and may be provided on a reimbursement

basis for a certain time period. When this is the case, grantees must adhere to cash-on-hand guidance in the Financial Guide and plan accordingly.

Closing the Award:

- **Site Visits and Audits.** Maintain and keep readily available thorough documentation, as site visits and/or audits will likely occur.
- **Memorandum of Understanding.** Ensure all grant related MOUs are collected and kept on file for future requests by BJA or audits.
- **Closeout requirements**. Grantees should plan to follow the existing OJP closeout procedures, including the use of the liquidation period to finalize expenditures.

SAMPLE TIMELINE (Appropriation passage through award closure)

*The Office of Justice Programs "Grant Application Review Process" can be viewed online (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/funding/grant_process.htm); a flow chart graphic outlining the review process is also included in the Appendix. This sample timeline uses BJA as an example of one federal agency's funding process. The timeline is subject to change.

- **Appropriation Passage:** An appropriation is passed (varies by fiscal year), approving funds for the event (i.e. Presidential Nominating Conventions).
- **BJA Funding Announcement:** Within 60-90 days of the authorization of funds (approved appropriation) BJA finalizes application guidance and the local agency is invited, via email, to apply for funding.
- **Grantee Application Submission:** Within 30 days of the funding announcement, application(s) are submitted to BJA, by the eligible applicant(s), via GMS.
- **BJA Initial Application Review:** Within 10 business days of application receipt, BJA completes a cursory review of the application and either sends the application back to the grantee with requested changes or moves the application forward in GMS and requests a budget review.
- <u>Budget Review</u>: Within 5-10 business days of notification, the financial office completes a thorough budget review and issues a budget clearance that moves the application forward to the award processing stage. Based upon the type of budget clearance issues, the applicant may be required to submit additional information before receiving a final approval of the budget, also called a Final Financial Clearance. Receiving a final approved budget can take up to one month.

- **BJA Award Process:** Within 5-10 business days of receiving a Final Financial Clearance the award begins to move through other OJP components. As part of the award process, BJA completes a final review of the entire application.
- OJP Award Process: All awards must be approved by all other OJP components including the Office of General Counsel (OGC), Financial Management and Budget divisions, Office of the Assistant Attorney General (OAAG), and Office of Communications (OCOM). In some circumstances, (for example a large-scale, high-profile event) BJA and OJP components will work to expedite the grant award as quickly as possible. In these situations, the BJA and OJP award processes can be shortened by several days.
- <u>OJP Award Notification</u>: Once all OJP components have approved the award package, OCOM issues formal award notification and the applicant receives email notification that it has 45 days to accept the award at which time the grantee may begin to obligate and expend grant funds.

A. 13 Financial Provisions and Policies⁵²

This guide includes references to the provisions and policies that are issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is the largest division of the Executive Office of the President. OMB is responsible for implementing and enforcing the President's policies across the entire federal government. These policies are detailed in OMB circulars and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and are identified as government-wide common rules applicable to grants and cooperative agreement. In concurrence with the OMB policies applicable across all federal agencies, each federal agency also has supplemental policies described in the CFR that are applicable to grants and cooperative agreements.

Table A.12-1: Office of Management and Budget Circulars/Code of Federal Regulations

Where can I	If I am part of a(n)	Resources from:	
find		OMB	U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
Administrative Requirements	Educational Institution	Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) ⁵³	Title 28 CFR 70 ⁵⁴
	State or Local Unit of Government or Tribal Organization	OMB A-102 Replaced by Uniform Administrative Requirements, also known as "common rule"	Title 28 CFR 66 ⁵⁵
	Nonprofit Organization	Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) ⁵⁶	Title 28 CFR 70 ⁵⁷
Cost Principles	Educational Institution	Title 2 CFR, Part 220 (OMB A-21) ⁵⁸	U.S. DOJ Administrative Requirements Reference
	State or Local Unit of Government or Tribal	Title 2 CFR, Part 225 (OMB A-87) ⁵⁹	Cost Principles in 28 CFR 66.22 and 28 CFR 70.27

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⁵² U.S. Department of Justice/ Office of Justice Programs Office of the Chief Financial Officer, 2011 Financial Guide, 2011.

⁵³ Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part215.pdf

⁵⁴ Title 28 CFR 70 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part70.pdf

⁵⁵ Title 28 CFR 66 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part66.pdf

⁵⁶ Title 2 CFR, Part 215 (OMB A-110) can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part215.pdf

⁵⁷ Title 28 CFR 70 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part70.pdf

⁵⁸ Title 2 CFR, Part 220 (OMB A-21) can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part220.pdf

Where can I	If I am part of a(n)	Resources from:	
	Organization		
	Nonprofit Organization	Title 2 CFR, Part 230 (OMB A-122) ⁶⁰	
Audit	Educational Institution		II S DOI Administrative
Requirements	State or Local Unit of	OMB A-133 ⁶¹	U.S. DOJ Administrative Requirements Reference
	Government or Tribal		Cost Principles in 28 CFR
	Organization		66.26 and 28 CFR 70.26
	Nonprofit Organization		00.20 and 20 CFR 70.20

Government-Wide Common Rules

The uniform administrative requirements for grants and cooperative agreements to state and local units of government (also known as "Grants Management Common Rule for State and Local Units of Government") for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 66.⁶² The uniform administrative requirements for grants and cooperative agreements with institutions of higher education, hospitals, and other nonprofit organizations for DOJ are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 70.⁶³

Additional government-wide requirements:

- Government-wide Debarment and Suspension (Non-procurement) is codified at Title 2 CFR Part 180, with DOJ-specific rules at Title 2 CFR Part 2867.
- Government-wide requirements for drug-free workplace (grants) rules are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 83.⁶⁴
- Restrictions on lobbying are codified at Title 28 CFR Part 69.65

For additional information on grants management and to obtain copies of current circulars, please visit the OMB website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_default. The most

⁵⁹ Title 2 CFR, Part 225 (OMB A-87) can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part225.pdf

⁶⁰ Title 2 CFR, Part 230 (OMB A-122) can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title2-vol1-part230.pdf

OMB A-133 can be found online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a133/a133 revised 2007.pdf

⁶² Title 28 CFR Part 66 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part66.pdf

⁶³Title 28 CFR Part 70 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part70.pdf

⁶⁴ Title 28 CFR Part 83 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part83.pdf

⁶⁵ Title 28 CFR Part 69 can be found online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-2010-title28-vol2-part69.pdf

recently updated version of the CFR can be found on the U.S. Government Printing Office's website at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collectionCode=CFR.

Office of the Inspector General Fraud Hotline

Grantees should report any allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse of grant funds to the Customer Service Branch (CSB) of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) via email to ask.ocfo@usdoj.gov. In addition to or instead of reporting allegations to the OCFO CSB, you may report them to the DOJ Office of the Inspector General via email to oig.hotline@usdoj.gov or to the fraud hotline at 1-800-869-4499.

Other Available Resources

- The OJP procurement guide: "Procurement Procedures for Recipients of DOJ Grants" found online at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/funding/pdfs/procurement_procedures.pdf
- Post-award Instructions for OCFO grant recipients and sub-recipients found online at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/funding/pdfs/post_award_instructions.pdf.
- Federal government regulation information, which is accessible at http://www.regulations.gov
- Grant information related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which is available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/recovery/
- Grants Management System (GMS) Training and Technical Assistance, which can be found at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/training/gmstraining.htm
- The GMS HelpDesk, which is available via email at GMS.HelpDesk@usdoj.gov or by phone at 202-514-2024
- The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, which is available at https://www.fsrs.gov

Managing Large-Scale Security Events				
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies				
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A.14 Post-award Requirements: Grant Fraud, Waste, and Abuse⁶

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) awards federal grant funds to recipients and sub-recipients for specific purposes and requires them to use the funds within established guidelines. Unfortunately, some recipients and sub-recipients have misused award funds in multiple ways, ranging from award mismanagement to intentional criminal fraud. With this chapter, we aim to help you avoid misuse of award funds and the resulting penalties.

Detection of Grant Fraud

You are encouraged to:

- Be aware of common grant fraud schemes. This knowledge is the best way to reduce or even eliminate the risk of fraud.
- Adopt effective fraud risk-management efforts within your organization, and encourage other recipients or sub-recipients of your award to do the same in order to prevent and detect fraud as early as possible.

Penalties of Grant Fraud

If you are found guilty of grant fraud, you may be subject to any or all of the following:

- A ban from receiving future funding;
- Administrative recoveries of funds:
- Civil lawsuits and criminal prosecution; and
- A combination of all or some of these remedies.

Fraud Indicators

The indicators or markers of fraud, waste, and/or misuse of award funds are varied and can be due to a range of causes. Follow-up on all such concerns is important.

Common Grant Fraud Schemes

Most misuse of funds falls into one or more of three general categories:

- Conflicts of Interest
- Failure to Properly Support the Use of Award Funds
- Theft

We will examine each of these categories in the sections that follow.

Conflicts of Interest

You are required to use federal funds in the best interest of your award program. Your decisions related to these funds must be free of hidden personal or organizational conflicts of interest, both in advice and in appearance.

⁶⁶ DOJ/ Office of Justice Programs. Office of the Chief Financial Officer, 2011 Financial Guide.

- Advice. In the use of award funds (direct or indirect), a recipient or sub-recipient should not participate in any decisions, approval, disapproval, recommendations, investigation decisions, or any other proceeding concerning any of the following people or groups:
 - o An immediate family member;
 - o A partner;
 - An organization in which they are serving as an officer, director, trustee, partner, or employee;
 - Any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or who has an arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest, or for other reasons can have less than an unbiased transaction with the recipient or sub-recipient.
- **Appearance.** In the use of award funds, you and your sub-recipients should avoid any action which might result in, or create the appearance of:
 - o Using your official position for private gain;
 - o Giving special treatment to any person;
 - o Losing complete independence or objectivity;
 - o Making an official decision outside official channels; or
 - o Affecting negatively the confidence of the public in the integrity of the government or the program.

Typical conflict-of-interest issues include:

- Less-than-arm's-length transactions—the act of purchasing goods or services or hiring an individual from a related party, such as a family member or a business associated with an employee of the recipient.
- Not using fair and transparent processes for sub-recipient decisions and vendor selection. These processes must be free of undue influence, and fair and transparent. Most procurement requires full and open competition.
- Consultants can play an important role in award programs; however, as a recipient or sub-recipient, you must ensure that their work for you conforms to all regulations governing a fair consultant selection process, reasonable pay rates, and specific verifiable work product.

Table A.13-1: Fraud Case Example #1

Background	Possible Fraud Indicators	Scheme Identified	Result
Individual was	Circumvention of the	Individual stole over	240-month
assigned to purchase	established procurement	\$100,000 by directing	prison sentence

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

equipment using a	process; vendor complaints	contracts to bogus	
federal award		companies that he had	
		established	

Failure to Properly Support the Use of Award Funds

A federal award agreement is a legally binding contract. As a direct recipient or a subrecipient, it obligates you to:

- Use your award as outlined in the agreement;
- Act with integrity when applying for and reporting your actual use of funds; and
- Properly track the use of funds and maintain adequate supporting documentation.

If you or your sub-recipient fails to comply with the terms and conditions of an award, including civil rights requirements, whether stated in a federal law, regulation, assurance, application, or notice of award, the awarding agency may take one or more of the following actions against you or your sub-recipient:

- Temporarily freeze payments of the award
- Disallow federal and matching funds for all or part of the award
- Wholly or partly suspend or terminate the current award
- Withhold further awards
- Take any other remedies legally available

Typical issues involving failure to properly support the use of award funds include:

- Deliberate redirection of the use of funds in a manner different from the purpose outlined in the award agreement;
- Failure to adequately account for, track, or support transactions, such as personnel
 costs, contracts, indirect cost rates, matching funds, program income, or other sources
 of revenue.

Table A.13-2: Fraud Case Example #2

Background	Possible Fraud Indicators	Result	
Recipient received a	An inability to provide sufficient	Recipier	nt paid the federal government
federal award for	and verifiable supporting	over \$30	00,000 to settle civil fraud
specific purposes	documentation concerning the	allegation	ons
	actual use of those funds		

Theft

Theft is the most common issue in almost all organizations—including those that receive federal awards. You are encouraged to keep the following in mind:

• People who embezzle funds can be extremely creative, while often appearing very trustworthy. These abilities are precisely why they can do so much damage to an organization and remain undetected for extended periods of time.

• Poor or no internal controls provide an opening for theft. A lack of proper separation of duties is one of the most common weaknesses.

Table A.13-3: Fraud Case Example #3

Background	Possible Fraud Indicators	Scheme Identified	Result
Nonprofit received	Unsuccessful program, lack	Funds had been	36- and 66-month
\$2.7 million in	of internal controls,	diverted to pay for a	prison sentences
federal award funds	unexplained income	wedding reception,	and full restitution
to assist		building construction,	
underprivileged		plasma TV, and	
children		personal credit card	
		bills, with an	
		estimated total loss of	
		\$450,000	

Ways to Reduce the Risk of Fraud

There are several things that you can do to reduce or even eliminate the risk of fraudulent use of your federal award:

- Examine your operations and internal controls to identify your fraud vulnerabilities.
- Implement specific fraud-prevention strategies, including educating others about the risks. The more people are aware of the issues, the more they can help prevent problems or detect them as early as possible.
- Maintain a well-designed and -tested system of internal controls.
- Ensure all financial or other certifications and progress reports are adequately supported with appropriate documentation and evidence.
- Identify any potential conflict-of-interest issues and disclose them to the awarding agency for specific guidance and advice.
- Follow a fair and transparent procurement process, especially when using consultants. Ensure that the rate of pay is reasonable and justifiable, and that the work product is well-defined and documented.

Contact the DOJ Office of the Inspector General at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/home/contactus.htm for more information.

A.15 Emergency Medical Services Venue Assessment Checklist⁶⁷

Use this checklist when identifying the level of emergency services needed.

Date:
Name of Venue:
Address:
·
Event Type
Hazards:
Vulnerabilities:
Environment
Indoor/Outdoor:
Climate:
Numbers:
Alcohol/Drugs:
Demographics of Spectators and Participants
Age:
Mobility:
Numbers:
Attitude:
VIPs:
Transportation
Access/Egress:
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Compliance:

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Internal/External:
ncility
Visibility/Lighting:
Fixed or Festival Seating:
Layout:
ADA Compliance:
ommunications
Internal:
External:
id Station on site Yes No
Number:
Staffed for the event? Yes No
obile teams to be used Yes No
Foot: Yes No Number:
Bike: Yes No Number:
Carts: Yes No Number:
Other: YesNo Number:

A.16 Intelligence/Counter Surveillance Planning and Operations Checklist®

Use this checklist to ensure that the IOC is adequately established and meets the needs of all the key stakeholders.

Task	Task Completion
 Coordinate the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) process with all related supporting agencies. This includes: Establishing clear standard operating procedures and division of responsibility between the agencies involved. 	YesNo
 2. Key stakeholders in the area of responsibility are actively represented in the IOC process. This includes: Assigning liaison personnel to the IOC from all key departments, agencies, and organizations in the jurisdiction, either on a full or part time basis; and Ensuring that diverse subject matter expertise is present in the IOC. 	YesNo
 3. Security measures are in place for the facility and meet all relevant standards and regulations. This includes: — Developing, publishing, and enforcing a security plan; and — Ensuring that personnel are familiar with the facilities security protocols. 	YesNo
 4. Security measures are in place for data and personnel, and meet all relevant standards and regulations. This includes: — Ensuring that the IOC meets all physical and clearance requirements to receive, store, and control secret/secure information; and — Ensuring that key decision-makers and relevant personnel have appropriate security clearances. 	YesNo
 5. The IOC maintains technical and procedural connectivity with intelligence/information sources at all levels of classification, using appropriate technological redundancy. This includes: Ensuring that the center has electronic access to relevant networks, classified and unclassified; Ensuring that connectivity is sustained and readily available; and Establishing simple access to and from the IOC for those responsible for gathering information. 	YesNo
6. Personnel demonstrate ability to receive, extract, or collect information from all available sources, including all relevant databases and systems, on a continuous basis. This includes: — Familiarizing personnel with the use of relevant systems and databases;	YesNo

⁶⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

T	ask	Task Completion	
	 Ensuring that personnel use appropriate systems and databases for a given scenario/investigation; and 	-	
	 Recording the volume of use of these networks. 		
7.	Analysts are able to blend, reconcile, and deconflict data,		
	information, and intelligence received from multiple sources	YesNo	
	and are able to identify patterns and trends that may indicate an		
	emerging, immediate, or long-term threat condition.		
8.	Analysts use any and all relevant and useful analytic tools and	YesNo	
	software that provide a more comprehensive and useful product.		
9.	Personnel produce briefings, reports, and/or alerts that provide		
	clear, credible, and detailed information on actions or activities	YesNo	
	that may be indicative of an emerging threat.		
10.	Tear-line formats are appropriately used, and unclassified		
	products are developed to ensure that state, local, and/or tribal	YesNo	
	officials with varying levels of clearance have access to useful		
	information.		
11.	The IOC uses standard terminology/lexicon to eliminate	Yes No	
	agency-to-agency terminology confusion.		
12.	Products are adequately vetted and reviewed prior to	Yes No	
	distribution.		

A.17 Incident Radio Communications Plan Form®

Purpose: The Incident Radio Communications Plan Form provides information on all radio frequency assignments in one location for each operational period. Information from the Incident Radio Communications Plan on frequency assignments is normally placed on the appropriate radio assignment list.

Preparation: The Incident Radio Communications Plan is prepared by the Communications Unit Leader and given to the Planning Section Chief.

Distribution: The Incident Radio Communications Plan is duplicated and given to all recipients of the Operational Plan, including the Incident Communications Center. Planners should include information from this communication plan in the Organization Assignment Lists (see Appendix A.9).

Instructions: See the table below for instructions related to each section of the Incident Radio Communications Plan.

Table A.16-1: Instructions for Completing the Incident Radio Communications
Plan

Item Number	Item Title	Instructions
1.	Incident Name	Print the name assigned to the
		incident.
2.	Date/Time Prepared	Enter date (Month Day, Year) and
		the time prepared (24-hour clock).
3.	Operational Period Date/Time	Enter the date and time interval for
		which the Incident Radio
		Communications Plan applies.
		Record the start time and end time,
		and include date(s).
4.	Basic Radio Channel Utilization	Enter the radio cache system(s)
	System/Cache	assigned and used for the incident
		(e.g., Boise Cache, FIREMARS,
		Region 5, Emergency Cache).
	Channel	Enter the radio channel numbers
		assigned.
	Function	Enter the function each channel
		number is assigned (i.e., command,
		support, division, tactical, and
		ground-to-air.)
	Frequency	Enter the radio frequency tone
		number assigned to each specified

⁶⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Item Number	Item Title	Instructions	
		function (e.g., 153.400).	
	Assignment	Enter the Incident Command System	
		organization assigned to each of the	
		designated frequencies (e.g., Branch	
		I, Division A).	
	Remarks	Include narrative information	
		regarding special situations.	
5.	Prepared By	Enter the names of the	
		Communications Unit Leader	
		preparing the form.	

Incident Radio and Communications Plan Form

Incident Radio and Communications Plan		1. In	cident Name:	2. Date/Time Prepared:	3. Operational Period Date/Time:
		4. Basic	Radio Channel Utilizat	tion	
System/Cache	Channel	Function	Frequency	Assignment	Remarks
Prepared By:					_

A.18 Legal Affairs Checklist*

Use this checklist in determining the level of involvement and role of the legal affairs group. This checklist will allow planners to identify and prepare for the various aspects of the event that might present legal issues.

Liability for injuries
Liability for actions or omissions
Liability for impact on normal emergency operations
Liability for other financial obligations incurred in responding to major emergencies occasioned by the event
Permit for parades
Permit for the sale and consumption of alcohol and food items
Permit for pyrotechnics
Permit for road and street closures
Permit for the mass gathering
Inspection for fire safety
Inspection for public health
Fee structures and charges for the services provided by local and state authorities
Fee structures and charges for the "User Pays" policy for the services provided at some sporting and entertainment events
Bonds or liability insurance for costs of responding to any emergencies related to the event
Bonds or liability for venue cleanup
Bonds or liability for traffic/crowd control
Bonds or liability for additional policing functions

 $^{^{70}}$ Domestic Preparedness.com. Pre-event Planning Checklist, 2012.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events	
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies	
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T.S	

A.19 2012 Convention Event Ordinances

The temporary "Event Zone" ordinance passed by the City of Tampa for the 2012 Republic National Convention can be found at: http://www.tampagov.net/dept special events coordination/files/RNC/RNC Temporary Or dinance.pdf.

The following is the extraordinary event ordinance passed prior to the 2012 Democratic Convention.

January 23, 2012 Ordinance Book 57, Page 501 ORDINANCE NO. 4814

AMENDING CHAPTER 15

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 15 OF THE CHARLOTTE CITY CODE ENTITLED "CHAPTER 15 – OFFENSES AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS"

WHEREAS, the City of Charlotte has a significant governmental interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of the general public and preserving the public order; and

WHEREAS, G.S.160A-174 allows a city by ordinance to define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of the public; and

WHEREAS, the City has a significant governmental interest in maintaining the aesthetics, cleanliness and proper sanitation of city property; and

WHEREAS, the City has a significant governmental interest in maintaining the safety of persons who use city property; and

WHEREAS, the City has a significant governmental interest in reducing the risk of liability arising from the use of city property.

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, that:

Section 1. Chapter 15 of the City Code is amended by adding a new Article XIV to read as follows:

"Article XIV. Extraordinary Events

Sec. 15-310. Definitions.

The following words, terms and phrases, when used in the section, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this subsection, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:

Extraordinary event means a large-scale special event of national or international significance and/or an event expected to attract a significant number of people to a certain portion of the City.

Sec. 15-311. Declaration of extraordinary event.

The City Manager may declare an extraordinary event, fix the location or boundaries of the extraordinary event, and establish the period of time of the extraordinary event.

January 23, 2012 Ordinance Book 57, Page 502

Sec. 15-312. Permits.

Upon declaration of an extraordinary event, the city manager, or designee(s), may: (i) identify those permits for which a large number of applications are expected for activities that will take place during the extraordinary event; (ii) set deadlines for submittal of applications for the various permits so identified, which deadlines may deviate from those specified elsewhere in this code; and (iii) establish and administer a fair and content-neutral process for issuing permits when multiple applications are submitted for the same period of time and/or location.

Sec. 15-313. Regulations.

- (a) During the period of time and within the boundaries of an extraordinary event, it shall be unlawful for any person, other than governmental employees in the performance of their duties to push, pull or transport any, vehicle, cart, or float, unless a permit specifically authorizes the use of that item(s).
- (b) During the period of time and within the boundaries of an extraordinary event, it shall be unlawful for any person, other than governmental employees in the performance of their duties, to throw any item unless a permit specifically authorizing such throwing.
- (c) During the period of time and within the boundaries of an extraordinary event, it shall be unlawful for any person, other than governmental employees in the performance of their duties, to willfully or intentionally possess, carry, control or have immediate access to any of the following:
 - A bar, chain, shaft, staff, cable, wire, lumber, or plastic pipe capable of inflicting serious injury to a person if thrown at or struck upon another, except as permitted by City Code Sec. 19-303(d);
 - (2) A container or object of sufficient weight that may be used as a projectile, or that contains objects that may be used as a projectile, that could inflict serious injury to a person or damage to property;
 - (3) An aerosol container, spray gun or soaker device;
 - (4) A paint gun, etching materials, spray paint container, liquid paint or marker containing a fluid that is not water soluble;
 - A backpack, duffle bag, satchel, cooler or other item carried with the intent to conceal weapons or other prohibited items;
 - (6) A glass or breakable container capable of being filled with a flammable or dangerous substance carried with the intent to inflict serious injury to a person or damage to property;
 - (7) A sharp or bladed objects such as a box cutter, utility knife, ice pick, axe, or any other object defined in City Code Sec. 15-14;
 - (8) A hammer or crow bar;
 - (9) Pepper spray, mace or any other irritant carried with the intent to delay, obstruct or resist the lawful orders of a law enforcement officer;
 - (10) Body armor, shield, helmet, protective pads, or gas masks carried or worn with the intent to delay, obstruct or resist the lawful orders of a law enforcement officer;

January 23, 2012 Ordinance Book 57, Page 503

- (11) A mask or scarf worn with the intent to hide one's identity while committing a crime;
- (12) A police scanner;
- (13) Rocks, bottles, objects, bricks or pieces thereof that are of sufficient weight or design as to cause serious injury to a person if thrown at or struck upon another;
- (14) A device used to shoot, hurl or project a missile of any description capable of inflicting serious injury to a person;
- (15) A "sock" or "pocket" containing material of sufficient weight as to cause serious injury to a person if thrown at or struck upon another;
- (16) Fireworks, smoke bombs, sparklers, and stink-bombs;
- (17) An animal unless specifically allowed under the terms of a permit issued in City Code Sec. 19-313 or is a service animal used to assist a person with a disability.
- (d) The following factors shall be a defense to prosecution for a violation of subsection (c):
 - The defendant was engaged in, or on the way to or from, an activity in which he
 or she legitimately used the device or object; and
 - (2) The defendant possessed that object for that legitimate use; and
 - (3) The defendant did not use or attempt to use the object as a weapon or to injure another person or damage property."

Section 2. This ordinance shall become effective at 12:01 a.m. on January 30, 2012.

Approved as to form

City Attorney

CERTIFICATION

I, Stephanie C. Kelly, City Clerk of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and exact copy of an Ordinance adopted by the City Council of the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, in regular session convened on the 23rd day of January, 2012 the reference having been made in Minute Book 132, and recorded in full in Ordinance Book 57, Pages (501-503).

WITNESS my hand and the corporate seal of the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, this the 27th day of January, 2012.

Stephanie C. Kelly, MMC,

Managing Large-Scale Security Events	
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies	
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A.20 Considerations for Processing Prisoners¹¹

In planning for a large-scale event, planners should consider using the following considerations in developing their prisoner processing operational plans. These considerations should be scaled to the event and may not always be applicable.

Elements of Prisoner Processing

- Initial response of mobile field forces/crow control units
- Transport to courthouse for staging / processing
- Continue to jail for booking
- Process for booking
- Enter into court immediately after booking
- If not released or bonded, enter into housing
- Remain at jail throughout incarceration

Considerations for transporting prisoners

- Designate vehicles to transport prisoners from each sector/secure zone. The number
 of vehicles assigned to each sector should be determined by the number of arrestees
 expected.
- Hold additional transport assets in reserve and on standby.
- Assign transport vehicles specifically for emergency transport.
- Hold transport assets in reserve and on standby that are compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

First Contact Procedures

- Monitor radio channels assigned to mobile field forces/crow control units.
- Call for assets to respond to determined location
- Survey arrestees for injury / trauma.
- Remove/account for and barcode all arrestee property.
- Take pictures of officer and arrestee with CRA number.
- Attach copies to the CRA for the officer and transport, along with the barcode.
- Apply a wrist-band with barcode.
- Complete a search, check restraints, and place the arrestee into a van.
- Account for arrestees, property, and personnel.
- Depart for the Transfer-Waiting Area at the courthouse.

⁷¹ The Tampa Police Department provided these prisoner-processing procedures, which were used during the 2012 Republican National Convention.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Transfer-Waiting Procedures

Once in the Transfer-Waiting area:

- Separate and secure arrestees;
- Play a looped DVD explaining the process to the arrestees;
- Medically triage arrestees;
- Account for property;
- Collect initial data on each arrestee;
- Upload media cards;
- Prepare the transport list;
- Scan/load arrestees for transport to the jail; and
- Send the list of arrestees to the jail for arrival preparation once the buses depart.

Transfer to the Jail Procedures

- Scan the bus for departure to the jail.
- Assign a lead car for each bus.
- Determine and assign identifiers for alternate routes.
- Monitor all buses continuously at the Command Post that are equipped with GPS.
- Play pre-recorded instructions while en-route to the jail.
- Enter the first gate for clearance upon arrival to the jail.
- Enter into the existing sally-port and unload arrestees.

A.21 Best Practices for Law Enforcement Public Information Officers

Developed by the TPD Public Information Office

Public Affairs

The Tampa Police Department determined that it must reach four critical audiences in order to have a successful political convention in its city. Those were media, law enforcement, demonstrators and the community at large. In the year leading up to the event, all PIO activities were designed to influence one of these four groups. This is a suggested guideline for a public information office that is preparing for a political convention or any other large-scale event in its city. Most of the concepts listed below can be tailored to different cities depending on the unique circumstances, geography and demographics of each venue.

Media Outreach

Hold Regional PIO Meetings - Hold the first regional PIO meeting approximately 18 months before the event. This will help engage all agencies that will be affected by the convention. In addition to public safety, this should include hospitals, school districts, public transportation, the airport, visitor's bureau and any other agencies that will receive media calls about the event. This sets a tone of regional cooperation and information sharing. It's also a step toward ensuring the public is getting a consistent message about issues related to the event that will impact the larger region. Some of these issues include traffic, school closures or an adjustment of school hours, access to public buildings and services, changes to public transportation routes, hotel availability and more. The release of information on these issues can adversely impact the security plan, so it is prudent to have good relationships and information sharing in place for consistent messaging. It's recommended to hold another regional meeting six to nine months before the event and then again right before the convention.

Establish a Public Affairs Subcommittee - Begin holding monthly meetings one year before the event. There should be a PIO representing each agency that is part of the Executive Steering Committee that oversees all security planning for a political convention. This subcommittee creates the media plan for the convention. The United States Secret Service PIO and the PIO from the lead local law enforcement agency co-chair this subcommittee. While there are certain public affairs guidelines established by the U.S. Secret Service, the lead local agencies will also need to create a plan for generating proactive positive coverage and how to respond to inquiries. The agencies on the subcommittee will staff the Joint Information Center during the event. However in Tampa, we found it productive to have a limited number of the agencies involved that may not actually staff the JIC such as the airport, hospitals, etc. Each member must be approved by the Executive Steering Committee.

Review the Federal Budget - Since a series of convention related expenditures would require city council approval, it would be advantageous to work with your chief, legal department and the purchasing department to bundle these expenses allowing a large number to go before council simultaneously. It's also critically important to establish a system for releasing public records related to these expenditures to all media at the same time. If a system is not established, the high volume of requests will keep the PIO in a reactive mode which is disruptive to the daily workload. These budget requests will begin 18 months to a year before the event.

Establish a City Joint Information Center - the Federal JIC template for political conventions only allows one seat for local law enforcement so it may be necessary to set up a city JIC to work jointly with the federal one. It would be ideal if they were located in the same building. Another option would be expanding the number of seats for local law enforcement to work inside the federal JIC.

Conduct "Show and Tell" News Events - Hold one proactive media event each month to establish the regional partnership and to give the community a sense of safety and security. These should start at least six months before the event. Select visual topics that set a positive tone for the event versus a heavy handed law enforcement image. This could be based on a training class for a specialized area that is part of the security force. Bike or Mounted Patrols are options for a softer public safety images. K-9 and Marine (if applicable) are options that can give federal agencies an opportunity to showcase their involvement. All topics and talking points should be preapproved by the Executive Steering Committee through the Public Affairs Subcommittee.

Hold a Media Round Table(s) - This meeting with top law enforcement leaders is an opportunity for the media to share its concerns and logistical challenges of covering the event. This is NOT for the department to release information or even answer questions. Newsroom decision makers should be invited; news directors, assistant news directors, assignment editors, executive producers, beat reporters, editors. This meeting allows the media to have its voice heard and be part of the process. Once you get this media feedback, the PIO and subcommittee members can fold the new information into the media plan. This meeting also creates a spirit of cooperation between law enforcement and media that can only benefit the department. It establishes that the department is interested in the best possible coverage of the coverage that is balanced, factual and based on substance.

Establish a Media Lot - Create an area for members of the media to write, edit and broadcast live. It must be in line of sight of the event and close to the **speaker's stage and protest area. During Tampa's roundtable discussion with the media, the department learned the media was fearful of being targeted by protestors and requested a safe place to work near the event. This task was logistically difficult and very time consuming. The following list includes some of the

logistics involved. It would be ideal to start this project four to six months before the event. We asked for a news director to volunteer to act as the point person for coordinating some of the logistics with the other stations. This helped save time and simplified the process.

In the end, the media lot became a source of information for law enforcement. PIO's assigned to the lot would have informal interaction with reporters and photographers and then shared the story angles and issues of concern. This information was used to help prep the chief on what issues may come up at the next daily briefing.

- 1. Identify location may have to lease space from a private owner or the political party hosting the event.
- 2. Provide fencing, flatbed trucks for live shots, private security for controlling access, set up electricity and bathrooms on the site. The department collected checks from the media outlets and paid the vendors for these services with a bundle of media checks. Media covered all infrastructure costs.
- 3. Determine access routes and times. This lot was on the edge of the vehicle exclusion zone. We established a window between 2:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. that vehicles could leave to gas up or new trucks could arrive.
- 4. Issue media lot credentials to all media outlets that paid for the infrastructure of the lot.
- 5. Hold a lottery with local and national media to establish where each media outlet would park its live truck and where they would broadcast live from on the flatbed trucks.
- 6. Have media outlets sign a legal waiver that releases the city of any liability at the media lot.

** Speaker's Platform-a stage and audio system provided for groups to voice their opinions. In Tampa, the groups applied for permits through City Hall to schedule their time on the stage.

Conduct Chief Media Visits - In the six weeks before the event, the chief should visit all major local media outlets for "OFF the RECORD" presentations and question and answer sessions. This is the follow up to the media roundtable held at the department. The PIO should ask larger media outlets to host smaller radio stations, weekly papers, news web services. This ensures the chief speaks directly to every media outlet. Tampa's Police Chief presented a compelling photo and video-driven PowerPoint on the department's philosophy of policing the event. It also contained visuals of violence and destruction that occurred at prior conventions. These meetings were extremely beneficial because for the first time the media understood the law enforcement perspective. The opportunity to ask the chief candid questions in a relaxed

environment showed the media that the department was transparent and earnest in its efforts to do the right thing with demonstrators and members of the media.

Establish Chief's Daily Briefing Schedule - It is very important that the media has access to the top law enforcement officer during the event to maintain public confidence and transparency. It is ideal to have at least two briefings daily. If possible release the time and location of these briefings during the Chief's media visits. This will give the media time to plan for live shot logistics, assigning crews and other challenges. In Tampa, the department set up a live satellite window with CNN during our daily chief briefings. This resolved a limited parking issue because any station in the country could down link the news conference from the satellite free of charge. The PIO office set up a pool camera rotation with the local stations to provide a live feed of the news conferences. The department worked with the local 24-hour news station to provide a locked down live truck to uplink the news conferences live daily. These efforts ensured the department's perspective was well represented in the news coverage. The demonstrators were readily available and Tampa felt the department's point of view should be as well. These regular briefings also significantly reduced the number of media calls to the JIC since the media knew it could get its questions answered at a predetermined time.

Establish a Social Media Presence - Establish a social media team that will proactively post police photographs and videos on the department's Facebook and Twitter accounts during the event. Having a strong plan in place for the mainstream media is only half of the equation. It is imperative to have an experienced social media team since this is a dominant form of communication for the public. The Tampa Police Department recruited outside LEO PIOs to handle social media posts during the event. One was assigned to riding with the chief and other commanders during the protests. This PIO took pictures and videos of police actions that were eventually picked up by the mainstream media. A second PIO was stationed in the JIC to oversee the department's social media accounts and monitor demonstrators' posts. This PIO would respond with the facts of a situation when erroneous rumors began circulate. A third PIO monitored the department's closed circuit television system and downloaded photos and videos to post on social media. If trouble makers posted any negative videos of law enforcement, this PIO was prepared to search the CCTV system for a more complete video of the incident for possible release to the media and on social media. This team captured countless acts of kindness by officers. Images of officers giving overheated protestors water, pumping air into a demonstrator's baby jogger, helping a protestor back into her wheelchair went viral or were picked up by the mainstream media. It is also important the team goes through training so they are familiar with the department's social media guidelines and objectives.

Hire an Event Photographer - This is imperative for documenting the event. It's also another source of photographs and videos to release to the mainstream media and post on social media.

Acquire a Media Truck for Protests - Setting up a truck for media covering protests provides reporters and photographers with a good vantage point. TPD used a flatbed truck and allowed the media to get on and off the truck during the largest march. This truck followed the lead law enforcement car and ensured the media could video tape and take photographs of the long line of protestors involved in the march. This goodwill gesture was very popular with the local media and some national outlets as well.

Establish a Reporters' Committee for Freedom on Information - Set up a conference call with this group involving your chief, police attorney and field force commander. This committee sets up a hotline for the media to call if they are arrested while covering large-scale political events in the United States. A local media firm is retained to answer these calls. It will be very important to meet with this firm several times leading up to the event and to include them on this conference call. The meetings and conference call gives law enforcement an opportunity to share its progressive approach to policing the event. It's also a chance to learn about media challenges at past conventions or political events.

Establish a Media Arrest Notification System - Establish a media arrest notification system. In Tampa, if a member of the media was detained or arrested, a text would be sent to the department's command staff. This would allow the appropriate supervisor to vet the arrest. They would determine if the member of the media violated the law and should go to booking or if he or she was detained with a large group and should be released to return to work. No members of the media were arrested in Tampa.

Conduct Joint Information Center Training - The City JIC will have numerous personnel who are not familiar with the National Incident Management System utilized by law enforcement. They will need to be trained to assist during the event. Many jurisdictions have certified JIC trainers in their fire department or emergency management department. In Tampa, two trainers were recruited from neighboring jurisdictions.

Establish News Release, Photograph and Video Approval System- Work with the Mayor's Office, Chief's Office and Legal to set up a streamline system for releasing material to the media in a timely fashion. Tampa utilized a live web portal through NC4 called ESponder for this process. All approved talking points and news releases were posted on this system for call takers to utilize as well.

Include News Release Dissemination as Part of the Operational Plan - Part of the department's plan for sending alerts to the local and national media, included the use of software called Collabria. Two months before the event, the PIO sent an email to all of its media contacts encouraging them and their colleagues to sign up for the notification system. The PIO used the web-based two-way communication tool to push out news releases and

updates via email and text. It proved to be an effective resource for building a media distribution list and providing time-sensitive information directly to reporters in the field.

Establish Media Monitoring System - Set up an automated system in the months prior to the event. Assign the task of downloading the coverage daily to support staff in the JIC. In Tampa, this coverage was uploaded into NC4's ESponder software so it was available for commanders to view.

Develop a Media Blitz and One Voice Policy - Two weeks before the event, the chief should become the single voice for the department. This establishes a strong, consistent image for the department. TPD set up a series of one-on-one interviews with the chief during this time period. This ensured the community was aware of the department's year of planning, preparing and training to have a smooth and safe event. Many of the interviews were saved to run during the event since the chief was too busy for one-on-one interviews during the operational period.

Law Enforcement Outreach

Create a Training Video - Create a video of top law enforcement officers such as the chief and/or sheriff, to play before the Field Force training. This should contain the department's philosophy and sets the tone for policing the event.

Create Training Curriculum - The PIO should contribute to the training curriculum for the supervisors overseeing the day to day operations of the RNC. This is an opportunity to reinforce the importance of relying on their supervisory discretion if media is facing arrest. Unless the activity threatens another person's safety or could result in property damage, the arrest may do more harm than good. The PIO can utilize videos or photographs of past cases that demonstrate this point. Unless the PIO is sworn with rank, this training should be presented by a commander. By utilizing visuals from past conventions and political events, the PIO segment of the training can highlight how demonstrators attempt to bait law enforcement into overreacting to create an iconic YouTube moment. This training should focus on how one single image or video of an officer's actions can mar the city's image on a global scale.

Community Outreach

Release a Transportation Plan - Although the USSS releases the transportation plan, this is an opportunity for the city to show the public all the measures or services it is putting in place to help its citizens during the event. In Tampa, the plan was released five weeks before the event. Tampa Police attempted to create a mobile app that people could check before leaving their house to learn if there was a temporary road closure due to the event; however, it was unsuccessful. Instead, we established transportation web page along with a frequently asked questions page to keep citizens up to date. This was very effective for dealing with any last minute transportation adjustments during the event.

Conduct a Police Citizen's Academy - From after action reports, Tampa Police learned citizens in other cities often complained that they had no idea what to expect before a convention and therefore were alarmed by the strong police presence. Two weeks before Tampa's event, TPD loaded 70 business and community leaders onto a coach bus and transported them to the police academy for a one day RNC Citizen's Academy. This reviewed the extensive training involved in preparing for the event and the department's unique approach of tolerant but ready. Video from past conventions were played so the community would understand why a swift police response may be necessary to keep the city safe. Officers dressed in the RNC uniform with hard gear and put on a demonstration that utilized many of the newly purchased assets, showcased the training and highlighted the different levels of policing the event. In addition to the field force team, it involved bike patrols, mounted patrols, the regional bomb team and the marine patrol. Media was invited to cover the RNC Academy and social media was utilized to show the rest of the community what to expect during the event.

Hold Town Hall Meetings - Help the mayor's office set up these public meetings in the areas of town that will be most dramatically impacted by the event. In Tampa, the speakers included the mayor, police chief, fire chief and transportation director. This allows the public to get their questions answered and express their concerns before the event.

Establish a Citizen Notification System - Tampa Police launched a campaign to sign up citizens for its Alert Tampa system that replaced Reverse 911 several years ago. This system allows commanders to send email or text messages to citizens about RNC activities that may impact their commute, etc. The department doubled the number of users in the months before the RNC from 8,000 to 16,000.

Establish a Business Community Notification System - TPD set up a notification system for property and security managers of downtown high rises. NC4 amended its program to establish two-way communication with the users. TPD also signed up business and community organizations for a total of 104. The community embraced the program so well that it has continued after the event.

Establish a See Something Say Something Campaign - Work with the Department of Homeland Security to utilize its campaign material connected to your event.

Demonstrators Outreach

Hold ACLU Forums - Arrange for the chief, field force commanders and police attorney to take part in the ACLU forums either via WebEx or in person. These take place several times in the year leading up to a political convention. This is an opportunity for the leaders to set a tone of tolerance and patience with demonstrators' theatrics as long as it doesn't cross over into

criminal activity. These may help law enforcement leaders establish a rapport with protest leaders prior to the event.

Develop a Demonstrator's Pamphlet - Create a user friendly map that highlights the parade route and services available along it such as bathrooms, water stations and shaded covered areas. Tampa's pamphlet provided ACLU tips for dealing with law enforcement during a protest. It also gave an overview of the city's event ordinance that established rules and regulations for demonstrations outside of the event. Finally, it provided tips for avoiding heat stroke in Florida's August weather.

Provide Weather Reports for Protestors - A goodwill gesture for reaching out to demonstrators is providing weather reports on the department's long range acoustic device known as ELRAD. Tampa Police set up a plan in advance to obtain a weather report daily from one of the local station's meteorologist. This was broadcast during the marches. All but one of the five local stations provided weather reports. The stations appreciated the promotional opportunity while the department reached out to demonstrators with the service.

A.22 Access Control Planning and Operations Checklist²

Use this checklist to develop an access control operational plan. This checklist is a guide that can be customized depending on the event.

7	ask a sk	Task Completion	
1.	Identify and establish an event perimeter and secure zone.	_	
	This includes:		
	Completing a scene survey;		
	 Controlling access to the incident command post, staging, and 	YesNo	
	other incident command facilities;		
	 Establishing an inner operational area perimeter; and 		
	 Establishing an outer perimeter. 		
2.	Identify and provide staff for event control zones/check-in	YesNo	
	points.	165100	
3.	Identify security zone requirements. These include:		
	 Coordinating with incident command/unified command; 		
	 Identifying the "Hot Zone" location if a HAZMAT/Weapon of 		
	Mass Destruction incident were to occur;		
	 Identifying the number of personnel needed to secure and maintain 	YesNo	
	zone(s);		
	 Identifying other resources needed based on the scale of the event; 		
	and		
	 Initiating coordination/communication with other responding/ 		
	supporting agencies.		
4.	Establish force protection capacity integrated within the Incident		
	Command System. This includes:		
	 Coordinating with specialized Law Enforcement teams and other 		
	responding/supporting agencies;	YesNo	
	 Assigning personnel to maintain force protection; 		
	 Identifying potential threats/hazards to responding/supporting 		
	personnel; and		
	 Implementing measures to counter any potential threats/hazards. 		
5.	Provide force protection for emergency personnel to allow them		
	to operate safely. This includes:		
	 Assigning personnel to maintain force protection; 	Yes No	
	 Searching event venues for the presence of explosive devices or 	YesNo	
	other immediate/secondary hazards; and		
	— Neutralizing or removing any threats from the site and restricting		
	access during an incident.		
6.	Implement and maintain a system to manage personnel identity.	Yes No	
	This includes:	168100	
	 Establishing a check-in point for all responding/supporting 		

⁷² U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program: Exercise Evaluation Guide- Public Safety and Security Response*. 2010.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Task	Task Completion
 personnel; Ensuring accountability for all units and personnel at the event; Ensuring that all units and personnel properly display or wear official identification; and Documenting all personnel entering and exiting the secure zone(s). 	
 7. Provide and plan for access to the event for skilled support teams (e.g., SWAT teams, Explosive Device Response teams). This includes: Coordinating with specialized law enforcement teams; Identifying and establishing controlled entry points; Providing these skilled support teams with accessible and safe routes of ingress and egress; and Conducting credential checks of all personnel entering/exiting the event location/secure zone(s). 	YesNo

A.23 Law Enforcement Venue Assessment Checklist⁷³

Use this checklist to assist in identifying the law enforcement personnel needed.

Date:
Name of Venue:
Address:
Crowd Control/Site Security
Access by the public:
Access by VIPs:
Access by emergency services:
Secondary route:
Security concerns:
Demographics of Spectators and Participants
Age:
Mobility:
Numbers:
Attitude:
VIP's to attend:
Patrols
Uniformed:
Non-uniformed:
Other security:
Intelligence contact: (Joint Terrorism Task Force, etc.)

⁷³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15 Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies Traffic Control (access/egress): Concerns: Alcohol (Circle one) • None • Limited access (such as beer gardens): • Distributing locations on event footprint **Incident Command Post** Location and contact information: Closest mutual aid resources if required: Promoter background investigation completed? Surveillance (closed-circuit television, locations, etc.): Credentialing required? Meals/lodging arrangements made for staff, if required? Overtime considerations addressed? Arrest/booking process identified? _____ Special teams required? (SWAT, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, K-9, etc.)

A.24 Bomb Threat Checklist⁷⁴

This form can be provided to dispatchers before and during the event. This form identifies the sets of questions that should be asked by the dispatcher and/or person taking the call.

Exact date and	d time of call:			
Exact words of	of the caller:			
Questions to	ask			
1.	When is the bomb going to explode?			
2.	Where is the bomb?			
3.	What does it look like?			
4.	What kind of bomb is it?			
5.	What will cause it to explode?			
6.	Did you place the bomb?			
7.	Why?			
8.	Where are you calling from?			
9.	What is your address?			
10.	What is your name?			

⁷⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15 Special Events Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual*, March 2005.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

Caller's Voice (please circle appropriate terms)				
calm	disguised	nasal	angry	broken
stutter	slow	sincere	lisp	rapid
giggling	deep	crying	squeaky	excited
stressed	accent	loud	slurred	normal
If the voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?				
Were there any background noises?				
Remarks:				
Person receiving call:				
Telephone number where call was received:				

A.25 Training and Exercise Course Catalogue Checklist⁷⁵

These tables provide comprehensive lists of training courses and exercises that should be provided for law enforcement personnel in preparation for a large-scale event.

Training Course Title	Description
Active Shooter Security Training	Training supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance response to an active shooter event by educating participants on the history of active shooter events, describing common behaviors/conditions/ situations with active shooters, and fostering communication between critical infrastructure owners/ operators/ law enforcement response teams
Active Shooter/Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training	Training from commanders on their personal experiences regarding an active shooter/IED event, including information on IEDs, tactical integration, and investigations
Airplane Explosive Response Training	Training on responding to airplane explosives
ATF Advanced Post Blast Investigation Techniques Training	Training by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) on advanced post-blast investigation techniques
ATF Basic Post Blast Investigations Training for Bomb Technicians	Training by the ATF on post-blast investigation techniques for bomb technicians
BioWatch Sample Collection Training	Training for local firefighters on the proper techniques for BioWatch sample/filter collection
Bomb-Making Awareness Program Training	Training by DHS for law enforcement, fire, and Emergency Medical Services personnel focused on increasing awareness of homemade explosives
Bomb Squad Advanced Electronics Training	Training to improve the understanding of advanced electronic circuitry for bomb disablement
Bomb Squad Large- Vehicle Bomb	Training on large-vehicle bomb-displacement tactics and strategies

⁷⁵ This checklist was based off of the training catelogue produced by training secuirty planners for the 2012 Democratic National Convention.

Training Course Title	Description
Countermeasures Training	
Bombing Prevention IED Counterterrorism Training	Training from the Office of Bombing Prevention designed to increase resilience while enhancing bomb-prevention capabilities; training designed to enhance the knowledge of state/local law enforcement and public-/ private-sector stakeholders by providing exposure to key elements of the IED threat, surveillance detection methods, and soft target awareness
Building Emergency Planning Capabilities Training	Training on how to incorporate key elements on successful incident management into planning efforts, including communicating with employees, building familiarity with local responders, coordinating with first responders, and integrating public affairs
Civil Disturbance Training	Training conducted in support of the civil disturbance subcommittee
Commercial Vehicle Counterterrorism Training	Training designed to train law enforcement officers responsible for the enforcement of commercial vehicles traveling on the nation's highways on how these vehicles can be used in committing an act of terrorism, either as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or transporting materials to further a terrorist cause
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Biosecurity Training	Training by the FBI on potential biosecurity risks, information and skills needed for a successful attack on research institutions, and warning signs to look for
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute Training	Training via the web on emergency management
Field Force Extrication Tactics Training	Training to provide emergency responders with knowledge and skills regarding the tools and information necessary to extricate an individual safely from a protester device, including briefings and practical exercises
Hazardous Devices	Training for state and local law enforcement on advanced

Training Course Title	Description
Response Unit Training	diagnostics for radiation physics and explosive devices.
Integrated Emergency Management Course Training	Training (exercised-based) that places Emergency Operations Center personnel under realistic crisis situations within a structured learning environment
Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Training	Training on the new dimension attack threat seen in the Mumbai Attack, and lessons learned from other cities
Local/federal Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, Joint Motorcade Training	Training for SWAT teams on motorcade tactics and team- transition scenario exercises
Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Training	Training by the Federal Air Marshals to provide law enforcement, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Fire/HAZMAT, and Airport Operations with an update on MANPADS – covering surface to air missiles
Motorcade Training	Motorcycle dignitary–detail training
Munitions Instructors Course Training	Training for law enforcement, corrections, military, and licensed security trainers to train other officers on OC/pepper spray aerosol projectors, less lethal impact munitions, and chemical munitions
Protective Detail Training	Training given by U.S. Secret Service (USSS) on protection for state and local police, motorcade operations and support, USSS special teams, USSS counter-surveillance, terrorist trends and tactics, and threat assessment
Public Safety WMD Response Training	Training on specific fundamentals and skills associated with an emergency response to a WMD incident, including detailed technical information and hands-on practice of actions required for emergency responders in such situations
Quick Clearance Training	Training by state highway patrol
Radical Element during NSSE Training	Training for command-level personnel on dealing with radical elements
Regional Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Training	Training (including joint agency tabletop scenarios/exercises) on WMD notification protocols, capabilities of various agencies, threat assessments, roles of epidemiologists/FBI/

Training Course Title	Description
	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/law enforcement, and sampling and laboratory issues
State and Local Anti- terrorism Training (SLATT)	Training for all personnel who participate in anti-terrorism activities, given by the SLATT Program and the FBI
State Emergency Management Training	Training officered by the state emergency management division
Surveillance Detection Training	Training on surveillance detection for municipal, state, and local law enforcement

Exercise Course Title	Description
Command-Level Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	Tabletop and functional exercise(s) co-sponsored by USSS and FEMA to allow commanders to clarify roles and responsibilities, validate existing plans and procedures, and review operational decision-making and interagency coordination
Consequence Management TTX	Tabletop exercise for participating departments and agencies to assess draft consequence management plans, policies, and procedures, including scenarios
Integrated Emergency Management Command TTX	Tabletop exercise to build awareness of how and why federal, state, and local emergency management systems function most effectively through teamwork
Joint Medical Operations Center (JMOC) TTX	Tabletop exercise to evaluate the current capabilities and gaps of a JMOC while maintain operational security
Operational Commanders TTX	Tabletop and functional exercise(s) co-sponsored by USSS and FEMA to allow operational commanders to clarify roles and responsibilities, validate existing plans and procedures, and review operational decision-making and interagency coordination
Senior Leadership TTX	Tabletop and functional exercise(s) co-sponsored by USSS and FEMA to allow senior leaders to clarify roles and responsibilities, validate existing plans and procedures, and review operational decision-making and interagency

Exercise Course Title	Description
	coordination

A.26 Training Request Form⁷⁶

Use this form to submit subcommittees' request for training. Using this, or a similar form, will allow for personnel to track the training provided and reassess training needs.

Date:			
To: Training [Working Group/Subcommittee]			
From: [Working Group/Subcommittee]			
, Chair/Co-Chair			
Brief Description of Training Need:			
Recipient(s) of this Training:			
Type of Training or Course Name:			
Training Provider:			
Cost of Training: \$ \$ Known Estimated			
Number of Training Sessions Anticipated:			
Desired Location(s) of Training:			
Date(s) of Training or To Be Completed By:			
Attachments: Please attach any course, training provider, and cost information,			
Upon conclusion of the training please provide a copy of training certificates to the Training [Working Group/Subcommittee].			
(To be completed by Training [Working Group/Subcommittee])			
Date Received:			

 $^{^{76}}$ This form was used by the TPD during the 2012 RNC by subcommittees requesting training.

	e Security E cal Law Enford	cement Agencies		
Request	Approved	Denied	(Reason:)

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A.27 Law Enforcement Pocket Guides

Below are the pocket guides provided by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department and the Tampa Police Department for the 2012 conventions.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Pocket Guide

Democratic National Convention

Law Enforcement Handbook

Operational Period August 30 – September 7, 2012





Anthony Foxx, Mayor

City of Charlotte

Rodney D. Monroe, *Chief of Police*Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

Message from the Chief of Police

You are about to face one of the most challenging assignments of your careers by helping to maintain the safety of those involved in the 2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC).

The level of commitment to this event is demanding. The hours will be long and even stressful at times. There will be occasions that your patience will be tried, but I know you always will display the highest level of professionalism which is the hallmark of our law enforcement officers.

I encourage you to be mindful, understanding, and most importantly, respectful of those exercising their Constitutional right to assemble peacefully. All your actions and reactions will be witnessed locally and worldwide. Therefore, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of courtesy while interacting with the thousands of visitors to our city.

I want to personally thank each and every one of you for adjusting your schedules and for taking time away from your families to help provide security for the DNC. Your hard work and dedication is appreciated. I'm honored that I have the privilege of working with you during this historic event.

Best Regards,

Rodney Montoe Chief of Police

KEY REMINDERS

- Always maintain a professional demeanor.
- · Maintain neutrality on lawful forms of expression.
- · Don't be baited into overreacting.
- Keep a watchful eye for those individuals intent on committing violent acts.
- Keep your Chain of Command fully advised of objective signs of potentially violent behavior.

Table of Contents

Crowd Management Strategies for Large Scale Events 4
Incident Command System
Medical Treatment and Hospitals
Enforcement Guide
Required Equipment
Bomb Threats and Explosive Devices
Arrest Processing
Cooperation With the Media
Maps
Logistical Information
Notes

Crowd Management Strategies for Large Scale Events

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of arievances."

- First Amendment to the United States Constitution

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized".

— Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

"...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

— Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

"As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve the community; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional Rights of all to liberty, equality and justice".

- CMPD Code of Ethics

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

We recognize that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution promotes, encourages and protects the right of free speech and the right of persons and groups to assemble peacefully. We further recognize that protected speech includes not only verbal statements, but other non-verbal expressive actions such as placards, large displays, and various performances. In addition, we recognize that the Fourth Amendment and our State's laws protect individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion into their persons, houses, papers and effects. Whether demonstrating, protesting, counter protesting, or showing support for a cause, individuals and groups have the Constitutional right to peacefully gather and express themselves without interference from law enforcement as to the content of their message.

Our overall goal during large scale demonstrations is to strike a balance between participants' First Amendment rights and our need to protect persons and property from injury or damage. To this end, the following overall strategy will guide us as we ready ourselves for the DNC.

Crowd Management Strategy. During a large scale assembly or demonstration, we can expect the following activity to occur: Lawful Assembly, Non-Violent Civil Disobedience, Isolated Violent Behavior, and in some circumstances behavior that constitutes an Unlawful Assembly. In response to the particular behaviors exhibited during a demonstration, we will rely on various crowd management strategies.

• Media access / persons recording police activity. The media has the right to be present and record activity including police action. Anyone, including the media, may record a police officer's actions. If individuals are recording your actions such as an arrest and they are physically interfering with the arrest, you should warn them to stand back and if feasible direct them to a location where they can continue to record the event while you perform your duties. You cannot prohibit the press or anyone else from recording your actions simply because you do not want to be recorded.

o Isolated unlawful acts during a Lawful Assembly


• Minor non-violent offenses. Officers will attempt to obtain voluntary compliance by issuing warnings and communicating information through the Chain of Command so that we can work with event organizers. Due to the size of the crowd, limited resources and tactical concerns, it may not be possible or advisable to take enforcement actions such as an arrest. Remember it is crucial that officers relay information to their COC before making an isolated decision to arrest someone for minor non-violent offenses such as blocking a street or sidewalk.

o Lawful Assemblies

- Cooperation with Event Organizers. We will cooperate in both the planning and management of large scale and other lawful demonstrations with the event organizers. We will communicate both prior to and during the activity with the event organizers to hopefully resolve such issues as parade routes or the changing dynamics of the activity.
- Tolerance. In most cases, we have to remember that time is on our side. Most of the people participating in large scale demonstrations do so not with the intent to commit acts of violence, but to support a cause that they strongly believe in. It is important that officers remain tolerant. It is anticipated that a small, but well trained number of "professional" agitators will take every opportunity to disrupt lawful assemblies by using several tactics one of which includes taunting officers in hopes that officers overreact, thereby turning a crowd against officers. Officers should be on their guard and not let themselves be baited into overreacting to verbal challenges, taunts, jeers and insults. Although offensive, such tactics are designed to get you to lose control and are not in and of themselves a violation of the law.

Violent behavior against persons and property. Curtailing violence is a high priority. Officers will rely on several tactics depending on the size of the crowd and location of the violent acts. In some circumstances, selected officers will track groups involved in illegal behavior for the purpose of documenting and collecting evidence for a successful prosecution. Not every arrest must be made immediately and a decision to arrest will depend on factors other than the fact that an offense occurred. Such factors include the size of the crowd and whether the crime involves an imminent threat to demonstrators or police.

A-95



Incident Command System

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department will operate under the Incident Command System (ICS) as a means to coordinate the efforts of multiple departmental divisions or outside agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident. Many incidents, whether major (such as hazardous material spills or civil disorders), minor (such as vehicle crashes and utility outages), or disasters (such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes), require a response from a number of different resources. Regardless of the size of the incident or the number of agencies involved in the response, all incidents require a coordinated effort to ensure an effective response and the efficient, safe use of resources.

CMPD will operate under the Incident Command System when dealing with the following:

- Emergency situations where the Emergency Mobilization Plan is utilized.
- Situations where a departmental response is required under the Charlotte-Mecklenburg All Hazards Plan.
- Situations involving personnel from different divisions and units where the event is expected to last longer than 24 hours.
- · Situations requiring coordination with outside agencies.
- Situations that require activation of the CMPD Command Center.
- · Other situations where the ICS would prove beneficial.

10

The ICS organization comprises six major functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, finance/administration, and intelligence.

Command is responsible for all incident or event activity. Although other functions may be left unfilled in the Command area, there will always be an Incident Commander. The command staff positions under the Incident Commander are:

- PIO Officer
- Safety Officer
- Liaison Officer

At a minimum, the Incident Commander will address the following, if necessary:

- · Activate the Incident Command System;
- · Establish a command post;
- Initiate the notification and mobilization of additional agency personnel;
- Obtain additional support from outside agencies;
- Establish staging areas;
- · Provide for public information and media relations;
- · Maintain the safety of all affected personnel; and
- Be responsible for preparing a documented after action report.

The Operations Section is responsible for directing the tactical actions to meet incident objectives.

- Divisions and groups are established within the Operations Section when the number of resources exceeds the Operations Section Chief's manageable span of control.
- Divisions demarcate physical or geographical areas of operation within the incident area.
- Groups demarcate functional areas of operation for the incident such as rescue, law enforcement, or fire.

At a minimum, the Operations Function will address the following, if necessary:

- · Establish perimeters;
- · Conduct Evacuations;
- · Maintain Command Post and Scene Security;
- Provide for detainee transportation, processing, and confinement;
- · Direct and control traffic; and
- Conduct post-incident investigations.

Medical Treatment and Hospitals

All on duty police and fire personnel who sustain non-critical injuries during the event will be transported to the nearest trauma center.

Facility Name	Phone No.	Address
Carolinas Medical Center	704-355-2000	1000 Blythe Blvd.
CMC – Mercy	704-304-5000	2001 Vail Ave.
CMC – Pineville	704-667-1000	10628 Park Road
CMC – University	704-863-6000	8800 North Tryon St.
Presbyterian Hospital	704-384-4000	200 Hawthorne Lane
Presbyterian Hospital – Huntersville	704-316-4000	10030 Gilead Road
Presbyterian Hospital – Matthews	704-384-6500	1500 Matthews Township Parkway

Enforcement Guide

Following is a list of helpful statues and ordinances involving public peace issues. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive and is provided as a reference guide only. Please consult the appropriate statue/ordinance prior to charging, in order to ensure that the offense being cited is appropriate.

Pertinent Statutes and Ordinances Violent Behavior

· Misdemeanor Riot. G.S. 14-288.2

- A person is guilty of misdemeanor riot if he/she
 - · willfully assembles
 - with two or more other persons; and
 - engages in a public disturbance
 - that by
 - » violent conduct or
 - » the imminent threat of violent conduct
 - causes injury or damage to persons or property or
 - creates a clear and present danger of such injury or damage.

13

14

Felony Riot G.S. 14-288.2

- A person is guilty of a Class F Felony if he/she
 - willfully assembles
 - with two or more other persons and
 - engages in violent conduct
 - that results in
 - » property damage in excess of \$1,500.00; or
 - » serious bodily injury; or
 - » damage or injury to persons or property or a clear and present danger and
 - » the person possesses a dangerous weapon or substance

• Failure to Disperse on Command G.S. 14-288.5

- A person is guilty of a Class 2 Misdemeanor if he/she
- fails to comply with a command to disperse
- given in a manner reasonably calculated to be heard by the assembly
- by a police officer or public official responsible for keeping the peace
- When the officer believes that a riot is occurring Note: Commands to disperse will be given by the command staff on scene. Once given, officers must not block the dispersal route and give the public a reasonable amount of time to disperse.

Assault on emergency personnel during state of emergency or riot

- It is a Class I felony for anyone
 - to commit an assault
 - on emergency personnel
 - which inflicts injury on emergency personnel
 - · during a state of emergency or
 - within the immediate vicinity of a riot or when a riot is imminent
- It is a Class F felony for anyone
 - to commit an assault
 - on emergency personnel
 - · with a dangerous weapon or substance
 - · causing injury and
 - · during a state of emergency or
 - within the immediate vicinity of a riot or when a riot is imminent

Weapons at Demonstrations G.S. 14-277.2

- It is a Class 1 misdemeanor for anyone who
- · willfully or intentionally;
- possesses or has immediate access to any dangerous weapon;
- while participating, affiliated or present as a spectator at any;
 - parade
 - funeral
 - picket line, or
 - demonstration upon any private health care facility or <u>public place owned or controlled by</u> state or local government.

15

• Trespass on a Public Utility G.S. 14-159.12

- Effective September 1, 2012, it is a Class A1 misdemeanor for anyone to
- · trespass on a
- electric power supplier, a public water system, any natural gas facility public or privately owned
- Where the person entered the building, or it was necessary for the person to climb over, go under or surmount a fence or other barrier to reach the facility
- It is a Class H felony for anyone to
 - · trespass on a public facility, and
 - with the intent to disrupt the normal operation of the facility and
 - the trespass involves an act that places either the offender or others on the premises at risk of serious bodily injury.

City of Charlotte Ordinances

· City Code Sec. 15-27

17

- Possession of obstruction devices; placing objects in roadway, public right of way prohibited.
 - Unlawful to place obstruction object or instrument with the intent to obstruct a public road, public sidewalk, public right of way, entrance or exit to private property or other area open to the public.

 Obstruction object or instrument means a device commonly known as a lock box or sleeping dragon or any components of those devices including but not limited to: pipes, tubes wire, handcuffs, chains, carabineers, or padlocks, or containers either weighted or not.

· City Code Sec. 15-27

- Placing objects in roadway, public right of way prohibited.
- Unlawful to place any tripod, bipod, or other pole or object with the intent to obstruct pedestrian or vehicular movement on a public road, public sidewalk, public right of way, entrance or exit to private property, or any other area open to the public.
- Unlawful for anyone to attach themselves to another person, building, vehicle, or fixture with the intent to obstruct pedestrian or vehicle movement on a public road, public sidewalk, public right of way, entrance or exit to private property, or any other area open to the public.

· City Code Sec. 15-28

- Possession and dispersal of noxious substances
 - Unlawful to possess any noxious substance with the intent to use the noxious substance to interfere with a lawful assembly or to interfere with the emergency services or to interfere with a person's right of entry or right to leave a place.

18

- Unlawful to throw, emit, or cause to be used as a projectile, or otherwise disperse any noxious substance.
- Noxious substance means any substance that is harmful or destructive or foul or offensive to human beings, such as but not limited to garbage, trash, refuse, animal parts or fluids, manure, urine, feces, or other organic waste by-products.

City Code Sec. 15-29 Police lines and barricades

 Officers of CMPD are authorized to establish police lines and barricades to preserve the public peace, arrest offenders and to protect the rights of person and property.

City Code Sec. 15-30 Kindling bonfires

 Unlawful to set a fire on any public street, avenue, highway, public property or right of way unless expressly allowed by a permit.

City Code 15-31

Attachments to public and private property

Unlawful to hang, fasten, or attach, any rope, wire, chain, sign, banner, or electrical device or power cord to any public or private property including buildings, bridges, overpasses, vehicles, construction equipment, memorials, utility poles or artwork unless express permission has been granted by the owner or manager of the property.

· City Code 15-313

- Extraordinary Event Ordinance prohibited items examples:
 - It is illegal to possess certain items within the extraordinary event zone such items as metal shaft, cable or plastic pipe capable of inflicting injury;
 - A container of sufficient weight that may be used as a projectile and cause serious injury;
 - Body armor, helmets, gas masks with the intent to delay or obstruct officers;
 - o Fireworks, smoke bombs, sparklers, and stink bombs

Note: Officers should seek voluntary compliance first before making an arrest. Remember in some circumstances it may not be tactically feasible to make an arrest. Arrests should not occur in isolation but involve chain of command.

19

Required Equipment

Based on your assignment, all patrol personnel at the rank of sergeant or below will carry:

- · Service weapon with magazine
- Radio
- Handcuffs
- · OC aerosol spray
- · Collapsible baton
- Personal armor
- · Traffic control vest
- · Riot helmet
- · Gas mask

Prohibited equipment includes, but is not limited to:

- Blackjacks
- · Brass knuckles
- Ammunition other than department issued for departmental weapons
- Gloves that do not cover the entire hand, wrist, and fingers, i.e., driving gloves
- Mirrored sunglasses

Bomb Threats and Explosive Devices

Response to Unattended & Suspicious Packages or IED's

The primary responsibility of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is to ensure the safety of persons and the security of the affected area. Any movement or investigation of a suspect explosive device should be left to the Bornb Squad's authorized explosives ordnance disposal personnel.

Definitions:

Unattended Package/Item

A package or item(s) that has been left in a location, by an <u>unknown</u> person or entity, with <u>no indications</u> or available intelligence that raises the threat level to a "suspicious/suspect package."

Suspicious/Suspect Item

A package or item <u>possibly</u> containing: energetic, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material. It is deemed to be unusual due to physical indicators, design, placement or intelligence information received. A suspicious package/item will require a response of the Bomb Squad personnel.

21

22

If you discover an <u>unattended</u> or <u>suspicious package</u> the following steps should be taken:

1. DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE PACKAGE.

- Evaluate the probability factors by asking questions such as, "Where did the item come from?" "Where was it placed?" "How long has it been there?" "Is the item a typical or normal item which would routinely be found in the area?" (Homeless person's effects?)
- Examine the exterior of the package for suspicious indicators it may contain, does it look out of place? Wires, odors, noises, etc.
- Attempt to identify and contact owner /sender to inquire of package contents.
- If you are still unable to resolve the situation contact the bomb squad.

Use your senses & common sense.

You can contact the bomb squad for assistance or response in several ways:

- Radio CMPD Communications (Any dispatched Channel on CMPD Radio)
- · Calling 911 or CMPD Command Center

Arrest Processing

The role of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is to maintain law and order and ensuring the safety of the public. Officers will arrest and take into custody those individuals engaging in criminal conduct.

Mobile Field Forces

Mobile Field Forces will be issued pre-packaged arrest kits for use in all arrests related to the DNC event. Each kit contains a preprinted wrist band, a sheet of peel-off barcode labels, property bags and arrest paperwork. Once an arrestee is secured, the arresting MFF officer will:

- · attach the provided wrist band to the arrestee
- attach the provided barcode labels to property bags and arrest paperwork
- hold until arrival of Prisoner Transport Van or other designated vehicle

Prisoner Transport

Vans or buses specifically configured for prisoner transport will be utilized for transporting arrestees. These vehicles will be available at the designated arrest collection points. Officers assigned to prisoner transport will for each arrest:

- scan both the barcode of the arresting officer and the arrestee
- take a digital photograph of the arresting officer and his/her arrestee
- submit this data electronically via the assigned mobile device

- transport arrestees to the Temporary Emergency Arrest Staging Area (TEASA) located at the Jail North Intake Center
- upon turning over arrestees to TEASA personnel, drop off any collected property at the property collection point also located at the Jail North Intake Center
- return to the designated staging area or arrest collection points as needed

Temporary Emergency Arrest Staging Area (TEASA)

The TEASA will be utilized to facilitate the safe and orderly processing of all DNC related arrestees. Personnel assigned to the TEASA will:

- meet the arriving prisoner transport vehicle at the designated gate and assist arrestees in exiting the vehicle in a safe manner
- take possession of the arrestees' paperwork from the transport officers
- escort arrestees into the TEASA facility where the arrestees will be searched and photographed
- arrestees will be escorted and then placed into one of the holding cages
- the arrestees' paperwork will be taken and handed over to one of the CRU data entry stations

- once the MCSO Intake Deputies indicate they are ready to process arrestees, the arrestees will be taken from the holding cages, photographed and escorted to the arrest processing center where they will be transferred to the control of MCSO deputies
- once the arrest processing has been completed and the arrestees are to be released then the MCSO will notify the TEASA, who will then escort the arrestees to the release point and have final photographs of the arrestees taken
- TEASA will provide instructions to the arrestees for the retrieval of any property that was taken during the arrest

25

26


Cooperation With the Media


Joint Information Center (JIC) -704-342-7850

CMPD recognizes that a spirit of cooperation and openness is an essential component in fostering the trust and support of the community it serves. It is generally appropriate to release information unless it would be detrimental to the investigation or prosecution of a crime, or is of a confidential nature according to public records law. The Public Affairs Office will support and assist staff in working with the media and coordinate the appropriate communication of timely and accurate information.

The media has the right to be present and record activity including police action. Anyone, including the media, may record a police officer's actions.


If individuals are recording your actions, such as an arrest, and are physically interfering with the arrest, you should warn them to stand back and if possible direct them to a location where they can continue to record the event. You *cannot* prohibit the press or anyone else from recording your actions simply because you do not want to be recorded.





Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies



Logistical Information

Please utilize your radio channel for additional details on the following:

- · Resting areas
- · Feeding areas
- Transportation

You may also contact Public Affairs at 704-432-6053 for any general questions.

Function	Talkgroup	Zone	Monitored by Dispatcher	Monitored by Command Center Rep
CMPD/ CFD Communications Center Conference	CLT Wide	23	YES	YES
Interagency Command	CLT Command-1	23-25	NO.	YES
CMPD Command Center to the MACC	CLT Command-2	23-25	NQ	YES
CMPD Command Talkgroup	CMPD CMD1	22	NO	YES
CMPD Command Talkgroup (SPARE)	CMPD CMD2	22	NO	As Needed
Mobile Field Force (MFF) Primary	CEU-1	13	YES	YES
MFF Secondary	CEU-2	13	As Needed	As Needed
MFF Conference	CEU-3	13	NO	NO
MFF- Warrants and Inquiries	CEU-4	13	YES	NO
SWAT/ Tactical Primary	SWAT-1 (CMPD)	12	As Needed	As Needed
SWAT/Tactical Secondary	SWAT-2 (CMPD)	12	As Needed	As Needed
SWAT/Tactical Tertiary	SWAT-3 (CMPD)	12	As Needed	As Needed
Venues Events (Arena, Stadium, and Conv Center)	PS-TAC1	25	YES	YES
Venues Events (Arena, Stadium, and Conv Center)	PS-TAC2	25	YES	YES
Delegate Buses / Traffic / Motorcycles / Foot Patrol	PS-TAC3	25	YES	YES
Special Response Units / Arrest Processing	PS-TAC12	25	YES	YE5
Motorcades	PS-TACS	25	As Needed	As Needed
SPARE	PS-TAC6	25	NO	YES
SPARE	PS-TAC7	25	NO	YES
SPARE	PS-TAC8	25	NO	NO
Airport Operations	PS-TAC9	25	NO	NO
Special Events - North/ Hotels	PS-TAC10	25	YES	YES
Special Events - South	PS-TAC11	25	YES	YES
Dignitary Protection	PS-TAC12	25	NO	NO
SPARE	PS-TAC13	25	NO	NO
SPARE	PS-TAC14	25	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward1	23	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward2	23	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward3	23	NO	NO
SPARE	Ward4	23	NO	NO
Logistics 1	CMPD1	21	NO	NO
Logistics 2	CMPD2	21	NO	NO
Site Security - JC Smith University	Metro	1 or 3	YES	NO
Site Security – Johnson & Wales	Central	1 or 2	YES	NO
Interagency Hazmat/EOD - Dispatch	HAZ-OPS1	23	YES	YES
Interagency Hazmat/EOD - Conference/Spare	HAZ-OPS2	23	As Needed	As Needed
Fire Dispatch	CITY-DISP	24	NQ	YES
CMUD - Support Services - garbage, water, debris	Evt5-PW1 / Evt6-PW2	18	NO	No

Acronyms

(ARC) American Red Cross

(ATF) Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms and Explosives

(BMC) Bomb Management Center (CFD) Charlotte Fire Department

(CMPD) Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

(CMUD) Charlotte-Mecklenburg Utilities Department

(DHS) Department of Homeland Security (Federal) (DNC) Democratic National Convention

(DNCC) Democratic National Convention Committee

(EMS) Emergency Medical Services

(EOC) Emergency Operations Center

(EOD) Explosive Ordnance Devise

(EPA) Federal Environmental Protection Agency

(FBI) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FEMA) Federal Emergency Management Agency (HazMat) Hazardous Materials

(ICS) Incident Command System

(IOC) Intelligence Operations Center

(JHAT) Joint Hazard Assessment Team

(J-HERT) Joint Hazardous Explosive Response Team

(JIC) Joint Information Center

(JOC) Joint Operations Center (FBI)

(MACC) Multi-Agency Communications Center

(MCSO) Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office

(NIMS) National Incident Management System (NSSE) National Special Security Event

(OEM) Office of Emergency Management

(PIO) Public Information Officer

(PPE) Personal Protective Equipment

(TESEA) Temporary Emergency Arrest Staging Area (TSA) Federal Transportation Safety Agency (USSS) United States Secret Service

(WMD) Weapons of Mass Destruction

Mission Statement


The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department will build problem-solving partnerships with our citizens to prevent the next crime and enhance the quality of life throughout our community, always treating people with fairness and respect.

We value:

- Our Employees
- People
- Partnerships
- Open Communications
- Problem Solving
- Integrity
- Courtesy
- The Constitution of North Carolina
- The Constitution of the United States



Tampa Police Department Pocket Guide



The Republican National Convention is the largest special event that the Tampa Bay Area has ever hosted and is one of the biggest challenges of our careers. More than 50,000 visitors from around the world will arrive in Tampa in August to attend the RNC. In addition, it is expected that there will be an additional 15,000 members of the media and an estimated 15,000 individuals who will travel here to express their opinions through demonstrations during this five day eyent.

We are confident that your law enforcement experience and the specialized RNC training you have received will ensure the flawless handling of this event. We appreciate your dedication to making this the best political convention to date. In order to accomplish this mission, we ask you to remember your training, and understand that your actions must be appropriate and in the best interest of the operation. Everything that we do will be viewed across the nation and around the world. Let's show the world what makes our state law enforcement the best.

Thank you for your dedication, patience and positive attitude during the next few days.

God bless and stay safe. Also, remember to drink plenty of water and wear sunscreen!

COMMUNITY INFORMATION REGARDING RNC: (866)762-8687 or www.tampagov.net/rnc

OFFICER SUPPORT/QUESTIONS: (813) 231-6135

WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ON-THE-JOB INJURY

All accidents must be reported to your supervisor immediately! If no supervisor is available, report the claim to Chartis by calling toll free (800) 242-2418 x 72239 policy # 015-11-0348 for work related injuries during normal business hours (8 am - 5 pm). Medical services may be obtained from one of the medical facilities listed below. For after hours care, go to the nearest hospital emergency room (listed below):

Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In 206 E Brandon Blvd Brandon, FL 33511 813-681-5571	Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In 13856 N Dale Mabry Hwy Tampa, FL 33618 813-264-1885	Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In 13610 Bruce B Downs Blvd Tampa, FL 33613 813-977-2777
Med Express Urgent Care Urgent Care Center/ Walk-In 2810 W Dr MLK Jr Blvd Tampa, FL 33607 813-877-8450	AFTER HOURS CARE Florida Hospital Carrollwood 7171 N Dale Mabry Hwy Tampa, FL 33614 813-971-6000	St. Josephs Hospital 3001 W Dr Martin Luther King Jr Blvd Tampa, FL 33607 813-870-4000
Florida Hospital 3100 E Fletcher Ave Tampa, FL 33613 813-971-6000	CRISIS CARE Tampa General Hospital Tampa General Circle Tampa, FL 33606 813-844-7000	

Medical

DECONTAMINATION PROCESS

A typical decontamination process consists of:

Evaluation- Determines the threat, contamination potential, and need for decontamination

Method- The degree of decontamination that is determined

Clothing Removal- For the purpose of physically removing contaminants

Wash- Water is an excellent solution to physically remove contaminants from the body

Soap- Mild soap might be provided as a surfactant to lock onto the contaminant

Rinse- removes all soap, debris, and contaminant

Garment- A disposable garment to be worn following decontamination

Re-evaluation- Determines if you can be released or should seek further medical treatment.

SIGNS OF HEAT EXHAUSTION

Heat exhaustion often begins suddenly, sometimes after excessive exercise, heavy perspiration, and inadequate fluid or salt intake. Signs and symptoms: Feeling faint or dizzy, nausea, heavy sweating, rapid, weak heartbeat, low blood pressure, cool, moist, pale skin, low-grade fever, heat cramps, headache, fatigue or dark-colored urine. Steps to dealing with heat-related issues should be taken in the following order:

- Call 911 and provide relevant information about the person
- Get the person out of the sun and into a shady or air-conditioned location
- · Lay the person down and elevate the legs and feet slightly
- · Loosen or remove the person's clothing
- Have the person drink cool water or other nonalcoholic beverage without caffeine
- Cool the person by spraying or sponging with cool water and fanning
- Monitor the person carefully. Heat exhaustion can quickly become heatstroke

CPR REMINDERS

Universal Precautions

Use glove and mask

Step 1 (CAB) Check for responsiveness

Circulation / Breathing / Airway

Look for signs of life (rise and fall of chest)

Check pulse /10 seconds

Step 2 Absence of pulse, start Compression @ Rates

100 comp/min - 30 compressions/2 breaths single rescuer Adult, Child and Infant.

100 comp/min - 30/2 two rescuers Adult and Child (Infant 100 comp/min @ ratio 15/2)

Step 3 Pulse present, but no breathing

Provide rescue breaths as follows:

Adults- 1 breath every 5 to 6 seconds.

Child/Infant - 1 breath every 3 to 5 seconds.

Compression Depths

Adults: 2

Child: 2" or 1/3 chest diameter Infants: 1 ½" ¼ chest diameter

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 1. It is legal for you to be audio/video recorded by anyone during your duties at the RNC. Expect it to be constant. Ignore it.
- 1st Amendment involves Free Speech and Right to Peaceably Assemble. Almost all 1st Amendment expression is legal, except words that are clearly obscene or true threats/inciting violence (riotous speech, although the mere advocacy of force or violence is insufficient).
- 3. Any regulation of speech must be content-neutral, and a person may not be silenced based upon an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction.
- 4. All aspects of the 4th Amendment still apply during RNC consensual encounters, "Terry" stops, articulation of reasonable suspicion for a pat down for weapons. Any detention must be brief and cursory.
- 5. Independent probable cause must exist for each arrest (can't be based on proximity to others suspected of criminal activity).
- **6.** Any force used must be "objectively reasonable" in light of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time.
- 7. Before arresting any protestor, consider, "What law is being broken?"
 "What charge do I have?" and "Is arrest necessary to accomplish your
 goal?"
- 8. Be aware, most lawsuits arise from RAWOV and disorderly conduct/ breach of the peace when no other charge is present. Be familiar with the elements, and include sufficient facts, documentation, and witnesses.

Arrests

USE OF FORCE POLICY

The department's policy is that "excessive" force on the part of the police officers will not be tolerated. The guidelines are as follows:

- 1. Officers are allowed to use only such force as is necessary to complete the arrest.
- This department expects all officers to defend themselves from physical attack while engaged in the performance of their official duty. If the person being arrested offers no resistance, then no force is required and none will be used.
- **3.** Use of force can be used if an officer must defend himself from physical attack. Use of force is also acceptable if there is no physical attack on the officer, but is needed to overcome resistance in carrying out the police mission.
- **4.** Officers, when not in uniform, must takes steps to clearly identify themselves prior to a use of force.
- 5. Action taken by an officer in self-defense or in defense of others, up to and including the death of the assailant, or any action taken by an officer in apprehending a suspect, will be considered warranted and justified if there is sufficient cause, as would appear real and reasonable to a prudent police officer, to fear the life or safety of the officer or another.
- **6.** Officers shall not carry any weapon not issued or approved by their department or with which they have not received training and demonstrated their proficiency.

ARREST AND ARREST PROCEDURES

Orient Road Jail at 1201 Orient Rd is the official site for the booking, processing, retention, and release of all prisoners associated with the RNC event. All other prisoners will be directed to the Falkenburg Road Jail facility. Remote booking will be conducted by H.C.S.O. at the Hillsborough County Courthouse. Defendants will make initial appearance in video court conducted from the Orient Road Jail facility.

Any use of force will be fully documented as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than the end of the officer's shift or extra duty assignment.

The Report Writing Center will be located in the Rivergate Tower, 5th Floor, 400 N. Ashley. The Center will have a Conference/ Situation Review room, 20 computers for data entry, Internet access for officers to check their email, phone service.

Potential Law Violations - The following may not be commonly known/utilized, but may be relevant during the RNC and are punishable by arrest/NTA, unless otherwise noted:

Ordinance/Statute	Description
Tampa 2012-56	Tampa "Event Zone" Ordinance (use section and subsection when citing)
Tampa Ord. 14-112	Discharging BB gun/air gun in City limits
Tampa Ord. 14-205	Diving/Jumping from bridges where signs are posted.
Tampa Ord. 3-42	Consumption of Alcohol on Premises Zoned for Off-Premises Consumption
Tampa Ord. 3-44	Consumption of Alc. w/i 500 ft of Premises Zoned for Off-Premises Consumption
Tampa Ord. 14-46	Aggressive Panhandling (Threat or Intimidation)
Tampa Ord. 25-173	Solicitation in the Right of Way
Tampa Ord. 27-521	Sale of Alcohol w/o a Permit
Tampa Ord. 3-40	Open Container (Civil Citation ONLY)
Tampa Ord. 3-41	Alcohol in the Park (Civil Citation ONLY)
Tampa Ord. 14-49	Possession of GLASS bottles on City streets/pub- lic prop. (Civil Citation ONLY, but failure to leave property or dispose of bottle and contents = RAWOV per City Code)
F.S. 316.2035(3)	Unlawful to obstruct street (non-moving infraction)
F.S. 316.2045	Obstruction of public streets, highways and roads (pedestrian violation)

F.S. 784.07	Batt, LEO/EMT/Firefighter
F.S. 790.161	Making, possessing, throwing, projecting, placing or discharging any destructive device or attempt to do so
F.S. 790.163	False report about planting bomb, explosive, or weapon of mass destruction
F.S. 790.166	Manufacture, possession, sale, delivery, display, use, or attempted or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction or hoax weapon of mass destruction
F.S. 790.19	Shooting or Throwing Deadly Missiles into a Building or Vehicle
F.S. 806.111	Fire Bombs
F.S. 810.10	Posted land; removing notice unlawful
F.S. 810.115	Breaking or injuring fences
F.S. 843.03	Obstruction by disguised person
F.S. 843.12	Aiding escape
F.S. 843.19	Offenses against police dogs, fire dogs, or police horses
F.S. 861.01	Obstructing Highway
F.S. 861.011	Obstructing Transportation Facility
F.S. 870.01	Riot
F.S. 870.02	Unlawful Assemblies
F.S. 876.12, et. seq.	Wearing mask, hood or other device on public way- Merely wearing a mask in public is not lilegal, nor is possession of a mask. Utilize ordinance prohibition on masks in event zone. These masks statutes should accompany an additional crime.
F.S. 876.52	Public Mutilation of Flag -DO NO USE THIS STATUTE AS IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

BOMBS, BOMB THREATS, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES

A vacant building that appears to be a safe house or hazardous device storage area should be considered dangerous as protestors may have counter-surveillance or booby traps in place. Do NOT make entry on your own. This will likely be a Tactical Response Team (TRT) entry. Your main job, once you identify these places, is to note what you observed without going back into the area.

Precursors to look for: Pipes, end caps, powders, bottles, gasoline, fuels, fertilizer, brake fluid, Vaseline, ice/cold packs, various household chemicals in unusual amounts, incendiary devices, fragmentation (nuts/botts/ball bearings/nails etc), chemical odors, gloves/beakers/glass/ice (cooling baths).

Incendiary devices (such as Molotov cocktails) were used by protestors at the 2008 RNC and did result in fires in the City of Minneapolis. Typically, these devices are self-igniting, which means that no flame is necessary. They are designed to ignite when the glass is broken and the chemicals inside touch the chemicals outside. A Bomb Squad response is required for these devices. They are considered a destructive device and need to be documented and treated as such. Do NOT handle these devices! Do not attempt to pour the contents out!!! Evidence collection is crucial and will be handled by the responding EOD team.

CALL for an immediate EOD response. Be prepared to advise them of the following: How many devices, approximately how large (1 liter, 2 gallons, etc), description of device, any suspect, arrestee, witnesses, or information.

Hazardous Materials


HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

Indicators of Hazardous Substance Exposure include: Skin irritation, dry or sore throat, nose bleeds, skin discoloration, shortness of breath or districts.


Isolate Contaminated Personnel from non-contaminated personnel, remove all clothing and equipment for wash down of contaminated area of body, place all clothing and equipment in sealed containers, seek medical treatment as soon as possible.

Collect information for incident reporting. Do not begin until area has been decontaminated. Evidence should NOT be disturbed until evaluated and recorded. Participate as necessary with other agencies. Provide all available information and assistance to other agencies involved in investigation.


Evidence should NOT be disturbed until evaluated and recorded. Participate as necessary with other agencies. Provide all available information and assistance to other agencies involved in investigation.




				1	\$	>≫	~	Threat Description	
Semi-Trailer	Container/Water Truck	Small Delivery Truck	SUV/Van	Car	Briefcase/Suitcase	Suicide Bomber	Pipe Bomb	iption	BOMB THREAT STAND-OFF CARD
60,000 lbs	10,000 lbs	4,000 lbs	1,000 lbs	500 lbs	50 lbs	20 lbs	5 lbs	Explosives Capacity	IT STAN
1570 ft	860 ft	640 ft	400 ft	320 ft	150 ft	110 ft	70 ft	Mandatory Evacuation Distance	D-OFF (
1571-9299 ft	861-5099 ft	641-3799 ft	401-2399 ft	321-1899 ft	151-1849 ft	111-1699 ft	71-1199 ft	Shelter-in- Place Zone)ARD
+9300 ft	+5100 ft	+3800 ft	+2400 ft	+1900 ft	+1850 ft	+1700 ft	+1200 ft	Preferred Evacuation Distance	



Food & Water







except by permit, or on private property with the prior written consent of the property owner (A)(9) Unlawful for any person to set, light or use a fire, campfire, bonfire, or fire pit on public property

intimidation, apprehension, injury, (A)(B) Unlawful for any person to throw, project, hurl or launch any object with the intent to cause intimidation, apprehension, injury, harm or damage to any person or property. Pointed wood or wood filled w/ any Lumber greater than 1/4" thick and not greater than 34" 2" width; if not thick at thickest part or plastic object blasting 1/8" wall greater than 34" thick & Weapons-air rifle, air pistol, paintball rifle, explosive, switchblade, crowbar, hammer, metal knuckles, nun chucks, mace, iron wrist shot, slungshot, shovel natchet, ax, slingshot, BB gun, pellet gun filled w/ liquid, solid or gas Any Projectile launchers, including supersoakers, water guns & Container/
device Filled
w/ urine,
Fecal matter,
blood or other bodily fluid

The following regulations shall be applicable throughout the entire City of Tampa, but only on public property that is owned, operated, managed, or leased by the City. Possession of the PROHIBITED ITEMS CITY-WIDE [TAMPA ORD. 2012-56 (7)(A)(1-7)]

items requires an intent to cause injury, harm or damage to person or property:

City Wide

EVENT ZONE

EXHIBIT A



Event

PROHIBITED ITEMS IN THE EVENT ZONE [2012-56 (7)(B)]

The items prohibited City-wide also apply, regardless of the person's intent to cause injury, harm, or damage to person or property. It shall be unlawful to possess the following items upon any public property within the Event Zone:

Rope, chain,	Frangible/	LOCKS-	Material	Masks or
	breakable containers including,	including, padlocks, bicycle locks, chain locks	designed for a portable shield, NOT including fabric	device where face is hidden; Gas Masks;

Note: prohibition on gas masks shall not apply to any person wearing a medical oxygen mask that fits over the nose and mouth of the person and provides oxygen from an oxygen tank to the person.

The lock prohibition does not include (i) an integral component of a conveyance or structure; (ii) locks when utilized by the owner of private real property to secure permanent or temporary fencing; or (iii) locks attached to a bicycle;

The prohibitions do not apply when the person or his/her employer is licensed to do business in Hillsborough County, and the possession of the item is in the normal course of the person's business or law enforcement personnel or employees possessing a prohibited item in the course of their authorized duties; or any licensed medical professional in the performance of their medical duties.


Pursuant to Section 9 of the ordinance, possession of obstruction devices is prohibited, as is placing objects in the right-of-way, sidewalk or roadway. This includes possessing or placing any tool, object, instrument or combination thereof, that is adapted, designed or intended to be used for obstructing the public's ability to freely move about, and includes a "Sleeping Dragon," tripods, bipod, pole, any sections of pipe or containers filled with or wrapped in weighted material such as concrete and/or containing handcuffs, chains, carabiners, padlocks or other locking devices. Unlawful for any person to inhibit the movement of emergency equipment on streets or sidewalks or rights of way or to place any instrument, tripod, bipod or other pole or object with the intent to obstruct the public's ability to freely move about on rights-of-way, sidewalks, entrance and exit to private property, or any other area to which the public has access. It shall be unlawful for any person to attach themselves to another person, building, vehicle or fixture with the intent to obstruct the public's ability to freely move about in areas to which the public has

Section 10 - Prohibits Camping and Temporary Shelters on any City property, including parks, rights-of-way and sidewalks. City may remove shelter, bedding or belongings.

Section 11 - Prohibition on Urination and Defecation and disposal thereof

Section 12 - Prohibits Rappelling or climbing on any pole, tree, building, parking structure, bridge, overpass, crane or tower.

PUBLIC VIEWING AREA AND PARADE ROUTE



Public View Area

Masks are prohibited in the Event Zone <u>but not in the Public Viewing Area or on the Parade Route.</u>

nt per ent dan	Cans and Any other item that law enforcement personnel thermoses determines to be a clear and present danger.	tem that lav s to be a cle:	Any other i determines	Cans and thermoses	Umbrellas with metal tips	Sticks, poles greater than dimensions set forth in City-Wide regs
bipod	Monopods bipods		Ice chests ladders	sticks	tripods	Bottles
Non-plastic containers		Fireworks Lasers	Coolers		Any weapon Camping as defined gear in Event Zone	Aerosol cans

In additional to the items prohibited City-Wide and in the Event Zone, the following items are **NOT ALLOWED** in the public viewing area:

PROHIBITED IN THE PUBLIC VIEWING AREA [TAMPA ORD. 2012-56 (7)(C)]

Managing Large-Scale Security Events
A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies
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A.28 Traffic and Transportation Plan Template"

The Traffic and Transportation Plan should be released to the public two weeks to a month before the event. This will allow the public to review the plan and make preparations, as needed.

Placeholders for law enforcement agencies to fill in with the necessary information are identified with brackets [].

Title: Law Enforcement and Public Safety Agencies Announce Security Restrictions and Transportation Plan for the [event].

Contact Information: [List contact information for all event-planning agencies and related stakeholders]

The [event] will be held in [city, state] from [dates]. The event has been designated as a [list designation].

Security and transportation plans for the convention and its events have been developed by a partnership of local, state, and federal law enforcement and public safety agencies. Every effort has been made to minimize the impact of these safety measures.

This plan provides the general outlines for road closures, vehicular and pedestrian restricted zones, and public transportation. Specific questions regarding this transportation plan should be directed to the participating agencies as identified.

In addition to the identified road closures and parking restrictions near event venues in [event venue locations], there will be intermittent traffic delays and temporary closures on interstate roads and throughout the area, beginning on [start date] until [end date], to allow [special transportation vehicles (e.g., motorcades)] to travel to and from event sites.

Road Closures, Parking and Pedestrian Restrictions

Road closures, parking restrictions, and changes to public transportation routes and public works services will be necessary during the [event] near [event venue locations]. The public's cooperation and patience in abiding by these restrictions is appreciated.

Parking-restricted areas will be posted with "Emergency No Parking" signage. Fencing, other physical barriers, and uniformed law enforcement officers will also be used to enforce vehicle and pedestrian restricted zones. Maps of the restricted areas in [event locations] are attached.

[Continue by outlining the parking restriction and road closures in each of the event's locations and/or affected areas.]

⁷⁷ This template was derived using the 2012 RNC Transportation Plan.

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

New Traffic Patterns and Pedestrian Restrictions

[Include information on new traffic patterns and pedestrian restrictions.]

Parking Garages

[Include information on closures/limited access to parking garages near the event venue(s).]

Access to city parks and services

[Include information on closures/limited access to city parks, landmarks, and city services.]

Airspace Restrictions

[If applicable, include information on airspace restrictions.]

Marine/Waterway Restrictions

[If applicable, include information on marine/waterway restrictions.]

Public Transit

[If applicable, include information on the impact to local public transit services.]

Online Information

[Provide the public with web links and additional resources where they can obtain additional information and updates about the event.]

Appendices/Attachments

[Include maps for all road closures, pedestrian restrictions, parking restrictions, etc.]

Appendix B. Summary of Key Planning Checklists

Below is a summary of planning checklists according to each core operational area, including pre-planning elements.

	Initiating Internal Department - Planning Checklist				
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹			
	Review Lessons Learned from Previous Large-Scale Events				
^	Begin Planning Immediately; Do Not Wait for Federal Guidance				
•	Develop a Strategic Vision				
•	Identify a Lead Planner for the Department				
•	Determine Authorities of Participating Agencies				
•	Establish a Local Core Planning Team				
•	Understand that Operational Plans will Remain in Flux				
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs A NSSE	Ēs			

	Developing the Operational Plan- Planning Checklist						
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹					
A	Staff and Engage in Subcommittees						
•	Coordinate and Participate in Planning Groups						
	Identify and Include Supporting Agencies and Organizations						

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

•	Develop Scalable Plans	
•	Test the Operational Plan Prior to the Event	
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs	

	Administrative and Logistics Support - Planning Checklist				
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹			
•	Engage in Collaborative Planning				
^	Work with Federal Grant Partners				
•	Acquire an Appropriate Number of Personnel				
•	Obtain Necessary Equipment				
•	Focus Resources on Proven Systems and Technologies				
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Logistics				
•	Practice Plans and Protocols				
•	Determine Staffing Requirements, and Track and Demobilize Officers				
•	Collaborate with Vendors and Hold them Accountable				
•	Provide Fixed and Mobile Nourishment Sites for Officers				
•	Coordinate Lodging for Officers				
•	Arrange for Officer Transportation				
	KEY: OLarge-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs				

Command and Control - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Establish a Command Structure with Appropriate Leadership	
•	Develop a Professional Relationship with Agency Leaders	
•	Coordinate Response through a Unified Operations Center	
A	Coordinate Response with the MACC	
•	Maintain Situational Awareness	
•	Keep Open Lines of Communication	
•	Structure Operations Similar to Traditional Patrol Operations	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Credentialing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
A	Abide by USSS Credentialing Protocols	
•	Determine the Type and Level of Credentials Required	
•	Determine if Vehicle Credentials are Needed	
•	Detail Credential Specifications	
•	Provide Specific Guidance to Individuals Requesting Credentials	
•	Process Credential Information in an Organized and Timely Fashion	
•	Develop Protocols for Creating and Distributing Credentials	

Credentialing - Planning Checklist			
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
•	Ensure that Officers Understand Credential Protocols		
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSES		

Crowd Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Anticipate Crowd Behaviors and Actions	
•	Use Data to Support the Development of Crowd Control Deployment	
•	Develop a Policing Strategy that is Focused on Non- Confrontational Tactics Centered on Team Policing	
•	Identify the Most Appropriate Resources for the Mission	
•	Determine Officer Dress	
•	Control Demonstrator Activities	
•	Collaborate with Other Organizations	
•	Train Officers on the Policing Strategy	
•	Inform the Public of Response Tactics	
•	Create Mobile Response Teams	
•	Position Commanders in the Field	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Dignitary/VIP Protection - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Determine Who Needs Protection	
•	Determine Your Protection Strategy	
•	Acquire and Train Officers	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for VIP Protection	
•	Minimize Officer Fatigue	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSES		

	Financial Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed	
	Develop a Comprehensive and Detailed Budget		
A	Understand How NSSEs may be Financed		
•	Communicate Regularly		
A	Prepare for Federal Site Visits and Post-event Audits		
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Fir	Fire/ Emergency Medical Services/ Hospitals/ Public Health - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
	Outline Operational Activities in Response Plans		
	Collaborate During Steady-State Operations to Prepare for a Health Event Response		
•	Coordinate Joint Reponses to Encourage Situational Awareness		
•	Train Medical Response Personnel		
	KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs NSSEs		

Intelligence/ Counterterrorism/ Counter Surveillance - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Conduct Threat and Risk Assessments	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Intelligence	
•	Collaborate with Field Operations	
•	Leverage Video Surveillance Technologies	
•	Conduct Traditional and Non-Traditional Crime Analysis	
•	Use Intelligence Sources with Mobile Technologies	
•	Strategically Integrate Intelligence Sources	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSES		

Interagency Communications and Technology - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed
	Develop an Operational Plan for Interagency Communications	
	Identify Communication Technologies	
•	Test Communication Mechanisms	
•	Establish a Central Communications Center	
	Create Communication Strike Teams	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Legal Affairs - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed
•	Include Law Experts in Early Planning	
	Ensure that Plans are Constitutionally Sound	
•	Prepare and Thoroughly Review Contracts	
•	Identify Strategies to Mitigate Litigations	
•	Ensure Outside Officers have Legal Jurisdiction	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

	Non-Event Patrol - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
•	Maintain Staffing and Resource Levels		
•	Manage Non-Security Event Responses		
•	Prepare for Large Emergencies		
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs			

	Prisoner Processing - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹	
•	Focus Strategies on Deterring Arrests		
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Prisoner Processing		
•	Conduct Pre-Event Exercises and Training		
•	Conduct Arrests Quickly		
•	Develop Protocols for Handling Evidence		
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs NSSEs			

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Conduct Infrastructure and Cyber Risk Assessments	
•	Develop an Operational Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure	
•	Request Assistance from the National Guard	

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Use Risk Management Software	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Public Information and Media Relations - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Designate Public Information Officers Early in the Planning Phase	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Public Affairs	
•	Build Positive Relationships with Demonstration Groups	
•	Openly Communicate with the Media	
•	Keep the Community Informed	
•	Manage Public Affairs through a Joint Information Center	
•	Provide On-site Information	
KEY: Clarge-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Screening and Physical Security - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
Security Perimeters and Checkpoints		
	Determine Secure Zones	
•	Establish Screening Protocols	

Screening and Physical Security - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Define Staffing Responsibilities	
•	Acquire Resources and Equipment for Establishing Perimeters	
A	Collaborate with the USSS for Screening Secure Zones	
	Airspace Security	
•	Learn Airspace Security Plans and Protocols	
•	Identify and Work in Partnership with Interagency Stakeholders	
_	Collaborate with the Airspace Operations Center	
Airport Security		
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Airport Security	
•	Establish Traffic Control Strategies	
•	Communicate with Stakeholders	
	Maritime Security	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Maritime Security	
Venue Security		
•	Determine Lead Authority	
•	Engage in Early, Collaborative Planning	
•	Coordinate Venue Security Officers	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/ Hazardous Materials - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Combine HAZMAT and Explosive Device Response (EDR) Planning	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for EDR/HAZMAT	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSEs		

Training - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
	Recommend Federal Incident Management Training	
•	Develop an Extensive Officer-Training Curriculum	
•	Deliver Training in Various Forms	
•	Track Training Sessions	
•	Test Personnel Post Training	
•	Conduct Drills and Exercises	
•	Give Training Resources to Officers	
•	Provide the Community with Training	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs ANSSES		

Transportation and Traffic Management - Planning Checklist		
	Key Steps	Completed 🗹
•	Collaborate with Other Stakeholders	
•	Develop an Operational Plan for Transportation	
•	Be Flexible	
•	Separate Traffic Command into Smaller Activities	
•	Use Officers, Signage, and other Resources to Guide Traffic	
	Coordinate Specialized Transportation for VIP/Delegate Buses	
KEY: Large-Scale Security Events and NSSEs NSSEs		

Appendix C. Acronyms

AAR After-Action Report

ADA Americans with Disabilities Act

ASOC Airspace Operations Center

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

CCC Interagency Coordination Communication Center

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CIRC Critical Incident Response Center

CMPD Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

CRS [DOJ] Community Relations Service

CSB Customer Service Branch

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DNC Democratic National Convention

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EDR Explosive Device Response

ESC Executive Steering Committee

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDLE Florida Department of Law Enforcement

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GMS Grants Management System

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

ICS Incident Command System

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IOC Intelligence Operations Center

JIC Joint Information Center

JMOC Joint Medical Operations Center

Managing Large-Scale Security Events

A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies

JOC Joint Operations Center

LEO Law Enforcement Officer

LTE Long Term Evolution

MACC Multi-Agency Command Center

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense System

MFF Mobile Field Force

MTS Maritime Transportation System
NCNG North Carolina National Guard

NIMS National Incident Management System

NSSE National Special Security Event

OC Oleoresin Capsicum [pepper spray]
OCFO Office of the Chief Financial Officer

OIG Office of the Inspector General

OJP Office of Justice Programs

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PIO Public Information Officer
PRD Pressure-Restricting Device
PRV Pressure-Reducing Valve
R&R Rest and Rehabilitation

RNC Republican National Convention

SLATT State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

TPD Tampa Police Department

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TTX Tabletop Exercise

USSS U.S. Secret Service

WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

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