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# City of Albuquerque Police Department On Body Camera System Research

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## INTRODUCTION

This research study has several goals. First, to document the use of the OBCS, second, to provide information useful for informing the development of a policy regarding the use of the OBCS and third, to provide information that will inform a method to audit the developed policy and the use of the system by APD personnel.

Currently it is not known how officers actually use the OBCS in the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). According to an APD special order authorized May 4, 2012, officers were required to use their OBCS during every citizen contact that is the result of a dispatched call for service, arrest warrant, search warrant, or traffic stop. On May 6, 2012 General Order 1-39 *Use of Tape/Digital Recorders* was made effective replacing an earlier version. This order includes the language in the Special Order and provides a list of incidents that must also be recorded. Another version of General Order 1-39 was made effective January 22, 2013 with some additional language including noting when officers should activate their cameras. It appears to also differentiate between dispatched and non-dispatched events and situations. Via our focus groups it appears many officers have interpreted the policy to include any citizen contact. The January 2013 general order appears to be modified by an October 2014 special order dealing with video evidence tagging procedures, which directed all officers to video if logged on a call where an arrest, criminal summons or non-traffic citation was issued. These four managing documents are found in the appendices of this report.

Official information sources for this study included the OBCS information system, City of Albuquerque Human Resource information, Automated Reporting System (ARS) data, APD computer aided dispatch information (CAD), and focus groups with sworn APD staff. City of Albuquerque and APD staff collaborated in providing access to the necessary official information and provided technical information in matching and merging information from the data sources. Eleven focus groups with APD patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants were conducted, as well as three focus groups with Investigative Bureau detectives and one focus group with a mix of Investigative Bureau sergeants and several SWAT officers. APD staff was helpful in arranging these focus groups.

APD has implemented an OBCS and similar camera programs are being implemented in law enforcement agencies around the country. This is a fairly new technology for law enforcement and best practices have not been established regarding the use of cameras, video storage and download protocols, privacy concerns, use of evidence, and officer training.

Literature addressing these and other issues suggests police departments have much to consider before investing in and implementing an OBCS.

This study involved two primary tasks. First, a review and analysis of APD video camera data, APD CAD data, and human resource data for APD officers was completed and second, focus groups of patrol officers, detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants from the APD Field Service Bureau (FSB), the Investigative Bureau (IB), and Special Services Bureau (SSB) were conducted.

This report includes this introduction, a literature review of current practices in the field of on body camera systems, a study design and methodology section, the analysis and discussion of the data listed above, and a recommendations and conclusions section.

## Research Goals

As noted above this research had several goals:

- To document the use of the OBCS by patrol officers, detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants in the Field Services Bureau (FSB), the Investigative Bureau (IB), and Special Services Bureau (SSB).
- To provide information useful for informing the development of a policy regarding the use of the OBCS and
- To provide information that will inform a method to audit the developed policy and the use of the system by APD personnel.

The original study design only included the use of official data to respond to the goals. Early in the design of the study the use of focus groups was adopted to provide insight on the use of the OBCS from the perspective of those using the cameras systems in the field. Various official data sources, noted earlier, were the primary sources of data to describe the use of the OBCS. The research team determined that in order to flesh out a more complete picture of the use of the OBCS, focus groups would provide beneficial information.

The issue of law enforcement agencies using OBCS is well documented in the news media. The issue is not nearly as well documented as a research topic. The body of research is growing as more jurisdictions embrace the idea of their police using video in their daily activities and more funding is provided for research. Research informing policy usually comes after long periods of evaluation and analysis by a wide range of researchers. We found that few evidence-based policies exist to guide OBCS. There is a large number of “check lists” available in the news media and internet blogs offered by law enforcement experts, researchers, and consultants. Our study may be one of the first on the issue of evidence-based factors guiding policy and providing a means to audit an OBCS as well as gather information from camera system users. At the time we began this study APD had several different camera systems.

This study focuses on studying the use of the *Taser Axon Flex* system being used by officers in the FSB and varying by IB officers and SSB officers. The FSB includes all officers assigned to one of Albuquerque's six area commands. A map of the area commands is included as Appendix A. After completing the FSB focus groups we were asked to expand our study to include IB and SSL detectives and sergeants. Our study does not include sworn staff assigned to Administrative Support Bureau, Professional Accountability Bureau, or any officer or unit that is not part of the FSB, IB, or SSB. All officers, sergeants and lieutenants in the FSB, as well as uniformed officers in the Traffic Division, Open Space Division, and Tactical Division (Explosive Ordinance, Bomb Squad, SWAT, and K-9) currently use the *Taser Axon Flex* system. Sworn staff in the IB and SSB uses a variety of other systems including the Scorpion system, the GoPro system, Muvi system, and Contour systems.

The data we analyzed gave us a structural picture of the amount of video being produced by the officers. The focus groups were a rich source of information that elaborated on the structure provided by the data. APD's organizational chart is included as Appendix B. Additionally, a more complete description of APD is included in the next section of the study.

Important for our study, we used only the *Taser Axon Flex* camera system video data. Just as importantly for our study the *Taser Axon Flex* camera system is paired with a database (EVIDENCE.com™). APD officers typically mount the camera module on the collar of their uniform but the officer has discretion in choosing where to mount the camera. The camera module is about the size of a large felt-tip marker and is connected by a wire to a wallet-size controller module that is carried on a belt or clipped to clothing. The recording device, onboard memory and most of the processing gear is in the camera module. The controller has the operating buttons and the power supply. There is a small battery in the camera module. The Axon Flex has what the industry calls "pre-event recording." In pre-event standby mode, the camera is always on, recording to a memory buffer with a capacity of 30 seconds. When the camera record button is pressed, the pre-event buffer is appended to the start of the recording. This feature captures incidents that start before the record button is pushed. Everything remains on the recorder module until the video is uploaded to a server. Video is recorded in 30-minute segments in MP4 format. The Axon model used by APD requires the use of Taser's cloud-based video storage called EVIDENCE.com (Dees, 2012).

## Description of the Albuquerque Police Department

Located in the southwestern United States, the city of Albuquerque is the largest city in New Mexico with a population of 557,169 in the city and 904,587 in the metro area (US Census, 2015). At the close of 2014, APD reported employing 711 patrol officers, 103 sergeants, and 34 lieutenants, a total of 848 officers in both FSB, IB, SSB, and support services (APD HR data, 2015). The Albuquerque Police Department began testing body worn cameras during August 2010, making it one of the first major police departments in the U.S. to have body worn cameras. At the time of this study, APD was the only police department under a federal mandate to carry body cameras. Beginning May 4, 2012, APD was operating under departmental Special Order 12-26 regarding the use of lapel cameras. Special Order 12-26 stated, “. . . all sworn department personnel will record each and every contact with a citizen during their shift that is the result of a dispatched call for service, arrest warrant, search warrant or traffic stop. The recordings will be saved for no less than 120 days. . . Failure to record a contact under the listed specifications may result in discipline.”

On May 6, 2012 APD administration made effective a revised policy (i.e., General Order 1-39) regarding the use of tape and digital recorders, including video/digital recordings. General Order 1-39 reads,

“. . . It will be the responsibility of the primary officer to ensure that the incident will be recorded in its entirety. If at any time the primary and secondary officer(s) should become separated, it will be the responsibility of the secondary officer(s) to record all their contact and/or actions during that incident.”

This General Order 1-39 contains a list of required recording circumstances. Another version of the General Order 1-39 was made effective January 22, 2013 which is similar to the May 6, 2012 versions with some small differences. These differences include some additional language noting when officers should activate their cameras and it appears to differentiate between dispatched and non-dispatched events and situations. Table 1 provides the required recording circumstances in addition to the language above. We used the January 2013 General Order 1-39 as the environment in which our calculations and focus group comments is made.

<b>Table 1. General Order 1-39 Required Recording Circumstances</b>	
1.	Resisting Arrest.
2.	Disorderly Conduct Arrests.
3.	Refusing to Obey an Officer Arrests
4.	From the start of a search warrant until the area is secured
5.	Those contacts where there is reason to believe a complaint could result
6.	Domestic violence calls for court purposes
7.	All calls involving suspected suicidal and/or suicidal individuals
8.	When a citizen refuses to sign a traffic citation
9.	When officers seek verbal/written permission to search a residence, building, structure, or vehicles. Officers will record through the duration of the search
10.	Child custody disputes

The policies, general orders, and special orders of APD provide background to the circumstances regarding video recordings. Another key element is the schedule used by APD to deploy video cameras to the patrol staff. According to an APD in-house history of the body-worn camera program, APD began testing body-worn cameras in August 2010. Early in the testing period APD realized a critical need would be maintaining the data. These involved the use, storage, sharing, and transfer of video files. During November 2012 APD implemented the *Taser Axon-Flex* camera system and began training officers in April 2013. In November 2013, APD began deploying 525 Taser cameras to uniformed staff and the camera system was fully deployed by January 2014 in the FSB. Camera systems were then deployed to uniformed officers in the Traffic Division (traffic and DWI), Open Space Division, and Tactical Division (Explosive Ordinance, Bomb Squad, SWAT, and K-9). Deployment to these officers was completed by the end of January 2014.

### Description of the Data

As noted earlier this study includes two separate but related tasks. Each one of these research tasks included different data sets. First, a review of official data from a variety of sources for FSB and IB officers and second a series of focus groups with APD FSB patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. Third, IB and SSB officers and sergeants were involved in their own focus group sessions after the first phase of the study was completed. Because of the success of the FSB focus groups, a round of focus groups was held for the IB and SSB officers to add their point-of-view to the discussion.

Five sources of information were provided by APD for the portion of the study using official data. The APD Technical Services Unit/Department of Technology and Innovation provided all the data. Table 2 lists the datasets, provides a brief description of each dataset, and offers a comment about any unique characteristics of the dataset. The Calls For Service computer

aided dispatch data (CAD) and the OBCS data is the backbone of our official data analysis. These data contain the primary number of the call, the time each call was created, the time dispatched to the officer, when the officer arrived on-scene, and when the officer “cleared” or closed each call. CAD also includes the type of call, the priority of the call, the address of the call, the beat of the primary officer on the call, as well as the secondary officer(s) answering the call.

The EVIDENCE.com™ website holds the Taser camera system video data and contains all the identifying information for the video recordings, EVIDENCE.com™ data was linked to CAD data. The EVIDENCE.com™ data included the time and length of the call, the description of the call and report number, and also the officer identifying information. Besides the EVIDENCE.com data, another dataset titled, “Taser Videos – OIM” contained all the video that had been saved beyond 120 days. The 120-day rule stems from Special Order 12-26, in that, data not identified as evidence in a report or case is deleted after 120 days. The OIM dataset is also referred to as “Tagged Evidence.” The OIM dataset contained the case number, the date the video was created, the officer number, and a brief description of the data.

The Automated Reporting System (ARS) data was matched to CAD data, EVIDENCE.com™, and OIM. ARS included every CAD call or “incident” in which a report by the officer was created. ARS also included incidents that may not have originated from a CAD call for service. Finally, APD provided a list of all APD personnel working for the department on December 31, 2014. This “HR” dataset consisted of the officer’s name, man number, gender, hired date, and race/ethnicity. This data was invaluable in linking CAD data to the EVIDENCE.com™, and OIM data.

<b>Dataset Label</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Comment</b>
Calls For Service (CAD)	All calls from Jan 1, 2013 to Dec. 31, 2014.	All calls for service dispatched to APD officers.
Automated Reporting System	Jan. 1, 2013 to Dec. 31. 2014	Report writing system, tied to CAD and linked to video data
Evidence Created	Jan. 1, 2013 to Dec. 31. 2014	EVIDENCE.com™ historical record of all video
HR Data	Dec 31, 2014	All APD Employees
Taser Videos – OIM	Jan. 1, 2013 to Dec. 31, 2014	Videos saved as evidence

### Focus Group Data

The focus groups provided a rich resource of information. Officers shared valuable insight into the circumstances involved in camera usage and their participation was anonymous. We conducted focus groups with sworn staff from three different bureaus (FSB, IB, and SSB),



including patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants. There was a large number of sworn staff involved in the fifteen focus group sessions and there was variety in the age of the participants, years of service, and gender. Patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants contributed information about when cameras were actually being used, how camera equipment was used, the pros and cons about using the camera system, their approach to a new policy, and “out-of-the-box” suggestions for improving the OBCS. Moreover, they gave their opinions, regarding the review of video footage, realistic policies, auditing cameras usage, the benefits of OBCS, the impact of OBCS on officer performance, and police transparency. A more complete description is provided with the review of focus group data.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Adopting On-Body Camera Systems**

The Albuquerque Police Department is in the process of refining its policies and procedures for on-body camera systems used by officers in the field (Boetel, 2015). Similar programs have been and will be implemented around the country. This is a rather new technology and many policies and procedures need to be put in place to ensure cameras are being used properly, video is being stored properly, and privacy concerns are being addressed in the protocols of camera usage. Literature addressing these concerns tells us there are many things to consider when adopting an OBCS in police departments.

Rationale for adopting OBCS for police officers stems from several recently highlighted concerns from both police departments and communities across the nation (Stanley 2013, 2015a). Recent events in Ferguson, MO and Cleveland, OH have put police use of force in the spotlight and have received much attention in the media. Police use-of-force and police legitimacy are concepts discussed in the news almost every day. On the other side of the equation, police officers put themselves at risk while patrolling and the adoption of body-worn camera systems may increase safety for police officers. Furthermore, cameras may help settle differential accounts of interactions police have with citizens.

In the now well-known ‘Rialto Study’ (Farrar and Ariel, 2013; Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland, 2014), investigators found the use of body-worn cameras decreased police officers’ use of force by nearly 60% and reduced citizen complaints against police officers by almost 90%. The study claims that simply knowing one is being recorded impacts both citizen and police behavior. However, body-worn cameras not only reduce police misconduct, they also provide the criminal justice system with video evidence of encounters and events that may be used in prosecution. A recent study by the American Prosecutors Research Institute (ManTech, 2012)

found that nearly 91% of prosecutors surveyed reported they used video evidence gathered from dash cams used in police cars. There is also evidence that body-worn cameras can provide police with videos to review for information the officer may have missed during the interaction (Clark, 2013). Video taken from body-worn cameras and dash cams may also benefit police officers who have been wrongfully accused of misconduct by providing play-by-play evidence of interactions between police officers and the citizenry (Robinson, 2012). Footage from body-worn cameras can help settle citizen complaints and can also be used to train new police officers on proper citizen interaction protocols (Vorndran et al., 2014).

An indirect benefit of using OBCS is the enhanced confidence citizens may have in the criminal justice system (ibid.). Due to recent media attention to police conduct, instituting an accountability system such as required recording of police-citizen interactions may increase police legitimacy and trust in the legal system (Stanley 2013, 2015a). Beyond the peace of mind such factors may offer citizens, extant research suggests the level of satisfaction citizens have with police is inversely associated with crime rates in local areas (Silver and Miller, 2004).

The footage derived from OBCS can also be used to enhance officer training (Vorndran et al., 2014; White, 2014). There are several ways video can be used to train new officers in the field. Footage can be reviewed by new officers to show different strategies police officers use when dealing with citizen interactions. They can serve as examples of what to do and what not to do. In addition, police officers who have had complaints against them can review footage of negative interactions (theirs or others) to get a better understanding of when and where the interaction elicited a complaint. Supervisors can evaluate footage and give instruction to officers who are incorrectly interacting with citizens (Vorndran et al., 2014), although a best practice regarding how often and under what circumstances supervisors should review OBCS footage (e.g., should video be randomly reviewed to monitor officer performance, and by whom?) has yet to be established (Miller et al., 2014).

### **Implementation Considerations**

Issues arise when implementing a body-worn camera system. Although there are policy templates regarding proper use of the camera systems (Miller et al., 2014; White, 2014), there is no consensus on precisely when police officers ought to record citizen encounters, who they record, where they record, or on issues concerning privacy and the proper storage of video. Video recordings from body-worn cameras can be used by the criminal justice system as evidence for trials and in civil court to settle citizen complaints. Therefore, video must be stored for a certain period of time, but for exactly how long is an issue police departments must determine for themselves. Retention duration of evidentiary video footage (i.e. footage marked as important for

investigative purpose) is generally determined by state law, but individual departments vary in how long they keep non-evidentiary video with the most common retention periods being between 60 and 90 days (Miller et al., 2014). Furthermore, state public disclosure laws may classify such video as public record and citizens may request access to video recordings of various encounters. While materials treated as evidence in an ongoing investigation are typically exempt from such laws, agencies must carefully consider the benefits and drawbacks of releasing non-evidentiary video when they have the discretion to do so.

Some policy analysts are concerned with police discretion of video recording (Stanley, 2013, 2015a). If proper policies are not put in place then police officers may choose what and when to record, diminishing the accountability of police conduct. Some analysts have recommended continuous recording from the beginning of the shift until the end (Stanley, 2013). However, this conjures privacy concerns for both the officer and the citizenry. Should police officers record video in people's homes or during encounters with minors? What about during interviews with victims or crime witnesses who may wish to keep their identities confidential? Is it reasonable to expect officers to record continuously even if they are on break or not with a citizen? In addition, federal policies limit the use of video recordings to prevent the warrantless capturing of video in private settings and most states have laws that also address this concern (ManTech, 2012). Thus, rather than having officers continuously record or record every citizen encounter, many policy templates require OBCS activation in response to every call for service and during a specified set of law-enforcement related encounters (Miller et al., 2014).

Several other topics are of import with regard to OBCS implementation. Salient among these is the requirement in 12 states that officers inform and obtain consent from subjects before they record them by audio or video (ManTech, 2012). Originally designed to undermine attempts to circumvent the "one-party consent" requirement of *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), by covert parties who would self-grant consent to record uninformed subjects, "two-party consent" laws have the side effect of barring officers from recording citizens without their permission, and vice-versa (Robinson, 2012). Fortunately, police executives in several of these states have already obtained exemptions for body-worn cameras from their state legislatures (Miller et al., 2014), and police departments in these states who have not yet done so can consider following suit. Agencies should also consider officer perceptions of and support for OBCSs prior to implementation (White, 2014). It is important to engage agency personnel who will be wearing the cameras in order to address their concerns, such as feeling mistrusted by superiors, experiencing stress over the possibility of excessive scrutiny of performance, or being unwilling to work with external researchers for program evaluation (Drover and Ariel, 2015). However,

many departments have found officers embracing the technology as it improves and as they become increasingly cognizant of its benefits (Miller et al. 2014; Jennings et al., 2014). Law enforcement agencies and policymakers considering implementation of OBCSs for the first time or who would like to learn more about effective implementation practices can refer to the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Body-Worn Camera Toolkit and its Law Enforcement Implementation Checklist (BJA, 2015).

### Technological Considerations

Technology is also a consideration when implementing an OBCS. Finding the best camera system involves many considerations that vary from department to department (Miller et al., 2014). Police departments must have policies and procedures in place for the use of video technology, the storage of the technology, and the storage of the recordings. Included in these policies should be explicit prohibitions against the tampering, editing, or copying of video data on recording or storage devices, as well as clear specifications for chain-of-custody of OBCS footage (ibid.). Further, there are many different kinds of technology that should be considered. Specifications to consider when buying camera systems are the battery life, video quality, recording limits, night recording, focal width, audio, camera placement, and radio integration capability (ManTech, 2012). Moreover, financial costs must be considered when implementing a required body-worn camera system (Miller et al., 2014). Table 3 lists specification estimates for seven different OBCS models for comparison. Interested departments and policymakers should refer to the publications listed in the References section for ManTech (2012) and SAVER (2012) for comprehensive lists of OBCS specifications and recommendations.

	<b>Taser Axon Flex ®</b>	<b>VIEVU PVR-LE2</b>	<b>StalkerVUE</b>	<b>Scorpion Micro DV</b>	<b>FirstVu</b>	<b>Wolfcom 3rd Eye</b>	<b>MuviView HD Series</b>
Recording Life	4 hours	4 hours	8 hours	4 hours	4 hours	5 hours	.5/3 hours
Charge Time	6 hours	3 hours	2 hours	2 hours	--	--	3 hours
Video Resolution	640x480	640x480	1280x720	640x480	640x480	1920x1080	1080p
Recording Speed	30 fps	30 fps	--	30 fps	30 fps	30 fps	--
Night Mode	Low light	Low light	IR Lens	No	IR Lens	IR Lens	Yes
Field of View	75°	71°	--	72°	Wide	120°	160°
Audio/Format	Various	MP2	Yes	Yes	Yes	AAC	Yes
Placement/Format	Various	Chest	Chest	Various	Chest	Chest	Various
Radio Interface	No	--	--	--	--	Yes	No
Approx. Price	\$1,000.00	\$900.00	\$800.00	\$120.00	\$800.00	--	\$119/\$249

--Unspecified

Source Citation: ManTech (2012)

In addition to technology considerations, police departments need to consider the possibility of hiring additional personnel in order to effectively store, secure, and maintain OBCS footage (Miller et al., 2014). Some departments may not have the infrastructure in place to store and retrieve video in a timely and efficient manner. Such limitations notwithstanding, there are websites such as EVIDENCE.com

EVIDENCE.com that allow police officers to store, edit, maintain, and recall videos that are stored on the website.

Finally, it is important that agency personnel and policymakers recognize the limitations inherent in OBCS technology. Early pilot trials have found the utility of body-worn camera video footage vulnerable to the circumstances of its capture—with diminished usefulness, for example, in situations where “officers are walking or running, where there is physical contact between officers and suspects, or officers are raising their hands to fire a weapon” (Rosenberg, 2011)—and this limitation does not appear to have a readily apparent fix, even as the nascent technology matures. Moreover, experts caution against adopting the widely-held belief that OBCSs will provide an objective, reliable, and unequivocal account of every incident they record. The Force Science Institute (FSI, 2010) notes four dimensions of human visual perception that either differ from or are not possessed by a video camera: field of view, focus of attention, depth of perception, and interpretation; and academics Justin Ready and Jacob Young emphasize this last dimension by asserting that multiple viewers of OBCS video will interpret the same events differently as they filter them through their differing life experiences (Ready and Young, 2014). One implication from these limitations is that OBCS footage should not be prioritized over traditional forms of evidence in court (Goodall, 2007; Friedman, 2014; Miller et al., 2014). According to the United Kingdom Home Office’s Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video Devices (Goodall, 2007):

“It is crucial that the wider use of such video evidence should not take primacy over other types of evidence, such as statements from police officers or other eyewitnesses. Police officers and other criminal justice agencies...must resist any suggestion that an absence of video images in any way weakens the strength of conventional evidence used in a case.” (2007:7)

### **Current Policy Templates**

As mentioned in the beginning of this summary of the literature, there is little evidence regarding the benefits and drawbacks to implementing OBCSs in police departments (White, 2014). Because this is such a new technology, many unforeseen issues may arise during implementation. Nevertheless, there have been several attempts made at issuing policy

recommendations for departments who wish or who are ordered to implement such programs. White (2014) points to the importance of independent research on OBCSs to better understand how they are being used, which practices are effective, whether or not civilians and officers support them, and their impact on outcomes such as reduced use of force and reduced complaints against officers. He also suggests the technology be evaluated during implementation to determine the most effective camera models and storing options. These recommendations fall short, however, when considering the actual use. These recommendations are more geared toward developing a policy than they are in actual usage.

The Police Executive Research Forum (Miller et al., 2014) provides a more comprehensive set of policy recommendations and rationales for those recommendations that address when officers should use their cameras, how they should use them, and identify potential hurdles to policy development. These recommendations emerged from three sources: (1) effective practice suggestions as discussed during PERF's 2013 conference in Washington, D.C., at which more than 200 representatives from law enforcement, government, and academia were participants; (2) qualitative data from PERF's interviews of more than 40 criminal justice personnel and other experts; and (3) a review of policies submitted to PERF by police agencies across the nation (ibid.). Examples of their recommendations can be seen in Table 4, which organizes them by category and provides a description for each category. For the full set of recommendations refer to the associated citation for Miller et al. (2014) in the References section.

<b>Table 4: OBCS Policy Categories, Descriptions, and Recommendations</b>		
	<b>Description</b>	<b>Example Recommendation(s)</b>
General Recommendations	Guidelines referring to OBCS mandate, assignment, and ownership; on body location; and on notification of beginning or ceasing recording	“Policies should clearly state which personnel are assigned or permitted to wear body-worn cameras and under which circumstances.” (p. 53)
Recording Protocols	Protocols for when officers should or should not record; for notification of recording and obtaining consent; and for documentation of these actions	“Officers should be required to activate their body-worn cameras during all calls for service and during all law-enforcement related encounters...[but] officers should be required to obtain consent prior to recording interviews with crime victims...[and] officers should have the discretion to keep their cameras turned off during conversations with crime witnesses...” (p. 55-57)
Download & Storage Policies	Policies on when and how to download and store video footage; for chain-of-custody of video footage; for retention duration of footage; and for guarding against deletion, tampering, or copying of footage	“Policies should designate the officer as the person responsible for downloading recorded data...[except] in certain clearly identified circumstances...[and] policies should include specific measures to prevent data tampering, deleting, and copying.” (p. 59)
Recorded Data Access & Review	Policies regarding who should be permitted to review body-worn camera video footage and when, and for public release of footage	“Officers should be permitted to review video footage of an incident in which they were involved, prior to making a statement about the incident.” (p. 62)
Training Policies	Policies regarding who should receive training for the use of OBCSs; when such training should occur; and how often trained personnel should receive refresher courses	“Body-worn camera training should be required for all agency personnel who may use...body-worn cameras...[and] a training manual should be created in both digital and hard-copy form.” (p. 65)
Policy & Program Evaluation	Policies regarding the evaluation of body-worn camera programs for effectiveness and cost	“Agencies should collect statistical data concerning body-worn camera usage...[and] conduct evaluations to analyze the financial impact of implementing a body-worn camera program.”

Source citation: Miller et al. (2014)

Miller et al.’s (2014) recommendations represent one of the most comprehensive policy templates to date. However, each department will have to create a policy that works for the

infrastructure of the department and any other unique needs they may face. Interested police departments and policymakers should also refer to the policy template developed by the Seattle Police Department (SPD, 2014) as well as those published by White (2014), the United Kingdom Home Office's Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video Devices (Goodall, 2007), and the International Association of Chiefs of Police's Model Policy (IACP, 2014).

### **Empirical Evidence**

Before reviewing the empirical evidence on the impact of OBCSs it should be noted that as of September 2013, only five empirical tests of the technology had been conducted (White, 2014). Two years later, the existing body of research on OBCSs isn't much greater: all told, the number of empirical articles published as a result of pilot trials or permanent implementations regarding the impact of OBCSs on any number of dimensions (e.g., use of force, complaints against officers, successful prosecution of offenders, and officer or civilian perceptions) amounts to no more than fifteen separate publications worldwide. Moreover, the comparability of these studies with each other or their generalizability for other locations is limited (Mateescu et al., 2015). The most well-known empirical study regarding the outcomes of police officers wearing body-cameras is the Rialto Study (Farrar and Ariel, 2013; Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland, 2014). The objective in this study was to determine whether the use of body-worn cameras would reduce police use of force incidents and reduce citizen complaints against the police. Investigators conducted a randomized controlled trial in Rialto, CA where police officers were randomly assigned to treatment (required to wear an OBCS) or control (without an OBCS) shifts over a 12-month period in 2012 and 2013. Their findings were encouraging: the number of use-of-force incidents dropped by 58.3% from the previous 12 months and the number complaints filed fell by 88% from the same period. The authors of this study theorized that officers and citizens behave with more civility when they know they are being watched.

Some controversy persists over the generalizability of the Rialto findings for other police departments, however. One key limitation of the Rialto Study is that its methodology did not allow investigators to adjudicate between the respective effects of the cameras on officer behavior vis-à-vis civilian behavior, and thus the same trial conducted in a different context could yield different results. Alex Sutherland, one of the Rialto Study researchers, said that the Rialto Study is not a definitive answer to the effectiveness of the cameras (Kaste, 2015). Another Rialto investigator, Barak Ariel, noted that current evidence is insufficient to generalize the study's findings and claim an overall benefit for law enforcement (Friedman, 2014). Essentially, there needs to be more research on the effectiveness of OBCS before any definitive outcomes can be evaluated.



In addition to the Rialto Study, Roy (2014) at Arizona State University (ASU) conducted a study to examine the impact of officer assignment and departmental policy on the willingness to use OBCSs, as well as their impact on the behavior of citizens and officers when cameras were activated in Mesa, AZ. First, she wanted to see if there were differences in activating the cameras during interactions with citizens between officers who were required to wear the cameras and officers who volunteered to wear the cameras. She found that officers who volunteered to wear the cameras were 10% more likely to activate their cameras during interaction than officers who were assigned mandatory OBCS. Second, she wanted to examine whether officers who were under mandatory activation policies and officers under discretionary activation policies differed in their activation of cameras during interactions. She found that officers under the discretionary activation policy were about 20% less likely to activate their cameras than officers under the mandatory activation policy. Moreover, the impact of departmental policy on whether or not officers activated their cameras held even while controlling for a host of situational factors, including the nature of the crime incident and the presence of suspects, bystanders, and other police officers.

Roy's (2014) work at ASU is neither the first nor the last study on body-worn cameras to emerge under the auspices of, or in partnership with, this particular university. Researchers from ASU collaborated with the Mesa Police Department in their twelve-month evaluation of the Axon Flex OBCS implementation (MPD, 2013). Beginning in October 2012, MPD recruited 100 police officers for their evaluation and divided them into two groups of 50. Officers in the first group wore OBCSs for one year's time, of whom approximately half volunteered to wear the cameras and the other half were assigned to them. Officers in the second group were the control group and did not wear OBCSs for the same year. During the first six months, officers in the first group were instructed to record every citizen contact; during the next six months, officers in the first group were instructed to use their discretion to turn on their OBCSs when they considered it appropriate to do so. At the conclusion of the trial, investigators found that volunteer officers were more than 60% more likely to use their OBCSs than the officers who were assigned to them; use rate dropped by 42% during the second six months (discretionary policy) as compared with the first six (mandatory policy); and overall departmental and use of force complaints decreased from the previous 12 months by 40% and 75%, respectively. Using data from the same trial, Ready and Young (2015) found that the officers who wore the cameras were more likely to be supportive of the technology and engage in proactive behaviors (with respect to issuing citations for ordinance violations) than those who did not, yet these same officers conducted fewer stop-and-frisks and arrests than their non-OBCS-wearing counterparts. Finally, Katz et al. (2014)

found from a 2012-2014 OBCS trial in the Maryvale area of Phoenix that officers in the target area experienced more productivity (as measured by arrests), were subject to fewer complaints, and handled more domestic violence cases which resulted in guilty pleas or verdicts during the trial period than their counterparts without cameras in comparable areas.

As well-known as American trials of body-worn cameras like the Rialto Study are, however, an important body of literature has resulted from studies conducted outside of the United States. In fact, some of the earliest trials of OBCSs took place between 2005 and 2006 in Plymouth, England (Harris, 2010). These initial trials were part of the Plymouth Head Camera Project during which 300 police officers were trained to operate 50 OBCSs, which they could voluntarily check out for use during a one-year period in 2006 (Goodall, 2007). From 2005 to 2007, investigators noted substantial decreases in citizen complaints and time spent by officers doing office work, as well as increases in officer time spent on patrol and officer productivity. Other OBCS implementation trials in the United Kingdom—like the Renfrewshire/Aberdeen trials in Scotland (ODS Consulting, 2011) and Operation Hyperion on the Isle of Wight (Ellis et al., 2015)—have resulted in similar changes, although the findings from their evaluations are often limited because they lack a comparison group design. One unique element of many of these studies is that they include measures of the perceptions of officers, citizens, or both, key dimensions that only a handful of studies in the U.S. have considered (Lawrence, 2015).

The state of the literature on empirical evidence lacks research on how citizens react to OBCS (White, 2014). One of the crucial components to adopting OBCS is the potential to increase police legitimacy and transparency in the eyes of community members. In places where the communities trust the police, crime is lower and people generally feel more inclined to call upon formal social controls; furthermore, communities who trust the police are more likely to engage in informal social control in their communities and are more inclined to work with the police (Silver and Miller, 2004). One of the components of community policing (known as a good method to engage the community in policing affairs) is to have mutual trust between officers and citizens (Gill et al., 2014). It would be interesting to see if the adoption of OBCS increases trust between officers and citizens and has yet to be studied empirically.

### **Future Policy Concerns**

One concern recurs consistently throughout the literature: there have yet to be established ‘best-practices’ when it comes to creating and implementing a comprehensive policy departments can adapt to the use of OBCS. This is not due to a lack of attention to the procedure, but rather the adoption of OBCS in police departments is relatively new. Some departments are simply piloting the new technology while other departments have been required to implement a program

such as the Albuquerque Police Department. There is a need for research in this area to determine the best practices that departments should adopt.

Many existing policy templates address similar concerns for OBCS use and echo one another's recommendations: activate cameras during all calls for service; notify citizens when they are being recorded and obtain consent before recording witnesses and victims; store video properly to prevent tampering or copying; and so on. Even so, unforeseen problems have already emerged and will most likely continue, meaning agencies and policymakers will need to adapt to these unforeseen problems. An example of this is the case in Seattle when a citizen requested to view the totality of the video footage collected by the city's police department up to the point of the request (Sullivan, 2014). In order to address the privacy concerns of those recorded and the police, the footage needed to be reviewed and sensitive information redacted. To review all of the video footage requested by the man would have required an infeasible quantity of time and would likely have incurred serious costs for Seattle police department (cf. Katz et al., 2014). Fortunately the man withdrew his request (Sullivan, 2014), but this situation shed light on some potential problems agencies will face in balancing privacy with transparency with respect to public disclosure requests. Such a concern is shared by citizens and police officers alike (Miller et al., 2014).

Another unresolved issue for which future research could contribute is officer review of body-worn camera video before making statements or filing reports. The Police Executive Research Forum recommends permitting officers to view OBCS footage of an incident in which they were involved prior to making a statement about it in order to assist officers' recall and hold them accountable for their actions in the footage (Miller et al., 2014). Force Science Analyst David Blake agrees, arguing that video footage can help officers understand how their ability to focus on particular aspects of an incident is dependent upon the nature of the circumstances surrounding the incident (e.g. level of stress of the officer, whether the incident was expected or a surprise, how quickly the incident unfolded, etc.) (Blake, 2015). However, some researchers like Matthew Feeney, a policy analyst for the Cato Institute, disagree. Feeney (2015) argues that the lawfulness of a use-of-force incident is highly dependent on what the officer in question thought at the time of the incident, and thus allowing the officer to view OBCS footage prior to making a statement obscures the legality of his or her actions. Future research should seek to determine more precisely the influence of prior viewing of body-worn camera video on officer statements, and stakeholders must weigh the respective merits of each course for policy.

Threading all of these concerns together is a question whose answer is often assumed but rarely discussed: What is the goal or purpose of OBCSs for police? This deceptively simple

question belies a more complex reality: while multiple stakeholders are likely to agree on the various potential functions of OBCSs, they will put differential emphasis on each. Is the “real” purpose of body-worn cameras to provide improved evidence for courts, as the UK Home Office claims (Goodall, 2007:8)? Or should primary emphasis be placed on deterring police misconduct, as Stanley (2015b) suggests? Even if these and other outcomes are not mutually exclusive, they are likely to compete in certain situations, as is often the case with policing goals generally (Plant and Scott, 2009). The gains provided by OBCSs in police accountability, prosecutorial evidence, and accurate reporting of police-community interactions must be balanced against the increased demands borne by the law enforcement personnel who employ them, as well as the losses in privacy for anyone subject to their scrutiny. Because policing in general often involves the pursuit of conflicting goals (ibid.), various stakeholders must carefully weigh the relative merits of every function OBCSs can or will be expected to complete.

## STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

### Data

The Albuquerque Police Department (APD) provided the Institute for Social Research (ISR) with administrative, calls for service, and Taser video data files for 2013 and 2014. While all of the APD data (administrative and calls for service) can be linked together with unique identifiers, there is no unique identifier in the Taser data to link each video to a call for service. Consequently, we developed a two-stage methodology to match video to any one call for service. We are confident this is an efficient and effective way to estimate whether or not there is video during a call for service. Using this method it is not possible to completely and accurately match videos to calls for service and it is difficult to provide an error rate. While this is true this method does provide a baseline measure of camera use compared to calls for service. This is not a sufficient measure to monitor a policy and APD should adopt a solution that matches each video to a call for service using a unique identifier.<sup>1</sup>

This estimate utilizes a two-stage process. In the first stage, the video data was restructured, where the original unit of analysis or row was a video to each row being an officer-date with each video time turning into a variable (see Table 5).

**Table 5. Example of Restructuring the Video Data So that It Can be Merged with the Calls For Service Data (Stage 1)**

Officer	Date	Video	Time		Officer	Date	Video 1	Video 2	Video 3
100	7/27/14	1	16:45	=>	100	7/27/14	16:45	17:15	18:30
100	7/27/14	2	17:15		100	7/28/14	20:45	21:15	21:30
100	7/27/14	3	18:30		101	7/28/14	5:45	6:15	8:30
100	7/28/14	1	20:45		102	7/29/14	9:45	10:15	11:30
100	7/28/14	2	21:15						
100	7/28/14	3	21:30						
101	7/28/14	1	5:45						
101	7/28/14	2	6:15						
101	7/28/14	3	8:30						
102	7/29/14	1	9:45						
102	7/29/14	2	10:15						
102	7/29/14	3	11:30						

This restructured data was then merged to the calls for service data using officer date as the identifier to link the two data files. Table 6 shows the results of this merge. Of the almost 1.5 million calls for service in 2013 and 2014, almost half (48.2%) were matched with an officer date that had video. Further investigation into the unmatched calls shows that the overwhelming majority (82.8%) occurred in 2013. This makes sense because the number of officers equipped

<sup>1</sup> We note that these are conservative estimates, since there is video that is not matched to a call.

with Taser cameras increased over this time. Table 7 shows that in 2014, 82.1% of calls for service were matched to an officer video date. These results provide evidence that the first stage of our process to estimate whether there is any video within the duration of any one call for service was successful.

<b>Table 6. Results of the Merge of Calls For Service Data and Taser Video Data</b>		
	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
CFS without Matching Officer Date Video	749,712	51.4
Officer Date Video Without CFS	6,060	0.4
CFS With Matched Officer Video Date	701,657	48.2
Total CFS	1,457,429	100.0

<b>Table 7 Results of the Merge of Calls For Service Data by Year</b>				
	<b>2013</b>		<b>2014</b>	
	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
CFS without Matching Officer Date Video	620,495	85.2	129,217	17.9
CFS With Matched Officer Video Date	107,702	14.8	593,955	82.1
Total CFS	728,197	100.0	723,172	100.0

<b>Table 8. Results of the Merge of Calls For Service Data by Month Year</b>		
<b>Month/Year</b>	<b>% Unmatched</b>	<b>% Matched</b>
Jan-13	99.8	0.2
Feb-13	99.6	0.4
Mar-13	99.8	0.3
Apr-13	93.4	6.6
May-13	88.1	11.9
Jun-13	88.1	11.9
Jul-13	86.9	13.1
Aug-13	88.4	11.6
Sep-13	87.5	12.5
Oct-13	88.8	11.2
Nov-13	68.2	31.8
Dec-13	28.9	71.1
Jan-14	21.4	78.6
Feb-14	17.1	82.9
Mar-14	18.0	82.0
Apr-14	16.8	83.3
May-14	15.4	84.6
Jun-14	17.8	82.3
Jul-14	17.6	82.4
Aug-14	16.8	83.2
Sep-14	17.6	82.4
Oct-14	16.6	83.4
Nov-14	17.7	82.3
Dec-14	21.7	78.3
Total	51.7	48.3
N	749,712	701,657

The second stage of the matching strategy consists of identifying any videos that start at least five minutes before the dispatch call time or five minutes after the call end time. Additionally, we coded any videos that ended within this call duration time as being within the call period. Table 9 shows the results from our coding of each call.<sup>2</sup> Overall, we find that a little less than one in three officer calls (30.1%) have a video within the duration of the call in 2013 and 2014. However, when we look at the percent of calls with video across 2013 and 2014, we see that a little more than one in two calls (51.6%) have video in 2014. This increase across years

<sup>2</sup> To account for when officers turn on/off their video before and after the beginning of a call in the data, we subtract five minutes from the start time of the call and add five minutes to the end time of the call in the matching procedure.

makes sense because the number of officers equipped with Taser cameras increased over this time.

<b>Table 9. Whether there was a Video in a Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes) by Year</b>						
	<b>2013</b>		<b>2014</b>		<b>Total</b>	
	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Video in Call Period (+/- 5 minutes)	63,840	8.8	373,009	51.6	436,849	30.1
No Video in Call Period (+/- 5 minutes)	664,357	91.2	350,163	48.4	1,014,520	69.9
Total CFS	728,197	100.0	723,172	100.0	1,451,369	100.0

Table 10 displays whether there was a video in a call by month for 2013 and 2014. We see that less than ten percent of calls were matched to a video in each month thru October 2013. Beginning in January 2014, we see that about fifty percent of calls were matched to video in each month.



<b>Table 10. Whether there was a Video in a Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes) by Month-Year</b>		
<b>Month/Year</b>	<b>No Video</b>	<b>Video</b>
Jan-13	99.8	0.2
Feb-13	99.8	0.2
Mar-13	99.9	0.1
Apr-13	96.0	4.0
May-13	92.8	7.2
Jun-13	93.0	7.0
Jul-13	92.2	7.8
Aug-13	93.1	6.9
Sep-13	92.4	7.6
Oct-13	93.6	6.4
Nov-13	81.5	18.5
Dec-13	57.6	42.4
Jan-14	52.4	47.6
Feb-14	49.2	50.8
Mar-14	49.1	50.9
Apr-14	47.9	52.1
May-14	46.5	53.5
Jun-14	47.1	52.9
Jul-14	47.4	52.6
Aug-14	47.5	52.5
Sep-14	48.3	51.7
Oct-14	48.0	52.0
Nov-14	47.8	52.2
Dec-14	50.3	49.7
<b>Total</b>	69.9	30.1
<b>N</b>	1,014,520	436,849

### Focus Groups

A focus group method was chosen to gather information on the current use of OBCS, satisfaction with the system, perceived areas for improvement, and perceived utility of the system from the perspective of those who use the camera systems. This information is designed to inform an OBCS policy for APD. The main purpose of the focus groups was to draw upon respondents' attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way in which would not be feasible using other methods, for example observation, one-to-one interviewing, or surveys. These attitudes, feelings and beliefs may be partially independent of a group or its social setting, but are more likely to be revealed through the social gathering and the interaction which being in a focus group provides (Gibbs, 1997). Compared to individual interviews, which aim to obtain individual attitudes, beliefs and feelings, focus groups elicit a wide range of views and emotional processes within a group context. Compared to observation, a focus group enables the researcher to gain a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time (Gibbs, 1997). Observational

methods tend to depend on waiting for things to happen, whereas the researcher follows a focus group guide in a focus group. In this sense focus groups are not natural but organized events. Focus groups are particularly useful when the everyday use of language and culture of particular groups is of interest, and when one wants to explore the degree of consensus on a given topic (Morgan & Kreuger 1993).

### **APD Focus Groups**

Focus group guides were developed to facilitate the focus group discussions. A careful review of available literature was completed prior to developing the focus group guides. This included a review of focus group literature, OBCS literature, similar studies, and a review of similar focus group guides for researching these types of programs. This literature was used to inform the development of the focus group guide.

The APD focus group guide, included as Appendix C, was designed to collect information on a variety of topics APD patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants in FSB and officers and sworn staff and sergeants of the IB and SSB. This includes how the equipment is used by officers, ease of use, when officers believe the system should be used, when officers believe the system should not be used, how officers currently use the system, the impact on police performance, the impact on police accountability, the impact on the community, and the impact on police transparency. Focus group guides were reviewed by APD staff. As part of the focus group study, field officers, IB detectives, and SSB officers completed a brief demographic survey, included as Appendix D, which provided us some limited background information including gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, work location and years in law enforcement and at APD. Sergeants and lieutenants did not complete the demographic survey in order to maintain their anonymity.

We conducted focus groups with APD patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants in FSB and sworn staff and sergeants of the IB and SSB. Planned focus groups with assistant district attorneys did not take place. An agreement could not be made with the DA's office on when and how to conduct the focus groups.

Potential study group members were identified because they were APD sworn staff in the FSB, IB, and SSB. APD identified current employees in this status. Recruitment occurred in collaboration with APD staff. Recruitment was done via email and APD's intranet, posted flyers, announcements at daily briefings that occur before the beginning of each shift, and flyers provided to potential study group members. Study group members volunteered to participate in focus groups.

Sworn staff, who were interested in participating, contacted ISR staff using the contact email address and contact cell phone numbers provided in the electronic notices and flyers. After making contact, APD officers were scheduled by an ISR staff person for one of the available focus groups. APD staff volunteering for a focus group was provided the date and time of their focus group and a study group identification number (ID), which they provided at the time they arrived at the focus group. No record was maintained of the APD officers who registered to attend a focus group. This precaution protected APD officers and they were not able to be identified as registering for or attending a focus group.

Through discussions with APD prior to starting recruitment, it was thought that recruitment would be relatively easy and productive. However, once recruitment began we had some difficulties in getting APD officers and detectives to volunteer for the focus groups. Extra announcements were made at the daily briefings to get officers to volunteer. At each focus group, we asked the participants why they thought we had trouble recruiting officers to participate. We were consistently told that it was due to low morale within APD, and a general consensus that participating would not do any good or bring about any change that would benefit APD officers. For the Field Service Bureau, there were a total of 8 focus groups conducted with APD field officers, 2 focus groups with APD sergeants, and 1 focus group with APD lieutenants. APD field officer focus groups began on March 3, 2015 and ran through April 9, 2015. Two focus groups were held with APD sergeants, on April 14, 2015 and April 15, 2015. One focus group was held with APD lieutenants on April 22, 2015. For the IB and SSB, there were a total of 4 focus groups conducted. A focus group consisting of IB sergeants and SSB Special Operations officers was held on September 1, 2015. Three focus groups were held with IB detectives on September 3, September 8, and September 10, 2015. Table 11 shows the total number of APD patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants in the Field Services Bureau of the department who were available to be recruited for the focus groups, and the total number of each category who attended the focus groups. It also includes the total number of IB and SSB sergeants and detectives who were available to be recruited for the focus groups, and the total number of each category who attended the focus groups. We were unable to recruit any participants from the SSB Traffic and Open Space unit and also from the SSB sergeants. We were only able to recruit 4 participants from the SSB Special Operations Unit.

<b>Table 11. Sample Population of APD Personnel Available for Focus Groups</b>			
	<b>Total Number in APD</b>	<b>Number Attended Focus Group</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>			
Patrol Officers	417	59	14.1
Sergeants	53	15	28.3
Lieutenants	18	4	22.2
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>			
IB SID	40	10	25
IB Violent Crimes	44	8	18.2
IB Property Crimes	28	11	39.3
IB Sergeants	21	5	23.8
SSB Special Ops	25	4	16
SSB Traffic & Open Space	39	0	0
SSB Sergeants	9	0	0

Each focus group consisted of 5-12 participants and lasted approximately 90 minutes. The same general topic questions were asked of participants at each focus group, with probing questions asked to reveal greater detail by clarifying or expanding upon responses. Each focus group was digitally audio-recorded using two digital audio recorders, the second recorder used as a backup. The purpose of audio recording was to accurately capture all the information from the focus group to be used as data. A note taker was used as a second method of collecting information from the focus groups. The notes were used to record non-verbal cues and main themes in each focus group. Focus groups were scheduled at different times of the day to accommodate the schedules of APD officers. A meal was provided at each focus group for the attendees. Focus groups took place at different Albuquerque Community Centers. One focus group was held on the University of New Mexico campus. Table 12 shows the attendance breakdown of each APD field officer focus group and IB/SSB focus group that was held.

<b>Table 12 Focus Group Attendance</b>		
<b>Focus Group #</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
1	8	13.6
2	7	11.9
3	12	20.3
4	5	8.5
5	7	11.9
6	9	15.3
7	6	10.2
8	5	8.5
Total	59	100
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
1	9	23.7
2	10	26.3
3	8	21.1
4	11	28.9
Total	38	100

The following set of tables reports the gender, age, ethnicity, education, years worked in law enforcement, years worked for APD, area command, and shift of all the FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants. The diverse array of participants illustrated in this analysis shows that our sample provided us with a wide range of information to be used as focus group data. Specifically Table 13 shows the mean, median and mode of age, total years worked in law enforcement, and total years worked for APD. The mean age of focus group participants was 34.9 and the mean years of total service was 10.1. According to the 2014 APD Annual Report, the average age of sworn officers was 38 and the average years of service was 11.8. The comparable numbers show our sample was representative of APD. The mean, median and mode for the IB/SSB focus group participants were higher than the FSB, showing that overall they had more law enforcement experience.

<b>Table 13. Age and Years of Service: Mean, Median, Mode</b>			
	<b>Age</b>	<b>Years Worked in Law Enforcement</b>	<b>Years Worked for APD</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>			
Mean	34.9	10.1	8.8
Median	33	7	7
Mode	30	7	7
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>			
Mean	36.4	11.4	11.4
Median	35	11	11
Mode	42	12	9

Tables 14 and 15 show the breakdown of gender and ethnicity for the FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants. The large majority of focus group attendees were male (84.7% for FSB and 78.9% for IB/SSB) and 15.3% (FSB) and 21.1% (IB/SSB) were female. This is comparable to the 2014 APD Annual Report count of 13% female and 87% male. The FSB focus group analysis of ethnicity was 59.3% Caucasian, 33.9% Hispanic, 3.4% African American, 1.7% Native American and 1.7% Asian. The IB/SSB focus group analysis was 47.4% Caucasian, 36.8% Hispanic, 2.6% African American, 5.3% Native American, and 7.9% Asian. These numbers are comparable to the 2014 APD Annual Report count of 55% Caucasian, 37% Hispanic, 3% African American, 1% Native American, and 0.4% Asian.

<b>Table 14. Gender</b>		
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
Female	9	15.3
Male	50	84.7
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
Female	8	21.1
Male	30	78.9

<b>Table 15. Ethnicity</b>		
<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
African American	2	3.4
Asian American, Pacific Islander	1	1.7
Caucasian (White)	35	59.3
Latino/a (Latin American) or Hispanic	20	33.9
Native American or American Indian	1	1.7
Total	59	100
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
African American	1	2.6
Asian American, Pacific Islander	3	7.9
Caucasian (White)	18	47.4
Latino/a (Latin American) or Hispanic	14	36.8
Native American or American Indian	2	5.3
Total	38	100

Table 16 reports the education levels of the APD FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants. The majority of field officer focus group participants either completed college (i.e., B.A. or B.S. degree) (39%) or some college (52.5%). The majority of IB/SSB focus group participants also either completed college (36.8%) or some college (44.7%). There was a higher percent of IB/SSB focus group participants with a Master's degree (7.9%).

<b>Table 16. Education</b>		
<b>Education</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
Completed College	23	39
High School diploma or equivalent (GED)	2	3.4
Master's degree	2	3.4
Professional degree/doctorate	1	1.7
Some College	31	52.5
<b>Investigative/Special Service Bureau</b>		
Completed College	14	36.8
High School diploma or equivalent (GED)	4	10.5
Master's degree	3	7.9
Professional degree/doctorate	0	0
Some College	17	44.7

Table 17 reports the age of FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants. A quarter of the FSB participants were in the age range 26-30 (25.9%) followed by 36-40 years of age (17.2%) and 31-35 years of age (15.5%). Almost a third of the IB/SSB participants were in the age range 41-49 (31.6%) followed by 31-35 years of age (28.9%) and 26-30 years of age (21.1%).

<b>Table 17. Age</b>		
<b>Age Range</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
22-25	7	12.1
26-30	15	25.9
31-35	9	15.5
36-40	10	17.2
41-49	5	8.6
50-54	5	8.6
55+	7	12.1
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
22-25	1	2.6
26-30	8	21.1
31-35	11	28.9
36-40	5	13.2
41-49	12	31.6
50-54	0	0
55+	1	2.6

Table 18 reports the total years in the law enforcement field of FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants. The majority of FSB focus group participants had been in the law enforcement field for 6-10 years (42.4%). This was followed by 1-5 years (25.4%). The majority of IB/SSB focus group participants had been in the law enforcement field for either 6-10 years or 11-15 years (both 34.2%).

<b>Table 18. Years in Law Enforcement</b>		
<b>Total Years in Law Enforcement field</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
1-5	15	25.4
6-10	25	42.4
11-15	9	15.3
16-20	2	3.4
20+	8	13.5
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
1-5	5	13.2
6-10	13	34.2
11-15	13	34.2
16-20	6	15.8
20+	3	7.9

Table 19 reports total years worked for APD of FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants. Similar to the total years in law enforcement information, the majority of FSB focus group participants had worked for APD for 6-10 years (50.8%), followed by 1-5 years (25.4%). Also similar to the total years in law enforcement for IB/SSB, the majority of focus group participants has worked for APD for 6-10 years (42.1%), followed by 11-15 years (36.8%).

<b>Table 19. Years Worked for APD</b>		
<b>Total Years worked for APD</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
1-5	15	25.4
6-10	30	50.8
11-15	7	11.9
16-20	2	3.4
21+	5	8.5
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
1-5	2	5.3
6-10	16	42.1
11-15	14	36.8
16-20	3	7.9
21+	0	0

Table 20 shows the FSB focus group participants categorized by the area command to which they were assigned. The city is separated into 6 different area commands; Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest, Valley, and Foothills. All field officers, sergeants, and lieutenants were part of Teams 1-9. Teams 1-9 signify the shift they work, Teams 1-3 are day shift, Teams 4-6 are swing shift, and Tams 7-9 are graveyard shift. Each area command has 9 teams. There was 1 officer from the DWI Unit who attended a focus group and there was 1 Field Investigator who attended a focus group. Field Investigators are dispatched to crime scenes to



take evidence (i.e. fingerprints, DNA, pictures, etc.). They are called for felony cases and resisting arrest cases. One officer who until recently had been in the field and who at the time of the focus groups worked in the Chief’s Office attended a focus group. The breakdown across area commands was relatively balanced, with the highest represented area command being the Northeast (20.3%) and the Southeast (20.3%). Northwest, Southwest, and Foothills area commands each made up 13.6% of the focus group participants, followed by Valley (11.9%).

<b>Area Command</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Northeast	12	20.3
Northwest	8	13.6
Southeast	12	20.3
Southwest	8	13.6
Valley	7	11.9
Foothills	8	13.6
DWI Unit	1	1.7
Field Investigator	1	1.7
Chief's Office	1	1.7

Table 21 shows the IB/SSB focus group participants categorized by the unit to which they were assigned to. The Investigative Bureau is separated into 3 different Divisions; the Special Investigations Division (SID), Criminal Investigations Division (CID), and Scientific Evidence Division (SED). We recruited from the SID and CID. The SID is composed of the Gang Unit, Narcotics Unit, Criminal Intelligence Unit, Vice Unit and Air Support Unit. The CID contains the Violent Crimes Section and the Property Crimes Section. The Violent Crimes Section is composed of the Sex Crimes Unit, Armed Robbery Unit, Homicide Unit, Domestic Violence Unit, Crimes Against Children Unit, Family Abuse and Stalking Team, Missing Persons Detail, Cold Case Homicide Detail, and Crisis Negotiation/Crisis Intervention Team. The Property Crimes Section is composed if the White Collar Crimes Unit, Crime Stoppers Detail, Auto Theft Unit, Burglary Unit, Pawn Shop Detail, Metal Theft Detail, Organized Crime Unit, Night Detectives, and Wrecker Services Unit.

<b>Focus Group</b>	<b>Unit</b>	<b>Count</b>
IB Sergeants & SSB SOD	IB Sergeants	5
	SSB SOD K9	2
	SSB SOD SWAT	2
Special Investigations Division	Gangs	2
	Criminal Intelligence	2
	Vice	2
	Narcotics	3
	Air Support	1
Violent Crimes	Sex Crimes	2
	Homicide	2
	Domestic Violence	1
	Crimes Against Children	1
	Armed Robbery	2
Property Crimes	Auto Theft	5
	White Collar	3
	Night Detectives	2
	Organized Crimes	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>38</b>

Table 22 shows the FSB and IB/SSB focus group participants categorized by the shift to which they were assigned. The highest represented shift participating in the FSB focus groups was swing shift (42.4%), followed by graveyard shift (32.2%) and day shift (25.4%). The highest represented shift participating in the IB/SSB focus groups was day shift (71.7%), followed by graveyard shift (18.4%) and swing shift (10.5%).

<b>Shift Assigned</b>	<b>Focus Group Participants</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Field Service Bureau</b>		
Day	15	25.4
Swing	25	42.4
Graveyard	19	32.2
<b>Investigative/Special Services Bureau</b>		
Day	27	71.1
Swing	4	10.5
Graveyard	7	18.4

## ANALYSIS and DISCUSSION

First, this section includes a review of the official data and second, a review of the focus group data. The official data includes on body camera system data, calls for service data, and officer characteristics. The focus group section analyzes and reports data from the 8 officer, 2 sergeant, and 1 lieutenant focus groups.

### Official Data


The following analysis only utilizes data from 2014 because as reported earlier the Taser camera system was not fully deployed with FSB patrol officers until January 2014 and with other designated officers until the end of January 2014. We start by profiling the 2014 Taser videos that were uploaded to EVIDENCE.com™ to get a sense of how much video has been collected. We then provide information about the types of APD-individual interactions that are videoed. Finally, we explore the officer characteristics that are related to whether or not there was video during the officer's calls for service.

### Video Information

There were 573,199 Taser videos uploaded to EVIDENCE.com™ in 2014. During the same year there were 723,172 calls for service. Figure 1 shows the large majority of videos were less than twenty minutes long and slightly more than five percent were thirty minutes long. The median duration was 5.44 minutes and the mean was 8.61 minutes long. A total of 684 individuals uploaded at least one video in 2014. In this study we were not able to differentiate officer types. Our review is not limited to FSB and SSB officers but includes any officer in 2014 that had at least one video. This includes officers, who may have been active or employed for some part of 2014 and officers who were issued a camera system sometime in 2014.

Table 23 shows that on average, each officer videoed a total of 52 minutes (median = 42) of video during each day of their shift. Furthermore, they videoed 6 videos (median = 5), for an average of 8.9 minutes for each video during each day. Officers uploaded a large number of videos to the servers in 2014. Next we connected the video to the calls for service data to understand if interactions between APD and individuals were being videoed according to policy.

Figure 1 Histogram of Duration of Videos in Minutes



**Table 23. Descriptive Statistics for Total Video, Total Number of Videos, and Average Video Minutes per Date**

	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Total Video per Date (Minutes)	52.0	42.1	0	733.6
Total Number of Videos per Date	6.1	5	1	51
Average Video Minutes per Date	8.9	8.2	0.1	41.1

### Call for Service Characteristics

The matching methodology matched calls for service for a single officer to video by that same officer.<sup>3</sup> However, during any given call for service, there may be multiple officers present, each of which has a corresponding call for service and potentially may or may not video the call for service. The January 2013 policy states, it is the responsibility of the primary officer to video the entire call for service, while a secondary officer should record if separated from the primary officer. With the change in policy, and since our interest is in whether or not calls for service are videoed, we examined whether or not any one officer on scene videoed a call for service. We found that 62.9% of the 384,573 calls for service in 2014 had video during the duration of the call

<sup>3</sup> For the following analyses we delete all officer calls with officers who did not have any video matched.

using the method describe earlier. We utilize cross-tabulations and chi-square tests to assess if there was a relationship between the incident’s characteristics and whether or not there was video.

Tables 24-27 displays the results for the number of officers on scene, call priority, call description, call type, and call location. Each of the tables shows the percentage of calls for service with no video, the percentage with video, and the total number of calls for service across the officer characteristics.

We began by examining the percent of video by the number of officers on scene. Table 24 shows that calls for service with only one officer (51.6%) were the least likely to be matched to a video. Calls for service with three or more officers (85.3%) were more likely than those with only two officers (74.3%) to be videoed.

	<b>1 Officer</b>	<b>2 Officers</b>	<b>3 or More Officers</b>
Video	51.6%	74.3%	85.3%
No Video	48.4%	25.7%	14.7%
Total Calls for service	219,826	153,397	21,243

In Table 25, we found evidence that officers were more likely to turn on their cameras during the highest priority calls for service compared to lower priority calls for service. Specifically, we found 75.6% of priority 1 calls for service had video within the duration on scene, 63.7% for priority 2, and 52.4% for priority 3. APD prioritizes calls on three main levels. A priority 1 call is a felony that is in progress or there is an immediate threat to life or property. A priority 2 call is where there is no immediate threat to life of property. Misdemeanor crimes in progress are priority 2 calls. A priority 3 is any call in which a crime has already occurred with no suspects at or near the scene. Also routine events and calls where there is no threat to life or property are priority 3 calls (Cathey & Guerin, 2009).

Officers were statistically more likely to video calls that had a higher priority level. This is an important finding. The chi-square tests most often displayed statistically significant differences without substantive differences because the data contains so many observations. This statistical "power" is due to the large number of calls means that our standard errors are smaller, such that any difference is found to be statistically significant.

	<b>Priority 1</b>	<b>Priority 2</b>	<b>Priority 3</b>
Video	75.6%	63.7%	52.4%
No Video	24.4%	36.3%	47.6%
Total Calls for service	66,016	208,441	120,009

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

Table 26 shows our attempt to code the call types based on whether the call for service should be videoed based on discussions with APD (meetings and focus groups) (See Appendix F). This measure ranges from one to three with one being the most likely to be videoed and three the least likely. The categorization was broadly created by combining calls by whether they were violent or not, the likelihood of the call including contact with a citizen, and the likelihood the call might result in a citizen complaint. Category 1 was most likely to be violent, include contact with a citizen, and result in a citizen complaint and category 3 was least like to contain the three components. Importantly, for this review we were unable to distinguish whether specific calls for service contained a citizen contact. This is important because officers are not required to video calls for service where contact with a citizen does not occur. Call types in category 1 included armed robbery, drunk driver, loud party, suicide, and mental patient. Call types in category 2 included animal, narcotics, and vandalism. Call types in category 3 included audible alarm, escort, and periodic-watch. We found that calls in category 1 (67.6%) were more likely to be videoed than those in category 2 (57.4%), and category 3 (33.1%).

	<b>Category 1</b>	<b>Category 2</b>	<b>Category 3</b>
Video	67.6%	57.4%	33.1%
No Video	32.4%	42.6%	66.9%
Total Calls for service	307,010	37,313	50,141

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

Table 27 displays the percentage of calls for service with video by area command. The number of calls with matched video differed by area commands, there was 11 percentage points between the area command with the highest rate of video in the call period (Foothills Area Command) and the lowest (Northwest). We found the Foothills area (67.8%) displayed the highest percentage, while the Northwest area (56.8%) displayed the lowest percentage. Further analyses focused on the type of calls by area command may provide additional information regarding these differences.

	<b>Southwest</b>	<b>Valley</b>	<b>Southeast</b>	<b>Northeast</b>	<b>Foothills</b>	<b>Northwest</b>
Video	66.5%	61.3%	64.5%	60.9%	67.8%	56.8%
No Video	33.5%	38.7%	35.5%	39.1%	32.2%	43.2%
Total Calls for service	45,179	66,782	90,600	79,480	53,139	49,393

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

Finally, we examined the percent of calls for service with video across different types of calls. We recoded the final call type (CALL\_TYPE\_F) variable in the CFS data into ten mutually

exclusive categories (See Appendix F). Table 28 presents the percent of call types with video within the CFS, the percent with video during the call for service for each type of call, the number of calls for service with video, the percent of calls for service, and the total number of calls for service. We found weapons calls for service (34.5%) displayed the lowest percent and violent calls for service (83.2%) had the highest percent with video. This finding matches with Table 25 that reports video and calls for service by call priority level with some added detail.

The public order call type accounted for 48.9% of all calls for service, traffic calls accounted for 21.3% of all calls, and other calls accounted for 13.7% of all calls. Together these calls accounted for 83.9% of all calls. The other call type accounted for the third highest percent of calls (13.7%) and the second lowest percent of calls matched with video (45.2%).

**Table 28. Percent and Number of Calls for service with Video and Percent and Total Number of Calls for service by Call Types**

Call Type	Percent of Calls for service with Video	Number of Calls for service with Video	Percent of Calls for service	Total Number of Calls for service
Auto Theft	70.2%	3,954	1.4%	5,630
DWI	69.5%	787	0.3%	1,133
Drugs	61.7%	451	0.2%	731
Other*	45.2%	24,388	13.7%	53,998
Property	73.2%	22,267	7.7%	30,434
Public Order	61.0%	117,723	48.9%	192,911
Sex	64.1%	752	0.3%	1,174
Traffic	66.9%	56,118	21.3%	83,942
Violent	83.2%	18,210	5.6%	21,885
Weapons	34.5%	905	0.7%	2,626
Total	62.3%	245,555	100.0%	394,464

\* Note: Other category includes call types “Acc wo/inj BOLO”, “DOA”, “Escort”, “Field Investigat”, “Missing person”, “Prisoner PU/Incu”, “Rescue call”, “SWAT”, “Subject Stop”, etc.

### Officer Characteristics

We utilize cross-tabulations and chi-square tests to assess the relationship between the officer’s characteristics and whether or not there was a video within the call duration. Tables 29 - 32 display the results for gender, race, rank, and years of service. Each of the tables shows the percentage of calls with no video, the percentage with video within the call duration, and the number of calls across the officer characteristics.

Table 29 shows that male officers (56.6%) were slightly more likely than female officers (53.9%) to have video within the call time frame.

<b>Table 29. Whether or Not there was Video in the Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes) by Officer Gender</b>		
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	56.6%	53.9%
No Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	43.4%	46.1%
Calls	578,748	74,136

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

Table 30 shows that Hispanic officers (55.3%) were the least likely to have video within the call, that non-Hispanic, non-white officers (56.6%) were the most likely (Asian, Black, Indian, etc.), and White officers (55.4%) were in between the two. While these differences are statistically significant they are not substantive differences.

<b>Table 30. Whether or Not there was Video in the Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes) by Officer Race</b>			
	<b>Other</b>	<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>White</b>
Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	56.6%	55.3%	55.4%
No Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	43.4%	44.7%	44.6%
Calls	43,013	258,044	303,286

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

Table 31 provides evidence that patrol officers (57.3%) were the most likely officer rank to have video within their calls for service. Sergeants (47.0%) were more likely than lieutenants (42.6%) to have video within their calls. Other officer (21.8%) ranks were much less likely to have video.

<b>Table 31. Whether or Not there was Video in the Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes) by Officer Rank</b>				
	<b>Lieutenant</b>	<b>Sergeant</b>	<b>Patrol Officer</b>	<b>Other*</b>
Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	42.6%	47.0%	57.3%	21.8%
No Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	57.4%	53.0%	42.7%	72.2%
Calls	2,925	33,564	609,384	7,011

\* The majority of Other Officer ranks are PSA officers (1,895) and TELOP2 (308)

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

Table 32 provides evidence that officers with fewer years of service were more likely to have video within their calls for service compared to those longer serving officers. Specifically, officers with 2-4.9 years of experience (64.3%) were the most likely to have video, while those with 15 years or more of service (47.3%) were the least likely to have video.



	<b>0-1.9 Years</b>	<b>2-4.9 Years</b>	<b>5-6.9 Years</b>	<b>7-9.9 Years</b>	<b>10-14.9 Years</b>	<b>15+ Years</b>
Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	55.8%	64.3%	61.2%	53.7%	52.3%	47.3%
No Video in Call Period (+/- 5 Minutes)	44.2%	35.7%	38.8%	46.3%	47.7%	52.7%
Calls	40,840	104,170	166,249	138,119	165,170	74,713

Note: Chi-square p-value=0.0001

A chi-square test provides a statistical examination of the relationship in the cross-tabulation. If the chi-square p-value is below 0.05, we are able to state with 95% confidence that the observed difference does not occur by chance. Simply, the differences across groups are statistically different if the p-value is below 0.05. All of the cross-tabulations in tables 26-30 were statistically significant.

This review includes all officers with at least one video and who have calls for service. It might have been useful to differentiate camera use by type of user. This includes FSB patrol officers, FSB sergeants, and officers from other bureaus (i.e. Special Services Bureau) and units (i.e. Traffic, DWI, Open Space, SWAT, etc.).

It is also important to remember once again that without unique identifiers to link the calls for service to the video, there is some error in our matching. We also have no way to adequately identify which calls for service did not contain a citizen contact. Currently we don't know the amount of error and we don't have a method to estimate the amount of error. However, we are able to examine the characteristics correlated with whether or not there is video during a call. We found no evidence of differences in video rates across gender or race. However, there were large differences in video rates for both years of service and rank. The finding dealing with difference by rank may not be unusual considering the primary job duties. Furthermore, we found higher priority calls were more likely to be videoed compared to lower priority calls.

These results lead to several conclusions. First, APD must develop a way to link the video data with the calls for service data. This will allow APD to track and monitor the use of OBCS and audit a policy. Because we could not precisely match video to calls for service our analysis is exploratory. Second, and related to the first finding, APD must be able to more clearly differentiate between call types and calls which are dispatched and non-dispatched as well as distinguish which calls include citizen contact. Third, and unsurprisingly, this review finds officers are not video-taping all calls for service. Because of the method we had to use to match video to calls for services we cannot precisely link video to calls for service. As part of any new policy there should be an ongoing review by an independent group. Fourth, we believe the current

policy is confusing and officers do not completely understand the policy. This finding is supported by our review of the official data and our review of the focus group data, which is discussed next. Fifth, the official data point out there was few differences among officers in terms of demographics and how they use their video cameras. There were differences by years of service with officers with fewer years being more likely to have videos connected to their calls. Also, unsurprisingly, we found patrol officers were more likely to have video compared to sergeants and lieutenants.

## Focus Group Analysis

This section addresses the use of lapel cameras and includes the types of calls that should and should not be recorded and the individuals who should and should not be recorded. Additionally, the section addresses identified factors that influence how lapel cameras are used, including technology and fear of reprimand.

This section includes two parts. First we include a review of the focus groups with FSB sworn officers and sergeants. This is done because our primary focus is on FSB officers and sergeants who are the principal users of the Taser on-body camera system. FSB sworn staff accounts for the largest number of users and they constitute the largest volume of contacts with citizens and calls for service. They were also the majority of the focus group participants and they use the camera system differently than the majority of the participants in the second section. Second, we include a smaller section that includes a review of the focus groups with sworn detectives from the Investigative Bureau. We were only able to recruit 4 sworn officers from the Special Operations Division (i.e. SWAT and K-9) unit in the SSB and we were unable to recruit any officers from the Metro Traffic Division (i.e. DWI/Traffic) or Open Space Division. For this reason we include comments by the SSB in the section with the Investigative Bureau representatives.

## General Findings in the Field Services Bureau

This section provides general findings from the focus groups conducted with FSB patrol officers, sergeants and lieutenants. Following this section we provide more detailed findings in relation to how officers currently use the on body camera systems, their views on the current policy and any future policy, and how a policy should be monitored for compliance. The focus groups were designed specifically to respond to these goals. In addition to responding to these goals this section generally describes a number of other important findings that are beyond the scope of our current contract. Because these findings are beyond the scope of our current contract

we do not further explore or describe them in the detailed findings section of the report. This includes training, technology, current use and release of video, impact on the court system, and overall morale. We believe many of these findings deserve further study and we include this information in the discussion and recommendations section of the report.

Many of the categories included in this section and more completely described in the next section are not mutually exclusive and are related to each other. We believe there are important distinctions in the categories and we describe these differences in this section as well as the connections.

### ***Camera Systems***

Without exception participants whether they were patrol officers, sergeants, or lieutenants recognized that on body camera systems have become a regular piece of their police equipment. Further they generally understood that the use of on body camera systems is rapidly expanding and is becoming the norm in many police departments.

### ***Use of Camera Systems***

Related to camera systems participants also noted in general they support the use of a camera system. This support varied among officers and the support was often tempered by a large variety of concerns. In general, these concerns included reliability of the technology, how the video is released to and used by the media, how the video is used by the local court system, the current policy, privacy concerns, and the current situation in the department regarding the settlement agreement with the federal Department of Justice and morale. This is a complicated situation, which is discussed in more detail in the next section. Some of the factors impacting the use of the camera system articulated by participants, such as the release of the video to the media and how the video is used in the court system are beyond the intent of this study. Some of these factors deserve further study.

### ***Current Camera System Use***

There was variation in how officers noted they use their camera systems. This includes the type of calls and situations in which they use their systems, when they turn on and turn off their camera systems during calls/situations, and what they video record. Despite this variation, there was general agreement that certain types of calls and situations should be routinely recorded. There was variation among other calls for service and situations. This detail will be further discussed in the next section on mandatory and discretionary camera use.

### ***Mandatory versus Discretionary Camera Use***

Participants almost unanimously, whether they were patrol officers, sergeants or lieutenants noted a policy should include mandatory aspects and discretionary aspects. Mandatory aspects centered on types of calls and situations. This included traffic calls, use of force situations, contacts that might lead to an arrest, warrant situations, violent crimes, and domestic disputes. Discretionary aspects were more complicated and nuanced. Discretionary aspects not only included types of calls and situations (i.e. alarm call, commercial burglaries, and residential burglaries where the citizen is the only contact), but ideas that within mandatory calls and situations officers should have the discretion to stop and start recording depending on circumstances. As an example, participants noted they should have the discretion to discontinue recording when they are conducting an investigation during the course of the recording.

### ***Potential Privacy Issues***

Related to other findings, participants also generally noted privacy issues regarding the use of camera systems. This includes places where there may be a greater expectation of privacy such as a person's home, the recording of juveniles, the recording of situations where there is no crime involved such as welfare checks, and the recording of victims and witnesses.

### ***Current Policy***

Participants noted they did not like the current policy for a variety of reasons. These reasons centered on the lack of discretion, the broadness of the current policy, and how the policy is currently monitored.

### ***Future Policy***

Many of the thoughts concerning any future policy were connected to the participant's thoughts and ideas regarding the current policy. In every focus group participants mentioned the previous APD belt tape/digital policy. This policy generally listed types of calls, contacts and situations (i.e. resisting arrest, disorderly conduct arrests, refusing to obey an officer arrests, search warrants, domestic violence calls, and contacts where there is reason to believe a complaint could result). Participants also suggested any future policy should cover the release of video, the use of video both in the department and outside of the department (i.e., the media and the courts), the technology, training on the equipment, and monitoring the policy.

### ***Monitoring a Policy***

This was an important part of the focus groups and participants had strong opinions. Participants discussed the different components that constitute policy monitoring. This included reviewing camera footage on a regularly scheduled basis, and as needed in the case of a citizen

complaint. It was suggested that reviewing camera footage be used as not only a way to monitor officer performance, but also to monitor policy efficiency. Participants suggested that minor acts of misconduct not be the focus when reviewing footage, such as occasional vulgar language, especially when the act is unrelated to the reason for review. Participants also suggested that identifying the cause of recurring problems through reviewing camera footage could allow for proactive solutions, such as refresher trainings.

### **Training**

We heard in the focus groups about a specific need for training on the camera system. Participants expressed that training would be useful and currently there is a lack of training. Training focuses on how to use the equipment and could include regular on-going training. Related to the training was a general concern related to how the video is used currently by the department to discipline officers and ideas focused on using the video to help train officers in proper policy and procedures.

### **Technology**

Generally participants agreed there are a variety of problems with the technology regarding the camera systems. This included upload times from the cameras to the cloud based website. According to participants it is often necessary to upload video during their off hours from their homes using their personal internet connections. Participants noted the equipment sometimes malfunctions or breaks. This included cord connections, on/off switches, the cameras, and battery packs. Participants noted there is limited access to spare parts.

### **Current Use and Release of Video**

While beyond the goals of this study we specifically asked about how the video is currently used and released and how the video should be released and used. The release of video to the media was a large concern of participants. Participants noted video is released too quickly and readily to the media and there should be limitations imposed. Suggestions included not releasing video while a court case was active. The New Mexico Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) was also mentioned often in relation to how participants perceived this impacts the release of video to the media, lawyers involved in court cases, and the general public. How this impacts the use of camera systems was often part of the discussion as well with some participants noting there was no impact on the use of the camera systems and other participants saying there was an impact on the use of the camera systems.

### **Impact on the Court System**

Focus group participants discussed the impact on the court system of camera systems. The discussion included how the lack of video can lead to dismissal of cases, how this impacts officers and morale, whether the lack of video should result in the dismissal of cases, and reasons for the lack of video.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report we were unable to conduct focus groups with Assistant District Attorneys of the Second Judicial District Attorney's Office to gain their perspective on this topic.

### **Detailed Findings**

#### **Current Camera System Use**

When discussing how participants currently used their body worn cameras, several things became apparent. First, participants agreed they recorded the majority of their calls. This included dispatched calls for services and self-initiated contacts. Participants also agreed that sometimes their camera systems malfunction or break. Second, participants described the process of responding to dispatched calls, the procedures they follow in terms of recording the call and the factors they take into consideration as they record. In doing so, participants identified factors that influence their use of camera systems.

This included various aspects of the equipment and program software functionality and inconsistencies regarding the implementation and monitoring of camera use. As these focus group participants explained:

*“Male participant: Me, personally, I don't care, I'll run my camera on every call because, like he was just saying about our integrity, our word is not good enough anymore, so in order to cover myself and to make sure that I have a job until retirement, then I'll run it on every call every time.”*

*Male participant: Most officers I talk to don't have a problem. If they [Admin] say turn it on every call, [I will] as long as it's working.”*

While issues regarding technology and equipment are outside the scope of this research study, it is important to briefly acknowledge because of its relation to and impact on camera use procedures.

Participants described the current system compared to the previous system and the different systems used in the department, specifically field officers versus specialized units. They also described differences by area command and shift. In brief, almost all participants reported using the Taser camera. A few participants reported currently using the Scorpion system.

A few participants noted they had more time to consider when to turn on their camera when dispatched to a call compared to self-initiated calls. Participants also noted during stressful situations and dangerous calls they don't always remember to turn on their cameras or they delay turning on their cameras. It was not an issue of attempting to subvert the policy. As one participant described:

*"...If you're enroute to an armed robbery call and you're a mile away, you have time to put [the camera] on in your car, which I do, but sometimes when somebody comes up to you or you get information and you're rolling down the street, that's not practical because you're concentrating on other things and a lot of people say well what's so hard about turning it on? When somebody's saying hey that person over there has a gun, you're focused on that and that's the priority and it's a dangerous situation, not to be focused on that, you're kind of silly. So to be messing with that camera is just, there has to be some kind of mechanism to cover spontaneity."*

In particular, a number of participants, in various focus groups, cited the example of a newer and younger officer who when confronted with a suspect with a knife kept backing away from the suspect while trying to start his camera rather than drawing his weapon. Participants cited this as an example of an officer who put his own life in danger because the officer was too concerned with following the camera policy.

A few participants noted they take certain extra precautions when working the graveyard shift. One participant raised the point that at night, the camera light blinks green, because of this; the officer may be in more danger at nighttime because they provide a visual target. In particular swing and graveyard shifts also pose issues for officers who experience equipment failures and require a replacement, because property is only open Monday through Friday during the day. In such instances, graveyard participants noted that they had to wait until the end of their shift, at 7:30a.m. the next day, to report the equipment malfunction and receive new equipment. One participant explained:

*"I'll say this, we're required to make sure that our vehicles are maintained, so we have to get our vehicles serviced, you have to make sure your weapon is maintained, you have to clean it. So somebody should make sure that our cameras, they should be checked once a month or twice a month or whatever to make sure that there's no malfunctions with the camera and it's working properly..."*

One participant emphasized the importance of over-documenting any malfunctions or possible discrepancies in video footage, citing two specific examples. The participant explained when a technology or equipment malfunction occurs, they immediately advise over the air their

camera is 10-7, meaning it is not working. The participant also added that some officers announce the camera is being turned off when speaking to another office in order to avoid any problems.

Additionally, participants expressed frustration with the procedures for charging the Taser camera battery and length of time required for uploading data. Many explained wanting to comply with the policy to record everything, but noted the equipment limitations made that unrealistic.

First, participants explained the battery did not always hold a sufficient charge to record continuously during a shift. If their camera battery dies, they have the ability to charge the battery from their vehicles. Participants noted previous experiences in which they didn't record a citizen contact because they received a dispatch call while in the process of charging their video camera battery. Participants agreed they were unable to disconnect and reactivate the camera system in time to record the citizen encounter. Participants noted the alternative option was to use the video camera on a discretionary basis, in order to preserve the camera battery.

Second, participants described uploading and downloading their video recordings as time consuming. Many participants discussed having to upload data from home on their personal time. Specifically, participants noted the modem of the CF31 computer model was better than that of the CF30; however, both were painfully slow.

Participants also noted that like their vehicle and weapons, it is their responsibility to maintain the camera system equipment and make sure it is in working order. Like their monthly vehicle service, participants expressed interest in having regularly scheduled maintenance for their camera systems.

Another concern raised by participants was video recording within controlled environments, like the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) and the Prisoner Transport Center (PTC), where installed video cameras were already recording everything. Participants also noted different uses when in other types of situations like when they have to take someone to the hospital or in the home of a citizen.

Participants also voiced concerns about videotaping juveniles, the mentally ill, suicidal individuals, deceased individuals, when it was not part of a crime, i.e., an elderly person who died of natural causes in their home, and individuals in their homes when there was no crime involved. In addition to discussing participants' commonalities, it is equally important to make note of the unique comments' and ideas shared—this will be included throughout the remainder of the topic sections.



## Policy

### *Mandatory versus Discretionary*

Participants provided different experiences, perspectives and input in regards to what should and should not be recorded. Almost unanimously participants agreed a new policy should consist of both mandatory and discretionary aspects. One focus group participant stated:

*“I think recording every contact, unrealistic. I think it’s a bad policy. But to have a clearly defined set of call types or incidents where going in you need to have your video running, and that expectation has been set, that’s fine. And then everything else I’ll use my discretion and I’ll make my best effort like some instances will just materialize instantly like that. If I need to turn it on ... I gotta deal with the situation at hand first.”*


Focus group members noted both mandatory and discretionary aspects must be outlined very clearly in the new policy, and mandatory and discretionary parts of the policy should include specific examples.

Participants discussed previously implemented policies—specifying what worked and what did not work in various situations. Specifically, the belt tape policy was brought up numerous times. Participants described that it was ideal for two specific reasons—First, participants believed the policy regarding the mandatory aspects of what must be recorded was clearer, providing specific calls and situations that should be recorded and those that should be discretionary.

Second, participants thought the policy was fair, realistic, and accounted for ethical considerations, such as citizen privacy and the privacy of officers. Previously, mandated belt tape recording included resisting arrest, disorderly conduct arrests, refusing to obey an officer arrests, from the start of a search warrant until the area is secure (as outlined in subsection 2-16-2 B), contacts where there is reason to believe a complaint could result, domestic violence calls for court purposes, all calls involving suspected suicidal and/or suicidal individuals, when a citizen refuses to sign a traffic citation, when officers seek verbal/written permission to search a residence, building, structure, or vehicles, and child custody disputes.

Figure 2 provided below displays the complex and intertwined issues participants addressed. The visual diagram is based upon actual qualitative data used from the focus groups. It represents a policy with mandatory and discretionary aspects related to video recording.

Figure 2 Issues Addressed by Participants



Discretionary recording aspects most commonly relate to calls involving juveniles, victims, calls where initially there is no individual involved, and contacts with citizens unrelated to a call. In order to protect the vulnerable, calls involving juveniles and/or victims should be recorded at the officers’ discretion in situations that are not mandatory. This is discussed in more detail in the potential privacy issues section.

Many participants noted it is problematic to require officers to video calls that are likely to result in a citizen complaint. They explained that the phrase ‘likely to result,’ allowed for interpretation by each officer, making the requirement discretionary and difficult to monitor and enforce. Opinions to this were somewhat mixed, some officers suggested the language should be removed. Others suggested the need to provide examples in the policy of calls that are likely to result in a citizen complaint. Participants noted almost any citizen call can result in a citizen complaint and this is why the policy has to have discretionary components. Participants did note they use their cameras when they have a call they believe could result in a citizen complaint. A few participants provided no alternative, and explained that was precisely why the policy should be entirely discretionary.

Participants also noted they were commonly approached by citizens on the street, in restaurants, gas stations, or other public areas. Sometimes citizens were simply asking for

directions, they wanted to say hello, or they just wanted to engage in casual conversation. Participants suggested that it was unnecessary to video such contacts. Moreover, several participants expressed they would be more willing to engage in conversation and interaction with citizens on a casual day-to-day basis, if they were not concerned about their camera battery dying, or the length of time it would require to download the video. A focus group participant suggested:

*“...can we make a positive PR bucket where sergeants could take something that their guys did out on a call and throw into that positive PR bucket and one of the PIOs could go through those and watch it in its entirety, have it approved through one of the deputy chiefs and give it to the news media...”*

In contrast, mandatory aspects in Figure 2 show clearly defined types of call that should or should not be video recorded. Calls that should be video recorded include; encounters with suspects, bystanders, witnesses, and citizen informants; calls related to traffic stops, DWI situations, domestic violence calls, and prisoner transport events. Calls that should not be recorded include; ones involving police dialogue, either in regards to tactics or personal concerns, and within controlled environments that have installed video cameras, such as the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC).

In addition to discussing the types of encounters that should be recorded and should not be recorded, participants also discussed the individuals within such encounters that should and should not be recorded. There was mutual agreement across focus groups that suspects and individuals under arrest should be recorded. Furthermore, participants specified they record any contacts in which a citizen is not allowed to freely leave, whether or not they have decided upon arrest. Participant responses were more mixed regarding video recording for a prisoner transport.

Several participants described various situations where they benefitted from video recording during a prisoner transport. For example, one participant recounted an experience where a person had a seizure while in the officers' backseat. The arrested citizen later accused the officer of endangerment, stating they had not received help putting on their seatbelt. After reviewing the video camera footage, it became clear that the citizen was lying and the officer was cleared.

There was mutual agreement that officers should be able to use their best discretion when gathering information from witnesses and citizen informants. Participants noted that citizens commonly react in two ways upon realizing they are being video recorded. Many times citizens who are providing a witness statement or information do not want to be video recorded. Some participants noted the beeping sound the camera system makes is a distraction to citizens. In such situations, participants describe the camera system as a hindrance to their investigations. In the

case that a witness or citizen informant does not mind being video recorded, the video can be very helpful for reviewing later when writing the report, or for use in court. Participants also explained the importance of receiving verbal statements for felony crimes.

In regards to gathering statements, participants explained video or audio recordings were helpful when handwritten statements were difficult to read due to handwriting. Further, one officer advised:

*“I’d say if we had the time to go back and watch our videos, which we really don’t, ... we just, we don’t have the time to sit through a 30 minute video...”*

They reported the court system has been requesting audio and video statements more frequently and appears to be relying less on written reports from APD officers. While beyond the scope of this research, participants were extremely frustrated when their written reports are not accepted as sufficient evidence in court, here is a typical exchange from one focus group:

*Female participant: “That’s my biggest issues with the cameras. I don’t mind doing them on scene or having to turn them on right when I get there to finish, but it’s in court when things are getting [bad], they don’t even trust what we say anymore, if you don’t have your video or something happened with your video, it cut out or whatever, the whole case will get dismissed and there’s been good cases, DWI cases and domestic ones have been dismissed because they somehow can’t find the video. So I think that should be changed in the court system, how they use the videos.*

*Male participant: Yeah they’re, they’re using our policy against us essentially.”*

### **Potential Privacy Issues**

In general, participants described the variety and complexity of citizen encounters and explained that because of this, officers should be allowed to use their judgment guided by their training in discretionary situations. In such instances, officers felt they should not intentionally video record such encounters or events, but if required to record the contact, at least have the discretion to divert the camera or turn off the camera after verbalizing the reason. Participants also agreed it is problematic for officers to be required to record each encounter from start to finish for a host of reasons. This includes personal discussions between officers, discussions with fellow officers and supervisors regarding the investigation of the incident or tactics regarding how to handle the situation, recording victims, witnesses, juveniles, persons in their home, and other places where there may be increased expectation of privacy. Each citizen encounter is different; they must use their training as it applies to the situation.

Participants voiced concern about their personal lack of privacy, as well as their professional lack of privacy. Numerous participants explained there are several times a day

where they record personal things, such as using the restroom, speaking to their spouse on the phone, speaking to other officers (i.e. shop talk and personal matters not related to work), or even singing along to the car radio. Participants noted some situations were less private than others, like singing to the radio. Such instances did not bother the participants, besides being a waste of video storage. The recording of more private situations did bother some participants, for example talking to a fellow officer about personal problems their family had been experiencing. Additionally, participants expressed concern with recording their conversations with fellow officers and supervisors regarding investigations or tactics. They explained such video recordings could become public and compromise an investigation, or provide information to suspects about police tactics. If police tactics were released to the public, procedures they follow might be compromised, endangering the community and the police.

Participants noted when appropriate, witnesses, citizen informants, and victims should either be audio or video recorded when giving statements, first accounts and/or suspect descriptions. Beforehand, officers may inform witnesses, citizen informants, and victims they are video recording. If witnesses, citizen informants, or victims do not consent to being video recorded, the officer may use their discretion to divert the video camera away from the citizen and continue to audio record the statements, first accounts and/or suspect descriptions. Participants described several different situations in which they felt necessitated discretion. First, participants described calls, which required officers to gather victim statements at hospitals or in transport to hospitals. In such instances, the officers described feeling uneasy about recording the victims in such vulnerable states, especially knowing the footage could later be used to re-victimize the victim. Participants also noted past experiences where they had been warned by a doctor or paramedic to stop recording. Many participants echoed concerns that the current policy to record everything conflicts with and violates federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) laws.

Second, participants described situations where they were required to supervise a suspect using the restroom. They noted that was a common occurrence they felt should not be recorded. Several other participants agreed and suggested they have the discretion to divert the camera and/or audio record only.

Third, participants described several different situations where they were required to enter a citizen's home, and felt it inappropriate to video record. One situation included entering a home for a welfare check. Once inside the home, participants realized a teenage female was in the process of exiting the bathroom after showering—she was undressed, screamed, and ran into her bedroom. The participant explained that a mother or father in the process of divorce often

requests those types of welfare checks. Moreover, it is not uncommon for such footage to be requested to show the court when arguing for custody—in such instances, video showing the naked teenage female would be available to the public. Other focus group participants voiced opinions similar to this person:

*“...Nobody’s looking at that aspect of, you know, I took this job to defend the constitution of the United States, not to violate people’s rights by going into their home and doing these things, so I’d like to see a better protection for the people.”*

## Monitoring Policy

### Reviewing Footage

Participants also spoke of the ways in which the policy is currently being monitored. When discussing how the APD currently monitored policy, participants noted they understood their supervisors reviewed the footage—beyond that, they were unsure of the amount of videos reviewed, the frequency of reviewing footage, or how such videos were selected. Despite this, many officers explained they didn’t have a problem with their supervisors reviewing footage.

The most common complaint regarding the review of camera footage was that minor acts of misconduct should not be the focus of review, and disciplinary actions in such instances are not fair or productive. Participants from several different focus groups expressed frustration that unimportant content, or minor acts of misconduct, were so heavily focused on and disciplined. The most common example of a minor act of misconduct was vulgar or derogatory language. On a similar note, participants also discussed previous experiences where their video footage was reviewed due to a citizen complaint and they were disciplined for an unrelated minor act of misconduct, such as not using department issued gloves.

Participants also suggested reviewing camera footage could provide more than just an opportunity for improving officer performance. They noted footage could also be used to improve policy. When reviewing footage, many suggested it is worthwhile to look for recurring issues. For example, if several officers appear to be struggling with similar issues identifying those recurring problems may indicate a refresher course is needed, or policy modifications considered.

Participants who identified as having a supervisory role discussed reviewing footage from their perspective. Participant supervisors discussed several specific situations where they found reviewing video footage very beneficial. One participant supervisor described reviewing footage for quality checks if an officer appears to be struggling with work, or has a sudden change in attitude. The participant explained in such situations, quality checks can be an efficient way to identify, approach and move forward with any issues an officer may be experiencing.

Several participant supervisors also discussed the benefit of reviewing the video footage for new officers. For example as this sergeant explained:

*“... as long as the officers know why we’re using the cameras and it’s not just because we don’t trust you, it’s to help them out, I think if that word is put out there, and you could even use it in the case if somebody violates the policy, instead of this strict discipline policy, educational based discipline would probably be a lot better. I get my officer in and I say you know policy says you’re supposed to turn it on. Review the policy with them, say okay don’t do it again, it should stop there. If it repeats then I need to take it up a little bit and that needs to be put into that policy.”*

As a whole, participant supervisors agreed they did not have enough time to review all video footage. While they agreed on the importance of reviewing footage at their discretion or as needed, they also expressed the need to be in the field supervising their officers. One participant suggested an “administrative sergeant” assigned to review video, paperwork, and other administrative tasks.

Several participants also brought up the ways in which the chain of command has changed with the advent of OBCS. They emphasized the importance of having accessible supervisors and a consistent chain of command. Participants voiced interest in revisiting aspects of the chain of command in order to enhance and solidify procedures.

Additionally, several participants within the focus groups mentioned being able to access and review their video recordings were helpful when completing case reports. Specifically, participants noted this was helpful for DWI cases, or cases that were likely to go to court.

### **Summary of Field Services Bureau Focus Groups**

Overall, officers, sergeants, and lieutenants spent almost an equal amount of time discussing drawbacks and benefits of using the OBCS and the current policy.

Participants expressed concerns with the current policy to record everything was rooted in a much deeper and complex issue of trust and integrity. The requirement to record everything was described as tedious and overkill and in some instances, a hindrance or distraction to other important job responsibilities. Even with those issues, participants agreed they were not necessarily deal breakers—the problem was that those issues existed, on top of the fact that the current policies did not account for camera and technology malfunctions. They explained that because of this, when the inevitable happens and footage is unavailable, their choices, abilities, and integrity were questioned.

On the other hand, many participants shared experiences where they felt the camera system had benefited the officer, the department, and the community. They agreed the cameras’ presence oftentimes improved police and citizen behavior and interactions. Citizens benefit from the cameras because they provide opportunities for transparency and additional accountability. Both essential for building trust between the police and citizens. In turn, officers benefit from the cameras because they can provide a safeguard in bad situations. As one participant responded:

*“A good policy will protect the community, the police department, the police officer...victims...the citizen...”*

Officers, sergeants, and lieutenants discussed the drawbacks and benefits of OBCS. Tables 33-35 provide the percent of time a particular topic was discussed. The percentages were based upon the eight officer focus groups, the sergeant percentages were based upon the two sergeant focus groups, and the lieutenant percentages were based on the lieutenant focus group.

The following percentages show specific areas of interest for the different participants. It is important to keep in mind the data results reflect the difference in the participant group sizes.

Officer participants spent 22% of the focus groups discussing technological procedures and policies. Other areas of concentration regarded their current camera use and policy. The remaining discussion focused on many different sub-topics, personal stories, and examples of situations, only consisting of a few minutes each and therefore only accounted for a small percentage of time, i.e., 1% to 3%.

<b>Table 33. Percent of Time Spent Discussing Topics - Officer Participant, Focus Groups 1-8</b>	
<b>Topic</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Current Camera Use and Policy	22
Technological Procedure and Policy	18
Sub-Total	40
Other Topics	60
Total	100

Sergeant participants spent a large portion of the focus group time discussing how they currently use the camera systems and aspects of monitoring and compliance, specifically reviewing camera footage and discipline.

Similar to the officer participant groups, the remaining discussion focused on many different sub-topics and personal stories and/or examples of situations, only consisting of a few minutes each and therefore only accounting for a small percentage of time, i.e., 1% to 3%.



<b>Topic</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Current Camera Use	10
Monitoring & Compliance Policy	9
Discipline	12
Sub-Total	31
Other Topics	69
Total	100

Lieutenant participants spent 66% of the time discussing types of calls and encounters. Additionally, 31% of their discussion focused on the benefits of the belt-tape policy. The remaining 3% of the time was spent discussing training.

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Type of Encounters to Record	66
Benefits of Belt-Tape Policy	31
Training	3
Total	100

Collectively, participants voiced the desire for clear and fair policies, reliable equipment, and procedures to achieve the department’s expectations. The procedures would provide applicable guidelines to refer to when technology or equipment malfunctions and necessitates equipment replacement. It would also provide an applicable outline to follow when documenting such situations. Furthermore, participants expressed that regular equipment maintenance would be beneficial, as well as more in depth training on equipment and program software. Such training would include the meaning of specific colors flashing on the Taser camera, how to avoid and correct them, and strategies for avoiding camera malfunctions.

### **General Findings in the Investigative Bureau and Special Operations Division**

This section of the focus group analysis reviews input from the Investigative Bureau and Special Operations Division focus group participants. Again it must be noted, only four participants from the Special Operations Division participated in the focus groups thus the input from Special Operations was extremely limited.

In this section we report on the data from our focus groups with the IB staff. The interview categories and questions are the same ones as those discussed with FSB staff.

Specifically, the findings in this section relate to how IB officers currently use the camera systems, discretionary use, privacy issues, training, release of video, their views on the future policy, and how a future policy should be monitored for compliance.

Tables 11 and 12 discussed earlier included the number of possible attendees and participants from IB and Special Operations. We held four focus groups with a total of 34 IB staff, which represented between 18% and 39% of their respective units in IB. Four Special Operations Division staff attended one of the four focus groups. These four staff were from two units (SWAT and K-9) and came from a total eligible sample of 73 sworn officers and sergeants.

### **Camera Systems**

Participants in the IB and Special Operations focus groups like FSB focus group participants realized the camera systems are going to continue to be used by the APD and have become a regular part of their equipment. The use of OBCSs in the Investigative Bureau are currently used in a more limited fashion and were seen as having a more limited use compared to use in the FSB. This is primarily a function of the difference in how IB officers perform their job, their more limited contacts with citizens, and the variety of camera systems they use. The focus group participants reported using several different camera brands and camera types. Most participants reported using Muvi and Scorpion and a few reported using Taser and GoPro systems. In addition to their department issued camera system, a number of officers reported occasionally using their iPhones in surveillance situations. It was not clear if these were City issued or personal iPhones. One participant noted they used a City issued iPhone. Officers noted the iPhones performed better at night when taking pictures and video including in regards to the high quality picture and the ease of use. Two of these users noted the availability of an available application that can be used to upload video to EVIDENCE.com.

### **Current Camera System Use**

There was variation in how officers noted they use their camera systems. The use depended on the unit in which the officer served. For example property detectives reported using their camera systems more frequently than special investigation and violent crime detectives. IB and the four Special Operations Division officers reported not using cameras as frequently as FSB officers.

Most participants noted they use an on-body camera during an operation when they are going to ‘take down someone’ and make an arrest. Others noted they used the cameras while executing a search warrant, and on the occasions when they perform a traffic stop. A participant from the SID focus group said:

*“We’re more of a surveillance unit, so we’re usually watching people, not talking to them. But, when we do conduct field interviews, we’re using the cameras. Different type of cameras, yeah. And then, really, when we’re on surveillance, the only time we turn on the body cameras is if we anticipate getting out and actually contacting people in a law enforcement capacity.”*

### **Mandatory versus Discretionary Camera Use**

The comment made in the previous section regarding the use of cameras moves us forward to the next topic, that is, the mandatory use versus discretionary use of cameras. Due to the nature of their work being predominately linked to surveillance and undercover operations, IB participants felt they should have more discretion than FSB officers in the use of camera. Participants related incidents when they could not continue interviews because another agency, i.e., AFD Rescue, asked the officer to leave since they were video taping. The participants stated they had no discretion and they were required to run video even when it may hamper their job. Participants stated that video cameras are a good tool when utilized at the discretion of the officer and not mandated by policy. As one officer described the situation:

*“I think just kinda what’s been said is certain times to run the camera that are mandatory and other times can be at the discretion of the officer. Anytime we’re gonna make an arrest or we take a takedown, it’ll be recording. Anytime there’s a potential use of force, make it mandatory. Make it more like the belt tape policy. . .”*

Interestingly, several participants noted that since they began using camera systems they are more likely to write a citation for minor violations, like possession of drug paraphernalia or marijuana. Prior to the camera systems participants noted they at times gave warnings for minor infractions and released the individual. Another officer noted he still gives warnings even after there is video of the event. He noted:

*“If it’s giving somebody a verbal warning and not arresting them for a roach, whatever it might be, I’ll go to IA and explain that all day. I have no problems with that. I don’t think it’s gonna happen. I really don’t. I don’t think you’re gonna get in trouble for being nice to somebody.”*

In response, several participants in this focus group noted they disagreed with this officer regarding his belief he would not get in trouble.

It was apparent to the moderators that officers did not have a clear understanding of the current policy pertaining to video cameras. Several times during the focus group sessions participants referred to the current policy as “filming everything.” It appears the current policy

had not been communicated to these officers and their understanding of the policy was not accurate. This finding is similar to what we found and reported in the FSB focus groups.

### **Potential Privacy Issues**

IB participants noted the importance of privacy issues regarding the use of camera systems. Similar to FSB officers they included in their concerns places where there may be a greater expectation of privacy such as a person's home, hospital rooms, and recording juveniles. They also raised a few unique issues. The nature of undercover work requires the anonymity of the undercover officer as well as the anonymous identity of informants. Any requirement to record these types of situations may jeopardize the safety of the undercover officer and the informant. A suggested solution was a formal method of redacting videos to erase the identities of individuals at risk. A second circumstance raised in several focus groups dealt with the revelation of pre-planning and tactics by officers during operations. One officer suggested the issue may be even bigger than allowing citizens to see and hear how officers approach situations.

*“What... it [releasing video] does is, it compromises officer safety. When I was in the task force, we had multiple documented situations where bad guys, these drug traffickers, would take your video, and they would go back to their training academies ... and teach the people that are trafficking drugs, this is what cops do. This is how they found the drugs; this is how they got them. This is what we're going to do to defeat them... release of the videos to the public is... jeopardizing sensitive techniques that we've been taught to try to defeat criminal activity, which now they're going to do, to defeat what we do.”*

### **Future Policy**

Responses regarding future OBCS policy prompted one distinctive idea. The suggestion was made in all four focus groups for a “split policy.” This term describes the suggestion that FSB officers would have an OBCS policy and IB officers would have an OBCS policy. The IB policy would allow those officers to not video every citizen contact or investigative situation. IB officers would however, be responsible for using the OBCS during arrests. This suggestion precipitated from the discussion about the difference in duties between the FSB and IB. Before a split policy was implemented the Department should study the idea. Some participants went further by suggesting that undercover operations should be exempt from video recording. These officers agreed that audio recording are less intrusive than video. Besides the difference in duties as a reason for a split policy, participants also explained that interviewing victims (e.g., in domestic violence cases) with a video camera running tended to cause the victims to hold back.

Participants suggested that the roles are different between FSB and IB detectives. Detectives come onto the scene, “when things are calmed down.” As one participant explained,

*“...we have a way different job than field officers do. We have time to do things, take our time, meet with people, set up things. Field officers, just they’re on the go right away immediately. They don’t know what they’re facing from call to call. So, I think we’re in a different bracket.”*

Another officer justified a split policy based on the precedence already established in the Department’s Standard Operating Procedures,

*“... I truly believe there is a difference between what field officers do and what we do. There’s a reason we have an SOP for investigations and an SOP for field. So a camera policy for field and a camera policy for investigations would be no different.”*

### **Monitoring a Policy**

As with the FSB officers, IB and Special Operations staff participants discussed the issues concerning policy monitoring. Possibly due to the low volume of video produced by IB and Special Operations Officers in comparison to FSB officers, IB and Special Operations did not seem as concerned as FSB about this issue. Opinion in the focus groups seemed to be to monitor video if an officer failed to video when required by policy. However, the need to video in the opinion of some participants was for the purpose of assisting in the performance of taking statements and as a tool during the case investigation process. Penalty for violating video policy was viewed as a minor incident. Participants did not assume the officer would be lying because for whatever reason the officer didn’t turn on the video camera. One officer stated,

*“So if there was a complaint or whatever, if you needed a video, you would see if there’s video and there is or there isn’t. And that would be it. If an officer was never recording anything, you would know and you would give them training on that and ...[if] you violated policy and that’s a sanction 5 or whatever, like anything, you don’t get done for not giving a written statement to someone. You’re not gonna get days off for that... It’s a tool. Like any of our other tools, you’ve got to be taught to use it and to have it.”*

### **Training**

The issue of training was discussed, both training to use video cameras and training to review video. During the discussion participants shared that they had not had much training in the use of the camera system they were assigned to use. This is somewhat the same situation as FSB officers. The statement was made during the discussion of the policy in which the officer contended that there should be one discretionary policy. The policy should treat video as a tool. Every officer should be coached to use the tool as much as possible and taught that if the tool is

used it is much easier to prove the officers' innocents, if necessary. Cameras need to be a tool to help the officer with an investigation regardless of where the officer works and officers should be trained to use the camera as much as any other tool at their disposal.

During the discussions, participants suggested using video as a training medium in the academy and during briefings to critique a situation. The idea of using actual APD officer video for training was unique and would be beneficial in the eyes of the officer making the suggestion.

One sergeant reported having gone the extra mile regarding the issue of training. This person had sought out training to learn more effective techniques for reviewing video. The sergeant had also trained staff in the unit how to use video as a tool for investigative purposes. It seems the training this sergeant had acquired would be invaluable to other IB and FSB officers.

### **Release of Video**

The release of video to the media was also discussed by IB and Special Operations participants. Just as FSB officers stated, video is released too quickly and readily to the media and there should be limitations imposed on the release of video by the Department. Additionally, communication was an issue that surfaced again during discussions about the release of video. One officer shared an example of a business rule governing the release of video.

*“So, it [the case] goes to a preliminary hearing, and the judge says all right, there’s no probable cause to move forward with this. Then you release the video. Or it goes to trial. The jury is the first one to see it. They make their determination. They have their day in court. And once that has been ruled that the officer acted appropriately or didn’t, then you can release it.”*

One of the most important aspects of releasing video hinged on the fact that participants wanted to know when video is being requested or ‘IPRAed.’ Officers suggested, that if the Department communicated when a video was requested the officer could agree or halt the release depending on if the video showed the undercover person or an informant. The case agent should have a chance to signoff on the release of the video. An added suggestion was made that identities could be redacted or blurred from the video if it was important. Giving officers final signoff authority would perhaps work in the IB and Special Operations units because they record a relatively small amount of video. Similar authority for FSB officers would most likely be very hard to implement due to the volume of video produced by FSB. In addition to the amount of video filmed by FSB, the reason for IB to sequester video is not appropriate for FSB officers.

### **Impact on the Court System**

IB and Special Ops participants were in agreement with the FSB participants regarding the impact of OBCS on the court system. IB officers added this specific circumstance of how the

lack of video can lead to dismissal of cases. This example is similar to those described by FSB officers during the first round of focus groups. The officer explained:

*“... a sheriff goes up and testifies to what he did and witness as a law enforcement officer, and it’s completely good and kosher, and that guy is guilty. And APD walks up and you don’t have video? Dismissed.”*

### **Summary of Investigative Bureau and Special Operations Division Focus Group**

In review of the focus groups with IB officers and the small number of Special Operations Division officers, the difference in these officers view point from their colleagues in the FSB was striking. Perhaps due to the lesser use and limited opportunities to use the on-body cameras, officers in IB did not have the same level of feelings about the use of the cameras. Again, only four participants from the Special Operations Division participated in the focus groups limiting the input from Special Operations.

Participants realized the camera systems are going to continue to be used by APD. However, participants felt strongly the on body cameras have limited use in their units, especially the undercover units. Because of the nature of their work these units use cameras in more limited situations. Unlike the FSB, the IB is using an assortment of camera brands.

Two areas that showed the greatest difference between FSB and IB officers were discretionary use of cameras and suggested future policy. IB officers felt they should have more discretion than FSB officers in the use of cameras due to their unique undercover and surveillance roles. Participants suggested that video cameras are a good tool when utilized at the discretion of the officer and not mandated by policy. Out of the discussion of the unique role of the IB detectives came the participant’s views on a future policy. The idea of a “split policy” was put forth, FSB officers would have an OBCS policy and IB officers would have an OBCS policy. The split policy idea was unique to this round of focus group sessions. Focus groups with the FSB participants didn’t elicit quite the same level of out of the box suggestions as came out of the IB sessions.

FSB and IB focus group participants viewed the aspect of privacy in the same ways. IB detectives saw privacy problems with filming in homes, and hospitals. They urged the use of redacting the identity of undercover officers and informants. They also suggested that video showing their tactics and plans should not be released to the public. Similar to the FSB focus group participants the current policy was not well understood.

IB participants were less concerned with the monitoring of a policy. The volume of video produced by IB detectives is much less than FSB officers and perhaps this is a factor in their attitude.

During the discussion of training, suggestions were made to coach officers to use and think of the video camera as a tool and to also train officers and supervisors on the proper way of reviewing video. Training like this would entail specific training workshops.

The impact of video evidence on the court was very similar to the discussion that came out of the FSB focus groups. Obviously, police officers are frustrated with the changes in the court, in which, judges demand video if the case involves an APD officer. The frustration occurs when the court does not hold other law enforcement agencies to the same standard.

Finally, an officer stated what seemed to be the feelings of several officers in the focus group sessions. This officer's solution to the question of discretion was to film everything, but his concluding comment was noteworthy.

*"I thank God I'm not in the field. Because I would be one of those ones, constantly forgetting to turn on my camera, and I would get dinged for it, sooner or later... I feel sorry for the field guys, having to deal with this camera policy."*



## CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATIONS

This section discusses the findings from the review of official data and focus groups. The discussion focuses on the research goals discussed elsewhere and listed here again.

- To document the use of the OBCS by patrol officers, detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants in the Field Services Bureau (FSB), the Investigative Bureau (IB), and Special Services Bureau (SSB).
- To provide information useful for informing the development of a policy regarding the use of the OBCS and
- To provide information that will inform a method to audit the developed policy and the use of the system by APD personnel.

Together these two sources of data tell more about the use of the camera system, provide information useful to informing the development of a policy, and provide information useful for developing a method to audit a policy than either source of information by itself. The focus groups provided us a unique view from the user's perspective and combined with the official data provide a more complete look into the research goals. As noted elsewhere the focus groups were designed to complement the official data.

The official data documents the use of the Taser camera system by patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants in the FSB and the focus groups findings allow us to place camera use into context with how officers say they use the cameras. We were not able to report the use of any other camera system.

Because APD does not currently have technology in place to match video data to calls for service data we developed the method described earlier to match video data to calls for service data. This method is imprecise and we are not able to provide an error rate. In time for this report we were not able to devise any other method to match the data sources more completely. Because we could not precisely match video to calls for service our analysis is exploratory. There are a variety of issues.

First, we were not able to match calls to video when multiple calls might have occurred within the span of one video. Focus group participants reported they sometimes do not stop their camera systems between calls and there are times when they are interrupted on a lower priority call by a higher priority call. We currently do not know how often this happens. Additional analyses may be able to further report this issue. Second, any errors in the data either with the video data or calls for service data may not allow matching. Third, because our method relies on matching video to calls for service based on a +/- five minute time frame we lose any matches

where this time frame does not match. Based on a preliminary analysis it does not appear this occurs frequently. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we cannot differentiate which calls have a citizen contact and so it is not possible with certainty to know all the calls which have a citizen contact and should have video, based on the current policy. Fifth, we believe the policy is unclear making it impossible to accurately determine if officers are following the current policy.

While imprecise we believe this method provides us insight into how officers use their camera systems and is precise enough to provide us valuable knowledge and insight regarding the current use of the system (not matched to the current policy) and information to inform a new policy that can be monitored. Additional analyses of the official data could help us further understand the relationship between video and calls for services and provide us valuable knowledge and insight. Additional more detailed analyses of the focus group data could help us better understand how officers use their camera systems, how the cameras impact their jobs and relationships to citizens, and could further inform a new policy.

## Conclusions

First, **APD must develop a way to link the video data with the calls for service data.** Such a link will allow APD to track and monitor the use of their OBCS and monitor a policy. At this point in time we cannot completely match camera system data to calls for service data.

Second, and related to the first, **APD calls for service data must clearly note if a call contains contact with a citizen.** It would also be useful for **APD to be able to more clearly differentiate between call types and calls which are dispatched and non-dispatched.** Currently we are unable to know which calls have citizen contacts. For this reason we cannot know exactly if a given call for service should have video. For example, public order calls comprise 46.2% of all calls for service and contain a large variety of call types. Many of these calls may not contain any contact with a citizen meaning there should be no video. We would need to develop a method to estimate this by call type. Although we know this happens we also know some calls almost always contain a citizen contact. This includes violent calls (includes domestic violence call), and traffic calls which together comprise 27.2% of all calls. Our review found that some portion of these calls do not have matching video – 17.9% of violent calls and 40.2% of traffic calls. This can occur for a variety of reasons, some of which have been mentioned elsewhere. This includes malfunctioning camera systems and a lack of a citizen. This should be a relatively rare event in the examples noted above. Based on the focus groups, we believe other reasons include, there may not be a suspect on scene and only a victim (i.e.

domestic violence calls), some calls may be incorrectly categorized, and officers may be using their discretion.

Taking into account the two points above, **we cannot explain why more calls currently do not have a matching video.** This finding deserves further study and could be the result of numerous factors. This may include officers not understanding the policy, officers not following the policy, the policy being unclear, malfunctioning equipment, matching errors between the camera system video and the calls for service, and the portion of calls that do not have a citizen contact.

Third, **we believe the current policy is confusing and officers do not completely understand the policy.** We believe this confusion accounts for some of the calls not matching to videos. This finding is supported by our review of the official data and our review of the focus group data. In the focus groups there was some confusion about the current policy and some participants suggested their understanding of the policy allowed them room to interpret when and what to video. The current policy cannot be monitored in its current form or with the currently available data.

Fourth, **the official data point out there was few differences among officers in terms of demographics and how they use their video cameras. This is supported by the focus group data.** There were differences by years of service with officers with fewer years of service being more likely to have videos connected to their calls. We also found patrol officers were more likely to have video compared to sergeants and lieutenants. This was not surprising given that in the focus groups we found sergeants and lieutenants were typically supervisors on many calls and were not as routinely taking calls for service.

Fifth, **very importantly focus group participants in the Investigative Bureau clearly reported using their camera systems differently than FSB focus group participants.** We did not have enough SSB staff attend focus groups to address this issue. This is an important finding and deserves careful consideration when considering a policy. We believe this suggests specific pieces of the policy need to address camera use by different units. This needs to also be considered regarding the type of cameras to be used by different units.

Sixth, **based on official data and focus group data officers are currently using their discretion in terms of which calls to use their camera systems and during calls what to video tape.** We found more video with higher priority calls and more serious call types. We did not attempt to measure what proportion of the total call time was videoed and this was not possible for this study. Focus group participants were clear in their belief some calls should be mandatory

and some calls should be discretionary and some parts of some calls should be discretionary as well (i.e. talking to victims and discussing tactics with fellow officers).

Seventh, and importantly, **it was very clear in the focus groups that in general officers understand the OBCS has become a normal piece of their equipment and officers are not opposed to the use of the camera systems.**

Eighth, officers understand a policy must be monitored and would prefer the focus of the monitoring be on the policy and not minor acts of misconduct, such as vulgar or derogatory language. The review of the data also supports the idea that **the policy must be monitored in a consistent manner with clear but flexible guidelines focused on improving adherence to the policy.**

Ninth, **the use of the OBCS has impacts on the larger criminal justice system and community that are not well understood.** A review of these impacts is beyond the extent of this study but need to be understood and deserve further study. These impacts include time to process court cases, court case dispositions, and the release and use of camera system video by the news media. Based on the focus group data these factors impact how officers use their camera systems and how they relate with members of the public.

We believe a future policy should take into account the listed conclusions. Both the official data and focus group data provide support for the conclusions. It would be a mistake, based on this study and the findings, to suggest officers are not routinely using their OBCS to record contacts with citizens. The use of OBCS is complex and multi-faceted and a simplistic view of the use of OBCS is a mistake.

## Recommendations

Recommendations take two forms. First, we provide general recommendations. This includes recommendations that are not specific to the design, content or monitoring of a policy. Because these recommendations are beyond the scope of this study these recommendations are broader and less detailed. Second, we provide recommendations specific to the design, content, and monitoring of an OBCS policy. These recommendations are based on our review of the official data and focus group data. The findings are tempered by our inability to precisely match the video data to the calls for service data.

### General Recommendations Beyond the Scope of the Study

These recommendations are derived from the focus group findings and are focused on findings not directly connected to our contracted scope of work of providing recommendations

for the design, content and monitoring of an OBCS policy. We include these recommendations because they were important themes from the focus groups and they have some impact on how officers use their camera systems. We believe they should be considered in a policy and they need to be better understood. They appear to impact the larger criminal justice system. Some of these issues are outside the direct control of the City of Albuquerque and the Albuquerque Police Department, and they deserve further study.

### *Current Use and Release of Video*

#### **Release of Video to the News Media and Public**

**Recommendation:** The release of camera system video to the news media should be in policy. APD should explore how other law enforcement agencies in the U.S., including local, state and federal, have dealt with this issue as well as subject matter experts and develop a policy that includes the appropriate release in terms of what is released and the timing of released video. How local and state law provide for the release and decline of public records request needs to be fully explored and considered in the policy. Video that is part of an on-going investigation and/ or a court case were of particular concern to focus group participants. Privacy concerns related to video showing the inside of someone's home, juveniles, the mentally ill, situations not related to a crime (i.e. medical emergencies), the deceased, etc. were also expressed as concerns.

#### **Provision of Video to the Court System**

The release of camera system video to the court system was an area of concern for focus group participants. This concern is directly related to the next recommendation dealing with the impact of video on the local court system.

**Recommendation:** APD should have a policy that deals with the provision of camera system video to the local court system. How and when camera system video is provided to the various actors within the court system was beyond the direct knowledge of the majority of the focus group participants. Focus group participants were able to articulate concerns more directly about their perceptions of how the lack of camera system video impacted court case dispositions and has led to the dismissal of primarily but not solely misdemeanor cases.

## Impact on the Court System

Focus group participants expressed a lot of concern with how they view camera system video impacts their court cases in both misdemeanor and felony cases. For this study we were not able to agree on the time and structure of focus groups with line attorneys of the Second Judicial District Attorney (DA) to gather additional information on this issue.

**Recommendation:** The City of Albuquerque and the Albuquerque Police Department should work with the DA and the Second Judicial District Court and Public Defender to more completely study the impact of camera system video on court cases in the court system.

**Recommendation:** The City of Albuquerque, the Albuquerque Police Department and stakeholders in the local criminal justice system should develop a policy regarding how video is shared, when video is needed in court cases, how video is used in court cases, and how to deal with missing video.

## Specific Recommendations

This section provides recommendations specific to the design, content, and monitoring of an OBCS policy. These recommendations are based on our review of the official data and focus group data. The findings are tempered by our inability to precisely match the video data to the calls for service data.

### Technology and Training

Several recommendations are associated with technology and training.

**Recommendation:** To reduce the number of occasions and amount of time OBCS users are not able to use their camera system because of broken or missing equipment or some type of malfunction we believe it would be useful to consider providing officers two complete systems. This may also help with the issue of uploading data to the website.

**Recommendation:** OBCS users should receive regular and routine training on the use of their camera systems. This training should include new and refresher training on the technology and a component on the benefits of the camera systems for law enforcement and the public. The training should also include any pertinent legal issues, new research, and policy changes.

**Recommendation:** APD should consider incorporating camera system videos into training that emphasizes the proper use of the camera systems in specific situations that are aligned with the policy. This will assist in monitoring the policy.

### Camera System Use

**Recommendation:** We recommend the policy not mandate the camera system be used for every citizen contact. A policy mandating the videoing of all citizen contacts is not practical or reasonable. The policy should also note when officers are prohibited from using their camera systems.

**Recommendation:** APD should consider an OBCS policy that is comprehensive and allows for flexibility as the use of OBCS and technology changes over time. OBCS users as well as police administrators, other criminal justice system stakeholders, and the community need to have clear and consistent guidelines. More complete guidelines should cover when and how camera systems are used, when and how the video is used and with whom, and how the video is shared.

**Recommendation:** We discovered in the focus groups participants in FSB and IB, because of the differences in their jobs, use their camera systems differently and have somewhat varied needs. These differences need to be better understood and accounted for in policy.

**Recommendation:** The policy should include consistent and clear guidelines and language regarding missing video when video is mandated.

**Recommendation:** The policy should take into account privacy issues regarding the videoing of citizens in situations, places, etc. where there is a consideration of privacy (i.e. private residences when the call is not crime related or a public safety issue, community event, public meetings, etc.), juveniles, the mentally ill, deceased, etc.

**Recommendation:** The policy should account for casual encounters with members of the public. Via the focus groups we believe officers have changed how they interact with the public.

### Monitoring a Policy

**Recommendation:** The policy should include clear guidelines on how the policy will be monitored. Focus group participants were not clear on how the video is used and reviewed by

APD beyond how it is reviewed by their immediate supervisors. The policy must be flexible and include a system designed to improve compliance without solely relying on progressive discipline to enforce compliance. Focus group participants noted the policy could include educational aspects that would allow supervisors to instruct officers on the importance and proper use of the camera systems.

**Recommendation:** Minor acts of misconduct that are not part of the purpose of reviewing the policy should not be disciplined. Minor acts may include instances of profane and derogatory language and or violations of policy involving equipment, etc. Rather, these videos could be used as an opportunity of improving officer performance. We believe a clearer, consistent, flexible policy that is viewed by officers as being “fair” will improve camera use compliance by officers.

**Recommendation:** APD should construct a method to document the video reviewed, the purpose of the review, and the result of the review. This method should be clear, consistent, and flexible.

**Recommendation:** APD should consider using camera system data as part of an early warning system. Focus group participants noted that all officers will occasionally have equipment malfunctions and/or forget to turn on their cameras. Some participants also suggested a few officers will not follow the policy for various reasons and often this is a symptom of a larger problem.

**Recommendation:** APD should consider engaging an outside group to monitor the policy. The monitoring of the policy should be on-going, routine, and systematic. It is clear from the review of official data that generally officers are using their camera systems and that not all calls for service we expect to be recorded are being recorded.

A future policy should consider these recommendations and the associated conclusions to this study. The study time frame and budget did not allow for more detailed analyses of the official data or the focus group data. We believe further analyses may provide additional useful information and detail to the conclusions and recommendations. While there are few known best practices and few model policies (there are lots of sample policies) many of our findings and recommendations are supported by the existing and emerging research. Because this is a new area of study and research APD should continue to study and monitor the use of OBCS. Our study lends to the national discussion and appears to be one of the first that uses both official sources of



data and information gathered from camera system users. While lending to the national discussion this study provides information that is more specific to Albuquerque and our situation and is useful for informing a new policy and monitoring a policy.

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
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
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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A. Map of APD Area Commands



Appendix B. APD Organization Chart



APD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

## Appendix C. APD Focus Group Guide

### On Body Camera Systems APD Focus Group Guide

#### **Welcome and Overview of Topic**

Thank you for participating in this focus group. The City of Albuquerque has contracted the UNM-Institute for Social Research (ISR) to conduct a study of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) On-Body Camera System (OBCS) used by Field Service Bureau patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. As part of the study, ISR will conduct focus groups with APD officers to discuss the state of OBCS. The primary purpose of the focus groups is to understand your thoughts and ideas regarding the OBCS and your recommendations for improving the APD OBCS policy. We will be talking with you for the next 90 minutes. Please speak from your own experience and knowledge. We are interested in hearing your honest feedback and opinions, there are no right or wrong answers.

#### **Assurance of Confidentiality/Anonymity**

No names will be associated with the transcript of the audio recording of this session, notes summaries, or reports. The information you share with us is anonymous and confidential. We hope you hear from all of you at some point during the discussion, you are not required to answer any question you don't feel comfortable answering.

#### **Statement of Ground Rules**

What we would like from you as participants:

- ❖ About 90 minutes of your time in this group
- ❖ Hear from each of you
- ❖ Hear from you one at a time
- ❖ Allow everyone in the group a chance to speak
- ❖ Your understanding and patience: spend about 7 minutes each question
- ❖ Your respectful treatment of each other
  - Please keep each other's words private. You are free to talk about the ideas you hear and talk about but do not say who was here or what they said.
  - Agree to disagree with each other; please do not attack others verbally or physically

What you can expect of the staff running this group:

- ❖ OK to get up to get food, answer a call or use the facilities
- ❖ Note taking by research staff.
- ❖ This discussion will be audio recorded to insure the accuracy of your responses. We don't want to interpret or paraphrase your responses.



- ❖ No use of your name with anything we write down – it will be erased from the tape recordings and notes will refer to each person as a number.
- ❖ We will respect your discomfort if you wish to be excused from the discussion. Please let us know if you are uncomfortable with the tape recorder being used.

### **Focus Group Questions**

General topic questions will be asked to facilitate a conversation. Probing questions will be asked to reveal greater detail by clarifying or expanding upon earlier responses.

### **Policies**

1. When should officers be required to have cameras turned on?
  - a. Provide a specific situation when cameras should be turned on.
  - b. Provide a specific situation when cameras shouldn't be on.
2. When do you think OBCS footage should be reviewed?
3. How is the OBCS equipment currently being used by APD officers?
4. What are some realistic policies and procedures for OBCS use?
5. If you could write the policies for the OBCS, what would you put in to make it better?

### **Outcomes**

6. What benefit does OBCS have for the community?
7. What benefit does OBCS have for police officers and APD?
8. What are the pros and cons of using the OBCS?
9. What would make the OBCS more appealing to your fellow officers?
10. Do you think using the OBCS hinders your ability to effectively do your job?
11. What impact does the OBCS have on your performance as a police officer?
12. How does the OBCS impact accountability?
  - a. Police and community accountability
13. Do you think the OBCS improves police transparency?
14. Is there anything else you would like to say about APD's OBCS?

## Appendix D: APD Field Officer Demographic Survey

On Body Camera Systems  
APD Focus Group Guide Survey

Please complete the following questions about your job or affiliation with Albuquerque Police Department (APD).

1. **Sex/gender:** *(Please indicate with an 'X')*  
 Male  
 Female
  
2. **How old are you?** *(Please indicate your age):* \_\_\_\_\_
  
3. **Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity?** *Please indicate by placing an 'X' next to category or categories (you may choose more than one) that best describes you.*  
 African American (Black)  
 Asian American, Pacific Islander  
 Latino/a (Latin American) or Hispanic  
 Native American or American Indian  
 Caucasian (White)  
 Other (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
  
4. **Indicate your highest level of education you have completed, or the highest degree received.** *(Please indicate with an 'X')*  
 Less than high school  
 Some high school  
 High school diploma or equivalent (GED)  
 Some college  
 Completed college, (i.e. B.A. /B.S. degree)  
 Master's degree (i.e. M.A./M.S./M.S.W degree)  
 Professional degree/doctorate (i.e., M.D., J.D., Ph.D., Ed.D.)
  
5. **How many total years have you worked in the field of law enforcement?**  
\_\_\_\_\_ years  
*(Please round up or down partial years – 6 months or more equals 1 year)*
  
6. **How many total years have you worked for the APD?**  
\_\_\_\_\_ years  
*(Please round up or down partial years – 6 months or more equals 1 year)*

**7. What area command are you assigned?**

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**8. What shift do you typically work?**

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Appendix E: APD Policies

# CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE

Albuquerque Police Department



Raymond D. Schultz, Chief of Police



May 4, 2012

**DEPARTMENT SPECIAL ORDER 12-26**

**TO: ALL PERSONNEL**

**SUBJECT: USE OF LAPEL CAMERAS**

Effective immediately, all sworn department personnel will record each and every contact with a citizen during their shift that is the result of a dispatched call for service, arrest warrant, search warrant or traffic stop. The recordings will be saved for no less than 120 days. Personnel will refer to the instructional video on PowerDMS for storing instructions. Failure to record a contact under the listed specifications may result in discipline.

Only incidents which fall under guidelines specified in General Orders SOP section 1-39 will be tagged into evidence.

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It is the responsibility of the officer to ensure their personal video recorder is in working condition and properly charged at the beginning of shift. Charging the camera throughout the shift via the MDT is recommended. If the camera needs to be replaced, the Watch Lieutenant will be responsible for issuing the officer another camera. If another camera is not available, a tape or digital recorder may be used. Officers will not utilize an audio recorder if a personal video camera is available.

BY ORDER OF:

RAYMOND D. SCHULTZ  
Chief of Police

RDS:ejp

ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
\* GENERAL ORDERS\*

Effective:05/06/2012; Replaces: 03/13/2012

**1-39            USE OF TAPE/DIGITAL RECORDERS**

POLICY:

It is the policy of the Albuquerque Police Department to record contacts in which certain arrests have been made, portions of search warrants, or those contacts with the public that could result in complaints against department personnel. Officers are directed to use tape **or digital** recorders for their protection to guard against claims of improper conduct. They are an effective tool that will be used in all the instances listed below, and other instances at the officers' discretion.

RULES:

1-39-1            USE OF TAPE/DIGITAL RECORDERS

[6]

- A.     Personnel will use issued tape/digital recorders to document the **incidents listed below.**

**It will be the responsibility of the primary officer to ensure that the incident will be recorded in its entirety. If at any time the primary and secondary officer(s) should become separated, it will be the responsibility of the secondary officer(s) to record all their contact and/or actions during that incident.**

1.     Resisting Arrest
2.     Disorderly Conduct Arrests
3.     Refusing to Obey an Officer Arrests
4.     From the start of a search warrant until the area is secured (**as outlined in subsection 2-16-2 B).**
5.     Those contacts where there is reason to believe a complaint could result.
6.     Domestic violence calls for court purposes.
7.     All calls involving suspected suicidal and/or suicidal individuals.
8.     When a citizen refuses to sign a traffic citation.
9.     When officers seek verbal/written permission to search a residence, building, structure, or vehicles. Officers will **record** through the duration of the search.
10.    **Child custody disputes.**
11.    **All calls and disturbances in the Downtown Entertainment District.**

[4]

- B.     Under no circumstances except those instances involving criminal investigations of department personnel will a conversation between another member or employee be tape recorded without all parties to the conversation being aware of the fact that it will be recorded.

ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
\* GENERAL ORDERS\*

Effective:05/06/2012; Replaces: 03/13/2012

- 1-39-2 DISPOSITION OF **RECORDED** CONTACTS
- [6] A. All recordings listed above, and/or contacts where an arrest was made will be tagged into Evidence, and will be listed on the report as being tagged.
- B. **All sworn department personnel will record each and every contact with a citizen during their shift that is the result of a dispatched call for service, arrest warrant, search warrant service or traffic stop. Non-sworn uniformed personnel issued digital recorders will also comply with this section. The recordings will be saved for no less than 120 days.**
- C. Personnel utilizing a tape recorder will contact a supervisor to receive a replacement cassette tape, before recording other contacts. Other contacts may be recorded on the same tape, but care should be made not to record over other previously recorded contacts. **Personnel issued video recorders that malfunction will contact their supervisor immediately to arrange for a replacement to be issued.**
- D. Personnel utilizing a **video**/digital recorder will lock/preserve the recording as soon as practical after the contact is over.
- E. When tagging a digital recording into evidence, officers will ensure the recording is downloaded on to a CD-R (or other appropriate permanent media) in a WAV file format.
- 1-39-3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICER
- A. All uniformed officers will be required to carry the issued recorder while on duty.
- B. Personnel **utilizing a tape recorder** will ensure that the issued recorder is functioning properly, has adequate batteries for the entire shift, and is equipped with tape cassettes.
- C. Personnel will bring to the attention of their immediate supervisor any malfunction of the recorder, or the need for replacement batteries, or tapes at the beginning of each watch. Arrangements will be made to repair/replace the recorder.
- 1-39-4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPERVISOR
- A. Supervisors will ensure personnel inspect the issued tape/digital recorder daily to check proper function.
- B. Supervisors will ensure that a recording of arrest incidents, as described above, is indicated in the report. If there is no recording, the report will include a detailed explanation of the incident and actions taken by both officer(s) and offender(s).



ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
GENERAL ORDERS

Effective: 01/22/13

Replaces: 01/09/13

**1-39 USE OF TAPE/DIGITAL RECORDERS**

POLICY:

It is the policy of the Albuquerque Police Department to record contacts in which certain arrests have been made, portions of search warrants, or those contacts with the public that could result in complaints against department personnel. Officers are directed to use tape or digital recorders for their protection to guard against claims of improper conduct. They are an effective tool that will be used in all the instances listed below, and other instances at the officers' discretion.

RULES:

1-39-1 USE OF TAPE/DIGITAL RECORDERS

[6] A. Personnel will use issued tape/digital recorders to document the incidents listed below.

It will be the responsibility of the primary officer to ensure that the incident will be recorded in its entirety. If at any time the primary and secondary officer(s) should become separated, it will be the responsibility of the secondary officer(s) to record all their contact and/or actions during that incident. In such incidents where the primary officer tags a recording and secondary officer(s) also have a recording: all recordings will be tagged into evidence. If the primary officer tags a complete recording or there is an outside source recording tagged into evidence and no secondary recording exist; this shall serve as meeting the requirements for this section.

B. The Albuquerque Police Department recognizes there are certain circumstances where officers in a proactive (non-dispatched) capacity, may happen upon a situation requiring immediate action to prevent injury, destruction of evidence or escape. In these types of situations officers should activate the recorder if doing so does not place them or others in danger. If the immediate activation of the recorder is not feasible due to immediate risk to the safety of the officer or others, the officer will activate the camera at the first available opportunity when the immediate threat has been addressed. Supervisors will closely review documentation of such incidents to ensure exigent circumstances did in fact exist.

1. Resisting Arrest.
2. Disorderly Conduct Arrests.
3. Refusing to Obey an Officer Arrests.
4. From the start of a search warrant until the area is secured (as outlined in subsection 2-16-2 B).
5. Those contacts where there is reason to believe a complaint could result.
6. Domestic violence calls for court purposes.



ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
GENERAL ORDERS

Effective: 01/22/13

Replaces: 01/09/13

7. All calls involving suspected suicidal and/or suicidal individuals.
  8. When a citizen refuses to sign a traffic citation.
  9. When officers seek verbal/written permission to search a residence, building, structure, or vehicles. Officers will record through the duration of the search.
  10. Child custody disputes.
- [4] C. Under no circumstances except those instances involving criminal investigations of department personnel will a conversation between another member or employee be tape recorded without all parties to the conversation being aware of the fact that it will be recorded.

1-39-2 DISPOSITION OF RECORDED CONTACTS

- [6] A. All recordings listed above, and/or contacts where an arrest was made will be tagged into Evidence, and will be listed on the report as being tagged.
- B. All sworn department personnel will record each and every contact with a citizen during their shift that is the result of a dispatched call for service, arrest warrant, search warrant service or traffic stop. Personnel will activate the recorder prior to arriving at the call or prior to citizen contact on non-dispatched events (within the safety parameters of 1-39-1B) and will record the entirety of citizen contact. Uniformed civilian personnel issued digital recorders will also comply with this section. The recordings will be saved for no less than 120 days.
- C. Personnel utilizing a tape recorder will contact a supervisor to receive a replacement cassette tape, before recording other contacts. Other contacts may be recorded on the same tape, but care should be made not to record over other previously recorded contacts. Personnel issued video recorders that malfunction will contact their supervisor immediately to arrange for a replacement to be issued. The malfunction and the replacement of the recorder will be documented in the applicable report.
- D. Personnel utilizing a video/digital recorder will lock/preserve the recording as soon as practical after the contact is over. Personnel will routinely download recordings and store them on a hard drive throughout their shift to ensure adequate memory space on the recorder.
- E. When tagging a digital recording into evidence, officers will ensure the recording is downloaded on to a CD-R (or other appropriate permanent media) in a WAV file format.





ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
GENERAL ORDERS

Effective: 01/22/13

Replaces: 01/09/13

1-39-3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICER

- A. All uniformed officers will be required to carry the issued recorder while on duty.
- B. Personnel utilizing a tape recorder will ensure that the issued recorder is functioning properly, has adequate batteries for the entire shift, and is equipped with tape cassettes. Personnel with rechargeable devices such as a personal video recorder will routinely recharge the device during their shift in order to maximize the battery life. Personnel who adhere to this have met the requirements of this section.
- C. Personnel will bring to the attention of their immediate supervisor any malfunction of the recorder, or the need for replacement batteries, or tapes at the beginning of each watch. Arrangements will be made to repair/replace the recorder.

1-39-4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPERVISOR

- A. Supervisors will ensure personnel inspect the issued tape/digital recorder daily to check proper function.
- B. Supervisors will ensure that a recording of arrest incidents, as described above, is indicated in the report. If there is no recording, the report will include a detailed explanation of the incident and actions taken by both officer(s) and offender(s).

# CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE

Albuquerque Police Department



Gorden E. Eden, Jr., Chief of Police  
October 7, 2014

**DEPARTMENT SPECIAL ORDER 14-84**

**TO: ALL CONCERNED PERSONNEL**

**SUBJECT: VIDEO EVIDENCE TAGGING PROCEDURES UPDATE**

The following change is an effort to reduce the number of dismissals in court and backlog of video requests. Cases are being dismissed because of the lack of information that is tied to videos. This problem is hindering the Evidence unit from being able to find the videos to provide to the appropriate people in a timely manner. This has caused a 90 day backlog for video requests.

Effective immediately, all TASER camera users will add a case number and category to their video in Evidence.com and make an electronic OIM entry in QueTel (one OIM entry for each segment of video which must be tagged separately--refer to the guidance below on how to do this) if they are logged on a call where an arrest, criminal summons, or non-traffic citation is issued.

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Also, please do not use the "Cases" tab in Evidence.com. That area is not for normal field officer use and is causing more of a delay when the Evidence unit is looking for videos.

Albuquerque

All officers that still use other camera systems (i.e., Scorpion, Contour, etc.) will make OIM entries in Quetel if they are logged on a call where an arrest, criminal summons, or non-traffic citation is issued. The list of items to be tagged in Sec. 1-39-1B and 1-39-2A of General Order 1-39 Use of Tape/Digital Recorders still applies also.

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Failure to follow the steps above could result in the deletion of your video. This could in turn cause a dismissal of your court case or possible disciplinary action.

For guidance on how to add a case and category and also make an electronic OIM entry please go to the how-to section of APDWeb ([apdweb.cabq.gov](http://apdweb.cabq.gov)) under the Tech Services tab.

BY ORDER OF:

GORDEN E. EDEN, JR.  
Chief of Police

GEE: cbw

## Appendix F: Call Types

Categorized	Call Type	CAD Label	CAD Categories
Other	27-0 Offn BOLO	Be on the Look out For Fraud/Forgery Offender	3
Other	Acc wo/inj BOLO	accident without injuries	3
Violent	Aggr assault/bat		1
Traffic	Aggr driver		2
Traffic	Aggr driver BOLO		3
Violent	Agr Assault BOLO		3
Public Order	Animal call		2
Violent	Armed Rob Comm	Armed Robbery Commercial	1
Violent	Armed Rob Indiv	Armed Robbery Individual	1
Violent	Armed Rob Res	Armed Robbery Residential	1
Public Order	Audible alarm		3
Auto Theft	Auto Theft		1
Auto Theft	Auto Theft BOLO		3
Auto Theft	Auto/Car Jacking		1
Auto Theft	BAIT Veh Theft		3
Other	Bomb threat		1
Property	Burglary		1
Property	Burglary Auto		1
Property	Burglary Comm		1
Property	Burglary ETS Act	Burglary Electronic Tracking System Activation	1
Property	Burglary Res	Burglary Residence	1
Sex	CSP	Criminal Sexual Penetration	1
Other	Chemical spill		3
Other	Chief's Overtime		3
Other	Contact		2
Other	Cover assistance	10-82 Back Up Cover	1
Other	DOA		1
Public Order	DV escort		1
Public Order	Demonstration		1
Traffic	Direct Traffic		3
Public Order	Disturbance		1
Public Order	Disturbance BOLO		3
Public Order	Drunk		1
DWI	Drunk driver		1
Public Order	E911 hang up		1
Other	Emer Alarm-ETS	Emergency Alarm Electronic Tracking System	1
Other	Escort	10-14 Escort	3
Violent	Family dispute		1
Other	Field Investigat	Field Investigator	3
Violent	Fight inprogress		1
Other	Fire call		1
Property	Forgery/cc/check	Forgery/Credit Card/Check	1
Other	Investigation of		3
Other	Juvenile call		1
Violent	Kid/abduct/hosta		1
Public Order	Loud music		2
Public Order	Loud party		1
Other	Message for deli	10-51 Message for delivery	2
Other	Missing Per BOLO		3
Other	Missing person		1
Drugs	Narcotics		2
Public Order	Neighbor trouble		1
Auto Theft	Onsite Auto Thef	Officer created call for Auto Theft	1
Public Order	Onsite Disturban	Officer created call for Disturbance	1
Public Order	Onsite Suspiciou	Officer created call for Suspicious Person	1
Public Order	Onsite Traffic		1

Other	P-watch	Periodic watch	3
Other	PU/deliver item	Pickup/Deliver item	2
Public Order	Panhandlers		1
Other	Prisoner PU/Incu	Prisoner Pickup	1
Public Order	Prowler		3
Other	Repo/PP Tow		3
Other	Rescue call		1
Violent	Robbery		1
Other	SWAT		1
Sex	Sex offense		1
Weapons	Shooting		1
Property	Shoplifting		1
Weapons	Shots fired		1
Weapons	Shots fired BOLO		3
Public Order	Silent alarm		1
Violent	Stabbing		1
Auto Theft	Stolen Veh Found		1
Other	Subject Stop		1
Other	Suicide		1
Public Order	Sus Per/Veh BOLO		3
Public Order	Susp Pers/Vehs		1
Public Order	Susp/Intox pers		1
Other	Tac plan	10-74 Tactical Plan	2
Property	Theft/Embez BOLO		3
Property	Theft/Metal		1
Property	Theft/fraud/embe		1
Traffic	Traffic stop		1
Property	Vandalism		2
Property	Vandalism-Metal		2
Other	Wanted person		1
Auto Theft	WarmUp Veh Theft		1
Public Order	Welfare check		1
Other	`		3
Property	ery/cc/check	Forgery/Credit Card/Check	1
Public Order	mental patient		1
Traffic	traff acc injuri		1
Traffic	traff acc no inj		1