

The Cleveland Division of Police Protection of the 2016 Republican National Convention:

A Quick-Look Analysis of the Public Safety Best Practices and Lessons Learned



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Prepared by the Police Foundation in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),
U.S. Department of Justice and BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center.

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Executive Summary

Large Scale Security Events (LSSEs) pose unique challenges for public safety and security planning and operations. Due to the high-profile nature and large number of attendees, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Secret Service (USSS) classified the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC) as a LSSE, as well as a National Special Security Event (NSSE), a subset of LSSEs, for its national significance. NSSEs are events of national significance due to their political, economic, social, or religious nature that may be targets of terrorism or criminal activity.

In order to update local law enforcement on best practices and lessons learned related to planning and securing these events, the Police Foundation (PF)—through a technical assistance agreement from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC)—developed updated Quick Look Analysis reports for the 2016 RNC in Cleveland and the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Philadelphia. This Cleveland Quick Look Analysis report highlights preliminary lessons learned and best practices for use in planning future LSSEs.

In developing this Quick Look Report, PF team members, subject matter experts on law enforcement and LSSEs, reviewed relevant media reports and documents, interviewed key members of Cleveland’s convention security planning team, observed LSSE discussions and documented key decisions, and visited local locations and activities related to the RNC and its security. The PF team also conducted post-event interviews with key personnel to gather input and develop promising practices, lessons learned, and other recommendations.

Major Observations

The PF team made several observations in the assessment of public safety and security operations for the 2016 RNC. Cleveland faced some unique challenges leading up to and during the presidential nominating convention. At the time of the convention, policing nationally, and the Cleveland Division of Police (CPD) specifically, were under intense national scrutiny. Not only did this cause challenges, but hosting such an important large-scale event also provided opportunities for the city and the department to help reshape the nation’s perception of policing, based on the outcomes of its efforts during the RNC.

The City of Cleveland, CPD, community partners along with state and federal partners hosted a successful convention. Cleveland received praise in the media for the positive interactions between protestors and police, and the collaboration between the department, businesses, residents and visitors before, during and after the Convention.¹ Despite the initial withdrawal of

¹Chenowith, Doral. “Police work to De-escalate Tensions During Cleveland Protests,” The Columbus Dispatch. July 19, 2016 <http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/07/19/cleveland-remains-calm-so-far-as-police-patrol-streets.html>; MacDonald, Evan. “Cleveland Police Perform Well Under Spotlight of Republican National Convention: Analysis.” Cleveland.com. July 22, 2016. http://www.cleveland.com/rnc-2016/index.ssf/2016/07/cleveland_police_perform_well_under_spotlight_of_republican_national_convention_analy

some law enforcement agencies that had originally offered to send officers to Cleveland, CPD was able to successfully gain support from state police and other police agencies to protect the RNC and ensure that all attendees were respected and allowed to exercise their First Amendment rights. The RNC was also the first national convention during which officers were equipped with body worn cameras (BWCs). All CPD patrol personnel were issued BWCs, while crowd management and arrest teams obtained specially-designed mounts so that the BWCs would accommodate their protective equipment.

The 2016 RNC took place soon after the shootings of officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge as well as within the context of anti-police protests in several cities across the nation. Despite the tense public atmosphere regarding law enforcement, Cleveland, learning from other cities who had been challenged with demonstrations, protests and civil unrest, was able to utilize de-escalation and community engagement techniques to minimize uses of force and mass arrests during the LSSE. The department reports only two uses of force and 24 arrests during the RNC.²

Based on these and other observations made, the PF team identified a number of best practices and lessons learned. Below is a summary of best practices and lessons learned, which are described in detail in this Quick-Look Report.

The multi-faceted and dedicated commitment to positive police-community relations became the highlight of the RNC, and enabled the CPD to reframe the public perception of law enforcement in Cleveland.

Best Practices

The following bullets highlight the key best practices from the 2016 RNC:

- ***Community Engagement / Police-Community Relations:*** CPD Chief Williams expressed his deep conviction that the RNC was a historical event. It was an event that the City should be proud of hosting, and therefore one in which the community should be active participants. During one community meeting, Chief Williams actively encouraged community members to participate in the RNC, to show their pride and character, and to not allow groups outside of the city to play a dominant role or diminish Cleveland's selection as such an important part of history.³ Constant engagement and transparency with all subsets of the Cleveland community (including business owners and stakeholders, religious leaders, residents, and universities) and RNC-affiliated visitors (including delegates and VIPs, media, and demonstrators), throughout the process, was

[sis.html](#); Reilly, Ryan. "Police in Cleveland are Handling the RNC Protests Well. The Bikes Really Help." The Huffington Post. July 21, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cleveland-rnc-protest-policing_us_578e71c9e4b0f180da632643.

² Statistics provided by Deputy Chief Tomba via email to Rodney Monroe, Police Foundation Team Member on February 1, 2017.

³ Police Foundation Team members attended this meeting with Chief Williams during their site visit on June 6, 2016.

the foundation upon which CPD built its strategy. Prior to the RNC, Chief Williams and Cassandra Bledsoe, the Chief's Community Liaison, engaged religious leaders, the Peacemakers' Alliance, business owners, and community members to address community violence issues and community concerns about march/parade routes, traffic issues and general law enforcement issues. CPD also emphasized the important role that these groups would play during the RNC. He gained their support—including as community volunteers—during the Convention. CPD also collaborated with local universities that agreed to house out-of-town officers before and during the event. During the RNC, Chief Williams could be seen walking through the demonstration crowds, engaging with demonstrators, personally de-escalating potentially contentious situations, and speaking with the media regularly. Police-community relations were also prioritized through Bike Patrol, Mounted Patrol, and standard uniforms—instead of riot gear. The multi-faceted and dedicated commitment to positive police-community relations became the highlight of the RNC, and helped reframe the public perception of law enforcement in Cleveland.

- **Command and Control:** The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was the focal point of the City's operations before, during, and immediately after the RNC. The Mayor and his staff were present in the EOC throughout the Convention as were representatives from all city, state, county and other public safety departments and relevant private sector organizations (e.g. utility providers). Extensive training regarding EOC operations and its activation two days before the RNC allowed the City to identify and work through challenges before the RNC began, as well as to familiarize all personnel (city and outside agencies) with administrative and operational protocols prior to the event.
- **Leveraging Resources:** CPD and the City of Cleveland utilized the Emergency Management Assistance Compact⁴ (EMAC) to help secure the assistance of various state police/highway patrol and other public safety agencies as well as to borrow resources, reducing costs and enhancing RNC security. Additionally, by clearly delineating roles and responsibilities, CPD was able to focus its resources on field activities and providing first-line response to demonstrators and potential issues, while federal agencies handled the transportation and security of all delegates.

Lessons Learned

The following bullets highlight the key lessons learned from the 2016 RNC:

- **Pre-Event Planning and Procurement:** CPD assigned a minimal number of staff to work on the planning part-time, immediately after being awarded the RNC. Not until October 2015 did CPD assign a contingent of staff to a full-time planning team, after the leads from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) were named and arrived in Cleveland, and the standard NSSE subcommittees began meeting. Approximately six months before the RNC, an additional set of people were assigned to the planning and logistics staff. The challenges caused by the City not starting the planning process early enough were exacerbated by the City needing to resolve conflicts between its own procurement regulations with federal procurement regulations; to coordinate between the local procurement processes and federal approvals, to resolve long lead times needed to

⁴ More information on the EMAC can be found throughout this document as well as at <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACOverviewForNRF.pdf>.

procure some items from vendors, and to develop policies and training prior to purchasing specific items, such as riot batons and tear gas.

- In accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 13688, “Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition,” CPD was required to have policies, procedures, and training developed and approved by BJA for the two specific controlled equipment items covered under the executive order before the equipment could be purchased and used. These requirements, and the lack of the City’s awareness of them delayed the process, and in some cases orders needed to be canceled because suppliers were unable to meet the abbreviated timelines. Strategic planning before Cleveland’s October Planning Team was put in place, could have allowed for greater flexibility in the identification and ordering of critical pieces of equipment., and prevented some of the rushed and canceled orders.
- In addition to challenges created by timelines, CPD experienced challenges in funding the procurement of necessary resources. One of the critical lessons learned from the 2012 RNC and DNC Primer was that host cities should seek an early ordinance from their governing body to allow for the funding and purchasing of equipment that require a long lead time. Had CPD used this strategy, they could have sought a special provision allowing the City Manager/Mayor to expedite the procurement process for RNC-related equipment, with a budget limit on expenditures that the Manager/Mayor could approve without sending before Council for approval. However, CPD officials indicated that the City could not afford to advance funds for personnel or equipment, to ensure that they would be reimbursed.
- Communication between the various centers—the EOC, the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), and the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC)—was at times disjointed because participants were unclear as to personnel assignments, their schedules and contact information. One approach to address inter-agency coordination issues is to organize command centers under the command of the local law enforcement agency. When local law enforcement owns and spearheads the coordination of government resources in support of the entire city’s effort, similar to the MACC which was under the direct management of the USSS, communication is streamlined. This structure helps ensure continuous communication, information exchange, and timely responses to situations as they arise.
- Additionally, the fusion center and the IOC were cautious about sharing information with the EOC because command staff was not present. In preparing for future events, greater planning should be focused on ensuring collaboration among “individual centers” and real-time intelligence sharing to improve situational awareness among all participants.

Conclusion

The City of Cleveland, the CPD, and their public safety partners planned and executed an effective and efficient security operation in a difficult and challenging local and national environment. Built on a foundation that emphasized community engagement, respect, and de-escalation, the security operation protected the RNC and its many events. It allowed persons to freely express themselves and their concerns. And it provided an opportunity for visitors, residents and businesses to enjoy the RNC and the City of Cleveland.

Section 1: Event Overview

Due to the size and high-profile nature of the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) classified the RNC as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). NSSEs are events of national significance due to their political, economic, social or religious nature. Presidential Nominating Conventions and other NSSEs, may also be the targets of terrorism or criminal activity. The City of Cleveland was on high alert following the San Bernardino terrorist attack, officer-involved shootings, shootings of police officers, and instances of civil disturbance in the months and weeks prior to the RNC. The national climate as well as the fact that the Cleveland Police Division (CPD) was under a consent decree, raised questions about the readiness of the Division to secure the RNC and its participants. However, despite these challenges, the Cleveland Police Division demonstrated its ability to rise above local and national policing issues and challenges, to execute an effective and community-involved security operation.

The following section provides an overview of event planning and response operations during the RNC, with special attention given to the efforts of the CPD.

Background

The 2016 RNC took place July 18 – July 21 at the Quicken Loans Arena, in downtown Cleveland. An estimated total of between 60,000 – 75,000 persons—comprised of local, state, and federal elected delegates, their families and friends; dignitaries and other invited guests; volunteers; national media; and, demonstrators—attended the event. While the Quicken Loans Arena and Progressive Field were the primary locations of the RNC, and the media center was located at the Huntington Convention Center of Cleveland, official events and other unassociated permitted activities took place throughout the downtown area, including the designated Free Speech Zone in the Public Square across from the Arena. In addition, a number of free speech demonstrations and marches were planned through downtown Cleveland.

Authorities

Authority for the planning and operations of local security for an NSSE can vary by jurisdiction, and is often reflective of the size and capabilities of the local departments and agencies. In many cases, local law enforcement will take the lead due to the security focus of the mission; however, in other jurisdictions the local Emergency Management Agency/Office of Emergency Management or the fire department may play a larger role.

Given the NSSE designation, a significant public safety footprint was required. City, state, and regional stakeholders played a central role in the planning and execution of this event. At the local level, the Cleveland Division of Police (CPD) coordinated most of the public safety aspects of the RNC. At the federal level, the United States Secret Service (USSS) served as the lead agency responsible for the design and implementation of the operational security of the event (at designated venues). Crisis management and counterterrorism fell to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and consequence management was assigned to the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA).

CPD served as the lead Ohio law enforcement agency and as the lead liaison between local response partners and the USSS. They jointly led the Executive Steering Committee (ESC); handled logistics; and coordinated activities such as field operations and response to demonstrators outside of areas under the jurisdiction of the USSS. They also conducted transportation and traffic enforcement. The Cleveland Fire Department (CFD) was a key contributor on the fire/emergency medical services/public health response, hazardous materials/Explosive Ordnance Disposal support, and code enforcement inside Quicken Loans Arena.


An RNC Executive Steering Committee of local and federal law enforcement agencies was responsible for coordinating and sharing planning efforts. Finally, the RNC Committee (RNCC) and RNC Host Committee were responsible for coordinating the actual event.

Figure 1 below depicts these major planning authorities.

Supporting Agencies and Organizations

To ensure the 2016 RNC was carried out safely, local, state and federal law enforcement agencies collaborated with local organizations to fulfill the security goals of the event.

Figure 1. RNC Planning Authorities



Law enforcement agencies.

CPD served as the lead law enforcement agency for the 2016 RNC. CPD officers and units were primarily responsible for the public-facing law enforcement components of the event. The conscious decision to keep CPD at the forefront was made to ensure that it would maintain control over the law enforcement messaging emerging from the RNC, and to provide an extra layer of accountability to the community. They also leveraged the Emergency Management

Assistance Compact (EMAC)⁵ to secure services of additional personnel. Mutual aid agencies⁶ enhanced the public safety footprint throughout the City, resulting in a larger-than-normal presence of state police and highway patrol officers, who were well-trained and well-equipped according to CPD officials. Each of the outside law enforcement agencies operated under the direction of CPD through a designated liaison.

Local businesses, media, and community organizations.

CPD Chief Williams deeply believed that the RNC was a historical event that the City should be proud of hosting, and one in which that the community should be active participants. During one community meeting, Chief Williams actively encouraged community members to participate in the RNC, to show their pride and character, and to not allow groups outside of the city to play a dominant role or diminish Cleveland’s selection as such an important part of history.⁷ Prior to the RNC, Chief Williams and Cassandra Bledsoe, the Chief’s Community Liaison, emphasized the role that religious leaders, the Peacemakers’ Alliance, and community members would play during the RNC. CPD engaged these groups prior to the event to address community violence issues, and was able to solicit their support – including as community volunteers – during the RNC. CPD also met with community members to the convention to address concerns about march/parade routes, traffic issues and the impact on their commutes, and general law enforcement issues. During the convention, community members and businesses provided complimentary food and beverages to officers as a sign of their gratitude, volunteered to provide attendees with information about local attractions and directions, and provided information to CPD officers when they noticed suspicious activities.

Cornerstones of Community Involvement for the RNC in Cleveland

- Constant community engagement
- Transparency
- Encouraging community participation
- Inclusion
- Addressing concerns/issues head on
- Partnerships
- Garnering support
- Commitment to positive police community interactions
- Being visible (particularly Chief Executives)
- Regular interaction with media
- Bike and Mounted patrols
- De-escalation

RNC Operations

The RNC was held from Monday, July 18 through Thursday, July 21, 2016. However, RNC operations officially began on Saturday, July 16, when the EOC opened. Between Saturday and

⁵ The EMAC, “acts as a complement to the federal disaster response system, providing timely and cost-effective relief to states requesting assistance from assisting member states who understand the needs of jurisdictions that are struggling to preserve life, the economy, and the environment.” More information on the EMAC can be found throughout this document as well as at <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACOverviewForNRF.pdf>.

⁶ Mutual aid agencies included, but were not limited to the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OHSP) and other Ohio state agencies; Ohio Army National Guard (OHARNG); outside state police and local law enforcement agencies; supplemental tactical law enforcement personnel; regional EMS assets and personnel; and Medical Reserve Corps (MRC).

⁷ Police Foundation Team members attended this meeting with Chief Williams during their site visit on June 6, 2016.

Monday morning, agencies with a primary role in the final preparations and build-out had representatives in the EOC, and were able to resolve minor issues and challenges that arose prior to the event, some of which were unanticipated during the planning process. The EOC was fully activated with 24/7 coverage on Monday, July 18 until Friday, July 22. During this time, the City of Cleveland received an estimated 60,000 – 75,000 visitors, including delegates, media outlets, demonstrators, dignitaries and supporting personnel. Security management for the event was a complex task that required coordinated communications and execution of each of the areas of operation.

CPD event operations concluded on Friday, July 22, 2016 after attendees departed Cleveland.

Event Venues.

During the RNC, three primary event venues existed. In addition, a number of delegate hotels and countless other venues including restaurants, bars, and other event sites were open to the public.

Table 1. *Primary Event Venues and Areas of Concern*

Venue/Areas of Concern	Address	Dates of Operation
Quicken Loans Arena	1 Center Court, Cleveland, OH 44115	July 18-22, 2016
Huntington Convention Center of Cleveland	300 Lakeside Avenue East, Cleveland, OH 44113	July 18-22, 2016
Demonstration Site: Public Square	Downtown Cleveland	July 18-22, 2016

Additional command centers were activated throughout the event. These allowed each agency/stakeholder to establish an all-hazards response and maintain situational awareness both internally and externally. Table 2 lists the command centers activated during the convention.

Table 2. *Event Operations Centers*

Event Operations Centers
City of Cleveland Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
RNCC Fusion Center
Joint Information Center (JIC)
U.S. Secret Service Multi-Agency Communication Center (MACC)


Secure zones.

Two major secure zones were established in Cleveland. The USSS controlled a higher security zone (“hard zone”) in and around Quicken Loans arena and the Huntington Convention Center of Cleveland, with CPD providing the majority of personnel needed to secure the area. This zone perimeter was secured with traditional jersey barriers and temporary eight-foot high security fences. In addition, security personnel from CPD and mutual aid agencies conducted car-sweeps and credential checks at various access points around Quicken Loans Arena. An outer secure zone was also maintained by CPD personnel.

The Huntington Convention Center of Cleveland also hosted official RNC activities and was

placed in the security hard zone. During the events, CPD and the USSS worked closely to implement the security operation within and around the Convention Center. USSS and CPD personnel coordinated security operations when USSS protectees attended events at the Convention Center.

Figure 2: Map of RNC Security Zones.



Critical infrastructure.

In preparing for the RNC, CPD conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of its critical infrastructure (including utilities, hotels, and buses). In addition, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) led an Infrastructure Assurance Task Force to conduct risk analysis and modeling of various cyber infrastructures to determine vulnerabilities, regional communication characteristics, and resiliency. The Critical Infrastructure subcommittee developed and provided the host site a Cyber Resiliency Review survey tool in order to assess their infrastructure and determine strengths and weaknesses.⁸ The reviews were coordinated by

⁸ The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), a component of DHS, has developed a series of Cyber Resiliency Review assessments and resources as part of its Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program. For more information about US-CERT and to access its resources, visit: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ccubedvp/assessments> (accessed February 4, 2017). Additional information designed to assist law enforcement investigate and prevent crimes that involve technology, technical assistance, training, and critical information can be found at the Law Enforcement Cyber Center, <http://www.iacpcybercenter.org/>, which is funded in part by BJA.

the Presidential Inauguration Committee, with the assistance of other partners, including the U.S. Department of Defense, FBI, and U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). During the RNC, the Ohio National Guard, Cleveland Division of Fire (CFD), and EMS also provided security at critical infrastructure sites.

Demonstrations.

CPD planners anticipated a total 60,000 – 75,000 people at the RNC, with the press estimating that 30,000 – 50,000 people from across the country would participate in demonstrations over the course of the week. Significantly fewer actually arrived. Major protest groups included Black Lives Matter, Greenpeace, Earth First, Clean Energy Revolution, American Civil Liberties Union, Gun Owners of America, as well as dozens of grassroots groups.

Financial Management.

Approximately \$50 million in federal funds for the RNC was awarded to Cleveland on April 1, 2016.⁹ Beginning in early 2016, BJA convened regular conference calls with the City of Cleveland to coordinate grant management activities and to quickly identify concerns as they arose. During the planning process, BJA also dedicated staff to meet the needs and requests of the City and coordinate with the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG)¹⁰ to conduct fraud prevention training to help ensure all expenditures were adequately documented and approved in accordance with regulations. BJA staff also conducted an in-person technical assistance visit prior to the event to review the procurement and documentation processes and to provide any additional assistance that was needed. After the RNC, the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General conducted an additional audit of the funds used, as is standard for recipients of BJA’s Nominating Convention grants. BJA also conducted a final programmatic and financial monitoring visit in early 2017.

The following section provides an overview of event planning and response operations during the RNC, with special attention given to the efforts of CPD.

⁹ See the Appendix for more information on the federal funding process, including a timeline and one-page Overview.

¹⁰ “The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in the [U.S. Department of Justice](https://www.justice.gov) (DOJ) is a statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in DOJ programs and personnel, and to promote economy and efficiency in those programs. The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws by DOJ employees and also audits and inspects DOJ programs. The Inspector General, who is appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, reports to the Attorney General and Congress.” More information and the final audit report use of federal funds for the 2016 RNC and DNC will be available at <https://oig.justice.gov>.

Section 2: Operational Assessment

This section of the report reviews the efficacy of law enforcement operations for the 2016 RNC.

Observations are organized by functional area, identified using the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Orientated Policing Services' *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, as well as by the subcommittees established for the 2016 RNC.¹¹ Observations are categorized as a best practice (BP) and/or lessons learned (LL). A best practice reflects the activities and actions that contributed to the success of the event, while a lesson learned identifies areas for improvement and highlights activities or actions that would have improved operations. In some cases, particular aspects of an activity or action were best practices and others were lessons learned. This information should provide useful guidance in planning future LSSEs.

The observations and discussions presented in this Quick-Look Report will be expanded upon to revise and update BJA's *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Primer)* document, presenting best practices and lessons learned from both the 2016 Republican and Democratic National Conventions.

2.1 Access Control: Screening and Physical Security

This functional area was responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the lives, property, and protection of civil liberties—of all patrons, citizens, VIPs, and USSS protectees during the RNC.

Observation 2.1.1 (BP): Early planning, regular meetings, and effective coordination led to the success of venue security.

During the RNC, event venues were effectively secured, with no major incidents. This can be attributed to the various planning strategies that took place. First, the Venue subcommittee began holding regular meetings with federal partners. This gave the subcommittee members ample time to establish relationships with one another and with key stakeholders and to plan. Subcommittee members from CPD and federal law enforcement also conducted site visits and walk-throughs of the major event venues, in order to plan for daily operations and special circumstances, and adapted plans in response to international terrorist attacks and intelligence.

Another key factor in operational success was the assignment of CPD personnel who were intimately aware of the venue's operations, layout, and staff. Officials assigned to the main venues worked daily throughout the year handling other special events at the main venues. This essentially provided opportunities for CPD personnel to continually refine their understanding of venue operations, which they were able to apply during planning and execution of operational plans for the RNC.

¹¹ Connors, Edward. *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Orientated Policing Services. 2007. Downloaded on February 2, 2017 from <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=482649>.

Effective coordination between local, state, and federal law enforcement during the event also ensured venue security. CPD and mutual aid agencies maintained an effective perimeter around Quicken Loans Arena and the surrounding parking lots throughout the event.

Observation 2.1.2 (BP): Physical security was maintained without a physical show of force, including equipment and large numbers of officers.

The RNC took place in a volatile national context marked by civil disturbances, protests and assaults on law enforcement officers in several U.S. cities. Additionally, the CPD was under intense scrutiny, marking the first time a city held a National Convention under monitorship by DOJ. CPD was committed to maximizing security while minimizing law enforcement presence. Prior to the RNC, DOJ arranged for several national police officials who have hosted NSSE events to meet with CPD command staff to discuss their experiences, strategies, and tactics for handling such large-scale events. Each emphasized the need for a layered police response which did not present an overbearing appearance to the public.

USSS and CPD officials successfully allocated resources and personnel to ensure the Quicken Loans Arena and surrounding areas were kept secure without a physical show of force. CPD officers maintaining the perimeter and stationed in the Public Square wore traditional Class A summer uniforms, with tactical response units stationed blocks away and out of sight. This paid dividends with demonstrators and attendees.

2.2 Administrative and Logistics Support

This functional area was responsible for acquiring, staging, and tracking all available and obtainable resources for the public safety agencies affiliated with the RNC during normal and emergency operations.

Observation 2.2.1 (BP): Collaboration among interagency partners was essential to providing public safety personnel with the resources and logistical support needed throughout the event.

During the significant pre-event planning, the CPD identified City agencies (including CFD; transportation agencies; the Department of Parks and Recreation; and, other stakeholders) and organizations (including the business community) that would be involved in the planning stages and engaged them, regardless of the size of their role during the RNC. For example, CPD built relationships with nearby universities and colleges that housed out-of-town law enforcement and provided meals. CPD was thoughtful in how it assigned its resources to the various colleges and universities, as well as how actively engaged it was in each of these institutions – going well beyond providing living and dining space. Each housing location was assigned a CPD official to assist daily with coordinating and responding to transportation, meal, accommodation, recreation activity, and equipment needs of the out of town law enforcement during their stay. For example, the one institution that was farthest away was the site chosen for those assets that had their own method of transportation, as opposed to being reliant on transportation provided.

Observation 2.2.2 (BP): Practicing logistics for operations on earlier events helped prepare personnel for the RNC.

The City of Cleveland has had numerous events that afforded all of the stakeholders involved in the RNC the opportunity to practice logistics, field-test their plans, and identify best practices and lessons learned. In addition to regular sporting events and concerts at Quicken Loans Arena; parades and marches including the Cleveland Cavaliers professional basketball championship parade only one month before the RNC; and, other events throughout the city served as an opportunity to prepare and identify best practices and lessons learned. During many of these events, CPD intentionally tested their communication systems, command and control operations, intelligence gathering, and strategic deployment which helped better prepare them for RNC operations.

Observation 2.2.3 (LL): Utilize EMAC as early as possible to secure outside personnel and resources.

CPD spent considerable amounts of time and energy identifying outside resources to supplement staffing requirements prior to the RNC. Unfortunately, as the RNC neared, many of the agencies that had initially offered to provide support withdrew for a variety of reasons, including issues with insurance, workers compensation and liability for their personnel while in Cleveland. CPD was able to utilize the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to secure approximately 2,700 additional officers and was also able to borrow resources that were only needed for the RNC—instead of having to buy them—and to train with while waiting for the procurement processes to take their course. CPD officials indicated that local agencies hosting future LSSEs should utilize EMAC as early as possible and scale back if needed. Jurisdictions may also consider the use of State Administrating Agencies (SAAs) to provide focused attention on and networks to help in securing outside personnel and resources as an option.¹²

Observation 2.2.4 (LL): Administrative and logistics planning and support staff should be identified and dedicated early and involved throughout.

After being awarded the RNC, CPD assigned a minimal number of staff to work on the planning part-time. Under the assumption that federal agencies that had more experience with similar events would come and determine what the security plans would be, CPD assigned staff to a full-time planning team in October 2015, when the leads from the USSS were named and the standard subcommittees started meeting. Approximately six months before the RNC, an additional set of people were assigned to the planning and logistics staff. In hindsight, CPD officials indicated that 10 – 12 months would have been the ideal timeframe to have full-time staff dedicated to planning. Staff for these roles should be identified by their qualifications and attention to detail, not necessarily their rank. CPD officials indicated that in many cases, line officers that were assigned to specific roles based on their abilities rose to the tasks that were assigned to them.

¹² For more information about utilizing State Administering Agencies (SAAs) in large-scale security events, see *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*.

2.3 Command and Control

This functional area was responsible for command and control operations employed during the 2016 RNC.

Observation 2.3.1 (BP): CPD established an effective operational command structure that helped shape the tone of the law enforcement response.

Throughout the RNC operations, CPD maintained its traditional command structure and maintained strong relationships with other city, state, and federal public safety agencies. Teams of outside officers from the same agency were kept intact and were assigned a CPD supervisor. Assigning a CPD supervisor to each team allowed for the city to control the overall tone of the law enforcement response and was seen by many community members as an additional level of accountability and ownership taken by CPD. Additionally, all CPD command staff maintained strong relationships with one another and their counterparts in other agencies and provided seamless event coordination and maintenance of public safety throughout the process. All law enforcement officers were able to communicate with one another through a designated radio channel and radios were also purchased and borrowed to facilitate communication and collaboration with personnel from other jurisdictions.

Observation 2.3.2 (BP): Collaboration between city, state, federal, and non-government agencies provided public safety personnel with necessary resources and logistical support throughout the event.

Collaboration between city, state and federal agencies was essential to providing first responders with the resources, support, and situational awareness they required over the course of the event. During the planning phase, CPD command staff identified and engaged organizations to support the RNC, such as the business community, religious leaders, and community members, and CFD, and was able to leverage resources and input during the RNC. CPD also worked closely with multiple vendors to ensure adequate resources. Effective coordination was evident through the partners' involvement and inclusion throughout the planning process and during the event.

Observation 2.3.3 (LL): Assigning the right individuals to command centers is imperative to ensuring effective coordination, communication, and decision-making.

CPD and City officials reflected that having higher-ranking people at the EOC to coordinate, communicate, and make decisions would have been better than having people who were only able to monitor and relay questions to their respective department executives.

2.4 Credentialing

This functional area was responsible for assisting with the application for and distribution of credentials for all law enforcement officers supporting the convention.

Observation 2.4.1 (BP): Clearly delineated roles and responsibilities prevented duplication of efforts and confusion.

At the beginning of the planning, USSS, RNCC, and CPD officials agreed that one set of credentials for law enforcement individuals and placards for vehicles that were pre-approved to

enter the “hard zones” and one set of credentials and placards for everything outside of those areas were all that would be required.

Observation 2.4.2 (LL): Ensure that correct personnel lists from mutual aid agencies are received well in advance to reduce last-minute processing.

Providing credentials, including electronic entry cards to the residence halls, was complicated by the fact that some out-of-town law enforcement agencies sending personnel to Cleveland continued to change personnel lists up to the day they arrived. Even as agencies arrived in Cleveland, CPD had to allocate personnel and resources to obtain credentials, ensure that there were rooms and parking spaces available, and confirm that they received all required trainings and materials.

2.5 Crowd Management

This functional area was responsible for managing crowds while maintaining officer and public safety.

Observation 2.5.1 (BP): The Cleveland Division of Police emphasized crowd maintenance and safety.

Throughout the preparation and planning for the RNC, CPD emphasized taking a professional and positive approach in their attire and in their interactions with demonstrators. CPD relied on its newly-established Bicycle Unit to maintain crowd safety in a non-threatening manner. Additionally, CPD officers were instructed to wear their normal Class A summer uniforms, rather than riot gear, and to refrain from making arrests unless absolutely necessary. Even in cases where demonstrators were purposely trying to get arrested, CPD officers calmly removed them when left with no other option. During marches and demonstrations, CPD officers also walked with, and talked to, marchers about their experience in Cleveland. In addition, the Ohio Army National Guard (OHARNG) was kept out of sight of those at Quicken Loans Arena and the Public Square because they were wearing their traditional military-style uniforms. All of this was done with the intent to focus on positive crowd maintenance and safety more than crowd control.

Observation 2.5.2 (BP): On-scene command—up to, and including, the Chief—helped to foster relationships with demonstrators and leaders and defuse any situations with unruly demonstrators.

CPD Chief Calvin Williams was ever-present in throughout the RNC planning and operational process. Prior to the RNC, Chief Williams and Cassandra Bledsoe—the Chief’s Community Liaison—emphasized the role that religious leaders, the Peacemakers’ Alliance, and community members played during the RNC. CPD engaged these groups prior to the RNC to address community violence issues, and was able to solicit their support—including as community volunteers—during the RNC. CPD also met with community members prior to the RNC to address their concerns about march/parade routes, traffic concerns and the impact on their commutes, and general law enforcement issues. During the RNC, Chief Williams could be seen walking through the demonstration crowds or even riding a bike with several command officials, engaging with demonstrators and officers, personally de-escalating potentially contentious situations, and regularly speaking with the media. In fact, on the third day of the RNC, police

responded to an incident involving flag-burning at a protest. During the incident, CPD was able to de-escalate an otherwise inflammatory situation as on-scene command worked to foster relationships with demonstrators and protest leaders.

Observation 2.5.3 (BP): Providing demonstrators a designated free speech area in the Public Square allowed CPD to better maintain crowd activities.

The CPD designated specific areas for demonstrations and protests, and effectively used their Bicycle and Mounted Units in those instances in which demonstrators marched outside of designated areas. The location of the designated free speech area was credited, in part, with the success of the event. CPD designated a park, located near the central business and entertainment districts, and within a couple of blocks of the Convention Center, which allowed groups of demonstrators to exercise their First Amendment rights, and yet not conflict with demonstrations at the Convention Center. Throughout the RNC, multiple demonstrations occurred simultaneously without incident with a team of Bicycle and other officers assigned to each group to afford freedom of speech and security. For example, on the third day of the Convention there were approximately five (5) groups demonstrating simultaneously in the park, in close physical proximity to each other. Each “demonstration” had a team of officers assigned to them which gave each group the opportunity to express itself in a safe environment, free of conflict from the other groups.

2.6 Dignitary/VIP Protection

This functional area was responsible for the establishment of security procedures and plans for protective details, as well as coordinating the use of multi-agency resources to assist visitors of the 2016 RNC.

Observation 2.6.1 (BP): Planning and clearly delineated roles and responsibilities resulted in effective dignitary/VIP protection.

The Dignitary/VIP subcommittee included representatives from each of the federal agencies that had responsibilities for protecting at least one dignitary or VIP and began planning as soon as possible. The planning process in Cleveland included the identification of contingencies and alternative plans that accounted for multiple routes to the Convention site and multiple times for departing and arriving, based on other potential VIPs and dignitaries. Additionally, the planning process clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for CPD and federal law enforcement. CPD worked in concert with USSS to provide support services to protect dignitaries/ VIPs—including supporting motorcade movements, entry/departure from sites, and physical protection—while federal officers were the lead.

2.7 Financial/Grant Management

This functional area was responsible for the distribution, management, and review of funds used to support public safety efforts during the 2016 RNC.

Had CPD used this strategy, they could have sought a special provision allowing the City Manager/Mayor to expedite the procurement process for RNC-related equipment, with a budget limit on expenditures that the Manager/Mayor could approve without sending before Council for approval. Instead, because of CPD's lack of funds and the fact that the City would not advance funds for personnel or equipment, CPD struggled to advance funds for personnel and equipment.

Host cities should assume that some initial funding from their own jurisdictions may be necessary prior to draw down of federal funds from the U.S. Treasury.

Observation 2.7.2 (LL): Under Executive Order 13688, CPD was required to have policies, procedures, and training developed and approved prior to use of specialized equipment.

It is important for host agencies to understand all requirements for purchasing well in advance of the event, and to complete the requirements prior to purchasing. Grant management and financial details are often challenging for host cities. For this reason, it is important for host cities to explore options regarding in-house groups or partners with the knowledge and expertise to focus on and take responsibility for these details. Host cities should also be prepared to justify the purchase of equipment rather than renting the same equipment. If purchasing new equipment, host cities should consider whether or not sufficient storage space exists for this equipment after the event. Careful consideration should be given to the difficulties of proceeding without the assistance of the State Administrating Agencies, who are well versed in facilitating procurement and other aspects of preparing for these events. Some benefits of SAAs are noted in the Planning Primer document.

The 2016 Presidential Nominating Convention grants were subject to the provisions of Executive Order 13688, "Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition" (EO 13688), which, according to Cleveland, caused delays and concerns not accounted for by CPD. While officials were aware of the special conditions required for the convention grants, including needing to have policies and training curricula in place for all pieces of controlled equipment, they did not fully factor in the time and personnel needed to address this process and had to rush deliveries of certain items and work with vendors to meet abbreviated timelines.

While this only impacted a limited amount of the equipment for the RNC, the City of Cleveland and CPD did experience some additional delays and concerns that were unaccounted for in their planning timeline. However, because of local fiscal restraints, the City indicated that it could not purchase equipment needed through the general fund and seek reimbursement. This left CPD needing to rush deliveries of certain items and needing to work with vendors to meet abbreviated timelines.

2.8 Fire and Public Health

This functional area was responsible for providing fire and public health response in support of all events and/or incidents surrounding the 2016 RNC, while maintaining normal response requirements for the citizens of the City of Cleveland.

Observation 2.8.1 (BP): The Cleveland Division of Fire and Cleveland Department of Public Health effective managed and coordinated fire and public health responses.

During the RNC, Cleveland Division of Fire (CFD) and Cleveland Department of Public Health (CDPH) personnel were responsible for managing fire and public health operations outside the secure perimeter and for supporting the CPD and USSS Command Center inside the secure perimeter. Both agencies also had representatives in the EOC to share information, coordinate the allocation of resources across city agencies, and support general security and situational awareness.

CFD also maintained a strong field presence throughout event. Fire/EMS units were strategically stationed throughout the Public Square—where the majority of demonstrators were gathered—and the rest of the RNC area, as well as in their stations throughout the City. Some of these units also leveraged bicycles and utility vehicles (gators) to ensure prompt response to any situations.

2.9 Intelligence/Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Surveillance

This functional area was responsible for obtaining, assessing, and disseminating information about individuals and groups who might pose a threat to protectees and designated venues associated with the 2016 RNC.

Observation 2.9.1 (BP): College interns and intelligence officers were leveraged in intelligence gathering and analysis.

During demonstrations/marches and significant RNC events, CPD deployed approximately 150 field intelligence officers. The primary roles of these officers were to provide situational awareness information—including approximate number of demonstrators and locations and general movements of large groups of demonstrators—to the EOC and to identify suspicious persons and vehicles and relay that information to uniformed officers and the IOC. Additionally, CPD employed a handful of student interns pursuing degrees in criminal analysis and intelligence to gather and analyze crime information and other data provided to the IOC. These interns complemented city, state, and federal officers and allowed CPD to keep more officers in the field.

Observation 2.9.2 (BP): Intelligence sources deployed in the field provided invaluable information and situational awareness to the various operations centers.

Acquiring real-time information using text messages, cellular phones, push to talk radio transmissions, Knowledge Center, and a cadre of citywide cameras proved to be an effective operational method. ArcGIS products¹⁶ complimented EOC reports and provided a common operating picture, along with extensive monitoring of social media. Facebook, Twitter and Instagram allowed law enforcement to gather information, determine threats and monitor activities. During one incident, the cameras were able to provide a clear picture of the license plate of a vehicle that was used by a couple of suspicious persons. The plate information was

¹⁶ The Situational Awareness Portal was developed collaboratively by geo-spatial consultants GeographIT and EBA Engineering for the 2016 DNC. CityView mobile app is a suite of software that can be used on smartphones or tablets to share information and upload pictures of building and park inspections from the field.

shared with the IOC, who ran criminal histories of the individuals, and shared that information with the EOC.

Observation 2.9.3 (LL): Enhanced communication between operation centers would have improved information sharing and situational awareness.

Communication between the various centers—the EOC, the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC), etc.—was disjointed because there was no assignment list, or call list and some personnel did not know who was assigned to which center. Additionally, the fusion center and the IOC were cautious about sharing real time intelligence information with the EOC. The City’s Operations Center should be staffed 24/7 with a senior law enforcement official from the lead agency, in this case CPD, who has decision making authority as well as the ability to ensure the effective sharing of information among the various command and intelligence centers.

2.10 Interagency Communications and Technology

This functional area was responsible for establishing primary and backup communications capabilities that allow local, state, federal, and other agencies to effectively communicate with necessary individuals as required throughout the event.

Observation 2.10.1 (LL): Assign the right personnel from each agency and emphasize interagency communication.

Public safety agencies in Cleveland are working to breakdown silos that exist, and the RNC provided a significant opportunity in which to do so. The EOC and its use of Knowledge Center provided an effective and efficient venue and opportunity for situational awareness and inter-agency communication throughout the RNC.

Communication between the various centers—the EOC, the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), the Intelligence Operations Center (IOC), etc.—was disjointed because there was no assignment list, or call list and some personnel did not know who was assigned to which center. Additionally, the fusion center and the IOC were cautious about sharing real time intelligence information with the EOC, because they were unsure of how the information would be protected in the EOC environment and whether all of the staff and observers in the EOC had the appropriate security clearances.

2.11 Legal

This functional area was responsible for providing legal support to the other subcommittees and responding to the legal questions that arose, including questions of public disclosure and attempting to minimize risk in civil liberties litigation.

Observation 2.11.1 (BP): Legal advisors were embedded in the EOC for at least 12 hours-a-day, which paid dividends because they were able to immediately inform law enforcement and public safety officials about the steps they should take during civil disturbances.

For example, during a flag-burning incident, legal advisors were able to walk law enforcement, fire, and EMS through the legal process and implications, and explain steps they should take to resolve the incident.

Observation 2.11.2 (LL): Include city and police department lawyers as early as possible to help with procurement law and guidelines, risk-management, information-sharing, jurisdictional challenges, and other areas where legal advice and assistance could prove valuable to the planning, implementation, and post-event processes.

The CPD and the City of Cleveland remarked that they should have engaged city and police department lawyers earlier in the procurement process, as well as in the development of resource use guidelines. City attorneys could help to identify risk management issues, review processes for information sharing, be on scene as incidents unfolded, and to address other legal challenges that develop before, during and following these events.

Observation 2.11.3 (LL): The lack of significant liability protection for law enforcement agencies outside of Ohio negatively impacted the City's ability to supplement their employees with mutual aid.

The City purchased \$50 million dollars worth of liability insurance coverage for the City and officers against any potential lawsuits brought for actions during the RNC. However, because the liability coverage did not adequately extend to external agencies, many of the agencies who initially agreed to participate eventually withdrew. However, once the EMAC was activated, CPD was able to complement its staff with state police and highway patrol agencies. Having the ability to provide outside law enforcement agencies with sufficient liability coverage helps to ensure host cities can gain the support of major police departments from around the country who have hosted or experienced demonstrations of the magnitude experienced during national conventions.

Observation 2.11.4 (BP): All CPD patrol personnel were issued BWCs and the crowd management and arrest teams obtained specially-designed mounts to accommodate their protective equipment.

CPD issued body worn cameras (BWCs) to approximately 1,100 patrol personnel with crowd management and/or arrest responsibilities to build off of Chief Williams' mission to ensure officer accountability and transparency. The cameras were activated for the entirety of the officers' shifts. Using a cellphone application (app) officers could tag specific times for future reference. Agencies hosting future large-scale events should thoughtfully consider issuing BWCs to all personnel engaged in crowd management and other public-facing positions to ensure officer accountability and transparency.

Body Worn Cameras

The 2016 Republican National Convention was the first national convention in which police officers were equipped with body worn cameras (BWCs). All 1,000 Cleveland Division of Police (CPD) officers are standard issued BWCs, and were required to wear them when working RNC events. Approximately 300 of the newest BWCs were also provide to CPD for use during the RNC, as were specially designed mounts so that crowd management and arrest team officers could also wear BWCs that could accommodate protective equipment. CPD purchased an additional 60 BWCs under the BJA grant.

Outside agencies assisting with the RNC did not wear BWCs and were not required to have them while working the RNC. CPD videographers were embedded in each external unit working to act as backup to BWC. CPD did not develop special BWC policy for RNC use; rather, standard CPD BWC policy remained in use during an incident and/or crowd management and/or when a Mobile Field Force was deployed.

BJA provides a variety of valuable resources for law enforcement using BWCs. The toolkit can be found at <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-gettingstarted.html>.

2.12 Non-Event Patrol

This functional area was responsible for maintaining current public safety response requirements for the citizens of the City of Cleveland during the RNC.

Observation 2.12.1 (BP): To the extent possible, CPD kept officers and command staff in their traditional districts/zones to conduct non-event patrol.

CPD is divided into five districts/zones. While CPD did reallocate personnel from each of the five districts to accommodate RNC events, to the extent possible, CPD left the remaining staff and their leadership in their traditional areas of responsibility (AOR). This conscientious decision was made by Chief Williams to further enhance the community relations work being done by officers in their communities, rather than using mutual aid officers that were unfamiliar with the AORs and the dynamics of the communities.

2.13 Arrestee Processing

This functional area was responsible for supporting mobile processing and booking capabilities for all law enforcement and the USSS during the 2016 RNC.

Observation 2.13.1 (BP): Cleveland created an effective arrestee processing strategy that maximized efficiencies and reduced the impact on officers in the field.

CPD and the Cleveland Division of Corrections developed a well thought out method for processing arrestees that focused on maximizing efficiencies for all parties. Processing vans were stationed strategically throughout the RNC area. Upon arrest, an individual would be brought to the nearest van and booked into the system. Arrestees were issued a wristband that identified them, captured their personal information, the offense(s) committed, and the arresting officer on scene prior to transport to the booking facility, which was some distance away. Whenever

possible and practical to do so, CPD would have a designated arrest team take persons into custody and process them to maintain consistency and to quickly remove arrestees from the area. By capturing information on the wristband, officers did not have to be pulled from their assignment in the field and could follow up on the arrest after their shift or when inflammatory situations calmed. Arrested individuals were kept in vans until a group of 10 was ready to be transported, again to maximize efficiencies. The arrest process allowed CPD to keep critical assets in play when an arrest was made, and to ensure the integrity of the arrest, booking and detention process.

Additionally, prior to RNC, the Cleveland Division of Corrections moved prisoners out of city detention centers to county and state facilities. This was done to create available bed-space in the event they needed it.

Observation 2.13.2 (BP): All arrests for crimes committed during the RNC were made by CPD officers.

All arrests for state and local crimes were made by CPD officers to ensure proper charging and to preclude out-of-town officers from having to return for future court dates. Teams of outside officers from the same agency were kept intact and were assigned a CPD supervisor.

2.14 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities

This functional area was responsible for developing and coordinating a critical infrastructure plan that would monitor and safeguard all computer systems, communication systems, energy systems, pipelines, railroads, and utility services.

Observation 2.14.1 (BP): The Ohio Army National Guard complemented CPD personnel by providing physical and cyber protection of critical infrastructure and utilities.

In preparing for the RNC, CPD conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of its critical infrastructure (including utilities, hotels, and buses). In addition, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) led an Infrastructure Assurance Task Force to conduct risk analysis and modeling of various cyber infrastructures to determine vulnerabilities, regional communication characteristics, and resiliency. The Critical Infrastructure subcommittee developed and provided the host site a Cyber Resiliency Review survey tool in order to assess their infrastructure and determine strengths and weaknesses. The reviews were coordinated by the Presidential Inauguration Committee, with the assistance of other partners, including the U.S. Department of Defense, FBI, and U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). During the RNC, the Ohio Army National Guard provided security at critical infrastructure sites, but only for those facilities that were not in the immediate demonstration areas.

2.15 Public Information and Media Relations

This functional area was responsible for developing and coordinating operational strategies that enable law enforcement media representatives to speak with one voice to the media and stakeholders concerning the design and implementation of the security plan for the 2016 RNC.

Observation 2.15.1 (BP): CPD command staff, members of the Mayor’s staff, and the USSS led an initiative, the Business Impact Work Group, to engage the business community.

The Business Impact Work Group met regularly to answer questions and help businesses in the area define the potential impacts of the RNC on their businesses. The group also worked to find mutually beneficial solutions to local challenges that the RNC posed.

2.16 Tactical Support and Explosive Device Response/Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)

This functional area was responsible for preparations on responding to, assessing, and rendering safe and suspicious items, improvised explosive devices, and hazardous materials in such a way as to safeguard life and property and restore the situation to normal as soon as possible after an incident.

Observation 2.16.1 (BP): Joint response teams complemented traditional Explosive Device Response/HAZMAT Teams.

The City of Cleveland had approximately eight Joint Agency Teams (police/fire) deployed throughout RNC associated events. The purpose was to detect and provide immediate response to suspicious persons and devices. Those teams augmented traditional bomb squad and HAZMAT units.

2.17 Training

This functional area was responsible for providing and coordinating training requests in preparation for the 2016 RNC.

Observation 2.17.1 (BP): CPD held a required orientation for all external law enforcement personnel that provided an overview of the CPD operating philosophy and guidelines regarding crowd management, use of force, arrests, and investigations.

CPD conducted a two-hour orientation for all external law enforcement personnel that provided an overview of the CPD operating philosophy and guidelines regarding crowd management, use of force, arrests, and investigations. All external law enforcement personnel were required to attend the training prior to being deployed.

Observation 2.17.2 (BP): All CPD command and supervisory personnel engaged in multiple tabletop exercises involving multiple scenarios.

All CPD command and supervisory personnel engaged in several tabletop exercises involving multiple scenarios including mass arrest, civil disturbances, explosions and terrorist attacks, and managing traffic events. One of the complexities associated with training law enforcement personnel from agencies outside the State of Ohio focused on the “open carry” [firearms] laws. Training also involved orientation of outside law enforcement on the applicable laws under which they would be exercising their authority (albeit somewhat curtailed or limited).

Observation 2.17.3 (BP): Functional training was held up to the week before the RNC.

As an all-hands-on-deck event, the RNC required city agencies and relevant stakeholders to work cooperatively in ways that, in some cases, they had not done before. The City of Cleveland held functional trainings up to the week before the RNC. Employees were encouraged to train on the shifts that they would be scheduled to work during the RNC and were encouraged to familiarize themselves with their counterparts. Doing this ahead of time proactively alleviated some of the issues that can arise from not being familiar with one another and understanding each others roles and responsibilities.

2.18 Transportation and Traffic

This functional area was responsible for coordinating motorcade and waterway route security for the safe transportation of delegates, governmental protectees, congressional members, and event participants as well as developing a plan for the control and diversion/rerouting of pedestrian and commercial traffic.

Observation 2.18.1 (BP): Planning, communication, and adaptability were critical for real-time operations of transportation.

Early in the planning process, CPD and federal officials devised a unified traffic plan for the RNC. Decisions regarding how to control traffic and expected movement of delegates, with considerable attention to bus movement for both delegates and out-of-town law enforcement, were factored into the traffic plans. Particularly around Quicken Loans Arena, bus drivers were provided multiple options for ingress and egress. Additionally, each bus driver had a radio to communicate with one another and the company liaison at the EOC, so there was constant communication.

CPD Harbor Unit and the United States Coast Guard provided waterway assets to maintain security on, and use for transportation if needed, the Cuyahoga River and Lake Erie.

Observation 2.18.2 (BP): Security on the buses expedited the transportation process and minimized traffic delays.

Federal officers from the Department of Homeland Security/Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), USSS, and other federal agencies were placed on each bus contracted by the RNCC to provide transportation to RNC delegates and official attendees. This prevented the buses from having to be screened each time they entered the secure zone near Quicken Loans Arena, and freed up uniformed police officers for other duties.

Observation 2.18.3 (BP): CPD and its partners were transparent about traffic and transportation issues throughout the process.

CPD and its partners were open and transparent about the road closures and traffic that the RNC would cause throughout the process. As soon as they were finalized, maps highlighting the road closures and various traffic restrictions were posted online and were discussed in public press releases. CPD Chief Williams also met with multiple community groups and individuals to discuss the impacts of various traffic issues on the community, including the effects on public transportation services. This properly prepared community members for the RNC.

Conclusion

Constant engagement with all subsets of the Cleveland community and RNC-affiliated visitors clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, and effective leadership proved to be instrumental to CPD's success in ensuring public safety and security throughout the 2016 Republican National Convention. CPD and City officials were able to allow persons to freely express themselves and their concerns and provide an opportunity for visitors, residents and businesses to enjoy the RNC and the City of Cleveland.

CPD understood the magnitude of the event, the potential for violent demonstrations, the difficult and challenging local and national environment, and the high risk to officer safety. In reviewing the law enforcement response in previous similar large-scale security events, it became clear that protection of the First Amendment and an overall philosophy of crowd engagement and maintenance instead of control and dispersal had to be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers.

In preparation for the event, CPD was able to utilize the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to help secure the assistance of various state police/highway patrol and other public safety agencies as well as to borrow resources, reducing costs and enhancing RNC security.

In order to maintain uniformity and consistency among the officers from various agencies, CPD employed several strategies to ensure that their practices and protocols were followed. All out-of-town officers from the same agency were kept together and were assigned a CPD supervisor. Additionally, only CPD and federal officers had arresting authority. Extensive training regarding operations before the RNC familiarized all personnel (city and outside agencies) with administrative and operational protocols prior to the event.

The RNC was held in Cleveland during a time in history when policing nationwide was under intense pressure and scrutiny. Indeed, the city itself was under additionally intense scrutiny leading up to the event. Cleveland was also tasked with protecting an event for a candidate who drew extraordinary levels of support and dissent, creating the potential for explosive civil unrest. The CPD was able to reframe the perception of policing in Cleveland by protecting the RNC with strong community outreach and partnerships, constitutional policing, transparency and officer safety in a thoughtful and balanced manner. They provided delegates, demonstrators, and visitors the ability to have their voices heard, and continued to keep the city safe at the same time.

Appendix A: List of Acronyms

BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
BP	Best Practice
BWC	Body Worn Cameras
CPD	Cleveland Division of Police
CFD	Cleveland Fire Department
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNC	Democratic National Convention
DNCC	Democratic National Convention Committee
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GIS	Geographic Information System
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IOC	Intelligence Operations Center
JIC	Joint Information Center
LL	Lesson Learned
LSSE	Large Scale Security Event
MACC	Multi-Agency Communication Center
NSSE	National Special Security Event
NTTAC	National Training and Technical Assistance Center
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OHARNG	Ohio Army National Guard
PF	Police Foundation
PIO	Public Information Officer
R&R	Rest and Rehabilitation
RNC	Republican National Convention
RNCC	Republican National Convention Committee
RNCHC	Republican National Convention Host Committee
RTCC	Real-Time Crime Center
SAA	State Administering Agencies
TSA	U.S. Transportation Security Administration
USSS	U.S. Secret Service

Appendix B: List of Cleveland RNC Committees

The list below identifies the 25 planning subcommittees, in alphabetical order, that were established for the 2016 Republican National Convention.

1. Airport
2. Airspace Security
3. Business Impact
4. Civil Disturbance
5. Consequence Management
6. Counter Surveillance
7. Credentialing
8. Crisis Management
9. Critical Infrastructure Protection
10. Crowd Management
11. Dignitary/VIP Protection
12. Explosive Device Response
13. Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials
14. Health/Medical
15. Intelligence/Counter-terrorism
16. Interagency Communications
17. Legal/Civil Liberties
18. Logistics/Asset Identification
19. Public Affairs
20. Staffing and Housing
21. Tactical
22. Technology
23. Training
24. Transportation/Traffic
25. Venue Security

Appendix C: Police Foundation Team Bios

Chief Frank Straub, Ph.D. (Ret.), *Police Foundation Director of Strategic Studies*, also a non-resident Fellow at the Combatting Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, served as the Cleveland/RNC Team Lead. Dr. Straub, a 30-year veteran of law enforcement, served as Chief of the Spokane Police Department for three years. Spokane is the second largest city in the state of Washington and serves a community of 210,000 residents. During his tenure, the SPD dramatically reduced serious crime and the use of force by its officers, expanded community policing initiatives, and implemented a department-wide body worn camera program. Dr. Straub also served as the Public Safety Director in Indianapolis, where he led 3,200 sworn and civilian personnel assigned to the Department of Public Safety's police, fire, homeland security and other divisions. In that capacity he was responsible for planning and implementing all public safety operations for Super Bowl XLVI, the Indy 500, NFL & NBA playoffs, and NCAA Final Four competitions. Prior to that, he was the Public Safety Commissioner in White Plains, New York for seven years, directing 435 sworn and civilian personnel. During his tenure with the NYPD, Dr. Straub also served on the FBI/NYPD joint terrorism task force (JTTF) for six years. Dr. Straub holds a Bachelors of Arts in Psychology from St. John's University, a Master of Arts in Forensic Psychology from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the City University of New York.

Chief Rodney Monroe (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert*, served on the Cleveland Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and "quick look" document. Chief Monroe has over thirty-seven years of law enforcement experience serving in various positions and overseeing a vast array of specialized commands, eventually serving as Chief of Police in several major cities. He has over twelve years of senior executive level experience as Chief of Police for the Cities of: Macon (GA); Richmond (VA); and Charlotte (NC). Prior, Chief Monroe served as a seasoned manager with senior executive level experience for the Metropolitan Police Department. Chief Monroe has significant experience in law enforcement, financial planning, personnel logistics, major criminal investigations, planning and managing initiatives to implement Community Policing strategies with emphasis on youth development and engagement, and special events within three major police agencies. Chief Monroe has significant experience planning, organizing, and managing LSSEs, including the 2012 Democratic National Convention, the 1995 Million-Man March, and the 1997 Presidential Inauguration.

Commissioner Robert Haas (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert*, served on the Cleveland Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and "quick look" document. Commissioner Haas served as the chief executive of the Cambridge Police Department from 2007 to 2016. Prior to this, he was the Massachusetts state Executive of Public Safety from 2006 to 2007, and served as the state Undersecretary of Law Enforcement and Homeland Security from 2003-2006. He was Chief of the Westwood (MA) Police Department from 1991 to 2003, and served in various positions in the Morris Township Police Department from 1976 until 1991. Commissioner Haas received a Masters of Arts in Criminal Justice Administration from Rutgers University and a Bachelor of Science Degree from William Paterson College of New Jersey. He has completed course work for a Ph.D. in Law, Policy and Society at Northeastern University. He has served on many boards and commissions, and is currently a member of the U.S. Attorney's Multi-disciplinary Threat Assessment and Intervention Working Group.

Jennifer Zeunik, Director of Programs, provided project oversight for all work completed and ensured that all deliverables are completed on time and within budget. Ms. Zeunik has twenty years of public sector and nonprofit project management experience, working closely with all levels of government, currently playing a pivotal role in the Police Foundation's training and technical assistance projects. In her previous role as a law enforcement consultant, Ms. Zeunik provided strategic management expertise to international, federal, state, and local criminal justice clients. Her work focused on justice policy research, business development activities, program management, strategic planning, training and technical assistance management, and development of strategic communications. She has served as a writer on numerous published reports, including the COPS funded Police Foundation [*Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust; Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis*](#); [*Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department*](#) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police ([*IACP National Policy Summit Report on Community Police Relations: Advancing a Culture of Cohesion and Community Trust*](#)). Ms. Zeunik holds a Bachelors Degree in Psychology and Criminology from Florida State University, and a Masters of Public Administration from the University of Georgia, School of Public and International Affairs.

Ben Gorban, Policy Analyst, provided off-site input and project support as well as document writing, review, and editing. Mr. Gorban is a policy analyst with more than eight years of experience supporting law enforcement-related projects including the provision of technical assistance and policy analysis support on projects related to countering violent extremism, community policing, and the role of social media in law enforcement. Mr. Gorban's areas of expertise include policy analysis, resource and strategy development, and communications and information dissemination. He has served as a writer on multiple published reports and articles, including the COPS Office funded [*Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis*](#); and [*Managing the Response to a Mobile Mass Shooting*](#) and [*Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks*](#). He received his MS in Justice, Law, and Society from American University in 2011 and his BA in both Philosophy and Justice, Law, and Society from American University in 2009.